allowing the redaction of compensation as “sensitive personal information”
How later courts described this case
- allowing the redaction of compensation as “sensitive personal information”
- “[A] strong presumption attaches to materials filed in connection with dispositive motions, such as a motion to dismiss or a summary judgment motion.”
- “[T]he privacy interests of innocent third parties . . . should weigh heavily in a court’s balancing equation.”
- “Commercial competitors seeking an advantage over rivals need not be indulged in the name of monitoring the courts . . . .”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
USONUITTEHDE RSTNA DTIESST RDIICSTT ROIFC TN ECWOU YROTR K
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:
ULKU ROWE, :
Plaintiff :
: 19 Civ. 8655 (LGS)
-against- :
: ORDER
GOOGLE LLC, :
Defendant. :
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LORNA G. SCHOFIELD, District Judge:
WHEREAS, Defendant Google LLC has filed five motions to seal documents submitted
in connection with the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. Plaintiff Ulku Rowe has
filed responses opposing portions of these motions to seal. Because the motions present similar
issues and the Memoranda of Law submitted in connection with the motions present similar
arguments, they are addressed jointly below.
WHEREAS, a three-part inquiry determines whether to seal a document. See Olson v.
Major League Baseball, 29 F.4th 59, 87-88 (2d Cir. 2022); Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of
Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 119-20 (2d Cir. 2006). The first question is whether the document is “a
judicial document subject to the [presumed] right of public access,” meaning that the document is
“relevant to the performance of the judicial function and useful in the judicial process.” Lugosch,
435 F.3d at 119 (internal quotation marks omitted). The second step, if the presumption attaches,
is to determine the weight of the presumption by assessing “the role of the material at issue in the
exercise of Article III judicial power and the resultant value of such information to those
monitoring the federal courts.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The third step is to
balance against the presumption any “competing considerations” such as “impairing law
enforcement[,] judicial efficiency” and “the privacy interests of those resisting disclosure.” Id. at
120 (internal quotation marks omitted). In weighing the presumption against competing
considerations, a court can seal documents only “if specific, on the record findings are made
demonstrating that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve
that interest.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
WHEREAS, the presumption of public access applies to the documents at issue. The
pending motions seek to seal documents and portions of the briefing submitted in support of the
parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. “It is well-settled that ‘documents submitted to a
court for its consideration in a summary judgment motion are -- as a matter of law -- judicial
documents to which a strong presumption of access attaches.’” Brown v. Maxwell, 929 F.3d 41,
47 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 121).
WHEREAS, the documents at issue are subject to a strong presumption of access, as they
were submitted in connection with a summary judgment motion. See Olson, 29 F.4th at 90 (“[A]
strong presumption attaches to materials filed in connection with dispositive motions, such as a
motion to dismiss or a summary judgment motion.”); Maxwell, 929 F.3d at 53 (“Materials
submitted in connection with a motion for summary judgment are subject to a strong presumption
of public access.”). Such documents “should not remain under seal absent the most compelling
reasons.” Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 121 (internal quotation marks omitted).
WHEREAS, for each document, the party seeking to file under seal must show that
competing considerations override the public right of access. See id. at 120. Defendant’s
motions to file under seal are addressed according to the type of information sought to be
protected and the considerations offered in support.
Identity of Clients and Strategic Initiatives
WHEREAS, Defendant argues that disclosure of the identities of customers, clients,
strategic business initiatives, and other sensitive commercial information (unrelated to
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compensation, which is discussed below) contained in certain documents would result in
competitive harm to the company. Preventing competitive harm is a countervailing interest that
can override the public right of access. See United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1051 (2d Cir.
1995) (“Commercial competitors seeking an advantage over rivals need not be indulged in the
name of monitoring the courts . . . .”); Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Sunny Merch. Corp., 97 F.
Supp. 3d 485, 511 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (allowing for the redaction of “specific business information
and strategies, which if revealed, may provide valuable insights . . . that a competitor would seek
to exploit” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Defendant argues that disclosure of the identities
of certain clients, individuals who are in contact with Defendant’s employees and strategies for
cultivating business could put it at competitive disadvantage. To avoid potential competitive
harm, Defendant proposes redactions of specific information, satisfying the requirement that a
sealing order be “narrowly tailored.” Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 124. Because this information is
unnecessary to adjudicate Plaintiff’s claims and the parties’ summary judgment arguments, the
risk of competitive harm outweighs the public right of access.
It is therefore ORDERED that, to the extent the sealing motions seek to protect the
identities of clients or strategic business initiatives, they are GRANTED.
Individual Compensation Information
WHEREAS, Defendant moves to file under seal documents containing information
related to the compensation of individual employees. This information concerns individuals who
are not parties to this lawsuit, and whose privacy interests must factor into the sealing analysis.
See Amodeo, 71 F.3d at 1050-51 (“[T]he privacy interests of innocent third parties . . . should
weigh heavily in a court’s balancing equation.”). Individuals’ financial information, including
their compensation, is considered private and can override even a strong presumption in favor of
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public access. See Dodona I, LLC v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 119 F. Supp. 3d 152, 156 (S.D.N.Y.
2015) (allowing the redaction of compensation as “sensitive personal information”); Statoil
(Nigeria) Ltd. v. Nigerian Nat’l Petroleum Corp., No. 18 Civ. 2392, 2020 WL 3170566, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2020) (approving request to redact employee salary information). But see In
re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, No. 03 MDL 1570, 2019 WL 3296959, at *7
(S.D.N.Y. July 22, 2019) (denying request to redact individual salary information).
WHEREAS, this information is central to Plaintiff’s claims and the parties’ arguments at
summary judgment. To understand the equal-pay issues, the public must understand what
constitutes the compensation of Plaintiff’s proposed comparators and how Defendant determines
it, making the presumption of access particularly strong with respect to this information.
Defendant admits that individual salary information is not confidential and that employees may
share information about their compensation freely, including outside of the company. Defendant
has not carried its burden to overcome the presumption of access with respect to compensation
amounts.
WHEREAS, to accommodate the privacy interests of third-parties, documents may be
filed under seal with the names, but not the compensation amounts, of non-party employees
redacted. Pseudonyms may be used to identify individual comparators. Defendant argues that
such an approach is unworkable and futile, as the identities of comparators could potentially be
deduced from public filings. This argument fails because it assumes the default is non-disclosure.
The presumption -- particularly strong for documents submitted in support of a summary
judgment motion -- is that of public filing, rebuttable only with “specific, on the record findings
. . . that closure is essential to preserve higher values.” Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 120 (internal
quotation marks omitted). Defendant has not offered a sufficient factual basis to make these
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findings.
It is ORDERED that, to the extent the sealing motions propose redactions to names and
other identifying information that could connect specific individuals to compensation amounts,
the motions are GRANTED. The motions are DENIED to the extent they propose redactions to
salary amounts or other information broader than necessary to preserve anonymity.
Compensation Practices Generally
WHEREAS, Defendant seeks to file under seal information about its compensation
practices generally. Defendant argues that disclosure of such information could cause
competitive harm, by allowing competitors to hire talent away from Defendant more efficiently.
This is a countervailing consideration, which in some cases can override the presumption of
disclosure. See, e.g., Oliver Wyman, Inc. v. Eielson, 282 F. Supp. 3d 684, 706-07 (S.D.N.Y.
2017) (allowing the redaction of average and individual salary information from summary
judgment record, due to risk of competitive harm). Defendant also states that its internal
compensation practices are proprietary.
WHEREAS, this information is central to Plaintiff’s equal-pay claims and the parties’
arguments at summary judgment. Unlike individual salary amounts, information about how
Defendant sets compensation in general does not implicate non-parties’ privacy interests. See
Barrett v. Forest Lab’ys, Inc., No. 12 Civ. 5224, 2015 WL 3851860, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 11,
2015) (denying motion to seal documents containing descriptions of compensation practices);
Saks Inc. v. Attachmate Corp., No. 14 Civ. 4902, 2015 WL 1841136, at *18-19 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.
17, 2015) (denying motion to seal records related to general business practices, contrasted with
“information about employee compensation as it relate[d] to any particular employee”). To
support its argument in favor of sealing, Defendant offers only conclusory statements and
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speculative predictions of competitive harm resulting from the disclosure of materials about its
internal organization. For example, its supporting documentation states, “[i]t would be damaging
to Google if these documents got into the hands of its competitors,” without elaboration. It also
states that “[i]n designing any written materials regarding compensation, . . . we assume that they
will be kept confidential and not published publicly.” That a fact has not previously been made
public is not enough to override the right of public access, which is particularly strong with
respect to these materials. Instead, Defendant must show, with particularized evidence, that
disclosure would cause some competitive harm. The materials submitted do not permit this Court
to make “specific, on the record findings” that sealing documents is “necessary to preserve higher
values.” Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 120 (internal quotation marks omitted). Compounding the
problem is the breadth of the withholding Defendant requests. For example, it wishes to withhold
entirely the Declaration of Chris Humez, which contains information about the compensation of
Plaintiff and her comparators, as well as information about how Defendant sets compensation
generally, all of which is central to Plaintiff’s claims. Defendant acknowledges that Plaintiff has
disclosed information about her compensation in this suit, but still seeks to file the portions of the
Humez Declaration concerning her compensation under seal. Allowing Defendant to withhold
the entire declaration would run afoul of the requirement that a sealing order be “narrowly
tailored.” Id. at 124.
It is ORDERED that, to the extent the sealing motions seek to protect information about
Defendant’s compensation practices generally, they are DENIED.
Job Descriptions
WHEREAS, Defendant seeks to file under seal various job ladders and job descriptions.
Defendant argues that the job ladders are proprietary and would result in competitive harm if
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disclosed, in the form of competitors’ modelling their internal employee management on
Defendant’s practices. This argument is unpersuasive. Defendant offers no plausible account of
how disclosure of information on job responsibilities would cause competitive harm, beyond
speculation that competitors would model their internal operations on those of Defendant. The
job responsibilities of Defendant’s employees, and whether or not they are comparable, are a
central issue in this case. The job descriptions offer the kind of information that a member of the
public would need to understand the resolution of the parties’ motions for summary judgment.
Defendant’s arguments in favor of sealing fall short of what is needed to make “specific, on the
record findings . . . that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to
serve that interest.” Id. at 120 (internal quotation marks omitted).
It is therefore ORDERED that, to the extent the sealing motions concern job ladders and
job descriptions, they are DENIED.
Recruiting Information
WHEREAS, Defendant seeks to file under seal information disclosing the identity of
candidates under consideration for executive roles. Defendant argues that this information is
private and, if disclosed, could harm those individuals because candidates typically do not
disclose to their current employer or manager that they are seeking another role. The identity of
individuals seeking executive positions is unrelated to the claims at issue or the parties’ summary
judgment briefing. The risk that disclosure of their identities could cause them harm outweighs
the presumption of public access. For most of the relevant documents, Defendant seeks to
withhold only the names of candidates, satisfying the requirement that a sealing order be
“narrowly tailored.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). However, for others, Defendant
seeks to withhold large portions of a candidate’s resume or information on their professional
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background. The nature of Plaintiff’s claims makes the credentials of job candidates, including
their prior experience, important context for understanding the adjudication of the parties’
motions. Any imposition on candidates’ privacy by disclosure of this information, particularly
when candidates’ names are redacted, does not outweigh the right of public access.
It is ORDERED that, to the extent the motions to file under seal seek to protect the
identities of candidates for positions with Defendant, they are GRANTED. The motions are
DENIED to the extent they propose redactions to other information broader than necessary to
preserve anonymity.
Other Personal Information
WHEREAS, Defendant seeks to file under seal personal information about non-parties to
this lawsuit, unrelated to their compensation, qualifications, job history, or other characteristics
relevant to Plaintiff’s claims. Such information consists of personal telephone numbers, email
addresses and home addresses. This information is unrelated to the resolution of this case and
implicates the privacy interests of non-parties. See Amodeo, 71 F.3d at 1050-51. These
countervailing privacy interests overcome the presumption against public access.
WHEREAS, Defendant seeks leave to file under seal the identity of a non-party female
employee who sought advice from Will Grannis, the Managing Director for the Office of the
CTO within Defendant’s Cloud organization, regarding compensation. Plaintiff opposes this
portion of the motion, arguing that this person’s seeking advice is relevant evidence to infer
discrimination and accordingly, its probative value outweighs any imposition on privacy
interests. This argument ignores that Defendant seeks only to redact the identity of the employee,
leaving the surrounding contents of the email and thereby preserving its probative value. These
redactions are “narrowly tailored” to protect the non-party’s privacy interest. Lugosch, 435 F.3d
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at 120 (internal quotation marks omitted).
It is ORDERED that to the extent the motions to file under seal seek to protect private
personal information unrelated to compensation, qualifications, job or educational history, and
other characteristics relevant to Plaintiff’s claims, they are GRANTED.
Summary
It is hereby ORDERED that Defendant’s motions to file under seal are GRANTED IN
PART, DENIED IN PART. Some of the relevant documents may be filed under seal in the
form requested by Defendant, as the proposed redactions comply with the guidelines given above.
The motions are GRANTED with respect to the following documents, which may be filed under
seal in the form requested by Defendant: Declaration of Sara B. Tomezsko in Support of
Defendant Google LLC’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibits 21, 22, 23, 24, 34, 35, 38, and
40 (Dkt. 143); Declaration of Maya S. Jumper, Exhibits 25, 59, and 95 (Dkt. 160); and
Supplemental Declaration of Sara B. Tomezsko in Further Support of Google’s Motion for
Summary Judgment and Opposition to Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and
Exhibits 3, 4, 10, and 14 thereto (Dkt. 187). The motions to file under seal are DENIED with
respect to all other documents.
The motions are denied without prejudice to renew. Defendant may propose redactions
consistent with the guidelines in this Order on documents it sought to file entirely under seal or
more narrowly tailored redactions to documents it sought to file in redacted form. All documents
currently filed under seal shall remain under seal at this time. If Defendant does not file a
renewed motion with respect to a document within thirty days of the issuance of this order, the
party originally filing the document shall refile it consistent with this Order.
The parties are reminded that this Order covers only the sealing or redaction of
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information submitted in connection with the parties’ motions for summary judgment. That
information may be filed under seal in connection with those motions does not mean it may be
filed under seal at trial. See Amodeo, 71 F.3d at 1049 (“[T]he public has an especially strong
right of access to evidence introduced in trials.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to close the motions at Dkt. 144, Dkt. 161,
Dkt. 171, Dkt. 188, Dkt. 198, and Dkt. 211.
Dated: September 26, 2022
New York, New York
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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