Mejia v. County of Rockland

USDC SDNY

DOCUMENT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT ELECTRONICALLY RILED

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK DOC #:

DATE FILED: _ 05/13/2024 __

RENE ALVARADO MEJIA, and all others similarly

situated,

No. 23 Civ. 492 (NSR)

Plaintiff,

OPINION & ORDER

-against-

THE NEW YORK UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM, et al.,

Defendants.

NELSON S. ROMAN, United States District Judge

Plaintiff Rene Alvarado Mejia (‘Plaintiff’) brings this action, on behalf of himself and all

others similarly situated, against Defendants County of Rockland, the Honorable Donna G.

Siberman, in her official capacity as County Clerk of Rockland County and the New York Unified

Court System (““NYUCS”), for, inter alia, violation of the Due Process and Equal Protection

Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, the Privileges and Immunities

Clause of the U.S. Constitution, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the New York State

Executive Law § 296, et seq. (““NYSHRL”). (First Amended Complaint, “FAC.,” ECF No. 8.)

Defendant NYUCS moves to dismiss Plaintiffs FAC under Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (the “Motion”, ECF No. 23.) For the following reasons,

Defendant NYUCS’ Motion is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

I. Factual Background

The following facts are taken from the FAC and assumed to be true for the purposes of

Defendant NYUCS’ Motion.

On or about July 29, 2022, Plaintiff’s attorney in a criminal matter before the Suffern

Justice Court called the Rockland County Drug Court (“Drug Court”) on Plaintiff’s behalf and

informed the Drug Court that Plaintiff has a pending case before the Suffern Justice Court for

Driving While Intoxicated, was referred to the Drug Court by the Suffern Justice Court, and that

Plaintiff is a limited English proficient (“LEP”) person and would require translation services in

Drug Court. (FAC ¶¶ 32-33.) The Drug Court informed Plaintiff’s attorney that “although the

Plaintiff’s criminal charges qualify for Drug Court, Drug Court does not provide translation

services and consequently that Plaintiff would not be allowed to participate in Drug Court despite

being otherwise qualified for Drug Court.” (Id. ¶ 34.) Because of the Drug Court’s failure to

provide translation and interpretation services, Plaintiff, as well as a putative class of Spanish-

speaking LEP individuals, is continuously denied access to Drug Court. (Id. ¶¶ 43, 47.)

Defendant NYUCS oversees Drug Court and provides for part of its budget. (Id. ¶¶ 20, 22.)

As a result, Plaintiff contends that Defendant NYUCS is potentially liable for the “deliberate

failure to implement policies and procedures necessary to afford Plaintiff access to interpretation

and translation in his native language.” (Id. ¶ 43.)

II. Procedural History

Plaintiff filed the FAC on June 7, 2023. (ECF No. 8.) On October 30, 2023, Defendant

NYUCS filed the instant Motion (ECF No. 23), as well as a memorandum of law (ECF No. 24)

and reply (ECF No. 26), in support thereof. Plaintiff filed an opposition to Defendant NYUCS’

Motion. (ECF No. 27).

LEGAL STANDARD

I. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)

“Determining the existence of subject matter jurisdiction is a threshold inquiry[,] and a

claim is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) when the

district court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it.” Morrison v. Nat'l Austl.

Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 2008). The principle of state sovereign immunity limits a

federal court's jurisdiction over suits against states. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 730, 119

S.Ct. 2240, 144 L.Ed.2d 636 (1999). As such, the Second Circuit has held that “[w]hether a federal

court has subject matter jurisdiction [pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment] is a question that may

be raised at any time by the court sua sponte.” McGinty v. New York, 251 F.3d 84, 90 (2d Cir.

2001) (concluding that district court properly considered whether defendants had sovereign

immunity, thus depriving the court of subject matter jurisdiction). Absent a state's waiver of its

sovereign immunity or congressional abrogation, a district court “lack[s] subject matter

jurisdiction” to consider claims against states. Close v. New York, 125 F.3d 31, 38–39 (2d Cir.

1997).

DISCUSSION

The Eleventh Amendment provides that “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not

be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the

United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S.

Const. amend. XI. Based on the Eleventh Amendment, “as a general rule, state governments may

not be sued in federal court unless they have waived their Eleventh Amendment immunity,” or

unless Congress has “abrogate[d] the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity when acting pursuant

to its authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Gollomp v. Spitzer, 568 F.3d 355,

365–66 (2d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). “The immunity recognized by the Eleventh Amendment

extends beyond the states themselves to state agents and state instrumentalities that are, effectively,

arms of a state.” Id. (citation omitted).

Congress has not abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to any of

Plaintiff’s causes of action, nor has New York State waived its immunity with respect to the same.

See New York Communities for Change v. New York State Unified Ct. Sys./Off. of Ct. Admin., 680

F. Supp. 3d 407, 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2023). Moreover, the Supreme Court has made clear that Congress

did not intend to override states' sovereign immunity on Section 1983 claims, see Quern v. Jordan,

440 U.S. 332, 340–42, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 59 L.Ed.2d 358 (1979); Dube v. State Univ. of New York,

900 F.2d 587, 594 (2d Cir. 1990), and “it is well-established that New York has not consented to

§ 1983 suits in federal court,” Mamot v. Bd. Of Regents, 367 F. App'x 191, 192 (2d Cir. 2010)

(citing Trotman v. Palisades Interstate Park Comm'n, 557 F.2d 35, 38–40 (2d Cir. 1977))

(affirming dismissal of Section 1983 claims against New York State agencies on Eleventh

Amendment grounds). Furthermore, the Second Circuit has “squarely held that Section 1 [of the

Fourteenth Amendment] claims for damages are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.” Santiago v.

N.Y. Dep't of Corr. Servs., 945 F.2d 25, 32 (2d Cir. 1991). Finally, “New York State has not

consented to be sued in federal court under the [NYSHRL].” Baez v. New York, 629 F. App'x 116,

118 (2d Cir. 2015) (affirming district court's holding that NYSHRL claims against New York State

was barred by sovereign immunity); see Purdie v. City Univ. of N.Y., No. 13-CV-6423, 2015 WL

129552, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2015) (same).

Here, Plaintiff’s first four claims proceed under Section 1983, and his fifth and final claim

under the NYSHRL. (See FAC ¶¶ 68-118.) In light of the above, none of Plaintiff’s asserted causes

of action can proceed against any “‘state agents and state instrumentalities’ where New York “is

the real, substantial party in interest.’” See New York Communities for Change, 680 F. Supp. 3d at

413 (quoting Henny v. New York State, 842 F. Supp. 2d 530, 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)). The Second

Circuit has consistently held that Defendant NYUCS is one such state instrumentality, see, e.g.

Bythewood v. New York, No. 22-2542-CV, 2023 WL 6152796, at *1 (2d Cir. Sept. 21, 2023)

(explaining that NYUCS is “‘unquestionably an arm of the state’ that shares in New York's

immunity to suit”) (citation omitted), and therefore barred claims against it, see, e.g., Kelly v. New

York State Unified Ct. Sys., 2022 WL 1210665, at *2 (2d Cir. Apr. 25, 2022). As a result, all of

Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant NYUCS fail as a matter of law. See New York Communities

for Change, 680 F. Supp. 3d 407 at 414 (dismissing claims against NYUCS on Eleventh

Amendment grounds); Segal v. New York State Unified Ct. Sys., No. 21-CV-2545 (LTS), 2021

WL 1841768, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2021) (same); Zahl v. Kosovsky, No. 08-CV-8308 (LTS),

2011 WL 779784, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2011) (same), aff'd, 471 F. App'x 34 (2d Cir. 2012).

In short, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claims asserted against

Defendant NYUCS and NYUCS’ motion to dismiss all claims asserted against it in the FAC is

therefore granted. Because dismissal is pursuant to Eleventh Amendment immunity, Plaintiff’s

claims against Defendant NYUCS are dismissed with prejudice, and “should not be reasserted in

an amended complaint” in federal court. See Wright v. Admin. of Child. Servs., No. 23-CV-10381

(LTS), 2024 WL 622280, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2024). Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant

NYUCS are dismissed without prejudice to refiling them in state court. See Greenwood v. State of

N.Y., 939 F.Supp. 1060, 1065 (S.D.N.Y.1996), vacated in part on other grounds, 163 F.3d 119

(2d Cir. 1998).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Defendant New York Unified Court System’s motion to

dismiss the First Amended Complaint is GRANTED. Plaintiff's claims against Defendant New

York Unified Court System are dismissed without prejudice to refiling them in state court. The

Clerk of Court is kindly directed to terminate the motion at ECF No. 23 and Defendant New York

Unified Court System.

Dated: May 13, 2024 SO ORDERED:

White Plains, New York

NELSON S. ROMAN

United States District Judge