Weaver, Jr. v. New York State Unified Court System

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

____________________________________________

STANTON E. WEAVER, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v. 1:23-CV-1518

(GTS/DJS)

NEW YORK STATE UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM;

NEW YORK STATE JUDICIAL REVIEW

COMMITTEE; CHAD BALZER; BALZER &

LEARY, PLLC; WILLIAM NEWMAN; BECKER,

GLYNN, MUFFLY, CHASSIN & HOSINSKI LLP;

and FLEISCHMAN BONNER & ROCCO LLP,

Defendants.

_____________________________________________

APPEARANCES: OF COUNSEL:

STANTON E. WEAVER, JR.

Plaintiff, Pro Se

71 Schultze Street

Canajoharie, NY 13317

HON. LETITIA JAMES MARK J. DOLAN, ESQ.

NYS Office of the Attorney General Assistant Attorney General

Counsel for NY State Defendants

The Capitol

Albany, NY 12224

OBERHEIDEN PC WILLIAM H. NEWMAN, ESQ.

Counsel for Defendants Balzer, Newman,

and Balzer & Leary, PLLC

30 Wall Street, 8th Floor

New York, NY 10005

BECKER, GLYNN, MUFFLY, CHASSIN & WALTER E. SWEARINGEN, ESQ.

HOSINSKI, LLP

Counsel for Itself

299 Park Avenue, 16th Floor

New York, NY 10171

FLEISCHMAN BONNER & ROCCO LLP PATRICK L. ROCCO, ESQ.

Counsel for Itself SUSAN M. DAVIES, ESQ.

81 Main Street, Suite 515

White Plains, NY 10601

GLENN T. SUDDABY, United States District Judge

DECISION and ORDER

Currently before the Court, in this pro se civil rights action filed by Stanton E. Weaver,

Jr. (“Plaintiff”) against the New York State Unified Court System, the New York State Judicial

Review Committee, Chad Balzer, Balzer & Leary PLLC, William Newman, Becker, Glynn,

Muffly, Chassin & Hosinski LLP (“Becker Firm”), and Fleischman Bonner & Rocco LLP

(“Fleischman Firm”) (collectively “Defendants”), are the following four motions: (1) a motion

to dismiss filed by Defendants Balzer, Newman, and Balzer & Leary (“Balzer and Newman

Defendants”) pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6); (2) a motion to dismiss filed by

Defendant Becker Firm pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6); (3) a motion to dismiss

filed by Defendant Fleischman Firm pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), 9(b), 12(b)(1), and

12(b)(6); and (4) a motion to dismiss filed by Defendants New York State Unified Court System

and New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct s/h/a New York State Judicial Review

Committee (“State Defendants”) pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (Dkt. Nos. 8,

21, 29, 39.) For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ motions are granted and Plaintiff’s

Complaint is dismissed.

I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND

A. Plaintiff’s Complaint

Generally, in his pro se Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the various Defendants worked

together to deprive him of his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection through the

2

following actions: (1) the Balzer and Newman Defendants, Defendant Becker Firm, and

Defendant Fleischman Firm filed and pursued motions in the state-court action that Plaintiff

alleges were fraudulent and frivolous and made false statements in their representations to the

courts related to those actions; (2) Defendant New York State Unified Court System, through

various Family Court, Supreme Court, and Appellate Division judges, issued and upheld

fraudulent decisions that were in conflict with the terms of the parties’ controlling divorce

stipulation agreement, and it further failed to properly respond to Plaintiff’s Freedom of

Information Law (“FOIL”) requests for information related to various Appellate Division judges;

and (3) Defendant New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct failed to properly

investigate Plaintiff’s complaints about the fairness and legality of the state-court proceedings.

(See generally Dkt. No. 1.) Generally, based on these factual allegations, Plaintiff claims as

follows: (1) his “right to appeal” has been violated by the fraudulent actions of Defendants; (2)

his right to “justice and ‘equal protection under the law’” has been denied by Defendants; (3)

Defendant Balzer, Defendant Newman, and their respective law firms engaged in the “illegal

aiding and abetting of Judge Tomlinson’s unjust acts”; and (4) justice “has been delayed and

denied by the fraudulent decisions” of Judge Tomlinson and the Appellate Division, and by the

related “cover-up” of their actions by the Appellate Division, the New York Unified Court

System, and the New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct. (Id.)

Construing this Complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds that

Plaintiff has asserted the following claims: (1) a violation of his equal protection rights under the

Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) a violation

of his equal protection rights under Article 1, Section 11 of the New York Constitution; (3)

3

conspiracy to interfere with civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985; and (4) a violation of his

due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1

B. Parties’ Briefing on Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss

1. Law Firm and Attorney Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss

Because the arguments raised by the Balzer and Newman Defendants, Defendant Becker

Firm, and Defendant Fleischman Firm are all essentially the same and/or apply to the claims

against all those Defendants, the Court will discuss them together for the sake of brevity.

a. Law Firm and Attorney Defendants’ Memoranda of Law

Generally, in support of their collective motions, the relevant Defendants make four

arguments. (Dkt. No. 8, Attach. 1; Dkt. No. 21, Attach. 1; Dkt. No. 29, Attach. 1.) First, these

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s Complaint should be dismissed for lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction based on either the Rooker-Feldman doctrine or the domestic relations exception.

(Dkt. No. 8, Attach. 1, at 7-9; Dkt. No. 21, Attach. 1, at 9-12; Dkt. No. 29, Attach. 1, at 10-11.)

Defendant Fleischman Firm relatedly argues that, even if subject-matter jurisdiction exists,

Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed because they are barred by collateral estoppel given that

they seek to re-litigate issues that have already been decided in a prior action. (Dkt. No. 29,

Attach. 1, at 9-10.)

Second, these Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to state a federal law claim

because he has not sufficiently alleged that any of them are state actors or were acting under the

1 Although the due process claim is less overt than the other three claims, it can be

reasonably extrapolated from Plaintiff’s intent to assert claims of a denial of his right to appeal

and a denial of justice due to fraudulent decisions by Judge Tomlinson and the Appellate

Division in particular.

4

color of state law. (Dkt. No. 8, Attach. 1, at 9-11; Dkt. No. 21, Attach. 1, at 12-14.) They argue

further that, to the extent Plaintiff raises any claim of fraudulent activity, Plaintiff has not alleged

facts sufficient to plead fraud under the applicable legal standard. (Dkt. No. 8, Attach. 1, at 12-

13; Dkt. No. 29, Attach. 1, at 13-15.) Defendant Fleischman Firm additionally argues that

Plaintiff has failed to plead a claim of conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 because he has not

alleged facts to plausibly suggest any type of agreement between the relevant attorney and law

firm Defendants and the State Defendants. (Dkt. No. 29, Attach. 1, at 12-13.) Defendants

Balzer and Balzer & Leary argue also that any claims against them specifically pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983 are barred by the applicable three-year statute of limitations. (Dkt. No. 8, Attach.

1, at 10.)

Third, these Defendants argue that, should the Court find that subject-matter jurisdiction

is lacking or that Plaintiff’s federal claims must be dismissed, his pendant state law claims must

also be dismissed because the Court has no basis to assert jurisdiction over those claims due to

the fact that the parties are all domiciled in New York (and thus diversity jurisdiction does not

exist) and Plaintiff has not provided any allegations to plausibly suggest that his damages in this

case would exceed the relevant jurisdictional threshold. (Dkt. No. 8, Attach. 1, at 10; Dkt. No.

21, Attach. 1, at 14-15.)

Fourth, these Defendants argue that Plaintiff should not be granted leave to amend the

Complaint because any amendments would be futile due to an inability to establish subject-

matter jurisdiction, the fact that he has not shown that he could provide additional allegations to

remedy the deficiencies in his asserted claims, and the fact that he has a dilatory motive of

seeking to delay the enforcement of a state-court settlement that was entered into more than six

5

years ago. (Dkt. No. 8, Attach. 1, at 13-14; Dkt. No. 21, Attach. 1, at 15-16; Dkt. No. 29, Attach.

1, at 16.)

b. Plaintiff’s Opposition Memoranda of Law

Generally, throughout his response briefs, Plaintiff makes four arguments. (Dkt. Nos. 14,

32, 33.) First, Plaintiff argues that the relevant Defendants violated his equal protection and due

process rights by bringing and continuing to pursue fraudulent litigation and motions and thereby

aided and abetted the State Court Defendants to issue fraudulent decisions against him. (Dkt.

No. 14, at 1-2, 8-9; Dkt. No. 32, at 3-9; Dkt. No. 33, at 2-4.) As part of this claim, Plaintiff also

argues that all Defendants engaged in a conspiracy to deprive him of his constitutional rights.

(Dkt. No. 32, at 4-5, 8-9.)

Second, Plaintiff argues that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is inapplicable to this case

because (a) he has alleged that the outcomes in the state-court proceedings were the product of

fraud and he therefore did not lose in those proceedings given that he was deprived of a fair trial

and fair appeals, (b) he is not complaining of injuries caused by the state court judgments but

rather of violations of his equal protection and due process rights, and (c) although some of the

decisions were rendered before he filed this federal action, he is not asking for review of any of

those judgments. (Dkt. No. 14, at 8; Dkt. No. 32, at 9-10.)

Third, Plaintiff argues that the domestic relations exception to subject-matter jurisdiction

also does not apply because “[t]his is not a case ‘over factual disputes related to domestic

relations’” but rather “a case of lies and fraud that have violated the Plaintiff’s ‘equal protection’

right.” (Dkt. No. 14, at 8; Dkt. No. 32, at 10-11.)

6

Fourth, Plaintiff argues that his claims are not barred by collateral estoppel because he

was not provided a full and fair opportunity to litigate issues in the prior state-court proceedings

as a result of fraud, and, in any event, he is not attempting to relitigate any matrimonial disputes,

but rather the alleged violations of his civil rights. (Dkt. No. 33, at 2.)

c. Law Firm and Attorney Defendants’ Reply Memoranda of

Law

Generally, in their collective reply briefs, the relevant Defendants make five arguments.

(Dkt. Nos. 15, 34, 37.) First, these Defendants argue that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies

in this case despite the fact that Plaintiff has alleged fraud because his claims seek a review of

the underlying state-court judgments (regardless of whether he frames them as such) and there is

no doubting that he indeed lost in those state-court proceedings. (Dkt. No. 15, at 5-7; Dkt. No.

34, at 4-5.) They relatedly argue that Plaintiff has not pled any fraud with the specificity

required under Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). (Dkt. No. 15, at 7-8; Dkt. No. 37, at 3.)

Second, these Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s Complaint must be dismissed

alternatively based on the domestic relations exception because that exception applies even

where fraud is alleged, he has not pled such fraud with particularity, and the purported fraudulent

actions are rooted in a dispute over the terms of Plaintiff’s divorce. (Dkt. No. 15, at 8-9.)

Third, these Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not challenged their arguments that he

has failed to state a constitutional claim on the basis that he has not plausibly alleged that the

relevant Defendants were state actors or acted under the color of state law, or that they engaged

in any type of conspiracy with the State Court Defendants. (Dkt. No. 15, at 10; Dkt. No. 34, at

6-7; Dkt. No. 37, at 2-3.)

7

Fourth, these Defendants argue that, even if subject-matter jurisdiction exists, if

Plaintiff’s federal claims are dismissed, there is no basis for diversity jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s

state law claims because all parties are domiciled in New York and Plaintiff has not alleged that

the amount in controversy is sufficient. (Dkt. No. 15, at 10.)

Fifth, these Defendants argue that Plaintiff has also failed to state any additional state law

tort claim such as defamation or infliction of emotional distress. (Dkt. No. 15, at 10-11.)

2. State Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

a. State Defendants’ Memorandum of Law

Generally, in their memorandum of law, the State Defendants make seven arguments.

(Dkt. No. 39, Attach. 1.) First, the State Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s Complaint must be

dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. (Id.

at 9-11.)

Second, the State Defendants argue that the Complaint alternatively should be dismissed

based on the domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction because all of Plaintiff’s alleged

injuries stem from the state court’s rulings in Plaintiff’s divorce proceedings. (Id. at 11-12.)

Third, the State Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims against them are barred by the

Eleventh Amendment because both State Defendants are considered agencies or departments of

New York State. (Id. at 12-13.)

Fourth, the State Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims against them are also barred by

judicial immunity because the actions taken by the relevant judges of the New York Unified

Court System were all within those judges’ judicial capacity and the actions of the New York

8

State Commission on Judicial Conduct were discretionary and/or of a quasi-judicial nature. (Id.

at 13-15.)

Fifth, the State Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted because Plaintiff does not have a federal constitutional right to an

investigation of his complaints against the various judges who rendered rulings in the state-court

proceedings, or a constitutional right under either the federal or New York constitutions to have a

judge investigated or disciplined by the New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct. (Id.

at 15-16.)

Sixth, the State Defendants argue that, if the federal claims are dismissed, the Court

should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any remaining state law claims. (Id. at

16-17.)

Seventh, the State Defendants argue that Plaintiff should not be granted leave to amend

his Complaint because repleading would be futile in this instance due to the lack of subject-

matter jurisdiction and other substantive defects that cannot be cured. (Id. at 17-18.)

b. Plaintiff’s Opposition Memorandum of Law

Generally, in his response memorandum, Plaintiff makes eight arguments. (Dkt. No. 45.)

First, Plaintiff argues that the State Defendants violated his rights to equal protection and due

process by “knowingly issuing[] multiple, fraudulently wrong decisions against the Plaintiff, in

multiple courts, over 5 years, culminating in the fraudulent Appellate decisions.” (Id. at 4-5.)

Second, Plaintiff argues that New York State waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity

to suit for equal protection violations in the case of Brown v. State of New York, 674 N.E.2d 1129

(N.Y. 1996), but that, even if the State has not waived its immunity, or to the extent it has not

9

waived immunity as to due process violations, the Court should “exercise their ‘equitable

powers’ and provide the Plaintiff relief” based on “the ‘extraordinary circumstances’ and 5-year

duration of these violations” that show that the state courts would be incapable of providing

Plaintiff with a fair trial. (Id. at 5-7, 9.) As a corollary to this argument, Plaintiff argues that a

federal court may intervene in state proceedings under circumstances that would otherwise

warrant abstention if the plaintiff shows bad faith or other unusual circumstances that call for

equitable relief. (Id. at 5-6.)

Third, Plaintiff argues that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply in this case

because (a) he did not lose in the state-court proceedings given that he was denied his right to a

fair trial and right to appeal, (b) he filed this federal action before the final state-court judgment

because he “currently has an appeal pending in the 3rd Appellate Division to address the

fraudulent contempt charge,” and “has a motion for ‘leave to appeal’ pending in the Court of

Appeals, to address all the original fraudulent Appellate decisions,” the response to which is

“now way overdue,” (c) he is not complaining of injuries caused by the state-court judgments but

rather by the violation of his constitutional rights during those proceedings, and (d) although

some of the judgments had been rendered before he filed this federal lawsuit, he is not asking for

review of those and they are nevertheless not final given that they are pending appeal. (Id. at 7-

8.)

Fourth, Plaintiff argues that the domestic relations exception does not apply because he is

not asking the Court to review the state court’s findings in his divorce action but rather to find

that his constitutional rights have been violated by the State Defendants’ actions. (Id. at 8.)

10

Fifth, Plaintiff argues that “[t]his case is a concrete example why ‘Judicial Immunity’

should cease to exist” and that “[t]he unprecedented, insidious, egregious, and immoral disgrace,

brought by NY States’s [sic] judges (court and JRC) should bring down the judicial immunity

shield for this case, but given the history and NY States’ [sic] reputation, the Plaintiff has little

hope the ‘right thing’ will ever be done, and does not pursue this avenue.” (Id. at 9.)

Sixth, Plaintiff argues that he has stated claims upon which relief can be granted in

federal court based on his previous arguments related to Eleventh Amendment immunity and the

State Defendants’ bad-faith actions. (Id. at 10.)

Seventh, Plaintiff argues that the Court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his

state law claims due to the State Defendants’ alleged bad faith actions that would prevent

Plaintiff from receiving a fair trial in any New York court. (Id.)

Eighth, Plaintiff argues that he should be granted leave to amend if necessary given the

“unprecedented” “level of conspiracy and violation of [his] rights.” (Id.)

c. State Defendants’ Reply Memorandum of Law

Generally, in their reply memorandum, the State Defendants make seven arguments.

(Dkt. No. 48.) First, the State Defendants argue that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies in this

case because (a) it is established that Plaintiff lost in state court based on the decisions he

appended to the Complaint, (b) all the harm he complains of from the alleged constitutional

violations stems from the state-court judgments he believes are fraudulent, and (c) despite his

new assertions that the relevant state-court judgments are not final, he stated in his Complaint

that he is seeking redress for those judgments and nothing in the Complaint confirms that any

appeals are pending related to the state-court decisions that are relevant to this action. (Id. at 4.)

11

Second, the State Defendants argue that the domestic relations exception also applies

because the alleged constitutional violations all stem from actions taken in the adjudication of

issues related to his divorce proceedings and subsequent appeals. (Id. at 5.)

Third, the State Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims against them are barred by the

Eleventh Amendment and that they have not waived that immunity as to any of Plaintiff’s

claims. (Id. at 5-6.)

Fourth, the State Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims against them are also barred by

judicial immunity and that Plaintiff has failed to raise any substantive opposition to this

argument, instead asking the Court merely to decline to apply judicial immunity based on the

circumstances of this case. (Id. at 6-7.)

Fifth, the State Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not refuted their argument that the

Complaint fails to state a cause of action. (Id. at 7.)

Sixth, the State Defendants argue that the Court should decline to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims and that Plaintiff has not provided any substantive

opposition to this argument. (Id. at 7.)

Seventh, the State Defendants argue that the Court should decline to grant Plaintiff leave

to amend the Complaint because any amendments he could make would be futile. (Id. at 8.)

II. GOVERNING LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Legal Standard for Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)

“It is a fundamental precept that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Owen

Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374 (1978). Generally, a claim may be

properly dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction where a district court lacks

12

constitutional or statutory power to adjudicate it. Makarova v. U.S., 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir.

2000). A district court may look to evidence outside of the pleadings when resolving a motion to

dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Makarova, 201 F.3d at 113. The plaintiff bears

the burden of proving subject-matter jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.

Makarova, 201 F.3d at 113 (citing Malik v. Meissner, 82 F.3d 560, 562 [2d Cir. 1996]). When a

court evaluates a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, all ambiguities must

be resolved and inferences drawn in favor of the plaintiff. Aurecchione v. Schoolman Transp.

Sys., Inc., 426 F.3d 635, 638 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing Makarova, 201 F.3d at 113).

Generally, dismissals for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction must be without prejudice

(because the Court lacks jurisdiction to pass on the merits of the claims asserted). See Katz v.

Donna Karan Co., L.L.C., 872 F.3d 114, 121 (2d Cir. 2017) (“One other wrinkle: when a case is

dismissed for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction, ‘Article III deprives federal courts of the

power to dismiss [the] case with prejudice.’”).

Finally, it appears to be a factually specific inquiry (if not an open question) whether a

dismissal based on sovereign immunity is one based on a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) or one based on a failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6). Compare Carver v. Nassau Cnty. Interim Fin. Auth., 730 F.3d 150, 156 (2d Cir. 2013)

(“[W]hether the claim of sovereign immunity constitutes a true issue of subject matter

jurisdiction or is more appropriately viewed as an affirmative defense is an open question in the

Supreme Court and the Second Circuit.... More recently, we held that the burden of proof in a

case involving the assertion of sovereign immunity is on the party asserting it—a holding that we

acknowledged is more consistent with the understanding that sovereign immunity was an

13

affirmative defense.”) with Dorking Genetics v. United States, 76 F.3d 1261, 1264 (2d Cir. 1996)

(treating a dismissal of a claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act based on sovereign immunity

as one based on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction).

B. Legal Standard for Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)

It has long been understood that a dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), can be based on one or both of two grounds:

(1) a challenge to the “sufficiency of the pleading” under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); or (2) a

challenge to the legal cognizability of the claim. Jackson v. Onondaga Cty., 549 F. Supp.2d 204,

211 nn. 15-16 (N.D.N.Y. 2008) (McAvoy, J.) (adopting Report-Recommendation on de novo

review).

Because such dismissals are often based on the first ground, some elaboration regarding

that ground is appropriate. Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a

pleading contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to

relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) [emphasis added]. In the Court’s view, this tension between

permitting a “short and plain statement” and requiring that the statement “show[]” an entitlement

to relief is often at the heart of misunderstandings that occur regarding the pleading standard

established by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

On the one hand, the Supreme Court has long characterized the “short and plain”

pleading standard under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) as “simplified” and “liberal.” Jackson, 549 F.

Supp. 2d at 212 n.20 (citing Supreme Court case). On the other hand, the Supreme Court has

held that, by requiring the above-described “showing,” the pleading standard under Fed. R. Civ.

P. 8(a)(2) requires that the pleading contain a statement that “give[s] the defendant fair notice of

14

what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Jackson, 549 F. Supp. 2d at

212 n.17 (citing Supreme Court cases) (emphasis added).

The Supreme Court has explained that such fair notice has the important purpose of

“enabl[ing] the adverse party to answer and prepare for trial” and “facilitat[ing] a proper decision

on the merits” by the court. Jackson, 549 F. Supp. 2d at 212 n.18 (citing Supreme Court cases);

Rusyniak v. Gensini, 629 F. Supp. 2d 203, 213 & n.32 (N.D.N.Y. 2009) (Suddaby, J.) (citing

Second Circuit cases). For this reason, as one commentator has correctly observed, the “liberal”

notice pleading standard “has its limits.” 2 Moore’s Federal Practice § 12.34[1][b] at 12-61 (3d

ed. 2003). For example, numerous Supreme Court and Second Circuit decisions exist holding

that a pleading has failed to meet the “liberal” notice pleading standard. Rusyniak, 629 F. Supp.

2d at 213 n.22 (citing Supreme Court and Second Circuit cases); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129

S. Ct. 1937, 1949-52 (2009).

Most notably, in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the Supreme Court reversed an

appellate decision holding that a complaint had stated an actionable antitrust claim under 15

U.S.C. § 1. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). In doing so, the Court

“retire[d]” the famous statement by the Court in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957),

that “a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond

doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him

to relief.” Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 560-61, 577. Rather than turn on the conceivability of an

actionable claim, the Court clarified, the “fair notice” standard turns on the plausibility of an

actionable claim. Id. at 555-70. The Court explained that, while this does not mean that a

pleading need “set out in detail the facts upon which [the claim is based],” it does mean that the

15

pleading must contain at least “some factual allegation[s].” Id. at 555. More specifically, the

“[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level [to a

plausible level],” assuming (of course) that all the allegations in the complaint are true. Id.

As for the nature of what is “plausible,” the Supreme Court explained that “[a] claim has

facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). “[D]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for

relief . . . [is] a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial

experience and common sense. . . . [W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to

infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged–but it has not

show[n]–that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (internal quotation marks

and citations omitted). However, while the plausibility standard “asks for more than a sheer

possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully,” id., it “does not impose a probability

requirement.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.

Because of this requirement of factual allegations plausibly suggesting an entitlement to

relief, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in the complaint

is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,

supported by merely conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.

Similarly, a pleading that only “tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement”

will not suffice. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (internal citations and alterations omitted). Rule 8

“demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id.

(citations omitted).

16

Finally, a few words are appropriate regarding what documents are considered when a

dismissal for failure to state a claim is contemplated. Generally, when contemplating a dismissal

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) or Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c), the following matters outside the

four corners of the complaint may be considered without triggering the standard governing a

motion for summary judgment: (1) documents attached as an exhibit to the complaint or answer,

(2) documents incorporated by reference in the complaint (and provided by the parties), (3)

documents that, although not incorporated by reference, are “integral” to the complaint, or (4)

any matter of which the court can take judicial notice for the factual background of the case.2

2 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c) (“A copy of any written instrument which is an exhibit to a

pleading is a part thereof for all purposes.”); L-7 Designs, Inc. v. Old Navy, LLC, No. 10-573,

2011 WL 2135734, at *1 (2d Cir. June 1, 2011) (explaining that conversion from a motion to

dismiss for failure to state a claim to a motion for summary judgment is not necessary under Fed.

R. Civ. P. 12[d] if the “matters outside the pleadings” in consist of [1] documents attached to the

complaint or answer, [2] documents incorporated by reference in the complaint (and provided by

the parties), [3] documents that, although not incorporated by reference, are “integral” to the

complaint, or [4] any matter of which the court can take judicial notice for the factual

background of the case); DiFolco v. MSNBC Cable L.L.C., 622 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir. 2010)

(explaining that a district court considering a dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. 12(b)(6) “may

consider the facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached to the complaint as exhibits, and

documents incorporated by reference in the complaint. . . . Where a document is not

incorporated by reference, the court may neverless consider it where the complaint relies heavily

upon its terms and effect, thereby rendering the document ‘integral’ to the complaint. . . .

However, even if a document is ‘integral’ to the complaint, it must be clear on the record that no

dispute exists regarding the authenticity or accuracy of the document. It must also be clear that

there exist no material disputed issues of fact regarding the relevance of the document.”)

[internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147,

152 (2d Cir. 2009) (“The complaint is deemed to include any written instrument attached to it as

an exhibit or any statements or documents incorporated in it by reference.”) (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted); Int'l Audiotext Network, Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 62 F.3d 69, 72

(2d Cir.1995) (per curiam) (“[W]hen a plaintiff chooses not to attach to the complaint or

incorporate by reference a [document] upon which it solely relies and which is integral to the

complaint,” the court may nevertheless take the document into consideration in deciding [a]

17

III. ANALYSIS

A. Whether the Court Has Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Over Plaintiff’s Claims

After careful consideration, the Court answers this question in the negative for the

reasons stated in the Defendants’ memoranda of law related to the points discussed below.3 To

those reasons, the Court adds the following analysis.

As all parties appear to acknowledge, in order for a court to find that it lacks jurisdiction

over a plaintiff’s claims under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, four requirements must be met:

“‘(1) the plaintiff must have lost in state court; (2) the loss must have occurred before the district

court proceedings commenced; (3) the plaintiff must complain of injuries caused by a state court

judgment; and (4) the plaintiff must invite district court review and rejection of the judgment.’”

Mulqueen v. Herkimer Cnty. Child Protective Servs., 22-CV-1301, 2023 WL 4931679, at *3

defendant's motion to dismiss, without converting the proceeding to one for summary

judgment.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

3 The Court does not adopt the alternative basis for finding a lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction asserted by many of the Defendants, i.e., the domestic relations exception, because

the Second Circuit has held that the domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction does not

apply in cases that are before the court on federal-question jurisdiction as opposed to diversity

jurisdiction. Deem v. DiMella-Deem, 941 F.3d 618, 623 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting Williams v.

Lambert, 46 F.3d 1275, 1284 [2d Cir. 1995]). Although Plaintiff does not specify which

jurisdictional statute he was intending to proceed under, Defendants have highlighted that

diversity jurisdiction does not exist in this case because the parties all appear to be domiciled in

New York State. (Dkt. No. 1, at ¶¶ 3-4.) Further, Plaintiff has clearly asserted federal claims

pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution (which, as Defendants

note, is enabled for suit through 42 U.S.C. § 1983, whether Plaintiff specifically cited to that

statute or not). The Court therefore finds that there is no basis for concluding a lack of subject-

matter jurisdiction based on the domestic relations exception, and it declines to address whether

the related domestic relations abstention doctrine recognized by the Second Circuit would apply

here given that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over those same claims pursuant to the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Deem, 941 F.3d at 623-25 (citing Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Block, 905

F.2d 12, 14 [2d Cir. 1990]).

18

(N.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2023) (Baxter, M.J.), report-recommendation adopted by 2024 WL 756833

(N.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2024) (Sannes, M.J.). The Second Circuit has recently clarified that the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine “applies only after state-court proceedings have ‘ended,’” and that

proceedings are not said to have ended if, at the time the plaintiff files the federal lawsuit, an

appeal of the relevant state-court proceeding is still pending in a state court. Hunter v.

McMahon, 75 F.4th 62, 67 (2d Cir. 2023) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus.

Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 291 [2005]). The Second Circuit highlighted that this is because “federal

courts ‘assess jurisdiction . . . as of the moment the complaint was filed.’” Hunter, 75 F.4th at 67

(quoting E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Lloyd’s & Cos., 241 F.3d 154, 163 [2d Cir. 2001]).

Plaintiff argues that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply in this case for various

reasons: (1) he did not actually lose in his state-court proceedings because the “intrinsic fraud

that occurred under the state court proceedings” denied him a fair trial; (2) the state-court

proceedings have not ended because appeals related to the relevant decisions are still pending;

and (3) he is not complaining of any injuries caused by the state-court judgments, but rather a

violation of his rights to due process and equal protection, and he is not asking for the review or

reversal of those judgments.4 (Dkt. No. 14, at 8; Dkt. No. 32, at 10; Dkt. No. 45, at 8.)

Plaintiff argues first that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply because the

underlying actions by Defendants, and the state-court decisions that resulted from those actions,

4 Although Plaintiff has asserted differing (but not conflicting) arguments regarding the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine in particular in his separate responses to the four motions to dismiss

under consideration in this Decision and Order, the Court will consider all those arguments

together when determining whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists as to any of the relevant

Defendants given his pro se status and the fact that all Defendants have raised the Rooker-

Feldman doctrine as a jurisdictional bar in their motions.

19

were fraudulent. Claims based in fraud “are not barred by Rooker-Feldman if (i) they seek

damages for injuries suffered from the alleged fraud and (ii) their adjudication ‘does not require

the federal court to sit in review of the state court judgment.’” Hylton v. J.P. Morgan Chase

Bank, N.A., 338 F. Supp. 3d 263, 275 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (citing Vossbrinck v. Accredited Home

Lenders, Inc., 773 F.3d 423, 427 [2d Cir. 2014]) (discussing analogous case in which the Second

Circuit found that fraud claims based on allegations that the defendants obtained the state court

judgment fraudulently were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine); see also Lorick v.

Kilpatrick Townsend and Stockton LLP, 18-CV-7178, 2021 WL 7906510, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Aug.

20, 2021) (quoting Fiorolla v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc., 771 F. App’x 114, 115 [2d Cir. 2019])

(“Contrary to plaintiffs’ suggestion, there is no ‘fraud-on-the-court’ exception to the Rooker-

Feldman doctrine: The Second Circuit has ‘clearly held that a plaintiff cannot rely on allegations

that the state court judgment at issue was obtained fraudulently to avoid application’ of that

doctrine, since such an exception ‘would require the federal courts to review the state

proceedings and determine that the . . . judgment was issued in error, which Rooker-Feldman

instructs we cannot do.’”); Gurdon v. Bank, 15-CV-5674, 2016 WL 721019, at *6 (S.D.N.Y.

Feb. 23, 2016) (highlighting that there is no blanket fraud exception to the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine, and that it applies even in cases where the injury is caused by a state court judgment

that the plaintiff claims was obtained through fraud on the state court). As will be discussed in

more detail below, assessing whether fraud occurred would require the Court to review the

correctness of the relevant state court decisions in this case. Plaintiff’s allegations of fraud are

insufficient to overcome the fact that the decisions entered against him by the state courts were in

20

fact adverse to him such that he is considered to be the loser in that litigation for the purposes of

the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.5

As to Plaintiff’s second argument, it is undisputed that the relevant decisions that Plaintiff

alleges deprived him of his rights occurred before he filed the federal Complaint, because the

Appellate Division decisions that affirmed Judge Tomlinson’s underlying substantive decisions

were issued on October 21, 2021. (Dkt. No. 1, Attach. 1, at 9-17, 121-23.) In an attempt to

overcome this fact, Plaintiff argues that the state-court proceedings had nonetheless not ended by

the time he filed the federal Complaint because, as he asserts in one of his response memoranda,

he “currently has an appeal pending in the 3rd Appellate Division to address the fraudulent

contempt charge,” and, “a motion for ‘leave to appeal,’ pending in the Court of Appeals, to

address all the original fraudulent Appellate decisions,” but the “response to that motion, from

the Court of Appeals is now way overdue.” (Dkt. No. 45, at 8.) He additionally states that he

“was again dragged back into court by Mr. Newman, on January 31, 2024, while suffering a jaw

infection, and barely able to communicate, to deal with ongoing litigation related to the 3rd

Appellate fraudulent pension decision.” (Dkt. No. 45, at 6.)

As an initial matter, the Court notes that none of these allegations appear in the

Complaint itself, nor has Plaintiff made any formal attempt to amend the Complaint to include

them. That, however, is not fatal under the circumstances. “[S]pecial solicitude requires a court

to consider new factual assertions contained in a pro se plaintiff’s response to a defendant’s

5 Plaintiff’s citation to an exception based on alleged bad faith, harassment, and

extraordinary circumstances is unavailing because that exception is related to the Younger

abstention doctrine, not the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and therefore does not apply under the

circumstances presented here. (Dkt. No. 45, at 5-6.)

21

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim (to the extent that those new factual assertions are

consistent with the factual allegations of the operative pleading)[.]” Weather v. New York State

Police, 19-CV-0400, 2019 WL 5387448, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 2019) (Suddaby, C.J.) (citing

Drake v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 147 F.3d 169, 171 n.1 [2d Cir. 1998]). The Court will therefore

consider these allegations to the extent they are relevant to (and consistent with) Plaintiff’s

claims. The only allegation Plaintiff makes related to any ongoing proceedings within the

Complaint itself is a statement that, as a result of Judge Bruening’s denial of Plaintiff’s motion to

reargue Judge Tomlinson’s decision on a contempt of court motion filed by Defendant Newman

seeking to enforce a prior judgment, “the Plaintiff will now be forced to file another appeal,”

which will “be heard by the 3AD.” (Dkt. No. 1, at ¶¶ 188-89.) There is no indication that

Plaintiff had filed any such appeal before the time he filed the Complaint in this action.

Based on information submitted by Plaintiff as part of the Complaint, the relevant

decision by Judge Tomlinson on the contempt motion is dated December 13, 2022. (Dkt. No. 1,

at 362.) Under New York procedural law, a party must take an appeal as of right within 30 days

after service of a copy of the judgment or order to be appealed. N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 5513(a). Given

that information submitted with the Complaint shows that Plaintiff filed a motion to reargue that

decision on December 30, 2022, the Complaint itself appears to allege that Plaintiff was served

with that judgment prior to that date. (Dkt. No. 1, Attach. 1, at 345-48.) Yet Plaintiff’s own

allegations also suggest that he had not appealed that decision by the time he filed the Complaint

nearly a year later on December 4, 2023. (Dkt. No. 1, at ¶¶ 188-89.) Although it is true that

Plaintiff filed a motion to reargue in the interim, “it is well settled that a motion to reargue may

not be used by a party to extend its time to appeal.” Forbes v. Giacomo, 11 N.Y.S.3d 485, 486

22

(N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dept. 2015); Haughton v. F.W.D. Corp., 598 N.Y.S.2d 994 (N.Y. App. Div.

2d Dept. 1993); Williamson v. Shang, 423 N.Y.S.2d 767, 836 (N.Y. App. Div. 4th Dept. 1979).

Plaintiff did not seek a stay of the time to appeal the underlying decisions by Judge Tomlinson

pending resolution of the motion to reargue, and Judge Bruening denied his motion to reargue.

(Dkt. No. 1, Attach. 1, at 345-58, 377-82.) Further, to the extent that Plaintiff’s Complaint could

be construed as alleging that the appeal he would need to take was from the decision on the

motion to reargue, the denial of a motion to reargue is not appealable. Boyle v. NYS Dep’t of

Motor Vehicles, 161 N.Y.S.3d 346, 349 (N.Y. App. Div. 3rd Dep’t 2021); Nulman v. Hall, 495

N.Y.S.2d 796, 797 (N.Y. App. Div. 3rd Dept. 1985). As a result, Plaintiff has not alleged that

any appeal of the contempt decision was pending at the time the federal Complaint was filed, nor

that any appeal he may have filed after Judge Bruening denied the motion to reargue would be

timely or valid so as to constitute an ongoing proceeding on the relevant motion.

Plaintiff also argues that he has sought “leave to appeal” the “original” Appellate

Division decisions to the New York Court of Appeals, yet neither the Complaint nor his

memoranda includes allegations to plausibly suggest that he had filed any such motion to appeal

by the time he filed his federal Complaint; instead, he seems to allege in the Complaint that he

had not filed any such appeal because he believed it would not have been within that court’s

jurisdiction. (See Dkt. No. 1, at ¶ 26 [alleging that “these cases are beyond the ‘Court of

Appeals’ jurisdiction and would certainly result in a ‘Res judicata’ denial”].) Further, as with the

above-discussed alleged appeal to the Third Department of the contempt decision, there is no

indication that any such motion for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals was timely. Of note,

the Appellate Division decisions related to Judge Tomlinson’s substantive rulings regarding the

23

terms of the divorce stipulation are dated October 21, 2021. (Dkt. No. 1, Attach. 1, at 9-17, 121-

23.) Plaintiff filed a motion to reargue related to at least one of these decisions on November 1,

2021, and then a motion to vacate both decisions on November 14, 2022, which was denied by

the Appellate Division on December 15, 2022. (Dkt. No. 1, Attach. 1, at 273, 297, 316-17.)

Even accounting for Plaintiff’s allegation that he did not learn of one of the Appellate Division’s

decisions until November 2022, the time to appeal or move for permission to appeal the

decisions even at that point had long since passed by the time Plaintiff filed the federal

Complaint more than a year later in December of 2023, and there is nothing provided in

Plaintiff’s submissions to plausibly suggest that he filed any such motion for leave to appeal

before he filed the federal Complaint. (Dkt. No. 1, at ¶ 137.) Therefore, even if the Court were

to accept Plaintiff’s new allegation that he has sought leave to appeal the Appellate Division’s

decisions to the Court of Appeals, nothing has been presented to plausibly suggest that any such

appeal would be timely in a manner that would allow the Court to conclude that the underlying

state-court proceedings had not effectively ended by the time of Plaintiff filed the federal

Complaint.

Lastly, to the extent that Plaintiff argues he was “dragged back into court” by Defendant

Newman, it is not clear what was involved in that alleged new conduct by Defendant Newman,

and Plaintiff’s statement that it was “related to the 3rd Appellate fraudulent pension decision” is

too vague to plausibly suggest that this was a continuation of the Third Department’s orders of

December 21, 2021, as opposed to a new and separate motion made by Defendant Newman to

enforce such orders. If it was a new motion to enforce in some manner, it should not properly be

considered to be part of a state-court proceeding that was already pending at the time Plaintiff

24

filed his federal Complaint. Although the Court is required to draw all reasonable inferences in

favor of Plaintiff at this stage, that does not absolve Plaintiff of the responsibility to provide

information that is specific enough to allow the Court to determine what he is actually alleging;

he does not say what court he was “dragged into” or provide any information regarding what this

new development involved other than “ongoing litigation related to” the Third Department’s

affirmance of the decisions of the Supreme and Family Court judges on the matter of his

pension. Thus, even if the Court were to extra-liberally construe these new assertions as proper

allegations (despite the fact that they relate to conduct engaged in after the Complaint was filed),

Plaintiff has simply not provided sufficient information to even plausibly suggest that this

activity represented a continuation of the relevant state-court proceedings in a way that is

relevant to the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction.

Simply put, Plaintiff has not included any factual allegations, either in the Complaint

itself or in his response memoranda of law, to even plausibly suggest that the decisions that

caused his alleged injury were not final at the time he filed his federal Complaint. The only

exception to this would be if Plaintiff filed a timely appeal to the Appellate Division related to

Judge Bruening’s granting of attorney’s fees to Plaintiff’s ex-wife, which was based on an

application filed by Defendant Newman after Judge Tomlinson granted the contempt motion.

(Dkt. No. 1, Attach. 1, at 378, 381.) However, although Plaintiff discusses this decision in the

Complaint and states that he will be “forced” to appeal it, there is no indication as to whether he

did indeed file a timely appeal of the decision on that motion for attorney’s fees to the Appellate

Division, only a statement in one of his response memoranda of law that he has filed an appeal to

25

the Appellate Division “to address the fraudulent contempt charge.” (Dkt. No. 1, at ¶¶ 42; Dkt.

No. 45, at 8.)

Turning to the remaining two elements, the Court finds that the Complaint both alleges

injuries caused by the state court’s judgments and seeks to have this Court review those

judgments. There is no escaping that the injuries Plaintiff complains of were a direct result of

the decisions of Judge Tomlinson and their affirmance by the Appellate Division; he alleges that

his rights have been violated and he has been denied justice by “the fraudulent litigation and

decisions” and that he has been “denied justice, tortured and held captive” as a result of these

decisions and the court proceedings and actions they have required for five years during this

litigation, which has caused him mental anguish, denied him time and peace to heal from his

medical issues, and prevented him from making financial commitments “due to the fear of

impending fraudulent decisions and their huge financial impact.” (Dkt. No. 1, at ¶¶ 192-93, 205-

13.) Further, although Plaintiff argues that he does not seek to have this Court review the merit

or substance of the state court’s decisions, the question of whether his rights to due process and

equal protection were violated by the allegedly biased or “fraudulent” actions of the relevant

judges or attorneys inherently would require this Court to assess whether those state court

decisions were correctly decided; there can be no violation of his constitutional rights under the

circumstances presented if the arguments or conclusions of the attorneys and judges have a

reasonable basis in the applicable state law.

For all of the above reasons, the Court finds that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over

Plaintiff’s claims to the extent they are based in the effects of the state-court proceedings. This

finding encompasses all claims against Defendant Balzer, Defendant Newman, Defendant Balzer

26

& Leary, Defendant Becker Firm, Defendant Fleischman Firm, and Defendant New York State

Commission on Judicial Conduct s/h/a New York State Judicial Review Committee, as well as

the claims against Defendant New York State Unified Court System for actions related to the

state-court proceedings. Such claims are dismissed without prejudice. Katz, 872 F.3d at 121.

B. Whether Remaining Claims Against Defendant New York State Unified

Court System Are Barred By the Eleventh Amendment

To the extent that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not deprive the Court of subject-

matter jurisdiction over all of Plaintiff’s claims, the Court further answers the above question in

the affirmative for the reasons that were discussed in Defendants’ memoranda of law. In

particular, Plaintiff’s allegations related to a deprivation of his due process or equal protection

rights based on the actions of the State Defendants in failing to properly respond to his FOIL

requests do not necessarily hinge on the state-court proceedings.

The Eleventh Amendment “means that, ‘as a general rule, state governments may not be

sued in federal court unless they have waived their Eleventh Amendment immunity,’ or unless

Congress has ‘abrogate[d] the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity when acting pursuant to its

authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.’” Gollomp v. Spitzer, 568 F.3d 355,

366 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Woods v. Rondout Valley Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. Of Educ., 466 F.3d

232, 236 [2d Cir. 2006]). This immunity “‘extends beyond the states themselves to state agents

and state instrumentalities that are, effectively, arms of a state.’” Gollomp, 568 F.3d at 366

(quoting Woods, 466 F.3d at 236). “Accordingly, ‘a governmental entity is entitled to Eleventh

Amendment immunity only if it is more like an arm of the State, such as a state agency, than like

a municipal corporation or other political subdivision.’” Gollomp, 568 F.3d at 366 (quoting

Woods, 466 F.3d at 236).

27

The Second Circuit has unequivocally held that the New York State Unified Court

System is an arm of the state and thus entitled to sovereign immunity. Gollomp, 568 F.3d at

366-68. To the extent that it might be relevant, the Court also notes that the Second Circuit and

courts within it have affirmed that the New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct is an

arm of the state and likewise immune. McKeown v. New York State Comm’n on Judicial

Conduct, 377 F. App’x 121, 123 (2d Cir. 2010); see also Vazquez v. City of New York, 21-CV-

1573, 2021 WL 1966397, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. May 17, 2021); Robertson v. Allen, 15-CV-0011, 2016

WL 205381, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2016) (Sharpe, J.); Ryan v. Cholakis, 13-CV-1451, 2014

WL 803776, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2014) (Suddaby, J.). Because Eleventh Amendment

sovereign immunity applies to the State Defendants, the question is therefore whether that

immunity has been waived.

Plaintiff’s reliance on Brown v. State, 89 N.Y.2d 172 (N.Y. 1996), as standing for the

proposition that New York State has waived its sovereign immunity for constitutional tort claims

(and specifically for equal protection claims) is misplaced, given that such case assessed whether

New York law waives such immunity specifically for suits brought in New York’s Court of

Claims. See Brown, 89 N.Y.2d at 179-83 (discussing that the basis for the waiver of immunity in

that case was found in New York’s Court of Claims Act, which defines the jurisdiction of that

court). Whether New York State may have waived its sovereign immunity for suits brought in

certain state courts has no bearing on whether it has waived such immunity for suits brought in

federal courts. Because there has been no indication presented in Plaintiff’s Complaint or

otherwise that New York State has waived its sovereign immunity for the relevant claims, either

as a general matter or in this specific instance, and because the State Defendants deny that it has,

28

the Court finds that any of Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant New York State Unified Court

System over which this Court has subject-matter jurisdiction are barred by the Eleventh

Amendment.

C. Whether Plaintiff Should Be Provided An Opportunity to Amend the

Complaint

After careful consideration, the Court answers this question in the negative for the

reasons stated in Defendants’ memoranda of law. See, supra, Parts I.B.1.a, c, and I.B.2.a, c. of

this Decision and Order. To those reasons the Court adds the following brief analysis.

Although a pro se plaintiff is generally to be afforded an opportunity to amend his or her

complaint to cure defects, “leave to amend is not required where it would be futile.” Robinson v.

Wright, 21-CV-1098, 2023 WL 6122882, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2023) (McAvoy, J.) (citing

Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 [2d Cir. 2011]). The identified defects in Plaintiff’s

Complaint relate to a failure to allege conditions giving rise to subject-matter jurisdiction, and

the Court is not convinced that Plaintiff could present any additional allegations that would cure

those defects, specifically given that the allegations already provided suggest that any appeals

that might be pending related to the state-court decisions were not timely submitted under New

York’s rules of civil procedure or before Plaintiff filed the federal Complaint in this action.

Further, to the extent that claims remain against Defendant New York State Unified Court

System over which the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction, Plaintiff has offered no reason to

believe (despite filing a Complaint with attachments that totals 418 pages and having the

opportunity to submit four responsive memoranda related to the current motions to dismiss) that

he can put forth sufficient allegations to plausibly suggest that sovereign immunity would not

apply to the New York State Defendants. Because permitting Plaintiff an opportunity to amend

29

the Complaint would be futile in this case, the Court finds that the Complaint should be

dismissed without such opportunity to amend.

ACCORDINGLY, it is

ORDERED that Defendants’ motions to dismiss (Dkt. Nos. 8, 21, 29, 39) are

GRANTED; and it is further

ORDERED that Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) is DISMISSED without

prejudice.

Dated: June 20, 2024

Syracuse, New York

U.S. District Judge

30