holding that federal district courts are barred from deciding cases “brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.”
How later courts described this case
- holding that federal district courts are barred from deciding cases “brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
GUY COZZI,
Plaintiff,
21-CV-0442 (LLS)
-against-
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD, et al.,
Defendants.
LOUIS L. STANTON, United States District Judge:
Plaintiff, appearing pro se, brings this action invoking the Court’s subject-matter
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332. He seeks the reversal of New York State courts’
rulings in his workers’ compensation case. By order dated March 3, 2021, the Court granted
Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis (IFP). The
Court dismisses the complaint for the reasons set forth below.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or portion thereof, that is frivolous or
malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v.
Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a
complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While
the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se
pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise
the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471,
474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, a resident of Connecticut, brings this action against the New York State
Workers’ Compensation Board (WCB), the Chubb Corporation (Chubb), the American Stock
Exchange (ASE), and Fisher Brothers, Esqs. ‒ the law firm that represented Chubb and ASE in
administrative and state-court proceedings. Plaintiff invokes both federal question and diversity
jurisdiction and asserts that his federal constitutional and statutory rights were violated. He cites
to the following provisions: “United States Constitution & United States Federal Laws.
Separation of Powers‒Article 1 & Article 3. Due Process‒5th & 14th Amendments. Equal
Protection‒14th Amendment. 42 U.S.C. § 1983, U.S. Code § 706, [and] 5 U.S.C.S. § 7703(c).”
(ECF No. 2, at 2.) Plaintiff seeks the reversal of the state-court judgment against him.
Plaintiff filed a 234-page complaint consisting of documents from the WCB’s
administrative proceedings and his state-court case. For the facts of his case, he refers the Court
to the writ of certiorari he submitted to the United States Supreme Court and legal briefs he filed
with the New York Court of Appeals and the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division,
Third Department (Appellate Division). These documents reveal the following: in September
2001, Plaintiff was employed in an office building near the World Trade Center (WTC). In the
months following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack, he sustained health injuries from
breathing the “toxic 9-11 dust and debris” while participating in the cleanup and recovery efforts
as a volunteer and working in his office building next to Ground Zero. (Id. at 18.)
In 2014, Plaintiff registered with the WCB under New York Workers’ Compensation
Law § 162, as a participant in the WTC rescue, recovery, and cleanup operations. He also filed a
claim for workers’ compensation benefits for injuries he suffered in 2001 at Ground Zero. But
the WCB determined that Plaintiff was not a participant in the WTC cleanup efforts under
Workers’ Compensation Law § 161, and that his claim was untimely because it was not filed by
September 11, 2003 ‒ within the two-year limitations period provided by state law, see Workers’
Compensation Law § 28. On appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed the WCB’s denial of
benefits to Plaintiff, holding that it was not arbitrary, capricious, or constituted an abuse of
discretion. See Cozzi v. American Stock Exchange, 148 A.D.3d 1500 (3d Dep’t), appeal
dismissed, 30 N.Y.3d 937 (2017).
In 2017, Plaintiff sought to reopen his claim with the WCB. But the WCB determined
that it did not have jurisdiction to rehear or reopen the claim. Plaintiff again appealed, and the
Appellate Division affirmed, finding that the WCB did not abuse its discretion in determining
that it was without jurisdiction to reopen Plaintiff’s claim. See Cozzi v. American Stock
Exchange, 172 A.D.3d 1658 (3d Dep’t), appeal dismissed, 33 N.Y.3d 1129 (2019), cert. denied,
140 S. Ct. 971 (2020).
Plaintiff now files this action seeking the reversal of the state courts’ decisions. He
asserts that the WCB and its Office of General Counsel denied him equal protection and due
process when they refused to process his claim. (ECF No. 2, at 18.)
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff’s complaint challenging the outcome of the state courts’ decisions ‒ which
affirmed the New York State Workers’ Compensation Board’s denial of his claims ‒ is barred
under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The doctrine – created by two Supreme Court cases, Rooker
v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v.
Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482-86 (1983) – precludes federal district courts from reviewing final
judgments of the state courts. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284
(2005) (holding that federal district courts are barred from deciding cases “brought by state-court
losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court
proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.”).
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies where the federal-court plaintiff: (1) lost in state court,
(2) complains of injuries caused by the state-court judgment, (3) invites the district court to
review and reject the state court judgment, and (4) commenced the district court proceedings
after the state-court judgment was rendered. Vossbrinck v. Accredited Home Lenders, Inc., 773
F.3d 423, 426 (2d Cir. 2014).
Plaintiff brings this action requesting that the Court reverses the state courts’ decisions
affirming the WCB’s denial of workers’ compensation benefits to him. He lost in state court,
complains of injuries caused by the state-court judgment entered before this action commenced,
and specifically invites this Court to reject the state courts’ rulings. Plaintiff is therefore asking
this Court to “sit in review of the state court judgment,” Vossbrinck, 773 F.3d at 427, which the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits. Because Plaintiff's claims are inextricably intertwined with
the state-court judgment against him, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker
Feldman doctrine to review his claims or reverse the state courts’ rulings.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff's complaint, filed IFP under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), is dismissed for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). All other pending matters in this case are
terminated.
Plaintiff has consented to electronic service. (ECF No. 3.)
SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 5, 2021
New York, New York
Louis L. Stanton
U.S.D.J.