The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
SINGH LOVEPREET,
Petitioner, Case # 19-CV-6628-FPG
v.
DECISION AND ORDER
WILLIAM P. BARR, et al.,
Respondents.
Pro se Petitioner Singh Lovepreet brought this petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging his continued detention at the Buffalo Federal Detention Facility.
ECF No. 1. Respondents move to dismiss, arguing that the petition is premature. ECF No. 4.
Because the Court agrees, Respondents’ motion is GRANTED.
Petitioner is a native and citizen of India. In June 2018, a Border Patrol agent apprehended
Petitioner shortly after he crossed the Mexico border into the United States. Immigration
authorities instituted removal proceedings, and Petitioner has been detained since his initial
apprehension.
After various administrative proceedings, on August 28, 2019, an immigration judge
denied Petitioner’s applications for relief from removal and ordered him removed. Petitioner did
not appeal the order to the Board of Immigration Appeals, and thus the order became final on
September 27, 2019. See Smith v. Tsoukaris, No. 11-4207, 2011 WL 6002464, at *3 (D.N.J. Nov.
30, 2011).
Respondents move to dismiss the petition as premature. They assert that the “government
is afforded a statutory 90-day period” in which to remove an alien following a final order of
removal, such that no claim for unconstitutional detention may lie. ECF No. 5 at 2. The Court
agrees. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A), “aliens ordered removed shall be removed by the
Attorney General within [a] 90-day ‘removal period.’” Turkmen v. Ashcroft, 589 F.3d 542, 547
(2d Cir. 2009). During the removal period, “[t]he government is required to detain” the alien. Id.
(citing 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2)). Courts have upheld the constitutionality of that limited detention
authority. See, e.g., Khotesouvan v. Morones, 386 F.3d 1298, 1300-01 (9th Cir. 2004).
In arguing to the contrary, Petitioner asserts that his detention has become unconstitutional
because he has been detained for over one year. However, prior to Petitioner’s removal order
becoming final, immigration authorities detained him under different statutory authority, so any
claim pertaining to the earlier period of detention is immaterial to the validity of his present
detention under § 1231(a)(2). See Abimbola v. Ridge, 181 F. App’x 97, 98 (2d Cir. 2006)
(summary order).
This is not to say that Petitioner will never be able to challenge the validity of his detention.
In Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), the Supreme Court interpreted § 1231(a) to limit “an
alien’s post-removal-period detention to a period reasonably necessary to bring about that alien’s
removal from the United States.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689. Thus, to the extent immigration
authorities continue to detain Petitioner after the removal period, he may be able to bring a claim
under Zadvydas. For that reason, the Court dismisses the petition without prejudice.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Respondents’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 4) is GRANTED.
The petition is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, and the Clerk of Court is directed to enter
judgment and close this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: November 4, 2019
Rochester, New York
Chief Judge
United States District Court