The opinion
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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-13671
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
LUIS ALEXANDER, III,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
K. BELL,
Deputy,
Defendant-Appellee,
PASCO COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE,
Defendant.
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-13671
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 8:19-cv-01834-MSS-AAS
____________________
Before WILSON, LUCK, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Plaintiff-Appellant Luis Alexander, III, a pre-trial detainee
proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s finding of qualified
immunity and grant of summary judgment for Pasco County Dep-
uty Kevin Bell. Alexander argues that Bell violated his clearly es-
tablished right to be free from excessive force when Bell placed him
in a chokehold and conducted a “takedown maneuver.” Because
there is not binding caselaw which establishes that chokeholds are
unconstitutional in a situation analogous to this one, we must
AFFIRM the district court’s order.
I.
Alexander was booked into Pasco County Jail in December
of 2018. On May 2, 2019, he was making a call in the telephone
booth in his housing unit. At the end of his call, he stood up from
his chair, in violation of an inconsistently enforced rule that in-
mates had to be seated while on the phone. Bell then entered the
housing unit, saw that Alexander was standing, and told him to sit
down. Alexander did not comply with Bell’s order. Bell then went
to Alexander, ended his phone call, and told him to go to his cell.
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22-13671 Opinion of the Court 3
Alexander told Bell to not disrespect him but still walked towards
his cell. Bell then ordered Alexander to provide his identification
card so that he could write a disciplinary report. Before Alexander
had an opportunity to comply with Bell’s order, Bell put his hand
in Alexander’s front shirt pocket to retrieve Alexander’s ID. Alex-
ander turned away from Bell and pushed him away. Bell then
wrapped his arms around Alexander’s neck and shoulder and con-
ducted a “takedown maneuver.” Bell took Alexander onto a mat-
tress on the ground and choked him. On the mattress, Alexander
continued to resist until Bell gained control of Alexander’s left arm
and placed it behind his back. Bell then handcuffed Alexander and
escorted him to the nurse’s office. The nurse did not observe any
injuries, and Alexander’s x-rays did not reveal spinal fractures or
abnormalities, but he did report pain in his neck, back, and arm.
Alexander sued Bell, alleging excessive force in violation of
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Bell moved for summary judgment, asserting
that he was entitled to qualified immunity because his force was
objectively reasonable, and he did not violate Alexander’s clearly
established constitutional rights. After reviewing evidence on the
record—including Alexander’s medical records, two videos of the
incident without sound, as well as depositions and affidavits from
Alexander, Bell, and numerous others employed and incarcerated
at the jail—the district court found that Bell is entitled to qualified
immunity and granted his summary judgment motion.
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II.
“We review de novo a district court’s disposition of a sum-
mary judgment motion based on qualified immunity, applying the
same legal standards as the district court.” Durruthy v. Pastor, 351
F.3d 1080, 1084 (11th Cir. 2003). Summary judgment is appropriate
when the record evidence shows “that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact” and the moving party “is entitled to judg-
ment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). At summary judg-
ment, the district court must draw all reasonable inferences in fa-
vor of the nonmoving party and may not weigh the evidence or
make credibility determinations. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150–51 (2000).
“To invoke qualified immunity, a public official must first
demonstrate that he was acting within the scope of his [] discretion-
ary authority when the challenged action occurred.” Patel v. City of
Madison, 959 F.3d 1330, 1338 (11th Cir. 2020). If an officer makes
this showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff “to demonstrate that
qualified immunity is inappropriate.” Id. To do so, the plaintiff
must show two things: (1) “when viewed in the light most favora-
ble to him, a material question of fact exists about whether [the
officer] violated [the plaintiff’s] constitutional right to be free from
the use of excessive force,” and (2) that the plaintiff’s “right was
clearly established in light of the specific context of the case” as to
have provided “fair notice” to the officer. Id. (quotations omitted).
Here, it is undisputed that Bell was acting within the scope
of his authority. The burden then shifts to Alexander to
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22-13671 Opinion of the Court 5
demonstrate that qualified immunity is inappropriate. First, we
consider whether material issues of fact remain about whether
Bell’s actions violated Alexander’s constitutional rights. We meas-
ure excessive force claims by pretrial detainees like Alexander un-
der a Fourteenth Amendment objective reasonableness standard.
See Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 391–92 (2015). To deter-
mine whether Alexander’s right to be free from the use of excessive
force under the Fourteenth Amendment has been violated, we con-
sider whether the force used against him was objectively unreason-
able, which is a fact-specific inquiry. Id. at 396–97. Non-exhaustive
considerations in determining the reasonableness of force include:
(1) “the relationship between the need for the use of force and the
amount of force used;” (2) “the extent of the plaintiff’s injury;”
(3) “any effort made by the officer to temper or to limit the amount
of force;” (4) “the severity of the security problem at issue;” (5) “the
threat reasonably perceived by the officer;” and (6) “whether the
plaintiff was actively resisting.” Id. at 397.
The district court found all the Kingsley factors weighed in
Bell’s favor, and accordingly held that Alexander did not demon-
strate a violation of his clearly established constitutional rights. Af-
ter careful review, we agree that the fourth, fifth and sixth factors
weigh in Bell’s favor. But we find that the first, second, and third
factors arguably weigh in Alexander’s favor.
As for the first factor—the relationship between the need for
force and the amount used—we are not convinced that Bell’s force
was proportional to the need presented. See id. The videos are not
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clear as to whether Alexander was placed in a chokehold, and in a
light most favorable to Alexander, we defer to his affidavit and dep-
osition stating that he was. And while Alexander conceded that he
disobeyed Bell’s original order to have a seat, he was not behaving
violently or aggressively towards Bell and did not threaten to harm
Bell. Bell may have felt the need to use force to maintain his au-
thority over both Alexander and the other inmates, but the extent
of the force used most likely exceeded that need. The second fac-
tor—extent of injury—is less clear, but likely weighs in Alexander’s
favor as well. See id. While the nurse reported that Alexander did
not report any injuries on the day of the incident, his medical rec-
ords show that he repeatedly sought medical and mental health
treatment related to the incident and was treated with pain medi-
cation. The third factor—efforts made by the officer to limit the
amount of force—also leans slightly in Alexander’s favor. See id.
Bell could have given Alexander an opportunity to comply with his
order to present his ID instead of immediately engaging in a
takedown maneuver and chokehold. Because the factors weigh in
both Alexander and Bell’s favors, the district court erred in holding
that Alexander did not demonstrate a material question of fact as
to whether Bell used unreasonable force.
Concluding that material issues of fact remain about
whether Bell’s conduct violated Alexander’s Fourteenth Amend-
ment rights, we consider whether the law clearly forbade Bell’s ac-
tions at the time he took them. See Patel, 959 F.3d at 1338. To meet
his burden, Alexander must identify relevant, concrete, and factu-
ally defined precedent which would make it “obvious” to
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reasonable government actors in Bell’s place that their actions vio-
lated federal law. Id. Essentially, we consider whether Bell was put
on notice that his conduct was unlawful. Alexander cited Popham
v. City of Kennesaw, 820 F.2d 1570 (11th Cir. 1987), to assert that Bell
was on notice that his actions would constitute excessive force in
violation of clearly established law. In Popham, we held that a rea-
sonable jury could have concluded that the officer there used ex-
cessive force when he choked the plaintiff unnecessarily. 820 F.2d
at 1576–77. Despite this factual similarity, Popham is not sufficiently
on point. We did not decide there whether the officer was entitled
to qualified immunity; we only examined the jury’s verdict, which
is where the language of qualified immunity came into play. See id.
at 1574. Thus, the cases are not sufficiently analogous to clearly
establish a constitutional right here. Further, research has not re-
vealed any case law from the Florida Supreme Court, this court, or
the U.S. Supreme Court which put Bell on notice that his conduct
was unlawful. Therefore, the district court did not err in finding
that Bell was entitled to qualified immunity and granting his mo-
tion for summary judgment.
AFFIRMED.