denying permissive intervention because Rule 24(b) “is expressly predicated on an applicant being possessed of a claim,” and the union had no such claim in a Section 10() proceeding
How later courts described this case
- denying permissive intervention because Rule 24(b) “is expressly predicated on an applicant being possessed of a claim,” and the union had no such claim in a Section 10() proceeding
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
RATES DISTR]
EE SLED Le,
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT "7
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK OCT □□□□□
ty □□
Wes Bc 1orwengutsS> □□
STERN DISTRICT □□
LINDA M. LESLIE, Regional DISTR
Director of the Third Region of
the National Labor Relations
Board for and on behalf of the
National Labor Relations Board,
Petitioner,
Vv.
22-CV-478 (JLS)
STARBUCKS CORPORATION,
Respondent.
DECISION AND ORDER
Petitioner Linda M. Leslie, Regional Director of the Third Region of the
National Labor Relations Board, seeks on behalf of the National Labor Relations
Board (“NLRB”) an injunction against Respondent Starbucks Corporation under
Section 10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act. See Dkt. 1. The Court initially
stayed this matter pending the completion of the hearing in the underlying NLRB
proceeding, which was scheduled to begin just a few weeks after Petitioner filed the
petition in this Court. See Dkt. 29.
On September 7, 2022, after Petitioner finished presenting its case-in-chief
and Respondent began presenting its case-in-chief in the NLRB hearing, the Court
lifted the stay and set deadlines for limited document discovery. See Dkt. 39.
Respondent served document subpoenas on current and former Starbucks
employees and the custodian of records for Workers United, the union that
represents Starbucks employees. Workers United, which agreed to accept service of
the subpoenas on behalf of Starbucks employees, moved to quash the subpoenas
issued to those employees (Dkt. 42) and its custodian of records (Dkt. 43).
Petitioner also moved to quash the subpoenas. Dkt. 44. Respondent opposed all
motions to quash. Dkt. 45; Dkt. 46; Dkt. 47. The Court granted, in part, and
denied, in part, the motions to quash and set deadlines for document production,
briefing on the petition, and a hearing at which the Court may allow the parties to
present testimony from certain witnesses. Dkt. 49.
In the interim, Workers United, the charging party in the NLRB proceeding,
moved to intervene or, alternatively, to participate as amicus curiae. Dkt. 32.
Respondent opposes both intervention and amicus participation by Workers United.
See Dkt. 37. Petitioner opposes Workers United’s intervention but does not oppose
amicus participation. See Dkt. 41. Workers United filed a reply in response to both
oppositions and in further support of its motion. Dkt. 50.
For the reasons below, the Court denies Workers United’s motion to
intervene and grants, in part, its motion to participate as amicus curiae.
DISCUSSION
I. Motion to Intervene
Workers United seeks both of-right and permissive intervention. Petitioner
and Respondent oppose both requests. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 governs
both types of intervention.
A. Of-right Intervention
Rule 24(a) requires the Court to permit intervention, “[o]n timely motion,” by
anyone who:
(1) is given an unconditional right to intervene by a federal statute;
or (2) claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that
is the subject of the action, and is so situated that disposing of the
action may as a practical matter impair or impede the movant’s
ability to protect its interest, unless existing parties adequately
represent that interest.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a).
Courts in the Second Circuit interpret Rule 24(a)(2)! to require intervention
when a movant: (1) files a timely motion; (2) asserts an interest related to the
transaction underlying the action; (8) is situated so that, without intervention, the
disposition of the action may impair or impede its ability to protect its interest; and
(4) has an interest that the parties do not adequately represent. United States v.
Pitney Bowes, Inc., 25 F.3d 66, 70 (2d Cir. 1994).2 The movant “has the burden of
showing that representation may be inadequate,” and “must at least overcome the
presumption of adequate representation that arises when it has the same ultimate
objective as a party to the existing suit.” U.S. Postal Serv. v. Brennan, 79 F.2d 188,
191 (2d Cir. 1978).
1 Workers United does not claim to have “an unconditional right to intervene
[conferred] by federal statute” such that Rule 24(a)(1) would apply. See Dkt. 32-1.
2 Unless noted otherwise, the Court omits internal quotation marks and internal
citations from the citations in this decision and order.
Evidence or allegations “of collusion, adversity of interest, nonfeasance, or
incompetence may suffice to overcome the presumption of adequacy.” Butler,
Fitzgerald & Potter v. Sequa Corp., 250 F.3d 171, 180 (2d Cir. 2001); see also United
States v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 326 F.R.D. 411, 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (denying
intervention as of right where proposed intervenors did “not show[] that the
Government cannot adequately represent [their] interest,” and did “not suggest that
there [was] any evidence of collusion, incompetence, nonfeasance, or any other
badges of inadequacy on the part of the Government”). In a context similar to this
one—where the union and charging party in a parallel NLRB proceeding sought to
intervene in a Section 10G) proceeding—the court noted it was:
difficult . . . to find that the Board, possessed of expertise developed
over the years, and which independently determines that a petition
be filed with the court for a temporary injunction for the protection of
the applicant, will not adequately represent the interest involved.
Reynolds ex rel. N.L.R.B. v. Marlene Indus. Corp., 250 F. Supp. 722, 724 (S.D.N.Y.
1966); see also McKinney v. Starbucks Corp., No. 2:22-cv-02292-SHL-cge, Dkt. 45, at
6 (W.D. Tenn. May 19, 2022) (quoting Reynolds).
Workers United asserts that it satisfies all of the Rule 24(a)(2) criteria
because (1) its motion is timely, (2) it has a substantial interest in any relief
resulting from this action because it is the primary beneficiary of such relief and
because this proceeding arises from its charges, (3) it cannot protect its interests
because it has no right to commence its own Section 10(j) proceeding and, without
intervention, cannot fill any perceived gaps in Petitioner’s presentation, and (4) it
has a unique ability to present evidence and arguments about a nationwide chilling
effect and would seek broader remedies than Petitioner. See Dkt. 32-1, at 7-9.3
Petitioner and Respondent do not dispute that Workers United’s motion is timely,
but argue that Workers United cannot satisfy the other, interest-based factors for
of-right intervention under Rule 24(a)(2)—specifically, that Workers United has no
interest in this Section 10(j) proceeding that would be impaired absent intervention
or inadequately protected by Petitioner. See Dkt. 37, at 2-6; Dkt. 41, at 5-10.
Assuming that Workers United has an interest related to the events
underlying this action,‘ it has not demonstrated that the outcome of this proceeding
would impair such interest if it were not allowed to intervene. This involves
Petitioner’s request for a Section 10G) injunction, and any relief this Court is asked
to grant would be on an interim basis—until the NLRB decides the issues before it.
The Court cannot conclude that any temporary effect of any outcome of this
proceeding on Workers United impedes its ability to protect its interests.
Nor has Workers United shown that Petitioner does not adequately represent
its interest in this proceeding. Workers United essentially concedes that its
ultimate objective matches Petitioner’s. See Dkt. 32-1, at 8 (stating that “the
interests of Workers United and the Board are aligned in many respects”). It
therefore must overcome the presumption that Petitioner adequately represents its
3 Unless noted otherwise, page references to filings on this docket are to the
numbering that appears on the footer of each page—not the numbering
automatically generated by CM/ECF.
4 The Court is skeptical that Workers United has such an interest, for the reasons
argued by Petitioner and Respondent, but will assume such an interest exists for
purposes of this decision and order only.
interest. But Workers United does not offer evidence of—or even allege—collusion,
adverse interest, incompetence, or a similar infirmity that would hamper
Petitioner’s representation of its interests. Given the nationwide scope of the relief
Petitioner requests, the Court anticipates that Petitioner plans to address any
alleged nationwide chilling effect. See Dkt. 1, at 39-43. Any differences in the
scope of remedies Workers United might seek do not justify full participation equal
to a party. In sum, the Court agrees with the observation by other courts that it is
difficult to believe Petitioner will fail to represent adequately Workers United’s
interest here. See Reynolds, 250 F. Supp. at 724; McKinney, Dkt. 45, at 6.
For these reasons, the Court denies Workers United’s request to intervene
under Rule 24(a).
B. Permissive Intervention
Under Rule 24(b), the Court may permit anyone to intervene who timely
moves and “is given a conditional right to intervene by a federal statute” or “has a
claim or defense that shares with the main action a common question of law or
fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(1). The Court “must consider whether the intervention
will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the original parties’ rights.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 24(b)(8).
Whether to permit intervention under Rule 24(b) is “wholly discretionary
with the trial court,” and that discretion “is very broad.” Brennan, 579 F.2d at 191,
192. When deciding whether to exercise discretion, courts consider the same factors
relevant to the of-right intervention analysis. See Penn-Star Ins. Co. v. McElhatton,
818 F. App’x 67, 70 (2d Cir. 2020). In addition, courts may consider “the nature and
extent of the intervenor[’s] interests” and whether the intervenor “will significantly
contribute to full development of the underlying factual issues in the suit and to the
just and equitable adjudication of the legal questions presented.” Brennan, 579
F.2d at 191-92.
As to permissive intervention, Workers United relies on its arguments for of-
right intervention and adds that it “does not seek to add complex new issues that
would unduly complicate [or delay] the proceedings.” See Dkt. 32-1, at 9-10.
Neither Petitioner nor Respondent argue otherwise, but both point out that
Workers United does not share a “claim” at issue in this Section 10(j) proceeding.
See Dkt. 37, at 4; Dkt. 41, at 6-7 & n.1.
The Court agrees. See Reynolds, 250 F. Supp. at 724 (denying permissive
intervention because Rule 24(b) “is expressly predicated on an applicant being
possessed of a claim,” and the union had no such claim in a Section 10()
proceeding); see also McKinney, Dkt. 45, at 6-7. That reason, alone, is enough to
deny Workers United permission to intervene under Rule 24(b). But the factors
discussed above also counsel against permissive intervention. See supra Section
I.A. Moreover, the supplementary evidence and relief Workers United seeks may
delay the Court’s resolution of this matter, which already involves numerous issues
and requests for relief. Workers United can achieve any enhancement of “the just
and equitable adjudication of the legal questions presented” through amicus
participation, as discussed below. See Brennan, 579 F.2d at 191-92.
The Court therefore denies Workers United’s request to intervene under Rule
24(b).
II. Motion to Participate as Amicus Curiae
As an alternative to intervention, Workers United seeks permission to
participate in this proceeding as amicus curiae, by offering evidence at the hearing
and participating in discovery. See Dkt. 32-1, at 10-12. Petitioner does not object
to this request. See Dkt. 41, at 10. Respondent objects to Workers United’s amicus
participation, arguing that such participation is not necessary or appropriate here,
and that amicus participation by Workers United would give Petitioner an unfair
briefing advantage—effectively, a sur-reply. See Dkt. 37, at 7-8.
Courts have “broad discretion to permit or deny an appearance as amicus
curiae.” Dunbar v. Landis Plastics, Inc., 996 F. Supp. 174, 179 (N.D.N.Y. 1998).
When deciding whether to allow amicus participation, courts consider whether the
participation “will aid .. . in the determination of the issues” presented—for
example, by “add[ing] a legal and factual perspective that is helpful to the court.”
Id. at 179-80. An amicus brief may serve that purpose when: (1) “a party is not
represented competently or is not represented at all”; (2) “the amicus has an
interest in some other case that may be affected by the decision in the present case”;
or (3) “the amicus has unique information or perspective that can help the court
beyond the held that the lawyers for the parties are able to provide.” Citizens
Against Casino Gambling in Erie Cnty. v. Kempthorne, 471 F. Supp. 2d 295, 311
(W.D.N.Y. 2007) (quoting Ryan v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 125 F.3d
1062, 1063 (7th Cir. 1997)).
The Court exercises its discretion here to allow Workers United to participate
as amicus curiae to the extent of submitting one brief. The Court credits Workers
United’s claim that it can provide perspective on the legal issues that may assist the
Court in resolving the petition, different from what the parties are able to provide.
But as discussed above, the Court is confident that Petitioner adequately represents
Workers United’s interest in this matter.
Because it recognizes the constraints of amicus participation—and because
Petitioner is equipped to present sufficient evidence to represent Workers United’s
interest and provide a complete record for the Court—the Court limits Workers
United’s participation to filing a brief sharing its perspective. See Citizens Against
Casino Gambling, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 311 (stating that an amicus participant “goes
beyond its proper role if the submission is used to present wholly new issues not
raised by the parties,” and that an amicus participant “has no control over the
litigation,” has “no right to institute any proceedings” in the litigation, and cannot
“file any pleadings or motions in the case”). Workers United’s amicus brief is due by
October 26, 2022.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court grants, in part, and denies, in part, Workers
United’s motion to intervene or, in the alternative, participate as amicus curiae
(Dkt. 32), as follows. Workers United may not intervene in this proceeding—under
either Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) or 24(b). Workers United may
participate as amicus curiae by filing a brief by October 26, 2022, but may not
present evidence or participate in oral arguments or any hearing.
SO ORDERED.
JOHN LAL. SINATRA, JR.
D STATES DIST
Dated: October 7, 2022
Buffalo, New York
10