Brown v. Campbell

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

CAROL BROWN,

Plaintiff,

21-CV-10276 (LTS)

-against-

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

CRYSTAL CAMPBELL,

Defendant.

LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge:

Plaintiff, who is appearing pro se, brings this action alleging that Defendant, who is her

sister, violated her rights. By order dated January 18, 2022, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request

to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis (IFP). The Court dismisses the

complaint for the reasons set forth below.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is

frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see

Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also

dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(h)(3).

While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to

construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret

them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470

F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in

original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits –

to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.

The Supreme Court has held that, under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to

state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the

Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing

the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals

of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550

U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court

must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is

entitled to relief. Id.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff brings this action against her sister, Crystal Campbell. Plaintiff’s complaint is

not the model of clarity, but the Court is able to discern that Plaintiff alleges that, after their

father died, Defendant kept all of his belongings and valuables. Plaintiff brings this action

seeking to recover family pictures, their father’s ashes, and other household items from

Defendant.

DISCUSSION

The subject matter jurisdiction of the federal district courts is limited. Federal jurisdiction

exists only when a “federal question” is presented, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, or when there is “diversity

of citizenship” between the plaintiff and the defendant and the amount in controversy exceeds

$75,000.00, 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Federal courts “have an independent obligation to determine

whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any party.”

Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006) (citing Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526

U.S. 574, 583 (1999)). If a court “concludes that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, [it] must

dismiss the complaint in its entirety.” Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 514; see also Fed. R. Civ. P 12(h)(3).

A. Federal question jurisdiction

To provide a basis for federal question jurisdiction, a plaintiff’s claims must arise “under

the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. A case arises under

federal law if the complaint “establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action or that

the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal

law.” Bay Shore Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Kain, 485 F.3d 730, 734-35 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting

Empire Healthchoice Assur., Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 690 (2006)). Mere invocation of

federal jurisdiction, without any facts demonstrating a federal law claim, does not create federal

subject matter jurisdiction. See Nowak v. Ironworkers Local 6 Pension Fund, 81 F.3d 1182,

1188-89 (2d Cir. 1996).

Plaintiff’s complaint does not set forth any federal claims or otherwise assert a basis for

federal question jurisdiction. Because Plaintiff’s claims do not arise under the Constitution or

any federal statute, federal question jurisdiction does not apply.

B. Diversity jurisdiction

Plaintiff also does not allege facts demonstrating that the Court has diversity jurisdiction

to consider this action. To establish jurisdiction under Section 1332, a plaintiff must first allege

that the plaintiff and the defendant are citizens of different states. Wis. Dep’t of Corr. v. Schacht,

524 U.S. 381, 388 (1998). In addition, the plaintiff must allege to a “reasonable probability” that

the claim is in excess of the sum or value of $75,000.00, the statutory jurisdictional amount. See

28 U.S.C. § 1332(a); Colavito v. N.Y. Organ Donor Network, Inc., 438 F.3d 214, 221 (2d Cir.

2006) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Plaintiff alleges that she resides in Bronx County, New York. Plaintiff fails to provide an

address for Defendant, but she asserts in her complaint that Defendant “lived in upstate New

York.” (ECF No. 2 at 9.) Because Plaintiff’s allegations indicate that she and Defendant are

citizens of the same state, diversity of citizenship does not exist between the parties, precluding

diversity jurisdiction.1

As Plaintiff has failed to allege facts showing that the Court has either federal question or

diversity jurisdiction of this matter, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s complaint for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113

(2d Cir. 2000) (“A plaintiff asserting subject matter jurisdiction has the burden of proving by a

preponderance of the evidence that it exists.”).

C. Leave to amend is denied

District courts generally grant a pro se plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to

cure its defects, but leave to amend is not required where it would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione,

657 F.3d 116, 123–24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). The

Court declines to grant Plaintiff leave to amend her complaint because the allegations show that

the defects in Plaintiff’s complaint cannot be cured with an amendment.

CONCLUSION

The Court dismisses the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ.

P. 12(h)(3).

1 Even if Plaintiff and Defendant are citizens of different states, the complaint would be

insufficient to demonstrate that the Court has diversity jurisdiction because Plaintiff fails to

allege damages in excess of $75,000.00.

The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would

not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See

Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).

The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a copy of this order to Plaintiff and note service on

the docket.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 31, 2022

New York, New York

/s/ Laura Taylor Swain

LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN

Chief United States District Judge