The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
TORREY BROWN,
Plaintiff,
-against-
19-CV-10723 (CM)
COUNTY OF KINGS; DISTRICT
ATTORNEY ERIC GONZALEZ; ADA TRANSFER ORDER
CHELSEA TODER; CPT BANKS J.;
CORRECTION OFFICER BROWN 9586;
INV TIMOTHY; FRIES SHIELD #528,
Defendants.
COLLEEN McMAHON, Chief United States District Judge:
Plaintiff, currently incarcerated at Elmira Correctional Facility, brings this pro se action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, setting forth claims of false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious
prosecution. The underlying events occurred in Brooklyn, New York. Named as Defendants are
the County of Kings, Kings County District Attorney Eric Gonzalez, Kings County Assistant
District Attorney Chelsea Toder, “CPT Banks J.,” Inv. Timothy, Fries Shield #528, and Officer
Brown. For the following reasons, this action is transferred to the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of New York.
DISCUSSION
Under the general venue provision, a civil action may be brought in:
(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents
of the State in which the district is located; (2) a judicial district in which a
substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim
occurred . . . ; or (3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be
brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is
subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.
28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). For venue purposes, a “natural person” resides in the district where
the person is domiciled. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(1).
Plaintiff filed this complaint regarding events occurring in Brooklyn, New York. Because
Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants reside in this District or that a substantial part of the
events or omissions underlying his claim arose in this District, venue does not appear to be
proper in this District under § 1391(b)(1) or (2).
Even if venue were proper here, however, the Court may transfer claims “[f]or the
convenience of the parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
“District courts have broad discretion in making determinations of convenience under Section
1404(a) and notions of convenience and fairness are considered on a case-by-case basis.” D.H.
Blair & Co. v. Gottdiener, 462 F.3d 95, 106 (2d Cir. 2006). Moreover, courts may transfer cases
on their own initiative. See Bank of Am., N.A. v. Wilmington Trust FSB, 943 F. Supp. 2d 417,
426-427 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“Courts have an independent institutional concern to see to it that the
burdens of litigation that is unrelated to the forum that a party chooses are not imposed
unreasonably on jurors and judges who have enough to do in determining cases that are
appropriately before them. The power of district courts to transfer cases under Section 1404(a)
sua sponte therefore is well established.” (quoting Cento v. Pearl Arts & Craft Supply Inc., No.
03-CV-2424, 2003 WL 1960595, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2003))); see also Lead Indus. Ass’n.
Inc. v. OSHA., 610 F.2d 70, 79 (2d Cir. 1979) (noting that “broad language of 28 U.S.C. §
1404(a) would seem to permit a court to order transfer sua sponte”).
In determining whether transfer is appropriate, courts consider the following factors:
(1) the convenience of witnesses; (2) the convenience of the parties; (3) the locus of operative
facts; (4) the availability of process to compel the attendance of the unwilling witnesses; (5) the
location of relevant documents and the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (6) the relative
means of the parties; (7) the forum’s familiarity with the governing law; (8) the weight accorded
to the plaintiff’s choice of forum; (9) trial efficiency; and (10) the interest of justice, based on the
totality of circumstances. Keitt v. N.Y. City, 882 F. Supp. 2d 412, 459-60 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); see
also N.Y. Marine and Gen. Ins. Co. v. LaFarge No. Am., Inc., 599 F.3d 102, 112 (2d Cir. 2010)
(setting forth similar factors). A plaintiff’s choice of forum is accorded less deference where
plaintiff does not reside in the chosen forum and the operative events did not occur there. See
Iragorri v. United Tech. Corp., 274 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir. 2001).
Under § 1404(a), transfer appears to be appropriate in this case. The underlying events
occurred in Brooklyn, New York, where most Defendants appear to reside. Brooklyn, New York,
is located in Kings County, which falls within the Eastern District of New York. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 112(a). Venue is therefore proper in the Eastern District of New York. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).
Based on the totality of the circumstances, the Court concludes that it is in the interest of justice
to transfer this action to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. 28
U.S.C. § 1404(a).
CONCLUSION
The Clerk of Court is directed to transfer this action to the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of New York. The Clerk of Court is further directed to assign this matter
to my docket, mail a copy of this order to Plaintiff, and note service on the docket. Whether
Plaintiff should be permitted to proceed further without prepayment of fees is a determination to
be made by the transferee court.1 A summons shall not issue from this Court. This order closes
this case.
1 Plaintiff also moved for assignment of pro bono counsel.
The Court certifies, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal from this order would
not be taken in good faith, and therefore in forma pauperis status 1s denied for the purpose of an
appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).
SO ORDERED.
Dated: November 25, 2019 □
New York, New York hie. I Wik
Chief United States District Judge