Nypl v. JP Morgan Chase & Co.

USONUITTEHDE RSTNA DTEISST DRIISCTTR OICFT N CEOWU YROTR K

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:

JOHN NYPL, et al., :

Plaintiffs, :

: 15 Civ. 9300 (LGS)

-against- :

: ORDER

JPMORGAN CHASE & CO., et al., :

Defendants. :

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LORNA G. SCHOFIELD, District Judge:

WHEREAS, courts have an independent duty to assess subject matter jurisdiction. Hertz

Corp. v Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 94 (2010); SPV OSUS, Ltd. v. UBS AG, 882 F.3d 333, 347 (2d Cir.

2018) (Calabresi, J., concurring);

WHEREAS, “[t]he objection that a federal court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction may be

raised by a party, or by a court on its own initiative, at any stage in the litigation.” In Touch

Concepts, Inc. v. Cellco P’ship, 788 F.3d 98, 101 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks

omitted);

WHEREAS, “Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution limits the subject-matter

jurisdiction of the federal courts to ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’” SM Kids, LLC v. Google LLC,

963 F.3d 206, 211 (2d Cir. 2020) (citation omitted);

WHEREAS, “[t]he standing doctrine, which emerges from Article III, is designed ‘to

ensure that federal courts do not exceed their authority as it has been traditionally understood.’”

Id. (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016)). “The doctrine imposes three

requirements: ‘[t]he plaintiff must have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to

the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable

judicial decision.’” Id. (quoting Spokeo, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1547);

WHEREAS, plaintiffs must demonstrate standing for each claim. Town of Chester v.

Laroe Ests., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1645, 1650 (2017);

WHEREAS, once the issue of standing is put at issue, a District Court has leeway as to

the procedure it follows. All. for Envt. Renewal, Inc. v. Pyramid Crossgates Co., 436 F.3d 82, 87-

88 (2d Cir. 2006). If genuine disputes of material fact exist, a Court may conduct a hearing, or

the issue may be resolved on motion supported by affidavits. Id. Here, no party has requested an

evidentiary hearing and, as explained below, no material fact is in dispute that would warrant a

hearing;

WHEREAS, Defendants pointed to evidence that Plaintiff Nypl lacks Article III standing

in their memorandum of law in opposition to the Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. (Dkt.

No. 726 at 29). Nypl testified at his deposition that he has not taken cash into a bank branch and

exchanged it for foreign currency. He further testified that he does not remember ever going to a

bank branch where he had an account and trading currency there. He then testified that he does

not have any recollection of ever going to a bank branch in the U.S. and exchanging currency;

WHEREAS, Plaintiffs did not dispute this evidence. (Dkt. No. 738 at 12-13);

WHEREAS, Plaintiffs were provided an additional opportunity to meet their burden of

showing that Nypl has standing and to explain why the California Unfair Competition Law claim

should not be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Nypl is the only Plaintiff

asserting that claim (Dkt. No. 770 at 2);

WHEREAS, Nypl did not refute the evidence identified by Defendants to show that he

lacks standing, offered no contrary evidence that shows that he has standing and has not met his

burden of demonstrating standing. Although Plaintiffs quote a litany of deposition testimony to

argue that Nypl has standing, none of that testimony answers the straightforward standing

question at issue here. The claims in this action are limited to injuries connected to transactions

“involving foreign currency purchased with U.S. Dollars and physically received at Defendants’

retail branches within the United States.” (Dkt. No. 349 at 1). Plaintiffs have not presented any

evidence to show that Nypl participated in such a transaction and therefore, cannot show that he

has suffered an injury for purposes of Article III standing. Other than the bald assertion that Nypl

“did refute” Defendant’s evidence that he lacks standing, Plaintiffs present no argument or

analysis to connect the evidence they have identified to any basis for finding that Nypl has

standing.

Plaintiffs have presented evidence of some transactions by Nypl, but none meeting the

contours of the claims in this case. First, Plaintiffs point to testimony that at some point Nypl

gave U.S. Dollars to one of the defendants and received a non-U.S. currency in return. This

testimony is insufficient to meet his burden because it does not provide any details about the

transaction, such as the currencies exchanged, the geographic location of the exchange, whether a

bank branch was involved or which Defendant was involved. Second, Plaintiff Nypl points to

testimony that he lived in California from January 2007 to December 2013, and that he

exchanged currency on many occasions. That testimony does not support Nypl’s standing

because it states that the exchange of currency took place outside of the United States. Nypl

stated, “I have exchanged currency. . . . I don’t recall specific dates, but I’ve done it on many

occasions. I’ve traveled to many countries, and I do it wherever I go.” The claims in this case

are limited to transactions “involving foreign currency purchased with U.S. Dollars and

physically received at Defendants’ retail branches within the United States.” (Dkt. No. 349 at 1,

4). Third, Plaintiffs point to testimony that Nypl has exchanged money in airports, that he has

sometimes conducted ATM transactions and that his ex-wife has exchanged money at a Chase

Bank. Again, none of this testimony supports finding that Nypl has purchased foreign currency

with U.S. Dollars at bank branches in the United States.

WHEREAS, Nypl is the sole plaintiff in this action asserting a claim under the California

Unfair Competition Law (“CUCL”). (Dkt. No. 186 at 15-16; Dkt. No. 190 98-100);

WHEREAS, to the extent Plaintiffs characterize Nypl’s standing issue as one of

supplemental jurisdiction, their argument is misplaced. Plaintiffs’ letter argues that the Court has

supplemental jurisdiction over the CUCL claim. This argument fails to address the threshold

issue of whether there is a case and controversy sufficient to provide Nypl with standing to bring

his claim -- a question separate from that of supplemental jurisdiction. “A plaintiff must

demonstrate standing for each claim.” Town of Chester, 137 S. Ct. at 1650 (emphasis added)

(internal quotation marks omitted). It is hereby

ORDERED that the CUCL claim is DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

because no plaintiff in this action has standing to bring such a claim. It is further

ORDERED that Defendants’ request for Nypl to be dismissed from the case entirely

because he lacks standing is DENIED. Under the one-plaintiff rule, so long as one plaintiff has

standing to assert each claim in the case, a court can adjudicate the case without inquiring as to

the standing of remaining plaintiffs. See Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 446 (2009) (“Because

the superintendent clearly has standing to challenge the lower courts' decisions, we need not

consider whether the Legislators also have standing to do so.”); Kachalsky v. Cnty. of

Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 84 n.2 (2d Cir. 2012) (“Where, as here, at least one plaintiff has

standing, jurisdiction 1s secure and we can adjudicate the case whether the additional plaintiff has

standing or not.”). Here, as to the remaining claims, which are brought on behalf of a putative

nationwide class, two Plaintiffs, Lisa McCarthy and Valarie Jolly, testified at their depositions

that they purchased foreign currency at JPMorgan branches and have met their burden of

demonstrating standing for this stage of the litigation.

Dated: January 19, 2022

New York, New York □

4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE