“[A] plaintiff must show the existence of additional circumstances, often referred to as ‘plus’ factors, which, when viewed in conjunction with the parallel acts, can serve to allow a fact-finder to infer a conspiracy.”
How later courts described this case
- “[A] plaintiff must show the existence of additional circumstances, often referred to as ‘plus’ factors, which, when viewed in conjunction with the parallel acts, can serve to allow a fact-finder to infer a conspiracy.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
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SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 1 DATE FLEES - □□□□
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: MEMORANDUM DECISION
IN RE: ICE LIBOR ANTITRUST LITIGATION : AND ORDER
19 Civ. 439 (GBD)
ee ee em ee ee ee ee er ee re ee tee ee eee rH HK HX
GEORGE B. DANIELS, United States District Judge:
Plaintiffs,' on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, bring this action for,
inter alia, a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act (the “Sherman Act”) against
various foreign and domestic banks (collectively, “Defendants”).’ Specifically, Plaintiffs claim
that Defendants engaged in a price fixing conspiracy to depress ICE LIBOR rates and returns to
perform “collusive manipulation of ICE LIBOR.” (Am. Compl., ECF No. 186, at 1, 23.)
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ consolidated amended class action complaint against all
' Plaintiffs are comprised of: Putnam Bank, City of Livonia Employees’ Retirement System, City of
Livonia Retiree Health and Disability Benefits Plan, Hawaii Sheet Metal Workers Health & Welfare Fund,
Hawaii Sheet Metal Workers Training Fund, Hawaii Sheet Metal Workers Annuity Fund, and Hawaii Sheet
Metal Workers Pension Fund.
> Defendants are comprised of: Bank of America Corporation, Bank of America N.A., Merrill Lynch,
Pierce Fenner & Smith Inc., Citigroup Inc., Citibank, N.A., Citigroup Global Markets Inc., JPMorgan Chase
& Co., JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., J.P. Morgan Securities LLC, Barclays PLC, Barclays Bank PLC,
Barclays Capital Inc., BNP Paribas S.A., BNP Paribas Securities Corp., Crédit Agricole S.A., Crédit
Agricole Corporate and Investment Bank, Credit Agricole Securities (USA) Inc., Credit Suisse Group AG,
Credit Suisse AG, Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC, Deutsche Bank AG, Deutsche Bank Securities Inc.,
HSBC Holdings ple, HSBC Bank PLC, HSBC Bank USA, N.A., HSBC Securities (USA) Inc.,
Intercontinental Exchange, Inc., Intercontinental Exchange Holdings, Inc., ICE Benchmark Administration
Limited (f/k/a NYSE Euronext Rate Administration Limited), ICE Data Services, Inc., ICE Data Pricing &
Reference Data, LLC, Lloyds Bank ple, Lloyds Securities Inc., MUFG Securities Americas Inc., The
Norinchukin Bank, Coéperatieve Rabobank U.A., Royal Bank of Canada, RBC Capital Markets, LLC, The
Royal Bank of Scotland Group ple, NatWest Markets Plc (f/k/a The Royal Bank of Scotland plc), National
Westminster Bank Plc, NatWest Markets Securities Inc. (f/k/a RBS Securities, Inc.), Société Générale, SG
Americas Securities, LLC, Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation, Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group,
Inc., Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation Europe Ltd., SMBC Capital Markets, Inc., UBS Group AG,
UBS AG, UBS Securities LLC, MUFG Bank, Ltd., and Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group Inc.
Defendants for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (See
Notice of Defs.’ Joint Mot. to Dismiss the Consolidated Am. Class Action Compl. (“Notice of
Mot.”), ECF No. 204.; Mem. of Law in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss the Consolidated Am.
Class Action Compl. (“Mem. in Supp. as to all Defs.””), ECF No. 230; ICE Defs.’ Mem. of Law in
Supp. of Their Mot. to Dismiss the Consolidated Am. Class Action Compl., ECF No. 232;
Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group, Inc.’s Notice of Mot. to Dismiss the Consolidated Am. Class
Action Compl. (“Mem. in Supp. as to Def. Mitsubishi’), ECF No. 245; MUFG Bank, Ltd.’s Notice
of Mot. to Dismiss the Consolidated Am. Class Action Compl. (“Mem. in Supp. as to Def. MUFG
Bank”), ECF No. 269.)? Defendants’ motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim are
GRANTED.
I FACTUAL BACKGROUND
ICE LIBOR is a system administered by the Ice Benchmark Administration (the “IBA”)*
that publishes daily “the rates at which panel banks ‘could’ obtain interbank unsecured funding
from each other or similar institutions,” which were represented as “the interest rate high-credit
3 Defendants make additional arguments and file additional motions to dismiss for claims that pertain to
certain subsets of the group of Defendants. In light of this Court’s determination that the amended
complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), it need not address Defendants’ motions to dismiss (1) with respect to all Defendants
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), (see Notice of
Mot.; Mem. in Supp. as to all Defs.); (2) with respect to the “Foreign Defendants” for lack of personal
jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), (see Notice of Mot. at 3 n.1 (listing the
“Foreign Defendants”); Mem. of Law in Supp. of Foreign Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss the Consolidated Am.
Class Action Compl. for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction, Improper Venue, and/or Inadequate Service (“Mem.
in Supp. as to Foreign Defs.”), ECF No. 205; Mem. in Supp. as to Def. Mitsubishi; Mem. in Supp. as to
Def. MUFG Bank; see also Notice of Mot. at 1, n. 1 (listing the “Foreign Defendants”)); (3) with respect
to the “Venue Defendants” for improper venue pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3), (see
Notice of Mot. at 3 n.2 (listing the “Venue Defendants”); Mem. in Supp. as to Foreign Defs.; Mem. in Supp.
as to Def. Mitsubishi); or (4) with respect to the “Service Defendants” for inadequate service pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5), (see Notice of Mot. at 3 n.3 (listing the “Service Defendants”);
Mem. in Supp. as to Foreign Defs.; Mem. in Supp. as to Def. MUFG Bank).
* The IBA is incorporated under the laws of England and Wales and conducts its administration of ICE
LIBOR from its registered office in London. (Mem. in Supp. as to Foreign Defs. at 1, 5.)
quality banks charge one another for short-term financing.” (Am. Compl. at §§ 3, 25 (citations
omitted).) The “panel banks’® are a group of multinational banks that both participate in setting
rates published by ICE LIBOR and also transact in financial instruments that are indexed to the
rates published by ICE LIBOR. (/d. at 9 11-12.) The process by which ICE LIBOR determines
the daily rate begins with the “Submission Question.” Each business day, the panel banks are
asked the question, “At what rate could you borrow funds, were you to do so by asking for and
then accepting interbank offers in a reasonable market size just prior to |lam?” (Ud. at 914.) The
submissions are intended to be “a subjective determination of the rate at which a given Panel Bank
could transact” on the interbank funding market. (/d. at § 23 (citation omitted).) After receiving
the panel banks’ responses, the administrator of ICE LIBOR collects and validates the submissions
and publishes the daily rates derived from those submissions. (/d. at § 13.)
Plaintiffs allege that since at least the time of the class period, the interbank funding market
has been “virtually non-existent,” despite the fact that the Submission Question assumes that there
is a funding market in which the banks are trading. (U/d. at §§ 3, 15, 18.) This, Plaintiffs claim,
leaves ICE LIBOR susceptible to manipulation by Defendants because the panel banks are offering
their opinions regarding something with which they are no longer involved. Ud. at 3-5, 15, 18,
398.)
Plaintiffs further assert that based on “objective statistical analyses of publicly available
data,” Defendants have observably manipulated ICE LIBOR during the class period, demonstrated
by their submissions and the resulting rates that were “always, or nearly always” below where they
should have been. (Ud. at § 24.) Specifically, to demonstrate their argument that the rates were
Plaintiffs identify a subset of Defendants as members of the group of “panel banks.” These Defendants
include: Bank of America, Citigroup, JPMorgan, Barclays, BNP Paribas, MUFG, Credit Agricole, Credit
Suisse, Deutsche Bank, HSBC, Lloyds, Norinchukin, Rabobank, RBC, RBS, Societe Generale, Sumitomo
and UBS.
artificially depressed during that class period, Plaintiffs compare the ICE LIBOR rates during the
class period against (1) the rate available for interest on excess reserves; (2) the rates at which the
panel banks’ actual debt traded contemporaneously; (3) General Collateral rates; and (4) the panel
bank Defendants’ contemporaneous CDS spreads. (/d. at §§ 421-54.) Plaintiffs also rely upon
Benford’s Law® to demonstrate that the rates during the class period were below where they were
expected. (/d. at 455-62.)
Il. LEGAL STANDARD’
A. Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss.
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The plaintiff
must demonstrate “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully”; stating a
facially plausible claim requires the plaintiff to plead facts that enable the court “to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” /d. (citation omitted).
The factual allegations pled must therefore “be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citation omitted).*
° Plaintiffs explain that Benford’s Law “states that in sets of legitimately occurring data, each digit. . .
should occur in certain predictable frequencies.” (Am. Compl. at § 43.)
‘Tn light of this Court’s determination that the amended complaint should be dismissed for failure to state
a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), it need not address Defendants’ claims that
the amended complaint should be dismissed on alternative grounds.
8 “In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court may refer ‘to documents attached to the
complaint as an exhibit or incorporated in it by reference, to matters of which judicial notice may be taken,
or to documents either in plaintiffs’ possession or of which plaintiffs had knowledge and relied on in
bringing suit.”” Fishbein v. Miranda, 670 F. Supp. 2d 264, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (quoting Brass v. Am.
Film Techs., Inc., 987 F.2d 142, 150 (2d Cir. 1993)).
A district court must first review a plaintiff's complaint to identify allegations that,
“because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Jgbal,
556 U.S. at 679. The court then considers whether the plaintiff's remaining well-pleaded factual
allegations, assumed to be true, “plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Jd.; see also
Targum vy. Citrin Cooperman & Co., LLP, No. 12 Civ. 6909 (SAS), 2013 WL 6087400, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19,2013). In deciding the 12(b)(6) motion, the court must also draw all reasonable
inferences in the non-moving party’s favor. See N.J. Carpenters Health Fund y. Royal Bank of
Scot. Grp., PEC, 709 F.3d 109, 119-20 (2d Cir. 2013).
II. PLAINTIFFS’ CONSOLIDATED AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM?
The dispositive issue before this Court is whether Plaintiffs’ amended complaint fails to
state a claim of price fixing, as it is the only legal claim included in the amended complaint. (See
While this Court finds that the amended complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant
to Rule 12(b)(6), it also finds, on alternative grounds, that Plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently allege that
the Foreign Defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(2). On a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2), plaintiffs bear
the burden of establishing personal jurisdiction. BWP Media USA Inc. v. Hollywood Fan Sites, LLC, 69
F. Supp. 3d 342, 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (citing MacDermid, Inc. v. Deiter, 702 F.3d 725, 727 (2d Cir. 2012)).
The Second Circuit has held, including with respect to claims that a group of defendants conspired to
manufacture LIBOR rates, that a plaintiff may demonstrate personal jurisdiction by alleging either that
Defendants manipulated LIBOR rates in the United States or that there was a “causal relationship” between
a group of defendants’ conspiracy to set rates and their respective trading activities in the United States.
Charles Schwab Corp. v. Bank of Am. Corp., 883 F.3d 68, 83-84 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting Waldman v.
Palestine Liberation Org., 835 F.3d 317, 341, 343 (2d Cir. 2016)). Here, the Foreign Defendants are all
incorporated and hold their principal place of business outside the United States. (See Am. Compl. at Part
Mem. in Supp. as to Foreign Defs. at 33.) Additionally, Plaintiffs fail to properly allege any improper
conduct on the part of the Foreign Defendants that would have taken place within the United States,
including the setting of the ICE LIBOR rate itself, which was administered by a U.K. company from its
London headquarters. (Mem. in Supp. as to Foreign Defs. at 1, 5.) Indeed, Plaintiffs make only conclusory
allegations that the Foreign Defendants engaged in some activity in the United States, or that their foreign
activity had a causal connection to the alleged conspiracy in the United States, without providing any factual
basis for these assertions. Moreover, not only is the amended complaint entirely devoid of any factual basis
or evidence to support these assertions, but Plaintiffs’ claims themselves are contradicted by Defendants’
evidence. (See Mem. in Supp. as to Foreign Defs. at 6 n. 9 (listing and describing the sworn declarations
provided by Defendants, all which contradict Plaintiffs’ claim).) Therefore, even if this Court did not find
that the amended complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), it
Am. Compl. at Part VII.) In order to demonstrate a violation under Section 1 of the Sherman Act,
a plaintiff must demonstrate, in part, ““a combination or some form of concerted action between at
least two legally distinct economic entities.” Virgin Atl. Airways Ltd. y. British Airways PLC, 257
F.3d 256, 263 (2d Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). Here, Plaintiffs argue that during the class period,
the ICE LIBOR rate was lower than it should have been at the time, that Defendants had a profit-
based motive to work together to depress this rate, and that Defendants colluded to set prices by
responding to the Submission Question in a manner that would result in a depressed rate. The
amended complaint, however, is made up of almost entirely conclusory allegations and is
essentially devoid of any evidence, direct or circumstantial, to support the conclusion that
Defendants colluded with one another. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ amended complaint cannot withstand
a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
1. Plaintiffs Fail to Properly Allege that Defendants Acted in a Conspiracy
or Engaged in Collusion.
Plaintiffs point to no evidence, nor do they offer anything beyond conclusory statements
and accusations, to support their claim that Defendants ever colluded, or let alone discussed, their
responses to the daily Submission Question. There is no basis to assume, in the absence of any
evidence whatsoever, that Defendants ever discussed lowering the rate with one another.
Indeed, in an attempt to support their claim, Plaintiffs outline meetings that Defendants
attended, which afforded them, as Plaintiffs describe, an “opportunity to conspire” and an
“opportunity to collude.” (Am. Compl at §§ 508-09.) Plaintiffs’ argument, however, is based
wholly in speculation and wishful thinking as to what Defendants might have done. As Defendants
correctly assert in their joint motion, “Plaintiffs have pointed to no communications, no regulatory
would find that the amended complaint should be dismissed with regard to the Foreign Defendants pursuant
to Rule 12(b)(2).
investigations, no cooperating witnesses, or any other facts that could conceivably convert their
claim into more than speculation.” (Mem. in Supp. as to all Defs. at 1; see also id. at 20 (“as to
the meetings Plaintiffs refer to with any specificity, they still fail to allege any communications,
or even a topic of discussion, that indicate the existence of any conspiratorial agreement’”).) It is
inappropriate to engage in guesswork regarding what topics Defendants might have discussed,
without providing any evidence upon which this Court may rely.
Moreover, Plaintiffs place a particularly heavy emphasis on the Alternative Rates
Committee (*“ARRC”) meetings, which Plaintiffs note were “strictly confidential” and “‘closed-
door affairs.” (Am. Compl. at §§ 511-58.) As Plaintiffs themselves acknowledge, however, and
as Defendants point out, “the agenda, participant lists, and minutes of every AARC meeting are
publicly available” and “several regulators . . . attended every one of those meetings.” (Mem. in
Supp. as to all Defs. at 20-21 (emphasis in original); see also Am. Compl. at 512-17.)
Presumably, discussions regarding illicit matters would have been made obvious from the minutes
of these meetings, or alternatively, regulators present at the meeting would have been on notice—
and likely would have initiated an investigation—had they been privy to any conversations
regarding price fixing. Therefore, if these discussions had taken place during the meetings that
Plaintiffs identify, it is reasonable to assume that there would be at least some evidence of their
occurrence. Indeed, the lack of evidence arising from these meetings leads to a conclusion
opposite of that which Plaintiffs attempt to allege.
Additionally, it is a practical reality that, in order to maintain a consumer base, businesses
will set prices at a competitive rate.!° Therefore, it does not defy reason that if Defendants wanted
'© This Court refers to the “hot dog analogy” it described during oral argument. Specifically, a reasonable
person would not expect that if one hot dog vendor sells hot dogs for $3.00, another on the same block
would sell them for $20.00. And, indeed, if one hot dog vendor sells hot dogs for $3.00 and three others
sell hot dogs for $3.05, this instance of parallel pricing does not, on its own, demonstrate that there was any
to remain competitive with other banks in the market, they might attempt to lower their answers
to the Submission Question and stay at least on par with the resulting rates. Indeed, a Defendant
would not have been acting improperly if, upon learning that the answers provided by other
Defendants were low, or that the ICE LIBOR rate itself had been low recently, it adjusted its
answer to the Submission Question accordingly. This alone does not demonstrate that Defendants
agreed to, or even discussed, lowering the rate as a group. Notably, and as Defendants point out,
Plaintiffs fail to assert any evidence of parallel conduct among Defendants to demonstrate that on
any particular day, they acted in conjunction to lower the rate. (Mem. in Supp. as to all Defs. at
22-24.) Moreover, in their motion, Defendants provide a chart which “combines the Complaint’s
separate charts for each Defendant Bank’s 3-month ICE LIBOR submissions,” which actually
demonstrates that there was consistent variation among the panel banks’ submissions. (See id. at
23.) Notably, Plaintiffs do not ever assert precisely what the ICE LIBOR rate should have been
during the class period. It is therefore difficult to determine whether or not there was parallel
pricing among Defendants in the first instance.
In the context of a claim for price fixing, asserting that there was collusion simply because
Defendants provided a similar answer to the Submission Questions, without any other evidence,
is not the same as asserting, with evidence, that Defendants agreed to collude and set the rates to
a specific price. Indeed, as the Second Circuit has held, “an allegation of parallel conduct coupled
with only a bare assertion of conspiracy is not sufficient to state a Section 1 claim.” Starr v. Sony
BMG Music Entm’t, 592 F.3d 314, 322 (2d Cir. 2010). Plaintiffs, therefore, cannot rely solely
upon the similar rates and assertions not based in fact or evidence to support their claim.
collusion. (See Tr. of Oral Arg. dated Jan. 30, 2020 at 53:7-15.) Although Plaintiffs claim that this was
only “part of the story,” (id. at 15:16), this Court strains to locate evidence or facts to support what it
assumes would be the other part—that is, Defendants’ collusion.
In sum, unless Plaintiffs can demonstrate sufficient circumstantial evidence that there was
a conspiracy among Defendants, i.e., “plus factors,” their amended complaint simply asserting
similar rates and an opportunity to conspire cannot survive Defendants’ motion to dismiss.
2. Plaintiffs’ Purported “Plus Factors” Fail to Support the Inference That
Defendants Engaged in a Conspiracy.
Recognizing that “smoking gun” evidence of a conspiracy may be difficult to identify, the
Second Circuit has held that a plaintiff attempting to allege a conspiracy under the Sherman Act
may instead point to “plus factors” that, when read in conjunction with other evidence, support the
inference that there was a conspiracy. Mayor and City Council of Balt., Md. v. Citigroup, Inc.,
709 F.3d 129, 135-36 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing Apex Oil Co. v. DiMauro, 882 F.2d 246, 253-54
(2d Cir. 1987) (“[A] plaintiff must show the existence of additional circumstances, often referred
to as ‘plus’ factors, which, when viewed in conjunction with the parallel acts, can serve to allow a
fact-finder to infer a conspiracy.”)). A plaintiff may do this by pointing to, for example, “a
common motive to conspire; evidence that the parallel acts were against the apparent economic
self-interest of the individual alleged conspirators; or evidence of ‘a high level of interfirm
communications.’” Jn re Publication Paper Antitrust Litigation, 690 F.3d 51, 62 (2d Cir. 2012)
(citation omitted), A court must be careful, however, not to regard activity that may “just as easily
turn out to have been rational business behavior” as a “plus factor.” Mayor and City Council of
Baltimore, Md., 709 F.3d at 137. Although it is not clear that Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged
parallel pricing by Defendants, this Court construes all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-
moving party, and therefore will consider Plaintiffs’ proffered “plus factors.” Regardless,
however, and despite Plaintiffs’ claims regarding alleged “plus factors,” Plaintiffs still fail to
provide sufficient reason that this Court should infer that there was a conspiracy or any collusion
among Defendants.
a. Plaintiffs Have Not Sufficiently Demonstrated That Defendants Had a Motive to
Depress ICE LIBOR Rates, Either Alone, or in a Conspiracy, or That They
Colluded.
Plaintiffs claim that Defendants had a profit-based motive to artificially depress the rates.
(See Am. Compl. at {{{ 559-75.) First, as Defendants properly note, Plaintiffs have not offered
any evidence of motive that is specific to any one Defendant. It is inappropriate for Plaintiffs to
rely upon aggregate data to demonstrate how an entire group of Defendants might stand to profit.
(Mem. in Supp. as to all Defs. at 24-25 (citing In re Commodity Exch., Inc., Gold Futures &
Options Trading Litig., 213 F. Supp. 3d 631, 662-64 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).)
Moreover, the most notable weakness in Plaintiffs’ assertions regarding Defendants’
alleged motive is that it defies logic. As Defendants explain, each of the defendant banks both
makes and receives payments based on the ICE LIBOR rates, and therefore, would stand to be
injured in the same manner that it would stand to benefit. (Mem. in Supp. as to all Defs. at 25.)
Plaintiffs attempt to side-step this flaw in their reasoning by largely focusing on the panel banks’
“funding desks.” Plaintiffs allege that the funding desks in particular benefit from a lower rate,
that the individuals running the desk are motivated by potential bonuses resulting from their
profitability, and that the other units within the panel banks are “‘generally indifferent to the USD
ICE LIBOR rate.” (See Am. Compl. at §§ 58-60, 561-70.) Plaintiffs again, however, provide no
evidence that this is true, nor do they assert anything beyond bare-boned allegations that the
funding desks were responsible in orchestrating the panel banks in a manner so that they personally
might benefit. Therefore, Plaintiffs have not sufficiently demonstrated that Defendants were
motivated to engage in price fixing.
Additionally, Plaintiffs rely upon the opportunities during which Defendants could have
engaged in conversations regarding manipulating the ICE LIBOR rate. (See Am. Compl. at □□□
576-81.) However, and as described above, simply alleging an opportunity to conspire without
10
providing any evidence whatsoever that any such discussions actually took place is insufficient to
survive a motion to dismiss. As is also described above, the fact that Plaintiffs cannot point to any
evidence derived from minutes of, or investigations arising out of, these meetings is detrimental
to their argument. Therefore, while this Court will consider Defendants’ opportunity to engage in
these discussions in conjunction with the other “plus factors,” it finds that this argument holds little
to no weight, given that Plaintiffs’ allegations as to any collusion appear to be no more than hopeful
assertions.
b. Plaintiffs Have Not Sufficiently Demonstrated the Reliability of the Common
Stimuli or Statistical Analyses Against Which They Analyze the ICE LIBOR Rate.
A large portion of Plaintiffs’ amended complaint is dedicated to their claim that various
“objective” statistical analyses demonstrate that ICE LIBOR rates were depressed during the class
period and were therefore clearly artificially manufactured by Defendants. (/d. at §§ 414-64, □□□□
86.) Additionally, Plaintiffs place particular emphasis on their analysis of the rates as they
compare to Benford’s law. Plaintiffs’ claims, however, are unreliable and dubious because they
simply assert that there should be certain, specific relationships between ICE LIBOR and other
financial metrics, but do not cite to any empirical or academic sources to support these assertions.
(See id.) Moreover, despite relying upon these metrics, Plaintiffs do not at any point in their
amended complaint actually indicate what they believe the ICE LIBOR rate should have been at
the time.
Plaintiffs rely most heavily upon Benford’s Law, alleging that their analysis of the ICE
LIBOR rates during the class period demonstrate “a statistical certainty of greater than 99% that
[Defendants’] submissions did not conform to Benford’s Law,” which they argue leads to the
“inescapable conclusion” that Defendants artificially manufactured the rates. (/d at § 46
(emphasis omitted).) While Plaintiffs assert that “Benford Tests” are applied by the Internal
11
Revenue Service and even some of the defendant banks to monitor accounting irregularities, they
provide no support for their claim that “legitimately created financial data sets generally follow
Benford’s Law [and] illegitimate data sets generally do not,” or that this is an objective analysis
upon which this Court should rely. (See id. at § 43.) Moreover, this Court has been unable to
identify any other court in this jurisdiction, or even the United States, that appears to have ever
credited Benford’s law as a reliable and objective test against which to compare trading and loan
rates. This Court therefore declines, without having seen any empirical evidence provided by
Plaintiffs, to be the first to do so.
Plaintiffs additionally point to the relationships between the ICE LIBOR rates during the
class period and (1) the rate available for interest on excess reserves; (2) the rates at which the
panel banks’ actual debt traded contemporaneously; (3) General Collateral rates; and (4) the panel
bank Defendants’ contemporaneous CDS spreads. (/d. at {§ 421-54.) More specifically, Plaintiffs
assert that that the interest on excess reserves “should be a floor,” (id. at § 422), the yield on a
Defendant bank’s debt issuances “should be equivalent to its corresponding USD ICE LIBOR
submission,” (id. at § 428), the general collateral rates, as secured rates, “should be substantially
lower” than the ICE LIBOR rates, (id. at § 441), and Defendants’ CDS spreads during the class
period, when compared to the ICE LIBOR rates, demonstrate that Defendants’ submissions “were
untethered to the perceived creditworthiness of the respective banks,” (id. at § 453). Again,
however, Plaintiffs make these assertions but do not provide any support for their theories about
what the relationships between these factors and the ICE LIBOR rate should be. Absent any
support for Plaintiffs’ claims, this Court cannot analyze as evidence Plaintiffs’ mere beliefs that
these tests are reliable.
12
c. Plaintiffs Cannot Save Their Argument By Simply Claiming That Defendants
Have Previously Engaged in Similar Behavior and Therefore Recidivism is Likely.
Plaintiffs assert that “many leaders and other officials . . . have been investigating USD
ICE LIBOR, recognized many of its problems, and are involved in attempts to reform or replace
it,” (id. at § 582), and moreover, that recidivism is likely because the panel banks have previously
engaged in benchmark price fixing, (id. at {§ 587-626). Although Plaintiffs reference previous
government investigations of specific Defendants and assert that “[a]lmost all of the Defendants
have pled guilty to criminal charges related to benchmark-rigging,” (id. at § 591), they offer little
argument as to why those facts are relevant to the instant case. Indeed, Plaintiffs’ only claim of
any connection between any prior violations and their current claim is that there are similar
structural characteristics in prior schemes because the other benchmarks “were calculated through
trimmed averages of submissions by a panel of nominally independent banks,” and that this prior
experience would serve as a “blueprint” for Defendants’ rate-setting of ICE LIBOR. (/d. at § 590.)
In response, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ claim as to potential recidivism “is inapplicable to
many Defendants and inadequate as to all of them” because Plaintiffs assert incorrect facts and the
investigations to which Plaintiffs point relate to benchmarks other than ICE LIBOR. (See Mem.
in Supp. as to all Defs. at 45-47.)
This Court need not reach a determination as to whether Plaintiffs’ argument on this point
is compelling. Even assuming, arguendo, that this Court found that Plaintiffs’ argument supports
the conclusion that Defendants have previously engaged in this behavior, and therefore truly did
have a “blueprint” to act similarly in the future, “[plus factors] must still lead to an inference of
conspiracy.” Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, Md., 709 F.3d at 137 (citation omitted).
Indeed, the analysis of “plus factors” is meant to determine whether there is a “reasonable
expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegality.” Arista Records, LLC v. Doe 3, 604
13
F.3d 110, 120 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (alterations omitted)). Plaintiffs
argue only that Defendants’ alleged prior conduct serves as a “blueprint” for recidivism—in other
words, that Defendants have the means to do it again.
Indeed, even when viewed in conjunction with the alleged parallel conduct and other “plus
factors,” including that if Defendants acted, they would have been acting contrary to their unilateral
self-interest, Plaintiffs’ “blueprint” theory does not lead to the reasonable conclusion that
Defendants actually engaged in a conspiracy. Considering Plaintiffs’ lack of evidence with respect
to essentially a// of their arguments, as well as the manner in which Defendants stood to be harmed
themselves by manually setting a depressed rate, Plaintiffs have offered only skeletal allegations
of the possibility of a conspiracy. Scattered, unsupported claims that do not together demonstrate
any logical reason why Defendants might have colluded, particularly when it seems—based on
Plaintiffs’ own admissions—that direct evidence would be available to Plaintiffs had there been
collusion, will not withstand a motion to dismiss. Therefore, even considering all of the “plus
factors” offered by Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged, either through direct or
circumstantial evidence, that Defendants engaged in collusion in order to artificially manufacture
the ICE LIBOR rates. Plaintiffs’ amended complaint should be dismissed against all Defendants,
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)."
'' Tn light of this Court’s determination that the amended complaint does not sufficiently support a claim
that there was a conspiracy among Defendants—a necessary factor to survive a motion to dismiss on a
claim of price fixing—this Court need not address Defendants’ alternative theories under which they assert
the amended complaint should be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Defendants’ motion to dismiss, (ECF Nos. 204, 245, 269), are GRANTED. The Clerk of
Court is directed to close these motions accordingly.
Dated: New York, New York SO ORDERED.
March 26, 2020 .
UBa/ 4 “3 dvita
B. DANIELS
UnitedStates District Judge
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