Opinion

Brown v. Victor

Court
District Court, W.D. New York
Filed
Feb 28, 2023
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 27.9%

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

W ESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

ANDRE BROWN,

Plaintiff, DECISION AND ORDER

11-CV-35S

v.

C.O. VICTOR,

CORRECTION OFFICER DAMSTETTER,

C.O. CONNOLLEY, and

CHRISTINA LoVERDE

Defendants.

In this action, Plaintiff Andre Brown alleges that Defendants assaulted him on

October 16, 2007, while he was an inmate at the Attica Correctional Facility. Having

recently (December 2022) been released from custody as a result of his successful

motion to vacate his state conviction, Brown now moves to reopen discovery to allow for

limited expert discovery (vocational and economic) relating to future lost-earnings

damages. Defendants oppose Brown’s request on the grounds that he failed to act

diligently in not pursuing the requested discovery during the discovery period. Further

familiarity with the parties’ arguments is presumed. Having fully considered the parties’

positions, this Court finds good cause to grant Brown’s motion.

District courts have wide discretion to determine the scope and process of

discovery. See EM Ltd. v. Republic of Arg., 695 F.3d 201, 2017 (2d Cir. 2012) (citation

omitted). A party seeking to reopen a closed discovery period must demonstrate “good

cause” for reopening. See Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 16 (b)(4) (providing that “[a] schedule may

be modified only for good cause and with the judge’s consent”); In Re Terrorist Attacks

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on Sept. 11, 2001, 03 MDL 1570 (GBD)(SN), 2023 WL 1797629, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7,

2023) (“The legal standard for allowing additional document discovery is ‘good cause’.”).

Six factors guide the good-cause inquiry: (1) whether trial is imminent; (2) whether the

request is opposed; (3) whether the non-moving party would be prejudiced; (4) whether

the moving party acted diligently; (5) whether the need for additional discovery was

foreseeable in light of the time originally permitted for discovery; and (6) whether the

discovery is likely to lead to relevant evidence. See Moore v. Peters, 341 F.R.D. 463,

472 (W.D.N.Y. 2022); Moroughan v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 320 F. Supp. 3d 511, 515 (E.D.N.Y.

2018) (citing cases).

In this Court’s view, four of the six factors weigh squarely in favor of reopening

discovery to allow for the limited discovery requested. First, trial is not scheduled to

begin until June 27, 2023, and no party has yet filed any pretrial submissions. Second,

while Defendants oppose the request, their primary basis for doing so—that Brown knew

during the discovery period that he was pursuing vacatur of his state conviction yet failed

to disclose vocational and economic expert witnesses—is not compelling, as further

discussed below. Third, other than likely necessitating a modest adjournment of the

present trial date, Defendants identify no specific prejudice. And fourth, it is undisputed

that the requested discovery is likely to lead to relevant evidence.

The fourth and fifth factors are not as clear-cut. While it was foreseeable that

Brown could be successful in his bid to vacate his state conviction, it is difficult to conclude

under the circumstances that he failed to act diligently in not pursuing expert discovery

related to that long-shot possibility. During the discovery period, Brown was serving two

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consecutive 20-year sentences, with little prospects for release. Pursuit of expert

discovery relating to future lost earnings would therefore have been entirely contingent

and speculative. It was not until December 2022 that the contingency was lifted.

Moreover, given Brown’s pro se status for much of the discovery period and his

subsequent representation by counsel acting in a pro bono capacity, pursuit of this expert

discovery in the face of such a remote contingency would likely not have been deemed

the most efficient, cost-effective, or reasonable course. Although Brown or counsel

could have explicitly reserved the right to pursue additional expert discovery in the event

Brown’s conviction was at any point vacated, this Court cannot conclude that their failure

to do so constitutes a lack of diligence, particularly given the unusual circumstances of

this case.

Accordingly, with the relevant factors weighing predominantly in Brown’s favor, this

Court finds good cause to reopen discovery for the limited purposes requested.

IT HEREBY IS ORDERED, that Plaintiff’s Motion to Reopen Discovery (Docket

No. 188) is GRANTED.

FURTHER, that within 14 days of the entry date of this decision, counsel for the

parties must meet and confer about a discovery schedule and the need, if any, for an

adjournment of the June 27, 2023 trial date.

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FURTHER, that within 21 days of the entry date of this decision, counsel for the

parties must file a joint written status report concerning a proposed discovery schedule

and, if necessary, a proposed amended pretrial schedule and adjourned trial date.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 28, 2023

Buffalo, New York

s/William M. Skretny

WILLIAM M. SKRETNY

United States District Judge

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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