Opinion

Brown v. Commissioner of Social Security

Court
District Court, W.D. New York
Filed
Aug 30, 2021
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 27.9%

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

DONNA B.,1

Plaintiff, Case # 20-CV-1422-FPG

v. DECISION AND ORDER

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Donna B. protectively applied for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under

Title II of the Social Security Act (the “Act”) on or about June 21, 2017, alleging disability

beginning November 12, 2016. Tr.2 88, 145-51. After the Social Security Administration (“SSA”)

denied her claim, Tr. 89-93, Plaintiff appeared, with counsel, at a hearing on May 30, 2019, before

Administrative Law Judge Mary Mattimore (the “ALJ”). Tr. 35-75. Plaintiff and a vocational

expert testified, and Plaintiff requested a closed period of disability benefits from November 12,

2016 to November 30, 2018. Tr. 37-38. On June 20, 2019, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision.

Tr. 10-24. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review, making the ALJ’s decision

the final decision of the SSA. Tr. 1-6. Plaintiff then appealed to this Court.3 ECF No. 1.

The parties moved for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(c). ECF Nos. 12, 13. Plaintiff filed a reply. ECF No. 14. For the reasons that

follow, Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED, the Commissioner’s motion is DENIED, and this matter

is REMANDED for further proceedings.

1 In accordance with this Court’s November 18, 2020 Standing Order regarding the identification of non-government

parties in social security decisions, available at https://www.nywd.uscourts.gov/standing-orders-and-district-plans,

this Decision and Order will identify Plaintiff using only Plaintiff’s first name and last initial.

2 “Tr.” refers to the administrative record in this matter. ECF No. 10.

3 The Court has jurisdiction over this action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3).

LEGAL STANDARD

I. District Court Review

When it reviews a final decision of the SSA, it is not the Court’s function to “determine de

novo whether [the claimant] is disabled.” Schaal v. Apfel, 134 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1998).

Rather, the Court “is limited to determining whether the SSA’s conclusions were supported by

substantial evidence in the record and were based on a correct legal standard.” Talavera v. Astrue,

697 F.3d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3)) (other citation omitted).

The Commissioner’s decision is “conclusive” if it is supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C.

§§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). “Substantial evidence means more than a mere scintilla. It means such

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Moran

v. Astrue, 569 F.3d 108, 112 (2d Cir. 2009) (citations omitted).

II. Disability Determination

To determine whether a claimant is disabled within the meaning of the Act, an ALJ follows

a five-step sequential evaluation: the ALJ must determine (1) whether the claimant is engaged in

substantial gainful work activity; (2) whether the claimant has any “severe” impairments that

significantly restrict his or her ability to work; (3) whether the claimant’s impairments meet or

medically equal the criteria of any listed impairments in Appendix 1 of Subpart P of Regulation

No. 4 (the “Listings”), and if they do not, what the claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”)

is; (4) whether the claimant’s RFC permits him or her to perform the requirements of her past

relevant work; and (5) whether the claimant’s RFC permits him or her to perform alternative

substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy in light of his or her age, education,

and work experience. See Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 470-71 (1986); Rosa v.

Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 77 (2d Cir. 1999); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920.

DISCUSSION

I. The ALJ’s Decision

The ALJ analyzed Plaintiff’s claim for benefits using the process described above. At step

one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in gainful activity since November 12, 2016, the

alleged onset date. Tr. 12. At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe

impairments: cervicalgia, status-post motor vehicle accident; migraine headaches; partial

vertebrectomy and left-sided foraminotomies; cervical radiculopathy; other spondylosis with

radiculopathy, cervical region; bilateral carpal tunnel; right knee bursitis; persistent depressive

disorder with panic attacks; and rule out specific learning disorder. Tr. 12-13. The ALJ

determined that Plaintiff’s hypothyroidism, hyperlipidemia, hypertension, and opioid dependence

in remission were non-severe. Tr. 13.

At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s impairments did not meet or medically equal

any Listings impairment. Tr. 13-15. Next, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained the RFC to

perform sedentary work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a) except that she can frequently finger

and climb ramps and stairs but not ladders, ropes or scaffolds and can occasionally kneel, crouch,

crawl, reach overhead bilaterally, and push and pull bilaterally. Plaintiff can work in a moderate

noise environment but have no exposure to concentrated fumes, odors, dust, gases, or other

irritants, and no temperature extremes or vibrations. Further, Plaintiff can perform simple work

with one to two step tasks, make simple workplace decisions, and tolerate minimal changes in

workplace settings and processes, but she cannot work with strict production quotas. Tr. 15-22.

At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff would be unable to perform any past relevant

work. Tr. 22. At step five, the ALJ determined that there were jobs in the national economy that

Plaintiff could perform and, therefore, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled. Tr. 23-

24.

II. Analysis

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the impact of Plaintiff’s migraine

headaches on her ability to work. The Court agrees.

It is well-settled that

[t]he Social Security regulations require a two-step process for the ALJ to consider

the extent to which subjective evidence of symptoms can reasonably be accepted

as consistent with the medical and other objective evidence. Brownell v. Comm’r

of Soc. Sec., No. 1:05-CV-0588 (NPM/VEB), 2009 WL 5214948, at *3 (N.D.N.Y.

Dec. 28, 2009). First, the ALJ considers whether the medical evidence shows any

impairment “which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other

symptoms alleged. . . .” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a). Second, if an impairment is

shown, the ALJ must evaluate the “intensity, persistence, or functionally limiting

effects” of a claimant’s symptoms to determine the extent to which they limit the

claimant’s capacity to work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(b). When the objective medical

evidence alone does not substantiate the claimant’s alleged symptoms, the ALJ

must assess the credibility of the claimant’s statements considering the details of

the case record as a whole. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(i)-(vii).

Camille v. Colvin, 104 F. Supp. 3d 329, 344 (W.D.N.Y. 2015).

Here, although the ALJ acknowledged at step two that Plaintiff’s migraine headaches were

a severe impairment, Tr. 12, the ALJ did not evaluate—let alone properly evaluate—the effect of

those migraines on Plaintiff’s capacity to work. Indeed, aside from recognizing that Plaintiff “also

had migraines,” Tr. 16, the ALJ made no mention in the RFC analysis of Plaintiff’s migraines or

how they may limit her functioning.

Plaintiff’s own testimony suggests that her migraines would cause her to be off-task or

absent for a significant portion of the workweek. Plaintiff testified at the hearing that she had four

migraines per week. Tr. 51. Plaintiff indicated that the migraines were triggered by her

activities—lifting something or even “[s]leeping the wrong way” could bring about a migraine that

would, according to Plaintiff, “last all day.” Tr. 51, 63. Medication did not provide any relief

from her symptoms. Tr. 63. Despite Plaintiff’s testimony, the ALJ did not address the implications

of Plaintiff’s migraines on her ability to work, nor did she include any off-task time or absences in

the RFC. As a result, it is unclear whether the ALJ considered the limiting effects of Plaintiff’s

migraines on her capacity to work, as required under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529. 20 C.F.R. §

404.1529(a) (“In determining whether you are disabled, we consider all your symptoms, including

pain, and the extent to which your symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the

objective medical evidence and other evidence. We will consider all of your statements about your

symptoms, such as pain, and any description your medical sources or nonmedical sources may

provide about how the symptoms affect your activities of daily living and your ability to work.”).

The Commissioner argues, post hoc, that the ALJ appropriately considered Plaintiff’s

headaches when formulating the RFC by limiting Plaintiff to moderate noise and no exposure to

fumes, dust, odors, and gases. ECF No. 13-1 at 8; see Kevin B. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 19-

CV-844-FPG, 2021 WL 1102997, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2021) (“The Court declines to engage

with this argument in depth because it relies on the Commissioner’s post hoc rationalizations.”).

The Commissioner assumes that the ALJ intentionally credited and incorporated some of

Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the limitations caused by her migraines, but not others. There is

no support for that conclusion. Even assuming the ALJ intentionally adopted certain limitations

and not others to account for Plaintiff’s migraines—rather than to account for some other severe

impairment—the decision provides no analysis setting forth the ALJ’s rationale for doing so.

The Commissioner also argues that the record does not support Plaintiff’s testimony that

her migraines would cause her to be incapacitated four days a week. ECF No. 13-1 at 8. Again,

this is an improper post hoc rationalization that is absent from the ALJ’s decision. To be sure, the

medical opinions in the record do not address Plaintiffs inability to work uninterrupted. But, to

the extent the ALJ intentionally discredited Plaintiff's testimony regarding the effects of her

debilitating migraines, the ALJ never provided any reasons supporting that decision.

The ALJ’s error is not harmless. The vocational expert testified that Plaintiff could miss,

at most, two days per month. Tr. 72-73. Had the ALJ credited Plaintiff's testimony that she would

be absent four times per week, she would miss approximately 16 days of work per month,

rendering her disabled.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiffs motion for judgment on the pleadings, ECF No. 12, is GRANTED, the

Commissioner’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, ECF No. 13, is DENIED, and this matter

is REMANDED to the Commissioner for further administrative proceedings consistent with this

Decision and Order, pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and § 1383(c)(3). The Clerk

of Court shall enter judgment and close this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 30, 2021

Rochester, New York :

Ebel. P. = JR.

United States District Judge

Western District of New York

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.