Void-Brown v. City of New York

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DOCUMEN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT | ween a mE

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK nore eee

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JANIESE VOID-BROWN, ps re tuto: APCOL(CG_ □

Plaintiff,

-against-

19-cv-8594 (PAE)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION;

DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY; CITY OF ORDER OF DISMISSAL

NEW YORK and NEW YORK CITY POLICE

DEPARTMENT; and HEDY AUGENBRAUN,

PH.D.,

Defendants.

PAUL A. ENGELMAYER, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Janiese Void-Brown, who has a mailing address in Kings County, New York,

brings this action pro se.' She asserts claims against the Federal Bureau of Investigation

(“FBI”), the Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”), the City of New York, the New York City

Police Department (“NYPD”), and her psychologist (collectively, “defendants”) for allegedly

engaging in multiple conspiracies to violate her civil rights since she was a child. For the

reasons that follow, the Court dismisses the complaint.

I, Background

On September 16, 2019, Void-Brown filed her complaint. Dkt. 1 (“Compl.”). She

claims, inter alia, that, in 2018, she began to suspect that she was a child trafficking victim and

“the illegitimate child of Charles Taylor, the former President of Liberia.” Jd. at 15. She alleges

that the FBI, DEA, and NYPD have known of her status as a trafficking victim and have created

! Void-Brown paid the filing fee for this action. In Void-Brown’s prior suit against the FBI, the

DEA, and others, she sought leave to proceed in forma pauperis, but after the magistrate judge

recommended denial of such leave, she paid the filing fee. See Void-Brown v. Fed. Bureau of

Investigation, No. 19 Civ. 286 (APG) (VCF), 2019 WL 2518117, at *1 (D. Nev. June 18, 2019).

“multiple conspiracy and entrapment schemes” against her in order to “locate assets associated

with Charles Taylor’ that “are commingled with the assets of Muammar Gaddafi, the former

leader of Libya.” Jd. at 16.

Void-Brown’s complaint recounts several instances of sexual assault and sexual

molestation, including the following. See id. at 17-18. She alleges that the FBI directed

“decades worth” of “acts of aggression (including the orchestration of sexual attacks perpetrated

against [Void-Brown] and her adoptive family starting when she was a 4 year old [sic] child.” Jd.

at 17. She also states that “as a 4 year old [sic] girl [she] was sexually molested by a 17-20 year

old Puerto Rican female as she was being babysat by another individual” and that “[i]n

1982/1983, [she] was attending the Fannie Smith Montessori school, when her classmates a

black boy and a white girl began bullying [Void-Brown] into kissing the black boy as she was in

the coat room preparing to depart. The black boy repeatedly called her cupcake.” Jd.

Void-Brown also alleges that her psychologist Dr. Augenbraum helped to entrap her. In

2008, she began seeing Dr. Augenbraun “because she had not yet started to date or engage in

romantic relationships, due to that trauma, and needed the assistance of Dr. Augenbraun to

develop a management plan assisting her with this aspect of her life. Jd. at 19-20. She claims

that “[t]he defendants instructed Dr. Augenbraun to provide inadequate care to Ms. Void-Brown,

which . . . allowed her to be lured into a number of entrapment schemes meant to psychologically

exploit [her].” /d. at 20. For example, she claims that, as a result, she “was lured to Europe and

other countries, where the defendants endeavored to conduct surveillance with the intentions of

identifying unknown business associates of Charles Taylor, while he was on trial at the Hague.”

Id.

Throughout her complaint, Void-Brown highlights the alleged role that the FBI, the DEA,

the City of New York, and the NYPD played in entrapping her. In one instance, she claims that:

[I]n 2009, the FBI, and DEA lured Ms. Void-Brown into romantic liaisons and

friendships with individuals who resembled, shared first names, common

backgrounds (such as nationality) with individuals associated with her biological

father’s regime in efforts to collect information regarding the missing assets, and

psychologically make the plaintiff more malleable to the coercive and surveillance

tactics of these agencies.

Id. at 20. She also alleges that defendants “coerced local and state agencies to depriv[e] Ms.

Void-Brown of her civil and constitutional rights in order to successfully execute their plans to

locate the liquid and illiquid assets associated with [her] biological father.” Jd.

As result of these claims and others, Void-Brown requests, infer alia, an injunction,

$4.5 million in damages, and forfeiture and disgorgement of salaries and other benefits from

defendants. See id. at 29-30.

II. Applicable Legal Principles

Courts have the authority to dismiss a complaint, even when the plaintiff has paid the

filing fee, if it determines that the action is frivolous, Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh Tenants

Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 363-64 (2d Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (citing Pillay v. INS, 45 F.3d 14, 16-17

(2d Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (holding that Court of Appeals has inherent authority to dismiss

frivolous appeal)), or that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, see Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil

Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999). Courts are obliged, however, to construe pro se pleadings

liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them “to raise the strongest

[claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474-75 (2d Cir.

2006) (emphasis in original).

A claim is frivolous when it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v.

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989), abrogated on other grounds by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544 (2007); see also Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992) (“[A] finding of

factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the

wholly incredible.”); Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998)

(“An action is ‘frivolous’ when either: (1) the factual contentions are clearly baseless . . . ; or (2)

the claim is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Il. Discussion

Even when read with the “special solicitude” due to pro se pleadings, Triestman, 470 F.3d

at 474-75, Void-Brown’s claims rise to the level of the irrational, and there is no legal theory on

which she can rely. See Denton, 504 U.S. at 33; Livingston, 141 F.3d at 437,

District courts generally grant a pro se plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to

cure its defects, but leave to amend is not required where it would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione,

657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011). Because the defects in Void-Brown’s complaint cannot be

cured with an amendment, the Court declines to grant Void-Brown leave to amend and dismisses

the action as frivolous.”

CONCLUSION

Void-Brown’s complaint is dismissed as frivolous. The Clerk of Court is directed to mail

a copy of this order to Void-Brown and note the fact of such service on the docket.

In the District of Nevada case, the magistrate judge recommended dismissal of the complaint as

frivolous. Void-Brown v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, No. 19 Civ. 286 (APG) (VCF), 2019 WL

2520022, at *2 (D. Nev. Apr. 1, 2019) (recommending dismissal where Void-Brown claimed that

“the FBI, Mr. Alvia, and a hotel were involved in a conspiracy to make it appear as though

Plaintiff was engaged in prostitution in order to blackmail Plaintiff’), The district court adopted

the recommendation dismissing the claims but granted her leave to file an amended complaint.

Void-Brown, 2019 WL 2519117, at *1. Void-Brown did file an amended complaint, Dkt. 19, and

the district court has since issued an order to show cause as to why the case should not be

dismissed, Dkt. 25.

The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would

not be taken in good faith, and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of an

appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).

The Clerk of Court is directed to docket this as a “written opinion” within the meaning of

Section 205(a)(5) of the E-Government Act of 2002. Pub. L. 107-347, § 205, 116 Stat. 1899,

2913 (2002) (codified at 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note).

SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 20, 2019

New York, New York p at {\ .

cee

United States District Judge