The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
GUELDA E. BROWN,
Plaintiff,
-against- ORDER
MONTEFIORE MEDICAL CENTER, 18 Civ. 3861 (PGG) (KHP)
DIANE RODRIGUEZ, ARETHA MACK,
VERONICA CRUTE, ANTHONY LEUNG,
and RUSSELL REILLE,
Defendants.
PAUL G. GARDEPHE, U.S.D.J::
Pro se Plaintiff Guelda E. Brown brings this employment discrimination action
against Defendants Montefiore Medical Center (“Montefiore”), Diane Rodriguez, Aretha Mack,
Veronica Crute, Anthony Leung, and Russell Reille. The Amended Complaint asserts claims for
race, national origin, religious and sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the New York State Human Rights Law (““NYSHRL”), and the New
York City Human Rights Law (““NYCHRL”). Brown also claims that she was denied medical
leave in violation of the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). Finally, Brown asserts state law
claims for assault, negligence, and breach of contract. (See Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 26) at 3-4)
On July 21, 2019, this Court dismissed Plaintiffs claims for (1) sex
discrimination under Title VII, the NYSHRL, and the NYCHRL; (2) FMLA violations; and (3)
assault, negligence, and breach of contract. (July 21, 2019 Order (Dkt. No. 52) at 13)
On July 25, 2023, this Court granted Defendants Montefiore, Mack, Crute, and
Leung summary judgment on (1) Plaintiff's hostile work environment claims under Title VII,
Section 1981, and the NYSHRL; and (2) Plaintiff's retaliation claims under Title VII, Section
1981, the NYSHRL, and the NYCHRL. The Court declined to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over Plaintiffs hostile work environment claim under the NYCHRL, and dismissed
that claim without prejudice. (July 25, 2023 Order (Dkt. No. 124) at 39)
Given that Defendant Rodriguez has not appeared in this case and had not joined
in the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, this Court directed Plaintiff to show cause
why her claims against Defendant Rodriguez should not be dismissed. This Court noted that
Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Rodriguez appear to be insufficient for the reasons set forth
in this Court’s July 21, 2019 and July 25, 2023 orders. (Id.)
On August 7, 2023, Plaintiff filed a response to this Court’s order to show cause,
requesting that “[her] claims against Defendant Rodriguez not be dismissed,” and stating that she
“optimistically await[s] [this Court’s] response to [her] request to reconsider and not allow
Rodriguez’s motion to be dismissed as she is the originator of the horrible experience [that
Plaintiff] endured for many years.”! (Pltf. Resp. (Dkt. No. 126) at 1, 4 (emphasis omitted))
Plaintiff contends that she “ha[s] clearly demonstrated [her] burden of proof to
this [C]ourt by submitting evidence of Rodriguez’s vitriolic behavior because of [Plaintiff s]
' To the extent that Plaintiff requests that this Court reconsider its decision to grant summary
judgment as to Defendants Montefiore, Mack, Crute, and Leung, that request is denied. Plaintiff
merely repeats arguments she made in opposing Defendants’ summary judgment motion, which
is insufficient to obtain reconsideration. See Richards v. N. Shore Long Island Jewish Health
Sys., No. CV 10-4544 (LDW) (ETB), 2013 WL 950625, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2013) (“[A]
party may not merely offer the same arguments that were previously submitted to the court when
secking reconsideration.”). Plaintiff also has not “demonstrate[d] controlling law or factual
matters put before the court in its decision on the underlying matter that [she] believes the court
overlooked and that might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court.”
RST (2005) Inc. v. Rsch. in Motion Ltd., 597 F. Supp. 2d 362, 365 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (citing
Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995)). Accordingly, reconsideration is
denied.
As to Plaintiff's reference to “Rodriguez’s motion” (PItf. Resp. (Dkt. No. 126) at 4), Rodriguez
has filed no motion and has not appeared in this case.
religious practice,” and that she “demonstrated that [her] religious belief was being attacked
which created extreme animus against [her].” (Pltf. Resp. (Dkt. No. 126) at 2) In particular,
Brown contends that
[y]ear after year during the Christmas season Rodriguez took it upon herself to
question [Brown’s] belief as to why [Brown] did not celebrate it. [Brown] had
explained numerous times throughout the years and Rodriguez seemed not
satisfied with [her] stance. It made [Brown] very uneasy as it seemed to [her] as
though [Rodriguez] was always attempting to proselytize; as she spoke frequently
about her leadership position in her church.
This made matters worse for [Brown] during [her] daily work experience.
Rodriguez used her position to attack, belittle [Brown] very often. [Rodriguez]
encouraged Defendant Mack to conspire[] against [Brown] because [Brown] was
not of either of their faith.
[Brown] filed numerous complaints as noted by the Compliance and Risk
Management (evidence filed). [Rodriguez] continued her vitriolic behavior
(witnessed in writing by [writer]) towards [Brown]. The Department of Human
Resources Administration did not enforce their own written policies and
procedures (which has also been submitted as evidence)... .
A peaceful and safe place to work was denied, as the HR leadership (Maureen
O’Shea) failed to enforce their policies and procedures for which they are equally
responsible for both Rodriguez’s, Mack’s behavior, Et al.
[Brown’s] medical physician[s] submitted their request to have [Brown]
relocated/removed from being exposed to the daily torment, (medical notes were
entered into evidence).
(id. at 2-3)
Plaintiff further contends that “[t]here is no denying that [her] complaints/meeting
with HR and Compliance angered Rodriguez and Mack which made them retaliate against
[Plaintiff].” (Id. at 3) In particular, Plaintiff asserts that she “was called Satan many times by
Mack as witnessed by Rodriguez herself and other staff members.” She further asserts that
[i]t is highly offensive and discriminatory to call any human being “Satan” as
Mack did on several occasions. Calling [Brown] “Satan” in the presence of many
is defaming [her] character and affecting [her] mental and emotional well-being.
It is deplorable to call anyone “Satan” as [Brown] ha[s] never behaved in an evil
way towards anyone. [Brown] [is] a true Christian who loves Jehovah and [she]
[is] respectful of all of God’s Creation.
(Id.)
Brown alleged these same incidents and raised these same arguments in her
opposition to Defendants Montefiore, Mack, Crute, and Leung’s summary judgment motion (see
Pltf. Opp. (Dkt. No. 105) at 25-26), and the Court addressed these incidents and Brown’s
arguments in the July 25, 2023 order granting summary judgment as to those Defendants. (See
July 25, 2023 Order (Dkt. No. 124) at 21-37)
In her response to this Court’s order to show cause, Brown also enumerates
“{c]ause[s] for [c]oncern”:
1. Diane Rodriguez’s [p]ersonnel file was never submitted into evidence for
review.
2. Human Resources did not provide any documentation of [their] many
meetings held with 1199 SEIU Delegates and Union Representatives.
3. Rodriguez was not subpoenaed and was a No Show at the deposition — the
only one deposed was a[n] HR representative — (Not Maureen O’[S]hea)
who sat in all of the meetings.
4, [Brown’s] [a]nnual [e]valuations demonstrated [her] positive character, as
it was kind, helpful, professional and friendly; which contradicts falsely
made[-]up email that [Brown] was never presented until the
deposition. ...
5. Settlement Conference:
[Brown] was le[d] to believe that after the settlement conference in 2020
which [Brown] was not in agreement with because it did not conform with
[her] emotional suffering, loss of sense of security/safety in the workplace,
[her] health, and as documented] by [her] physicians and [her] [lJawyers
provided to assist [her] as per the New York Legal Assistant Group (Bruce
Strong, Anderson Kill Law Firm) due to the years of duress, retaliation
that held [her] in this demoralizing situation for years. [Brown] believe[s]
that true justice has yet to present itself.
Resp. (Dkt. No. 126) at 4)
Brown does not explain how any of these “[c]ause[s] for [c]oncern” show that her
claims against Defendant Rodriguez should not be dismissed, however. Brown’s complaints that
certain evidence was not provided or “submitted into evidence” are unavailing, as she had a
responsibility to conduct discovery and otherwise “meet the requirements necessary to defeat a
motion for summary judgment,” even as a pro se party. See Jorgensen v. Epic/Sony Recs., 351
F.3d 46, 50 (2d Cir. 2003) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Her complaint that Rodriguez
“was not subpoenaed and was a No Show at the deposition” suffers from the same flaw.
Moreover, Brown has not shown that any of this evidence — even if available and set forth in
support of her claims — would create a material issue of fact as to her claims against Defendant
Rodriguez. Brown’s assertion that her evaluation demonstrates her “positive character” and
“contradicts” a “made[-]Jup email” is of no moment, as the July 25, 2023 order did not rely on
any such email, and Brown’s “positive character” is not at issue with respect to her claims
against Rodriguez. Finally, Brown’s discussion of a 2020 settlement conference is irrelevant to
the determination of whether Brown’s claims against Rodriguez should be dismissed.
In sum, Brown has not explained why her claims against Defendant Rodriguez
should not be dismissed, given this Court’s discussion of Rodriguez’s conduct in the July 25,
2023 order.
“Sua sponte dismissal of the complaint with respect to [a non-appearing
defendant] is appropriate here, because the issues concerning [that defendant] are substantially
the same as those concerning the other defendants, and [plaintiff] had notice and a full
opportunity to make out h[er] claim[s] against [the non-appearing defendant].” Hecht v. Com.
Clearing House, Inc., 897 F.2d 21, 26 n.6 (2d Cir. 1990); see also Chan v. City of New York,
No. 19 Civ. 7239 (RPK) (SJB), 2023 WL 2734681, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2023) (“[B]ecause
plaintiff's claims with respect to the non-appearing [defendants] are essentially identical, those
claims are dismissed against those defendants as well.”); Odyssey Re (London) Ltd. v. Stirling
Cooke Brown Holdings Ltd., 85 F. Supp. 2d 282, 288 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff'd, 2 F. App’x 109
(2d Cir. 2001) (“Even though defendant . . . did not enter an appearance in this case or join in the
motion to dismiss, sua sponte dismissal with respect to him is appropriately considered if the
issues are substantially the same as those concerning the other defendants, and plaintiff had
notice and full opportunity to make out its claim against [the non-appearing defendant].”).
In its order granting summary judgment to Defendants Montefiore, Mack, Crute,
and Leung, this Court analyzed Rodriguez’s conduct at length, and concluded that her conduct
did not result in a hostile work environment for Brown and did not constitute retaliation against
Brown. (See July 25, 2023 Order (Dkt. No. 124) at 22-27, 33-37) The Court nonetheless gave
Brown an opportunity to explain why her claims against Rodriguez should be permitted to
proceed. Because Brown has not shown that her claims against Rodriguez are plausible or that
there is evidence that creates a material issue of fact as to those claims, Brown’s claims against
Rodriguez will be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Rodriguez are
dismissed. The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a copy of this order to pro se Plaintiff, and to
close this case.
Dated: New York, New York
September 5, 2023
SO ORDERED.
(al Lancyohe
Paul G. Gardephe
United States District Judge