Opinion

Brown v. Federal Bureau of Investigations

Court
District Court, S.D. New York
Filed
Jul 25, 2019
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 27.0%

“ A complaint will be dismissed as ‘ frivolous’ when ‘ it is clear that the defendants are immune from suit.’ ” (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989))

How later courts described this case

  • “ A complaint will be dismissed as ‘ frivolous’ when ‘ it is clear that the defendants are immune from suit.’ ” (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989))
  • holding that an appellant demonstrates good faith when he seeks review of a nonfrivolous issue
  • “ Because an action against a federal agency . . . is essentially a suit against the United States, such suits are . . . barred under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, unless such immunity is waived.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

CYNTHIA BROWN,

Plaintiff,

19-CV-6647 (LLS)

-against-

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION;

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

Defendants.

LOUIS L. STANTON, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff, appearing pro se, brings this action against the Federal Bureau of Investigation

(FBI) and the United States Department of Justice (DOJ), alleging that federal officials violated

her constitutional rights in Brooklyn, New York. By order dated July 18, 2019, the Court granted

Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis (IFP). For

the reasons set forth in this order, the Court dismisses this action and grants Plaintiff thirty days’

leave to replead.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court must dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint, or portion thereof, that is

frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see

Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also

dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to

construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret

them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470

F.3d 471, 474-75 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in

original).

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, using the Court’ s general complaint form, brings this action against the FBI and

DOJ, asserting that on July 3, 2019, federal officials violated her constitutional rights in

Brooklyn, New York. But Plaintiff provides no facts about what occurred; she only attaches a

sheet of paper addressed to the attention of Michael J. Kohn in Queens, New York.

DISCUSSION

A. Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to make a short and

plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. A complaint states a claim for relief

if the claim is plausible. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To review a complaint for plausibility, the Court accepts all

well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in the pleader’s

favor. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). But the Court need not accept

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially legal

conclusions. Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). After separating legal conclusions

from well-pleaded factual allegations, the court must determine whether those facts make it

plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.

Plaintiff’s complaint fails to comply with Rule 8. It does not contain a short and plain

statement showing that Plaintiff is entitled to relief. The complaint contains no facts showing

how Defendants were personally involved in violating Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

B. Sovereign Immunity

The doctrine of sovereign immunity bars federal courts from hearing all suits against the

federal government, including suits against its agencies, such as the FBI and DOJ, except where

sovereign immunity has been waived. United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980)

(quoting United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941)); Robinson v. Overseas Military

Sales Corp., 21 F.3d 502, 510 (2d Cir. 1994) (“ Because an action against a federal agency . . . is

essentially a suit against the United States, such suits are . . . barred under the doctrine of

sovereign immunity, unless such immunity is waived.” ). The Court must dismiss Plaintiff’ s

claims against the FBI and DOJ as frivolous because any constitutional claims she seeks to assert

against these entities are barred under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (iii); see Montero v. Travis, 171 F.3d 757, 760 (2d Cir. 1999) (“ A complaint

will be dismissed as ‘ frivolous’ when ‘ it is clear that the defendants are immune from suit.’ ”

(quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989))).

C. Claims Under Bivens

Because Plaintiff alleges that federal officials violated her constitutional rights, the Court

liberally construes the complaint as asserting claims under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents

of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). A plaintiff may bring Bivens claims against

a federal official to seek redress for a violation of his or her constitutional rights. See Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009) (“[Bivens] is the federal analog to suits brought against state

officials under [42 U.S.C. § 1983].”). But Bivens relief is available only against federal officials

who are personally liable for the alleged constitutional violations. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct.

1843, 1860 (2017).

The Supreme Court has recognized Bivens claims in three contexts: (1) unreasonable

search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment, Bivens, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), (2) employment

discrimination under the Fifth Amendment, Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979), and (3)

inadequate medical treatment of an inmate under the Eighth Amendment, Carlson v. Green, 446

U.S. 14. See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1854-55 (2017). Further, “the Court has made

clear that expanding the Bivens remedy is now a ‘disfavored’ judicial activity.” Id. at 1857.

Here, although Plaintiff asserts that federal officials violated her constitutional rights, she

does not allege any facts suggesting a viable Bivens claim. To the extent Plaintiff may be

asserting a claim under Bivens, the complaint must be dismissed. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

LEAVE TO REPLEAD

The Court dismisses this action for Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim on which relief may

be granted and suing defendants who are immune from suit. In an abundance of caution and in

light of the Second Circuit’s direction to provide a plaintiff an opportunity to amend the

complaint unless it would be futile for the Plaintiff to do so, see Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116,

123–24 (2d Cir. 2011), the Court grants Plaintiff thirty days’ leave to submit an amended

complaint that addresses the deficiencies above.

Plaintiff must provide a short and plain statement of the relevant facts supporting each

claim against each defendant named in the amended complaint. Plaintiff must show that she is

entitled to relief against any defendant she seeks to sue. If Plaintiff seeks a remedy for the

alleged violation of her constitutional rights under Bivens, she must name as defendant(s) the

individual(s) who violated her rights and allege facts suggesting that her claims fall within the

parameters outlined in Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1854-55 ‒ unreasonable search and seizure under the

Fourth Amendment, employment discrimination under the Fifth Amendment, or inadequate

medical treatment of an inmate under the Eighth Amendment. The Court advises Plaintiff that if

all of the events giving rise to her claims occurred in Brooklyn, New York, the United States

District Court for the Eastern District of New York may be the proper venue for her claims. See

28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1), (2).

CONCLUSION

The Clerk of Court is directed to assign this matter to my docket, mail a copy of this

order to Plaintiff, and note service on the docket. Plaintiff’s complaint, filed in forma pauperis

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), is dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)Q), (11), (a1). The

Court grants Plaintiff thirty days’ leave to file an amended complaint.

The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would

not be taken in good faith, and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of an

appeal. Cf. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962) (holding that an appellant

demonstrates good faith when he seeks review of a nonfrivolous issue).

The Clerk of Court is directed to docket this as a “written opinion” within the meaning of

Section 205(a)(5) of the E-Government Act of 2002.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 24, ON Vork

New York, New Yor

US.D.J.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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