Opinion

Williams v. NYC Board of Elections

Court
District Court, S.D. New York
Filed
Feb 28, 2024
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 27.7%

The opinion

DOCUMENT

ELECTRONICALLY FILED

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DOC #:

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK DATE FILED: 2/28/2024

CARMAN WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING REQUEST FOR

PRO BONO COUNSEL

-against-

23-CV-5460 (AS) (KHP)

NYC BOARD OF ELECTIONS, et al.,

Defendants.

KATHARINE H. PARKER, United States Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff has filed an Application for the Court to Request Counsel. For the following

reasons, Plaintiff’s application is denied.

LEGAL STANDARD

The in forma pauperis statute provides that the courts “may request an attorney to

represent any person unable to afford counsel.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). Unlike in criminal

cases, in civil cases, there is no requirement that courts supply indigent litigants with counsel.

Hodge v. Police Officers, 802 F.2d 58, 60 (2d Cir. 1986). Instead, courts have “broad discretion”

when deciding whether to grant an indigent litigant’s request for pro bono representation. /d.

Even if a court believes that a litigant should have a free lawyer, under the in forma pauperis

Statute, a court has no authority to “appoint” counsel, but instead, may only “request” that an

attorney volunteer to represent a litigant. Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of lowa,

490 U.S. 296, 301-310 (1989). Moreover, courts do not have funds to pay counsel in civil

matters. Courts must therefore grant applications for pro bono counsel sparingly, and with

reference to public benefit, in order to preserve the “precious commodity” of volunteer-lawyer

time. Cooper v. A. Sargenti Co., Inc., 877 F.2d 170, 172-73 (2d Cir. 1989).

In Hodge, the Second Circuit set forth the factors a court should consider in deciding

whether to grant an indigent litigant’s request for pro bono counsel. 802 F.2d at 61-62. As an

initial matter, the litigant must demonstrate that she is indigent, for example, by successfully

applying for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. The court must then consider whether the

litigant’s claim “seems likely to be of substance” – “a requirement that must be taken

seriously.” Id. at 60-61. If an application meets these threshold requirements, the “court must

further consider the plaintiff's ability and efforts to obtain counsel,” as well as her “ability to

handle the case without assistance in [ ] light of the required factual investigation, the

complexity of the legal issues, and the need for expertly conducted cross-examination to test

veracity.” Trahan v. City of New York, 2015 WL 4469559, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 15, 2015) (citing

Cooper, 877 F.2d at 172 and Hodge, 802 F.2d at 61-62). In considering these factors, district

courts should not apply bright-line rules. Hendricks v. Coughlin, 114 F.3d 390, 392-93 (2d Cir.

1997). Rather, each application must be decided on its own facts. See Hodge, 802 F.2d at 61.

DISCUSSION

As an initial matter, Plaintiff meets the threshold requirements for an application for pro

bono counsel. Plaintiff filed a Request to Proceed in Forma Pauperis (IFP), which the Court

granted. (ECF No. 3.) When Plaintiff filed her Application for the Court to Request Counsel,

Plaintiff affirmed that her financial status has not changed. (ECF No. 48.) Plaintiff therefore

qualifies as indigent. Additionally, the complaint asserts claims for discrimination and

retaliation. At this preliminary phase of the case, the Court finds that the claims are likely “of

substance” for the purpose of an application for pro bono counsel. Hodge, 802 F.2d 61-62.

Because the threshold requirements for an application for pro bono counsel are met,

the Court turns to the remaining Hodge factors – namely, Plaintiff's ability and efforts to obtain

counsel, as well as her ability to handle the case without assistance. These factors weigh

strongly against the application.

To start, Plaintiff admits that she has taken no steps to finding an attorney on her own.

(ECF No. 48.) Thus, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate an inability to obtain counsel, which is a

sufficient basis to deny the application. See, e.g. Sweeney v. Unger, 2015 WL 13948596, at *1

(S.D.N.Y. June 1, 2015) (finding that an application for pro bono counsel “must be denied”

where the petitioner did not provide any proof of efforts to obtain counsel).

Additionally, Plaintiff has not demonstrated an inability to handle the case without an

attorney's assistance. Plaintiff states that she wants pro bono counsel to assist with

depositions and in preparing for dispositive motions. However, Plaintiff has already responded

to the only dispositive motion currently pending – Defendants’ motion to dismiss – and she

appears to have completed that task without the assistance of counsel, undercutting any

argument that she requires counsel to assist with dispositive motions. Although Plaintiff does

not have a law degree, none is necessary to prosecute a case, and the Court grants special

solicitude to pro se plaintiffs. The Court will construe Plaintiff's submissions to raise the

strongest arguments they suggest. Additionally, Plaintiff has not demonstrated any reason why

she would not be able to manage depositions on her own. This is a relatively simple case

factually; that is, it concerns a discrete set of facts over a short period of time and involves a

limited number of potential witnesses. Because Plaintiff has not demonstrated an inability to

prosecute this matter without the assistance of counsel, her application for pro bono counsel is

denied. See, id. at *2; see also Urena v. City of New York, 2023 WL 5715836, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.

Sept. 5, 2023) (denying application for pro bono counsel where the case was “not particularly

complex,” and the plaintiff had not shown that he could not investigate the facts and present

the case himself).

The Court reminds Plaintiff that she may contact the New York Legal Assistance Group’s

pro se clinic at 212-659-6190 to inquire whether an attorney connected with the clinic is

available to provide free legal assistance.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Application for the Court to Request Counsel is

DENIED.

The Clerk of the Court is respectfully directed to terminate the motion at ECF No. 49.

SO ORDERED.

Dated Non York New vork ket haut He □□ ahha

KATHARINE H. PARKER

United States Magistrate Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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