finding a claim against a parole board chairman was “properly dismissed as frivolous because [the plaintiff] never alleged any facts describing [the chairman’s] personal involvement in the claimed constitutional violations”
How later courts described this case
- finding a claim against a parole board chairman was “properly dismissed as frivolous because [the plaintiff] never alleged any facts describing [the chairman’s] personal involvement in the claimed constitutional violations”
- “Substantive due process analysis is . . . inappropriate . . . [where a] claim is ‘covered by’ the Fourth Amendment.” (alterations in original) (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 843 (1998)
- “The fact that agents have used their cars to block a vehicle does not necessarily mean that, instead of a Terry stop, there was a de facto arrest.”
- “[Q]uestions concerning a suspect’s identity are a routine and accepted part of many Terry stops.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
____________________________________
DAVID E. LILLY,
Plaintiff,
DECISION AND ORDER
v.
1:18-CV-00002 EAW
TOWN OF LEWISTON, SCOTT
STAFFORD, individually and in his
official capacity as a Town of Lewiston
Police Officer, and CHRISTOPHER
SALADA, individually and in his official
capacity as Chief of Police of the Town of
Lewiston,
Defendants.
____________________________________
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff David E. Lilly (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, brings the instant lawsuit
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and New York state law alleging defendants Town of
Lewiston (“Lewiston”), Scott Stafford (“Stafford”), and Christopher Salada (“Salada”)
(collectively “Defendants”) illegally seized him and retaliated against him. Presently
before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (Dkt. 11). For the reasons that follow, Defendants’
motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is granted in part and denied in part, and
Defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) is denied as moot.
BACKGROUND
The following facts are taken from Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint. (Dkt. 10).1 As
is required at this stage of the proceedings, the Court treats Plaintiff’s well-pleaded
allegations as true.
Plaintiff entered the United States Air Force on or about July 26, 2011, where he
advanced to the rank of staff sergeant before honorably separating from the Air Force on
or about January 25, 2018. (Id. at ¶¶ 22-25). On December 29, 2014, at 4:00 p.m., Plaintiff
was visiting his parents in Lewiston, New York, and drove to Artpark to walk his golden
retriever and take photographs. (Id. at ¶ 36). Artpark enjoys over 150,000 visitors
annually, and these visitors include numerous individuals with vehicles bearing license
plates, registration, and/or inspection stickers issued by states other than New York. (Id.
at ¶¶ 34-35). Plaintiff drives a 1994 Toyota compact pickup truck with valid Virginia
license plates, registration, and inspection stickers.2 (Id. at ¶ 38). He parked in a parking
lot at Artpark, where he observed at least two other vehicles parked in the same lot as him.
(Id. at ¶¶ 38-39).3
1 Allegations from Plaintiff’s original Complaint have been noted where relevant.
(Dkt. 1).
2 Plaintiff attached several pictures of his vehicle to his original Complaint. (Dkt. 1
at 14-15).
3 In the original Complaint, Plaintiff alleged the parking lot was empty other than his
vehicle. (Dkt. 1 at ¶¶ 30-31).
While walking his dog, Plaintiff noticed a Lewiston Police Department Patrol SUV
stop behind his vehicle for approximately 30 seconds. (Id. at ¶¶ 40, 44). Plaintiff alleges
he was unable to identify the occupant of the patrol vehicle at that time, but that upon
information and belief it was Stafford. (Id. at ¶¶ 43, 45).4 Stafford requested a license
plate search of Plaintiff’s vehicle, but not of the other two vehicles in the parking lot. (Id.
at ¶¶ 46-47). Stafford did not immediately receive back any identification information
about Plaintiff’s vehicle. (Id. at ¶ 64). Plaintiff waved at Stafford in an attempt to identify
himself as the owner of the vehicle, but was not acknowledged by Stafford. (Id. at ¶ 48).
Plaintiff continued to walk his dog, and observed Stafford exit the lot Plaintiff’s car was in
to park in the main Artpark parking lot next to the only entrance and exit road to Artpark.
(Id. at ¶¶ 49, 53). Numerous other vehicles were parked in the main parking lot, but
Stafford did not run a license plate check on any of those vehicles. (Id. at ¶¶ 50-52).
Plaintiff returned to his truck, and at approximately 4:45 p.m. he drove past Stafford
and began driving from Artpark to the Sand Docks at Lewiston Landing Park,5 which was
4 Plaintiff alleges in the original Complaint that he recognized the driver of the patrol
vehicle as Stafford. (Dkt. 1 at ¶ 31).
5 Defendants note that Plaintiff originally alleged that the alleged events took place
at “Lewiston Landing Park,” but now alleges the events occurred at the “Sand Docks,” and
Defendants contend the pleadings are not clear as to whether it is the same location. (Dkt.
11-7 at 16 n.2; compare Dkt. 1 at ¶ 38, with Dkt. 10 at ¶ 61). However, the Court takes
judicial notice of the map of Lewiston Landing Park, Rindfleisch v. Gentiva Health Sys.,
Inc., 752 F. Supp. 2d 246, 259 n.13 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (“Courts commonly use internet
mapping tools to take judicial notice of distance and geography.” (collecting cases)), which
matches the map attached to the Amended Complaint that purports to represent the Sand
Docks parking lot, compare Lewiston Landing Park, Google Maps,
https://www.google.com/maps/place/Lewiston+Landing+Park/@43.1740649,-79.049342
about one mile away. (Id. at ¶¶ 60-61). The Sand Docks provide a panoramic view of the
Niagara River and Canada, and attract numerous visitors, including individuals with out-
of-state vehicles. (Id. at ¶¶ 57-59). Plaintiff arrived at the Sand Docks parking lot at
approximately 4:50 p.m., and backed his vehicle into a parking space so that his vehicle
was facing west toward the sunset.6 (Id. at ¶ 70). There was a steep embankment behind
Plaintiff’s vehicle, and vacant parking spaces to either side. (Id. at ¶¶ 71-72). Plaintiff
began taking photographs of the Niagara River and Canada from his car. (Id. at ¶ 76).
Stafford entered the Sand Docks parking lot and instead of parking in one of the
vacant spots next to Plaintiff, he stopped at a 90-degree angle immediately in front of
Plaintiff’s vehicle, blocking the truck between the patrol vehicle and the embankment. (Id.
at ¶¶ 78-80). Plaintiff saw a dog in the car, and believed the dog to be a canine named
Taser. (Id. at ¶¶ 87-88). Plaintiff alleges that “[b]ased upon information and belief, Taser,
among other things, was trained to be aggressive and/or intimidating,” and that the
Lewiston Police Department had knowledge that Taser was aggressively trained. (Id. at
¶¶ 92-93). Plaintiff placed both of his hands on his steering wheel. (Id. at ¶ 100). Stafford
stayed in his patrol vehicle and lowered his driver window, and Plaintiff used his left hand
1,19z/data=!4m5!3m4!1s0x89d35dc6998e74af:0x35316f9949b01e21!8m2!3d43.173701
1!4d-79.0492831?hl=en-US (last visited Mar. 19, 2020), with (Dkt. 10 at 17).
6 In its previous Decision and Order, the Court took judicial notice that on December
29, 2014, sunset was at 4:48 p.m. in Lewiston, NY. (Dkt. 9 at 8 n.2); see 2014 Sun Graph
for Lewiston, Time and Date, https://www.timeanddate.com/sun/@5124307?month=12&
year=2014 (last visited May 16, 2019); see also Grant v. City of New York, No. 15-CV-
3635 (ILG) (ST), 2019 WL 1099945, at *3 n.10 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2019) (taking judicial
notice of the time of sunset).
to lower his driver-side window before placing his hand back on the steering wheel. (Id.
at ¶¶ 101-02). Stafford stated that he saw Plaintiff at Artpark and asked Plaintiff what he
had been doing there. (Id. at ¶ 103). Plaintiff told Stafford he had been walking his dog
and taking photographs. (Id. at ¶ 104). Stafford then asked Plaintiff if he was Edward
Lilly’s son, to which Plaintiff responded yes. (Id. at ¶¶ 105-06). Next, Stafford asked if
“he knew Plaintiff from Kiwanis Park,” and Plaintiff “indicated affirmatively.” (Id. at
¶¶ 107-08). Plaintiff asked Stafford “why Plaintiff was being seized,” but Stafford did not
answer and instead asked Plaintiff “a series of additional questions” which continued for
approximately 10-15 minutes. (Id. at ¶¶ 111-14).
Plaintiff commenced the instant lawsuit on January 2, 2018. (Dkt. 1). Defendants
filed their Answer on April 18, 2018 (Dkt. 2), and on June 22, 2018, they filed a motion
for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) (Dkt. 7).
The Court granted Defendants’ motion on June 17, 2019, and dismissed Plaintiff’s claims
without prejudice and with leave to replead. (Dkt. 9). On July 16, 2019, Plaintiff submitted
an Amended Complaint. (Dkt. 10). Defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss on July
30, 2019 (Dkt. 11), and no response to the motion was filed.
DISCUSSION
I. Legal Standard
“In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6), a district court may consider the facts alleged in the complaint, documents
attached to the complaint as exhibits, and documents incorporated by reference in the
complaint.” DiFolco v. MSNBC Cable L.L.C., 622 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir. 2010). A court
should consider the motion by “accepting all factual allegations as true and drawing all
reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Trs. of Upstate N.Y. Eng’rs Pension Fund
v. Ivy Asset Mgmt., 843 F.3d 561, 566 (2d Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2279 (2017).
To withstand dismissal, a claimant must set forth “enough facts to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Turkmen v. Ashcroft, 589 F.3d 542, 546 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009)).
“While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need
detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his
entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation
of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal
quotations and citations omitted). “To state a plausible claim, the complaint’s ‘[f]actual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.’” Nielsen
v. AECOM Tech. Corp., 762 F.3d 214, 218 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555).
When a plaintiff proceeds pro se, the Court is “obliged to construe his pleadings
liberally, particularly when they allege civil rights violations.” McEachin v. McGuinnis,
357 F.3d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 2004).
II. Section 1983 Claims
The Court begins with Plaintiff’s claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, over which
this Court has original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (“The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of
the United States.”). Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action against persons who,
under color of state authority, caused the deprivation of any rights, privilege, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Municipalities and other local government entities are considered “persons” under § 1983.
Monell v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). Here, Plaintiff alleges
Defendants violated his First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights pursuant to
§ 1983.
A. Fourth Amendment Claims
The Fourth Amendment states: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause[.]” U.S. Const. amend IV.
“[A] seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and
asks a few questions. So long as a reasonable person would feel free to disregard the police
and go about his business, the encounter is consensual and no reasonable suspicion is
required.” Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991) (quotation and citation omitted).
“Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way
restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a ‘seizure’ has occurred.” Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968). The Second Circuit has explained:
Pertinent factors identifying a police seizure can include the threatening
presence of several officers; the display of a weapon; physical touching of
the person by the officer; language or tone indicating that compliance with
the officer was compulsory; prolonged retention of a person’s personal
effects, such as airplane tickets or identification; and a request by the officer
to accompany him to the police station or a police room.
Brown v. City of Oneonta, N.Y., 221 F.3d 329, 340 (2d Cir. 2000).
Additionally, “the police can stop and briefly detain a person for investigative
purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that
criminal activity ‘may be afoot,’ even if the officer lacks probable cause.” United States
v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 30). “This form of
investigative detention is now known as a Terry stop.” Davis v. City of New York, 959 F.
Supp. 2d 324, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
“While ‘reasonable suspicion’ is a less demanding standard than probable cause and
requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence, the Fourth
Amendment requires at least a minimal level of objective justification for making the stop.”
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000). “The officer [making a Terry stop] . . . must
be able to articulate something more than an ‘inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or
“hunch.”’” Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329 (1990) (alterations in original) (quoting
Terry, 392 U.S. at 27). “Reasonable suspicion is an objective standard; hence, the
subjective intentions or motives of the officer making the stop are irrelevant.” United
States v. Bayless, 201 F.3d 116, 133 (2d Cir. 2000).
“In assessing the reasonableness of an officer’s suspicion, we must take into account
the totality of the circumstances and must evaluate those circumstances through the eyes
of a reasonable and cautious police officer on the scene, guided by his experience and
training.” United States v. Compton, 830 F.3d 55, 61 (2d Cir. 2016). “[T]he proper inquiry
is not whether each fact considered in isolation denotes unlawful behavior, but whether all
the facts taken together support a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing.” United States v.
Lee, 916 F.2d 814, 820 (2d Cir. 1990). “It is sometimes the case that a police officer may
observe ‘a series of acts, each of them perhaps innocent in itself, but which taken together
warrant[ ] further investigation.’” Ligon v. City of New York, 925 F. Supp. 2d 478, 489
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (alteration in original) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 22).
As they did in their motion for judgment on the pleadings, Defendants contend that
Plaintiff’s encounter with Stafford was consensual, and that regardless the encounter at
most constitutes a lawful Terry stop. (Dkt. 11-7 at 10-20; see Dkt. 7-3 at 14-21). The
Court finds that Plaintiff has stated a claim for violation of his Fourth Amendment rights
against Stafford for the reasons that follow.
1. Consensual Encounter
Plaintiff alleges that Stafford blocked his parked truck with a police SUV to question
him and that this amounts to a seizure. Defendants argue that this Court should follow the
Eleventh Circuit’s holding in Miller v. Harget, 458 F.3d 1251, 1258 (11th Cir. 2006)
(holding there was no seizure because the plaintiff “intended to walk to his [hotel] room
after voluntarily parking the car. It is not dispositive that [the officer] would have
prevented [the plaintiff] from backing [the] car out of the parking space. . . . In the instant
matter, [the plaintiff] did not [allege] that he had any intent to back out of the parking space
when [the officer] pulled up behind him.”), and cite several cases within this Circuit in
support of the proposition that blocking a person’s car is not sufficient to constitute a
seizure, see Rotbergs v. Guerrera, No. 3:10CV1423 MRK, 2012 WL 1204729, at *8 (D.
Conn. Apr. 11, 2012) (“Even if Officer Guerrera did block Mr. Rotbergs’s exit with his
car, such a blockage is not sufficient to constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure.”); United
States v. Perez, No. 01 CR. 848 (SWK), 2002 WL 1835601, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8,
2002) (finding that two officers parking in such a way as to prevent a person from moving
his vehicle “without more, does not indicate that a seizure took place”); United States v.
Baldwin, No. CR. 3:97CR188 (AHN), 1998 WL 563851, at *3 (D. Conn. 1998) (“[E]ven
if [the plaintiff’s] car was blocked in front and in the rear, that fact, in isolation, is
insufficient to render the encounter a seizure in light of the totality of the circumstances
which indicate that the officers’ conduct was not restraining or coercive.”).
However, in Pane v. Gramaglia, 509 F. App’x 101, 103 (2d Cir. 2013), the Second
Circuit ruled a “reasonable police officer would have known from established precedent
that having a fellow officer pull a marked police car with activated turret lights behind [the
plaintiff]’s parked car, thereby effectively blocking her movement, and directing the
vehicle’s spot light toward the interior of [the plaintiff]’s vehicle constituted a seizure that
required reasonable suspicion.” Although Defendants correctly note that the officer in
Pane activated his turret lights behind the car, and more than one officer was involved in
the incident, the Second Circuit stated such conduct “effectively block[ed]” the plaintiff’s
movement, and cited numerous cases holding that a seizure occurred where a police car
blocked a suspect’s vehicle. Id. Even one of the cases discussed above that was cited by
Defendants indicates that while police blocking a parked vehicle did not necessarily mean
there was an arrest, the conduct did at least constitute a Terry stop. Perez, 2002 WL
1835601, at *10; see also United States v. Perea, 986 F.2d 633, 644 (2d Cir. 1993) (“The
fact that agents have used their cars to block a vehicle does not necessarily mean that,
instead of a Terry stop, there was a de facto arrest.”); United States v. Lopez, __ F. Supp.
3d __, No. 3:18-CR-137(RNC), 2020 WL 113774, at *7 (D. Conn. Jan. 10, 2020) (“A
seizure amounting to a Terry stop occurs when an officer uses his patrol car to ‘box in’ an
individual’s car, preventing the suspect from driving away.”). Further, unlike the plaintiff
in Miller, here Plaintiff’s allegations do not indicate that Plaintiff intended to exit his
vehicle after parking—to the contrary, Plaintiff alleges that he stayed in his truck to take
pictures after arriving at the Sand Docks. (Dkt. 10 at ¶¶ 70, 76).
Here, as with any Fourth Amendment analysis, whether Stafford’s actions
constituted a seizure depends on the totality of the circumstances. Plaintiff has alleged that
his vehicle was blocked by Stafford’s at a 90 degree angle, thus boxing him into the parking
spot with a steep embankment behind him, and that Stafford remained in this position for
10-15 minutes (an allegation that was missing from the initial Complaint). Under the
circumstances, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that he was seized, and Defendants’ argument
that the stop was consensual cannot be resolved at this stage of the proceedings.
2. Reasonable Suspicion
Defendants also argue that even if the Court finds the encounter was not consensual,
Plaintiff has failed to adequately allege that Stafford did not have reasonable suspicion to
temporarily detain and question him. The Court disagrees for the following reasons.
As a preliminary matter, Defendants argue that Plaintiff “changed many of his
factual allegations in a transparent attempt to eliminate the allegations this Court concluded
created reasonable suspicion,” and as a result, the Court should reject the allegations in the
Amended Complaint that contradict those in the original Complaint, and consider
allegations from the original Complaint that Plaintiff omitted in the Amended Complaint.
(Dkt. 11-7 at 16-18). “There is authority supporting the notion that a court may disregard
amended pleadings when they directly contradict facts that have been alleged in prior
pleadings.” Kilkenny v. Law Office of Cushner & Garvey, L.L.P., No. 08-CV-588 KMK,
2012 WL 1638326, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 8, 2012); see Colliton v. Cravath, Swaine &
Moore LLP, No. 08 CIV 0400 (NRB), 2008 WL 4386764, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2008)
(“Where a plaintiff blatantly changes his statement of the facts in order to respond to the
defendant[‘s] motion to dismiss . . . [and] directly contradicts the facts set forth in his
original complaint, a court is authorized to accept the facts described in the original
complaint as true.” (alterations in original) (quotations omitted)), aff’d, 356 F. App’x 535
(2d Cir. 2009). “However, many courts in this Circuit have held otherwise, and note that
‘[p]rior inconsistent pleadings, though admissible . . . are controvertible, not conclusive,
admissions.’” Bernadotte v. N.Y. Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens, No. 13-CV-965 MKB, 2014
WL 808013, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2014) (alterations in original) (quoting The Ltd., Inc.
v. McCrory Corp., 683 F. Supp. 387, 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)).
Defendants contend the following allegations in the Amended Complaint contradict
admissions from the original Complaint: Plaintiff originally alleged that the parking lot at
Artpark was empty other than his vehicle (Dkt. 1 at ¶ 30), and now claims that at least two
other vehicles were parked there (Dkt. 10 at ¶¶ 39, 47); in the original Complaint, Plaintiff
claimed he recognized the driver of the patrol vehicle at Artpark as Stafford (Dkt. 1 at
¶ 31), but now alleges he did not identify Stafford at Artpark (Dkt. 10 at ¶¶ 43-44); and
Plaintiff alleged in the original Complaint that Officer Stafford left the Artpark parking lot
after running the license plate check (Dkt. 1 at ¶ 36), but now alleges that Stafford left the
lot and parked in another lot next to the entrance/exit and remained there until after Plaintiff
left the lot (Dkt. 10 at ¶¶ 53, 55, 62-63). The Court finds it need not determine whether it
should consider these facts because the contradictions alluded to by Defendants are not
material to the Court’s determination as to whether Plaintiff’s allegations support a finding
of reasonable suspicion. In other words, even if the Court considered the facts stated above
as alleged in the original Complaint, it would still find that Plaintiff has properly alleged a
claim for violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.
Defendants also contend the Court should consider the following allegations stated
in the original Complaint but omitted from the Amended Complaint: Plaintiff’s reference
to the “distinctive” appearance of his vehicle and the photographic exhibits of the truck
attached to the original Complaint (Dkt. 1 at ¶ 34), as well as reference to the appearance
ticket allegedly issued to Plaintiff by Stafford at Kiwanis Park in 2010 (id. at ¶¶ 22-24,
52-55). Courts in this Circuit have held that “[t]he mere fact that a plaintiff has chosen to
omit, for strategic reasons, a fact alleged in an earlier pleading does not entitle the Court to
consider that fact once it has accepted the amended pleading for filing.” Vasquez v. Yadali,
No. 16-CV-895 (NSR), 2020 WL 1082786, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2020). Although some
courts have considered allegations from a prior complaint when deciding a motion to
dismiss, see Poindexter v. EMI Record Grp. Inc., No. 11-cv-559 (LTS)(JLC), 2012 WL
1027639, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2012) (“[E]ven though the Amended Complaint is the
operative pleading, the Court may still credit admissions in the original complaint and
attached exhibits.” (citing Sulton v. Wright, 265 F. Supp. 2d 292, 295 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)),
the logic relied on by those courts stems from a Second Circuit decision holding that a
district court erred in refusing to admit a prior inconsistent pleading as evidence at trial,
see Andrews v. Metro N. Commuter R.R. Co., 882 F.2d 705, 707 (2d Cir. 1989). In the
instant matter, “Defendants have failed to present any persuasive authority that a similar
rule should apply upon consideration of a motion to dismiss, where the Court is obliged to
evaluate the sufficiency of the pleading itself, as well as any materials attached thereto or
within the scope of judicial notice.” In re PXRE Grp., Ltd., Sec. Litig., 600 F. Supp. 2d
510, 525 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d sub nom. Condra v. PXRE Grp. Ltd., 357 F. App’x 393 (2d Cir.
2009); see Kilkenny v. Law Office of Cushner & Garvey, L.L.P., No. 08-cv-588 (KMK),
2012 WL 1638326, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 8, 2012) (“[O]nce an amended pleading is filed,
a court may not import information that was contained in the prior pleading but omitted
from the amended pleading.”). Accordingly, the Court will not consider the allegations
omitted from Plaintiff’s original Complaint in deciding the instant motion.
The Court finds that it cannot resolve at this stage of the proceedings whether
Stafford had reasonable suspicion for the stop. Plaintiff alleges that his pickup truck was
one of three vehicles in a parking lot at Artpark, which is a park that receives upwards of
150,000 visitors a year, many of whom travel from out of state. (Dkt. 10 at ¶¶ 34-39).
Plaintiff also alleges that his pickup truck had a valid registration sticker, inspection sticker,
and license plates, and that all of the exterior lights on his vehicle were functional. (Id. at
¶ 54). The Amended Complaint alleges that after leaving Artpark, Plaintiff drove to a
different park that also frequently has out-of-state visitors for a panoramic view of the
sunset. (Id. at ¶ 70). Plaintiff further alleges that it was not yet dark in the park when
Stafford approached him. (Id. at ¶¶ 73-79). These allegations do not provide an articulable
basis for suspecting criminal activity or even a traffic violation, and at most could give rise
to a mere “hunch.” See United States v. Lopez, No. 3:18-CR-137(RNC), 2020 WL 113774,
at *6 (D. Conn. Jan. 10, 2020) (finding “the time of day, the location of the cars, the manner
in which the cars were parked, and the fact that the engine of at least one of the cars was
running” were “insufficient to support an objectively reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity required for a Terry stop”); see also Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000)
(“An individual’s presence in an area of expected criminal activity, standing alone, is not
enough to support a reasonable, particularized suspicion that the person is committing a
crime.”); cf. United States v. Bold, 19 F.3d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 1994) (“[T]he police officers’
independent corroboration of the anonymous tipster’s information, the unusual location of
the car in the parking lot, and the inability of the officers to see in the darkly tinted car
windows, when combined with the report of a firearm in the car, provided a sufficient basis
under Terry for the officers to further investigate by opening the car doors and requesting
the occupants to get out for questioning.”).
The Court additionally finds that even if the allegations did support a finding of
reasonable suspicion, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that the scope and duration of the stop
were unreasonable under the circumstances alleged in the Amended Complaint. “For an
investigative stop based on reasonable suspicion to pass constitutional muster, the ensuing
investigation must be reasonably related in scope and duration to the circumstances that
justified the stop in the first instance, so as to be minimally intrusive of the individual’s
Fourth Amendment interests.” United States v. Glover, 957 F.2d 1004, 1011 (2d Cir.
1992). The Amended Complaint alleges that Stafford questioned Plaintiff for 10 to 15
minutes. (Id. at ¶¶ 111-14). Although the allegations indicate that some of the questions
asked by Stafford related to Plaintiff’s identity (Dkt. 10 at ¶¶ 101-08); see Hiibel v. 6th
Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., Humboldt Cty., 542 U.S. 177, 186 (2004) (“[Q]uestions
concerning a suspect’s identity are a routine and accepted part of many Terry stops.”),
nothing in the allegations indicates that Stafford’s questioning should have lasted more
than several minutes.
Because the facts alleged by Plaintiff do not allow the Court to definitely resolve
the question of whether Stafford had reasonable suspicion for the stop, the Court finds that
the Amended Complaint states a Fourth Amendment claim. Accordingly, Defendants’
motion is denied as to the Fourth Amendment claim against Stafford.
B. First Amendment Retaliation
“To plead a First Amendment retaliation claim a plaintiff must show: (1) he has a
right protected by the First Amendment; (2) the defendant’s actions were motivated or
substantially caused by his exercise of that right; and (3) the defendant’s actions caused
him some injury.” Dorsett v. County of Nassau, 732 F.3d 157, 160 (2d Cir. 2013). “[T]he
First Amendment protects a significant amount of verbal criticism and challenge directed
at police officers.” City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 461 (1987). “Speech directed at
police officers will be protected unless it is likely to produce a clear and present danger of
a serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance or unrest.”
Kerman v. City of New York, 261 F.3d 229, 242 (2d Cir. 2001).
Plaintiff has failed to state a First Amendment claim in the Amended Complaint.
Plaintiff has not alleged that he engaged in any protected activity such as criticizing the
Lewiston Police Department before the alleged incident with Stafford, let alone that
Stafford’s actions were motivated or caused by Plaintiff’s engagement in that protected
activity. See Kamholtz v. Yates County, 800 F. Supp. 2d 462, 464 (W.D.N.Y. 2011)
(“[P]laintiff has not alleged facts showing that he engaged in activity protected under the
First Amendment, and . . . he therefore has failed to state a valid retaliation claim under the
Free Speech Clause.”). Accordingly, the Court grants Defendants’ motion as to Plaintiff’s
First Amendment claims.
C. Fourteenth Amendment
Plaintiff also alleges a violation of his due process rights pursuant to the Fourteenth
Amendment. (Dkt. 10 at ¶¶ 128-30). However, Plaintiff has not alleged any basis for a
due process claim independent of his Fourth Amendment claim, and it is well-established
that the Fourth Amendment “provides the proper analytical framework” for evaluating an
unreasonable seizure claim, not the Fourteenth Amendment. See Bryant v. City of New
York, 404 F.3d 128, 135-36 (2d Cir. 2005) (“Substantive due process analysis is . . .
inappropriate . . . [where a] claim is ‘covered by’ the Fourth Amendment.” (alterations in
original) (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 843 (1998)).
Accordingly, Defendants’ motion is granted as to Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim.
D. Claims Against Lewiston
“[T]o establish municipal liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove that ‘action
pursuant to official municipal policy’ caused the alleged constitutional injury.” Cash v.
County of Erie, 654 F.3d 324, 333 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S.
51, 60 (2018)). “[T]o hold a [municipality] liable under § 1983 for the unconstitutional
actions of its employees, a plaintiff is required to . . . prove three elements: (1) an official
policy or custom that (2) causes the plaintiff to be subjected to (3) a denial of a
constitutional right.” Batista v. Rodriguez, 702 F.2d 393, 397 (2d Cir. 1983). Official
municipal policy includes “the decisions of a government’s lawmakers, the acts of its
policymaking officials, and practices so persistent and widespread as to practically have
the force of law.” Connick, 563 U.S. at 61. To survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff
“cannot merely allege the existence of a municipal policy or custom, but must allege facts
tending to support, at least circumstantially, an inference that such a municipal policy or
custom exists.” Triano v. Town of Harrison, NY, 895 F. Supp. 2d 526, 535 (S.D.N.Y.
2012) (quotation omitted). A plaintiff may satisfy the “policy or custom” requirement by
alleging one of the following:
(1) a formal policy officially endorsed by the municipality; (2) actions taken
by government officials responsible for establishing the municipal policies
that caused the particular deprivation in question; (3) a practice so consistent
and widespread that, although not expressly authorized, constitutes a custom
or usage of which a supervising policy-maker must have been aware; or (4)
a failure by policymakers to provide adequate training or supervision to
subordinates to such an extent that it amounts to deliberate indifference to
the rights of those who come into contact with the municipal employees.
Brandon v. City of New York, 705 F. Supp. 2d 261, 276-77 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (citations
omitted).
Plaintiff’s allegations are not sufficient to establish that a policy or custom exists.
Plaintiff alleges that the Lewiston Police Department represents on its website that “all
members of the patrol division are highly trained officers capable of responding to a variety
of incidents” (Dkt. 10 at ¶ 15), that the Lewiston Police Department “and/or certain active
members thereof have been the subject of multiple lawsuits for, among other things, their
alleged violations of the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments” (id. at ¶ 16), that the
Lewiston Police Department had knowledge that the dog Taser “had been trained to be
aggressive and/or intimidating” (id. at ¶ 94), and that the Lewiston Police Department
“knew or should have known that some members of the public would be intimidated and/or
frightened by Taser” (id. at ¶ 95). Allegations of one aggressive dog on a police force are
not sufficient to plausibly suggest “a practice so widespread that it constitutes a ‘custom or
usage’ sufficient to impute constructive knowledge of the practice to policymaking
officials,” or a failure by policymakers to train the deputies, particularly here where the
Amended Complaint does not allege that the dog in fact acted aggressively or was actively
used to intimidate or injure Plaintiff. See Tieman v. City of Newburgh, No. 13-CV-4178
KMK, 2015 WL 1379652, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2015) (finding allegations of
testimony by “numerous residents” at a public comment session “regarding the excessive
and unnecessary use of police dogs during arrests” failed to “plausibly state that there is a
City practice of using excessive force during arrests, generally, or using police dogs so
consistent and widespread as to constitute a custom or usage”); see also Whitfield v. City
of Newburgh, No. 08 CV 8516 (RKE), 2015 WL 9275695, at *29 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2015)
(dismissing Plaintiff’s claim that the police department’s K-9 policy was unconstitutional
because “a single example of excessive force . . . cannot amount to an established policy,
practice, or custom”). Additionally, Plaintiff’s allegations regarding “various lawsuits” are
“not probative of the existence of an underlying policy that could be relevant here.” Jean-
Laurent v. Wilkerson, 461 F. App’x 18, 22-23 (2d Cir. 2012); see Walker v. City of New
York, No. 14-CV-808 ER, 2015 WL 4254026, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2015) (dismissing
claims of widespread policy or practice where plaintiff “merely list[ed] the names of
numerous lawsuits, without indicating whether they resulted in a finding of liability against
the Officers or the City or providing any specific details about the cases”). Therefore, the
Court grants Defendants’ motion as to the claims against Lewiston.
E. Supervisory Claims
A supervisory defendant must have been personally involved in a constitutional
deprivation to be held liable under § 1983. Williams v. Smith, 781 F.2d 319, 323 (2d Cir.
1986); see Richardson v. Goord, 347 F.3d 431, 435 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Supervisor liability in
a § 1983 action depends on a showing of some personal responsibility, and cannot rest on
respondeat superior.” (citation omitted)). “[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-
official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the
Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. Personal involvement may be shown where:
A supervisory official, after learning of the violation through a report or
appeal, . . . failed to remedy the wrong[;] . . . created a policy or custom
under which unconstitutional practices occurred, or allowed such a policy or
custom to continue[; or] . . . was grossly negligent in managing subordinates
who caused the unlawful condition or event.
Williams, 781 F.2d at 323-24 (citations omitted). However, a “‘plaintiff cannot base
liability solely on the defendant’s supervisory capacity or the fact that he held the highest
position of authority’ within the relevant governmental agency or department.” Houghton
v. Cardone, 295 F. Supp. 2d 268, 276 (W.D.N.Y. 2003) (citation omitted); see also
Montero v. Travis, 171 F.3d 757, 761-62 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding a claim against a parole
board chairman was “properly dismissed as frivolous because [the plaintiff] never alleged
any facts describing [the chairman’s] personal involvement in the claimed constitutional
violations”).
The only allegation against Salada in the Amended Complaint is that he “is sued
individually and in his official capacity as Chief of Police” (Dkt. 10 at ¶ 9), which is not
sufficient to allege Salada’s personal involvement. See Williams, 781 F.2d at 323.
Accordingly, the claims against Salada must also be dismissed.
III. State Law Claims
Defendants further contend that any state law claims alleged in Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(b)(1), arguing in part that
Plaintiff failed to comply with New York General Municipal Law § 50-i and noting that
some courts have indicated that dismissal on those grounds is based on lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. (Dkt. 11-7 at 26 n.5). The Court does not address these jurisdictional
arguments because it is clear from the Amended Complaint that Plaintiff does not allege
any state law claims. (See Dkt. 10 at 13-14 (alleging claims for “deprivation of rights”
pursuant to § 1983 under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments)).7 Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint contains a general assertion at the beginning that the action is brought
pursuant to “the common law of the State of New York” (Dkt. 10 at ¶ 1), and in the
“Wherefore” clause Plaintiff alleges that he seeks damages under “the laws of New York”
(id. at 15), but these conclusory allegations are plainly insufficient to assert a claim.
Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss any state law claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)
is granted, and the motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) is denied as moot.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)
is granted in part and denied in part, and the motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1)
is denied as moot. (Dkt. 11). All of Plaintiff’s claims in the Amended Complaint are
dismissed with prejudice with the exception of Plaintiff’s claim against Stafford pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based upon the Fourth Amendment. The Clerk of Court is instructed
to enter judgment in favor of Lewiston and Salada and terminate them from the caption.
SO ORDERED.
________________________________
ELIZABETH A. WOLFORD
United States District Judge
Dated: March 27, 2020
Rochester, New York
7 In contrast, the original Complaint included a “Fourth Cause of Action Under
Federal and/or State Law Against All Defendants.” (Dkt. 1 at 11).