state officers entitled to qualified immunity if their actions did not violate clearly established law
How later courts described this case
- state officers entitled to qualified immunity if their actions did not violate clearly established law
- “[W]hen a prison regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.”
- “[P]rison security is a compelling state interest, and ... deference is due to institutional officials’ expertise in this area.”
- requiring proper and timely exhaustion of prisoner claims
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION AUG 02 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JEFFREY FORTER, No. 12-35470
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:10-cv-06065-MO
v.
MEMORANDUM *
RANDY GEER; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Michael W. Mosman, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted July 24, 2013 **
Before: ALARCÓN, CLIFTON, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
Oregon state prisoner Jeffrey Forter appeals pro se from the district court’s
judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that defendants violated his
constitutional rights and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(“RLUIPA”) in connection with Christian Identity materials that defendants
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
deemed inflammatory. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review
de novo the district court’s summary judgment, Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 926
(9th Cir. 2004), and determination that a prisoner failed to exhaust administrative
remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d
1108, 1117 (9th Cir. 2003). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Forter’s
constitutional claims related to the prison’s refusal to provide Forter with Christian
Identity materials he had ordered because Forter failed to raise a genuine dispute of
material fact as to whether the regulation justifying withholding the materials is not
reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. See Turner v. Safley, 482
U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (“[W]hen a prison regulation impinges on inmates’
constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate
penological interests.”); see also Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 725 n.13
(2005) (“[P]rison security is a compelling state interest, and . . . deference is due to
institutional officials’ expertise in this area.”).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Forter’s RLUIPA
claim regarding the Christian Identity materials that were withheld, as well as the
materials that were later given to him, because Forter failed to raise a genuine
dispute as to material fact as to whether the challenged policy substantially
2 12-35470
burdened the exercise of his religious beliefs. See Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418
F.3d 989, 994 (9th Cir. 2005). Moreover, defendants were entitled to qualified
immunity and, as to the materials he eventually received, any injunctive relief
would be moot. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 243 (2009) (state officers
entitled to qualified immunity if their actions did not violate clearly established
law); Warsoldier, 418 at 997 n.7 (“There exists little Ninth Circuit authority
construing RLUIPA.”); cf. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(e) (“A government may avoid the
preemptive force of any provision of [RLUIPA] . . . by providing exemptions from
the policy or practice for applications that substantially burden religious exercise,
or by any other means that eliminates the substantial burden.”).
The district court properly dismissed Forter’s remaining claims without
prejudice because Forter failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. See
Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93-95 (2006) (requiring proper and timely
exhaustion of prisoner claims). The district court did not clearly err in finding that
Forter failed to pursue all levels of administrative grievances available to him. Cf.
Sapp v. Kimbrell, 623 F.3d 813, 822-23 (9th Cir. 2010) (exhaustion is not required
where administrative remedies are rendered “effectively unavailable”).
Forter’s contentions regarding alleged pending discovery, judicial bias, and
the court’s failure to address his equal protection claim are unpersuasive. His
3 12-35470
reliance on McCabe v. Arave, 827 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1987), is misplaced.
AFFIRMED.
4 12-35470