The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT | att 2 INT □
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK \ 1 BCTRONICALI D
QS HOLDCO INC., | DATE FILE \/s{20eto
Plaintiff,
wipe No. 18-cv-824 (RJS)
ORDER
BANK OF AMERICA CORPORATION et al.,
Defendants.
RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, Circuit Judge:
On August 6, 2019, the Court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss the operative
complaint in this action on the grounds that, since Plaintiff no longer owns the claims it seeks to
assert, it is not the real party in interest under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a). (Doc. No.
102 (“Opinion” or “Op.”).) The Clerk of Court entered judgment in favor of Defendants the
following day. (Doc. No. 103.) On September 3, 2019, Plaintiff filed a motion pursuant to Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b) and 59(e) asking the Court to (1) vacate the Court’s judgment so
that Plaintiff might amend its complaint, or (2) in the alternative, amend the judgment so that
Plaintiff might pursue its claims under New York law in state court. (Doc. No. 104.) On
September 10, 2019, the Court denied Plaintiff's motion as to vacating the judgment and allowing
Plaintiff to amend, but asked for briefing from Defendants regarding Plaintiff's argument that the
Court should amend its August 6, 2019 order to dismiss the state claims without prejudice. (Doc.
No. 107 at 4.) The Court is now in receipt of that submission. (Doc. No. 109.)
As stated in the Court’s September 10, 2019 order, to prevail on a Rule 59(e) motion to
alter or amend a judgment, a movant must either (1) “present factual matters or controlling
decisions the court overlooked that might materially have influenced its earlier decision” or (2)
“demonstrate the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.” Sanluis Devs., L.L.C.
v. CCP Sanluis, L.L.C., 556 F. Supp. 2d 329, 331 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). The Court assumes the parties’
familiarity with that standard, as set forth in the Court’s September 10, 2019 order. (Doc. No.
107.) But it bears repeating that Rule 59(e) and Rule 60(b) are extraordinary remedies aimed at
correcting clear errors or presenting facts or controlling authority the district court overlooked.
(See Doc. No. 107 at 2.) See Johnson v. New York City, No. 10-cv-5359 (PKC) (JLC), 2011 WL
2471030, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 21, 2011) (quoting Cordero v. Astrue, 574 F. Supp. 2d 373, 380
(S.D.N.Y. 2008)) (observing that reconsideration of a judgment under Rule 59(e) is an
“extraordinary remedy to be employed sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation of
scarce judicial resources”).
Plaintiff argues that the Court’s August 6, 2019 Opinion should be amended to dismiss its
state law claims without prejudice. However, during briefing, neither of the parties addressed the
issue of whether dismissal of Plaintiff's New York state claims should be with or without prejudice
under Rule 17, and the Court’s order was silent on the subject. Rule 17 and Rule 41 are also silent
as to whether dismissal for failure to prosecute in the name of the real party in interest is to be with
or without prejudice.'
To be sure, Defendants have not articulated any procedural reason, under either New York
or federal law, why Plaintiff may not attempt to bring similar claims in state court. Rule 17(a),
which was the basis for dismissal, is about limiting access to federal courts. Nevertheless, Plaintiff
has not provided any authority to suggest that a New York state court would be any less demanding
with respect to standing. See Spencer v. Standard Chemicals & Metals Corp., 237 N.Y.479, 480,
1 Although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) provides that involuntary dismissal will be deemed to
“operate as an adjudication on the merits,” it expressly makes an exception for dismissal based on failure
to join a party under Rule 19, which is certainly analogous to dismissal for failure to prosecute in the name
of the real party in interest under Rule 17.
(1924) (“If, as between the assignor and assignee, the transfer is complete, so that the former is
divested of all control and right to the cause of action, and the latter is entitled to control it and
receive its fruits, the assignee is the real party in interest.” (internal citation and quotation marks
omitted)).
In any event, because Plaintiff has identified no authority that the Court overlooked or that
otherwise requires — or even allows — the Court to relieve Plaintiff of final judgment here under
either Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b), IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT what remains of Plaintiff's
motion is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: January 5, 2020 YL
New York, New York
CHARD J. SULLIVAN
UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE
Sitting by Designation