Opinion

Calvino v. Brown

Court
District Court, S.D. New York
Filed
Jan 22, 2020
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 27.0%

“[A]n action is ‘frivolous’ when either: (1) the factual contentions are clearly baseless . . . ; or (2) the claim is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.”

How later courts described this case

  • “[A]n action is ‘frivolous’ when either: (1) the factual contentions are clearly baseless . . . ; or (2) the claim is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.”
  • holding that “a finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

ERNEST CALVINO JR.,

Plaintiff,

19-CV-11954 (CM)

-against-

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

NAJEE BROWN,

Defendant.

COLLEEN McMAHON, Chief United States District Judge:

Plaintiff brings this action pro se. By order dated January 21, 2020, the Court granted

Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis (“IFP”). The

Court dismisses this action for the reasons set forth below.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or portion thereof, that is frivolous or

malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a

defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v.

Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a

complaint, or portion thereof, when the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ.

P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to

construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret

them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470

F.3d 471, 474-75 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted, emphasis in

original).

A claim is frivolous when it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v.

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989), abrogated on other grounds by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544 (2007); see also Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992) (holding that “a

finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the

irrational or the wholly incredible”); Livingston, 141 F.3d at 437 (“[A]n action is ‘frivolous’

when either: (1) the factual contentions are clearly baseless . . . ; or (2) the claim is based on an

indisputably meritless legal theory.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, using the Court’s general complaint form, brings this action alleging that

Defendant has conspired to harm him. He asserts the following facts, verbatim:

claim to support me, claim that he has my asset, someone claim hes holding my

mail to help me.

(ECF No. 2, 5 ¶ III.) Plaintiff seeks the return of his property.

DISCUSSION

A. Frivolous Complaint

Even when read with the “special solicitude” due pro se pleadings, Triestman, 470 F.3d at

475, Plaintiff’s claims rise to the level of the irrational, and there is no legal theory on which he

can rely. See Denton, 504 U.S. at 33; Livingston, 141 F.3d at 437.

District courts generally grant a pro se plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to

cure its defects, but leave to amend is not required where it would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione,

657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988).

Because the defects in Plaintiff’s complaint cannot be cured with an amendment, the Court

declines to grant Plaintiff leave to amend and dismisses this action as frivolous. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).

B. Plaintiff’s Litigation History

Since December 17, 2019, Plaintiff has filed numerous frivolous actions in this Court. He

filed this and other frivolous complaints even after the Court warned him that further vexatious

or frivolous litigation in this Court will result in an order barring him from filing new actions IFP

unless he receives prior permission. See, e.g., Calvino v. Jones, ECF 1:19-CV-11601, 3 (S.D.NLY.

Dec. 23, 2019). On January 10, 2020, the Court directed Plaintiff to show cause why he should

not be barred from filing any further actions in this Court IFP without first obtaining permission

from the Court to file his complaint. See Calvino v. Fauto L., ECF 1:19-CV-11958, 4 (S.D.NLY.

Jan. 10, 2020).

CONCLUSION

The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a copy of this order to Plaintiff and note service on

the docket. The Court dismisses this action as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)G).

The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would

not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See

Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).

SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 22, 2020 ,

New York, New York huh Wyk

COLLEEN McMAHON

Chief United States District Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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