finding that, although the plaintiff “might well have been able to satisfy us that Defendants’ actions violated his clearly established rights,” the plaintiff “through his counsel, [has simply] failed to carry the burden assigned to him by law.”
How later courts described this case
- finding that, although the plaintiff “might well have been able to satisfy us that Defendants’ actions violated his clearly established rights,” the plaintiff “through his counsel, [has simply] failed to carry the burden assigned to him by law.”
- holding that aright was not clearly established where the plaintiff failed to pro *1196 vide "a single case citation to support” that notion
- affirming summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds where the plaintiff’s response “made little, if any, attempt to meet his heavy two-part burden,” and “[w]ithout any such argument, Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity” (internal quotation marks omitted)
- upholding summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds where plaintiff’s response “made little, if any, attempt to meet his heavy two-part burden,” and “[w]ithout any such argument, Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity” (internal quotation marks omitted)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH July 9, 2013
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Clerk of Court
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
OLIVER A. ROJAS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
No. 12-1283
KENNETH A. ANDERSON;
NICHOLAS WILSON, in their
individual and official capacities,
Defendants - Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
(D.C. No. 1:11-CV-01200-DME-KLM)
Earl S. Wylder of Irwin & Boesen, P.C., Denver, Colorado (William P. Buckley
of The Law Firm of Leonard Chesler, P.C., Denver Colorado, with him on the
brief) for Plaintiff - Appellant.
Gillian M. Fahlsing of Senter Goldfarb & Rice, L.L.C., Denver, Colorado, for
Defendants - Appellees.
Before HARTZ, McKAY, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.
McKAY, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff Oliver Rojas appeals the district court’s order granting summary
judgment to Defendants on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims.
Plaintiff was arrested after Defendant Officer Kenneth Anderson stopped
Plaintiff, who was visibly intoxicated, and his two cousins as they were struggling
to enter a house at three o’clock in the morning. Upon being questioned by
Officer Anderson, Plaintiff and his cousins told Officer Anderson that Plaintiff
lived at the house, and one of the cousins allegedly showed Officer Anderson
Plaintiff’s driver’s license, which listed the house as Plaintiff’s address. Despite
these representations, Officer Anderson decided to take Plaintiff to a
detoxification facility based on the fact that Plaintiff “was clearly intoxicated and
barely able to stand.” (Appellee’s Resp. Br. at 17.) To do so, he grabbed
Plaintiff’s arm and attempted to walk Plaintiff off of the front porch. Around that
time, a woman later identified as Plaintiff’s mother opened the door. She initially
spoke to Plaintiff’s cousins in Spanish but then “said in English, ‘That’s my
nephew, that’s my son, they live here.’” (R. at 101.)
During this exchange, Officer Anderson maintained his hold on Plaintiff
and “kept pulling on [his] arm and telling him not to go inside of the house.” (R.
at 57.) According to Officer Anderson, Plaintiff refused to comply “and, instead,
he lunged back and forth” in an effort to free his arm, which Officer Anderson
perceived as an attempt by Plaintiff to hit him. (R. at 57.) Plaintiff and his
cousins, however, agree that Plaintiff “never swung at [Officer Anderson]” (R. at
105), did not “attempt to hit Officer Anderson with his fist,” and did not “attempt
to strike Officer Anderson in any other manner” (R. at 190, 191; see also R. at
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189). Another officer who arrived on scene as back-up likewise did not see
Plaintiff take a swing at Officer Anderson.
As a result of his efforts, Plaintiff ultimately broke free from Officer
Anderson’s grasp, at which point he ran into the house. Officer Anderson
followed Plaintiff and, after a struggle and with the assistance of the two other
officers on scene, arrested him for attempting to assault a peace officer. Plaintiff
was then taken outside and placed in a patrol car, where he continued to resist,
forcefully kicking at the car window. In response, Defendants removed Plaintiff,
who was at this point handcuffed, from the patrol car to better secure him.
According to Plaintiff, after he had been removed from the patrol car and his feet
tied, Defendants picked him up and dropped him face-first onto the asphalt,
causing him to split open his chin and fracture his mandible.
Following this incident, Plaintiff filed a complaint under § 1983 against
Defendants asserting claims of unlawful seizure and excessive force. 1 The district
court granted summary judgment to Defendants based on qualified immunity,
concluding Officer Anderson had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff and, in light of
the exigent circumstances surrounding the event, his warantless entry into
Plaintiff’s home was therefore justified. The district court further concluded that
1
Plaintiff’s complaint originally included additional claims asserted by two
of his sisters and claims against another officer and the City of Northglenn.
These claims were voluntarily dismissed before resolution of Defendants’ motion
for summary judgment.
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Defendants’ act of dropping Plaintiff did not violate the Fourth Amendment
because it was reasonable for Defendants to pull Plaintiff out of the patrol car by
his legs and to place him in a hobble restraint, even if they did so in a careless
manner. 2 Plaintiff appeals this decision, arguing summary judgment was
inappropriate on both of his claims. 3
“We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo,
reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”
Clark v. Edmunds, 513 F.3d 1219, 1221-22 (10th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation
2
The district court appears to have accepted Defendants’ theory of
Plaintiff’s excessive force claim—that Plaintiff was accidentally injured as he was
removed from the patrol car. (R. at 210 (“The gravamen of Rojas’s Fourth
Amendment excessive force claim is that Defendants Anderson and Wilson used
excessive force when they pulled him from the patrol car and Rojas’s chin hit the
pavement.”), 212 n.4 (“Rojas does not allege that the Defendants intentionally
slammed his head into the pavement.”).). Plaintiff did, however, offer testimony
that Defendants intentionally dropped him after he was removed from the patrol
car and after Defendants tied his feet. (R. at 184-88 (Rojas Dep., cited in Pl.’s
Resp. to Mot. for Summ. J., R. at 170).)
3
As an initial matter, Defendants argue we lack jurisdiction to consider
Plaintiff’s appeal because Plaintiff’s arguments are based on the district court’s
factual determinations, and we may review only the district court’s legal
conclusions. Defendants’ argument mistakenly relies on the limitation on our
interlocutory jurisdiction over denials of qualified immunity. See Fogarty v.
Gallegos, 523 F.3d 1147, 1153-54 (10th Cir. 2008) (“[W]e have interlocutory
jurisdiction over denials of qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage to
the extent that they turn on an issue of law. . . . At this stage, however, we are not
at liberty to review a district court’s factual conclusions, such as the existence of
a genuine issue of material fact for a jury to decide, or that a plaintiff’s evidence
is sufficient to support a particular factual inference.” (internal quotation marks
and brackets omitted)). No such limitation applies to our review of final
judgments granting qualified immunity, over which we of course have
jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
-4-
marks and brackets omitted). “However, because qualified immunity is designed
to protect public officials from spending inordinate time and money defending
erroneous suits at trial, we review summary judgment decisions involving a
qualified immunity defense somewhat differently than other summary judgment
rulings.” Id. at 1222 (internal quotation marks omitted). “When a defendant
asserts a qualified immunity defense, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to satisfy a
strict two-part test: first, the plaintiff must show that the defendant’s actions
violated a constitutional or statutory right; second, the plaintiff must show that
this right was clearly established at the time of the conduct at issue.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). “If, and only if, the plaintiff meets this two-part test
does a defendant then bear the traditional burden of the movant for summary
judgment—showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that he
or she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
In response to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff made
little, if any, attempt to meet his “heavy two-part burden,” Martinez v. Carr, 479
F.3d 1292, 1294 (10th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). 4 Rather,
4
While Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and briefing on appeal
contain slightly more extensive discussions regarding the qualified immunity
analysis, they did little to help us consider the issues of this case. For instance,
Defendants maintain that Officer Anderson had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff
for an attempted assault on a peace officer because “it is undisputed that Rojas
(continued...)
-5-
with regard to his unlawful seizure claim, Plaintiff cursorily argued (1) Officer
Anderson had no need to take Plaintiff to a detoxification facility because he
could have easily determined that Plaintiff lived at the house; (2) Officer
Anderson’s asserted concern for Plaintiff’s safety and the safety of the residents
of the house “is absurd” (R. at 172); and (3) Officer Anderson “did not have
probable cause to arrest [him] for attempted assault on a peace officer, because an
attempted assault never occurred” (R. at 173). Absent from Plaintiff’s argument
is any discussion of how Officer Anderson’s actions violated Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights, any discussion of whether “the infringed right at issue was
4
(...continued)
‘lunged back and forth’ and that Anderson interpreted these movements as an
attempt by Rojas to strike him.” (Appellee’s Resp. Br. at 19.) Defendants
correctly assert that “[p]robable cause exists if the facts and circumstances within
the arresting officer’s knowledge . . . are sufficient to lead a prudent person to
believe that the arrestee has committed or is committing an offense.” Romero v.
Fay, 45 F.3d 1472, 1476 (10th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted).
However, this determination is made by “examin[ing] the events leading up to the
arrest, and then decid[ing] whether these historical facts, viewed from the
standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount to probable cause.”
Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(emphasis added). Officer Anderson’s subjective interpretation of Plaintiff’s
actions is therefore irrelevant, and Defendants’ repeated reliance on it is
unpersuasive. With respect to Plaintiff’s excessive force claim, we note
Defendants’ continued refusal to acknowledge the possibility that Plaintiff’s
claim was based on Defendants’ alleged conduct in intentionally dropping
Plaintiff after he had been removed from the patrol car and his feet tied—a
possibility that is clearly supported by the cited portions of Plaintiff’s deposition
testimony (see R. at 184-88 (Rojas Dep., cited in Pl.’s Resp. to Mot. for Summ.
J., R. at 170)).
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clearly established at the time of the allegedly unlawful activity,” Martinez, 479
F.3d at 1295, or a single case citation to support such positions, see Thomas v.
Durastanti, 607 F.3d 655, 669 (10th Cir. 2010) (“The plaintiff bears the burden of
citing to us what he thinks constitutes clearly established law.”). Without any
such argument, Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. See Martinez,
479 F.3d at 1295 (“[T]he record must clearly demonstrate the plaintiff has
satisfied his heavy two-part burden; otherwise, the defendants are entitled to
qualified immunity.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
On appeal, Plaintiff faults the district court for ignoring “a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether [he] attempted to assault [Officer] Anderson.”
(Appellant’s Opening Br. at 10.) According to Plaintiff, the existence of a
genuine issue of fact on this matter requires reversal. What Plaintiff fails to
comprehend, however, is that it is “[i]f, and only if,” he satisfies his two-part
burden 5 that Defendants “then bear the traditional burden of the movant for
5
In determining whether a plaintiff has satisfied this initial burden, district
courts are instructed to “view the facts and draw reasonable inferences in the light
most favorable to the party opposing the summary judgment motion,” which, “[i]n
qualified immunity cases, . . . usually means adopting . . . the plaintiff’s version
of the facts.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007) (internal quotation marks
and brackets omitted). It appears the district court failed to properly apply this
standard. For instance, in resolving Plaintiff’s unlawful seizure claim, the district
court construed certain disputed material facts in the light most favorable to
Defendants and disregarded other evidence in Plaintiff’s favor. Specifically, the
district court concluded “Rojas had refused to comply with Anderson’s orders to
produce identification.” (R. at 209.) The record, however, reveals (1) Plaintiff
(continued...)
-7-
summary judgment—showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact and
[they are] entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Clark, 513 F.3d at 1222
(internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). Because Plaintiff failed to
meet his burden on “the legal qualified immunity question,” this traditional
summary judgment burden never shifted back to Defendants. Thomson v. Salt
Lake Cnty., 584 F.3d 1304, 1327 (10th Cir. 2009) (Holmes, J., concurring).
Plaintiff’s focus on appeal on a genuine issue of material fact is therefore
misplaced.
We turn then to Plaintiff’s excessive force claim. Plaintiff’s response to
5
(...continued)
told Officer Anderson “that he lived there” (R. at 93); (2) one of Plaintiff’s
cousins handed Officer Anderson Plaintiff’s driver’s license, which listed the
house as Plaintiff’s address; and (3) upon opening the door to the house,
Plaintiff’s mother told Officer Anderson “‘That’s my nephew, that’s my son, they
live here’” (R. at 101).
Although we are troubled by the district court’s deviation from the
appropriate summary judgment standard of review, we are convinced that this
error does not require reversal. As discussed above, Plaintiff made no attempt in
his opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment to satisfy his two-
part burden, under his version of the facts or otherwise. Indeed, the paucity of
Plaintiff’s responsive briefing undoubtedly contributed to the district court’s
misplaced reliance on Defendants’ version of the facts and Defendants’
characterization of Plaintiff’s claims. And, although on appeal Plaintiff faults the
district court for disregarding factual disputes, he again offers next to no
argument that, when the facts are properly construed and his claims properly
characterized, Defendants violated his clearly established constitutional rights.
Accordingly, while we cannot endorse the reasoning given by the district court,
we can hardly now fault the court for the conclusion it ultimately reached—that
Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. See Smith v. McCord, 707 F.3d
1161, 1162 (10th Cir. 2013).
-8-
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on this claim fares even worse. The
entirety of his responsive argument on this point consists of two sentences: “We
are not contending that the excessive force occurred in the house. Rather, we are
contending that the excessive force occurred when Rojas was dropped on the
street, his chin was cut and required seven sutures, and he suffered a fractured left
mandible.” (R. at 176.) This response does nothing to support Plaintiff’s
position that Defendants’ alleged conduct constituted excessive force. Nor does it
discuss whether Plaintiff’s right to be free from such force was clearly
established. Again, without any such argument, Defendants were entitled to
qualified immunity. See Martinez, 479 F.3d at 1295.
We note that our independent review of the record suggests a case might
well have been made that Defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity.
That is, Plaintiff might well have been able to establish that Officer Anderson did
not have probable cause to arrest him because “under the totality of the
circumstances, a reasonable person would [not] believe that” Plaintiff had
attempted to assault Officer Anderson, United States v. Martin, 613 F.3d 1295,
1302 (10th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted), and Officer Anderson’s
warrantless seizure of Plaintiff inside his home was therefore unreasonable. He
likewise might well have been able to establish that Defendants’ conduct in
(allegedly) intentionally dropping Plaintiff face-first on the asphalt after he had
been removed from the patrol car constituted excessive force. And, for both of
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his claims, Plaintiff might well have been able to satisfy us that Defendants’
actions violated his clearly established rights. See, e.g., Tubbs v. Harrison, 383
F. App’x 804, 807 (10th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he law is clearly established that a
warrantless home entry must be . . . pursuant to clear evidence of probable cause .
. . .”); Dixon v. Richer, 922 F.2d 1456, 1462-63 (10th Cir. 1991) (affirming denial
of qualified immunity at summary judgment on the plaintiff’s excessive force
claim because the officers’ conduct in kicking, beating, choking, and hitting the
plaintiff with a flashlight after he had been frisked was “not objectively
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment”). However, given the sparsity of
Plaintiff’s argument and his failure to point to any authority to support his claims,
both here and in the district court, Plaintiff, “through his counsel, [has simply]
failed to carry the burden assigned to him by law.” Smith v. McCord, 707 F.3d
1161, 1162 (10th Cir. 2013).
In light of Plaintiff’s failure to adequately sustain his high burden, we have
no choice but to affirm the grant of qualified immunity. As we recently
explained, the fact that “clients like [Plaintiff] are usually bound by their lawyers’
actions—or, as here, inactions,” “[s]ometimes . . . means good cases are lost by
bad lawyers, a lamentable cost of our legal system.” Id. Indeed, “[o]ther
remedies seek, if often all too imperfectly, to address this problem, including
administrative sanctions . . . and malpractice claims.” Id. Unfortunately, none of
this allows us to reach a result different from the one reached by the district court.
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Based on the foregoing analysis, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
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