Briggs v. Casey

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

VERON BRIGGS,

Plaintiff,

1:22-CV-1221

Vv. (DJS)

CASEY, et al.,

Defendants.

APPEARANCES: OF COUNSEL:

VERON BRIGGS

Plaintiff, Pro Se

Troy, New York 12182

PATTISON SAMPSON GINSBERG & RHIANNON I. GIFFORD, ESQ.

GRIFFIN PLLC

Attorney for Defendants

P.O. Box 208

22 First Street

Troy, New York 12180

DANIEL J. STEWART

United States Magistrate Judge

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER!

Pro se Plaintiff Veron Briggs brings this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights action

alleging that Defendants falsely arrested him in violation of his constitutional rights. See

generally Dkt. No. 20, Am. Compl. Pending before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment seeking dismissal of the Complaint in its entirety. Dkt. Nos. 25 &

' Upon the parties’ consent this matter has been referred to the undersigned to exercise full jurisdiction pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73. See Dkt. No. 15.

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25-11, Defs.” Mem. of Law. Plaintiff filed an opposition to the Motion to which

Defendants replied. Dkt. No. 33, Pl.’s Opp.; Dkt. No. 36. Plaintiff's opposition is styled

as a cross-motion for summary judgment. See generally Pl.’s Opp.

For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is

GRANTED and Plaintiffs Cross-Motion is DENIED.’

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges that he was falsely arrested days after Defendants arrived on the

scene of an inactive domestic dispute between Plaintiff and Ms. Nevaeh Wright. Am.

Compl. at pp. 2-4; Dkt. No. 25-1 at J§ 4-5, 8, 13. At the time Defendants arrived on the

scene, Plaintiff was no longer present. Dkt. No. 25-1 at 95. The alleged victim, Ms.

_| Wright, then told Defendants that Plaintiff physically assaulted her, called her profanities,

and threatened to kill her. Dkt. No. 25-1 at 6. She also provided a written statement to

that effect. Dkt. No. 25-4 at p. 2. Corroborating her allegations was a visible gash on her

face personally observed by the Defendants. Dkt. No. 25-1 at § 6; Dkt. No. 25-2 at ¥ 6.

Based on this information, and because Plaintiff was not at the scene, Defendants

prepared both an application for an arrest warrant and accusatory instruments charging

”) Plaintiff with (1) criminal obstruction of breathing by applying pressure in violation of

New York Penal Law § 121.11(a) and (2) third degree assault with intent to cause physical

injury in violation of New York Penal Law § 120.00(1). Dkt. No. 25-1 at § 10. On March

28, 2022, the arrest warrant was issued. Dkt. No. 25-7. The following week, Plaintiff

? The Court notes that Plaintiffs Cross-Motion is untimely because it was filed after the response date set by the

Dkt. Nos. 31-33. Nor does it comply with the Court’s Local Rules for filing a cross-motion. See L.R.

2.

was arrested pursuant to that arrest warrant. Dkt. No. 25-6. Defendants were not present

and did not participate in the arrest. /d.; Dkt. No. 25-1 at 7 13; Dkt. No. 25-2 at J 16.

Il. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate only where “there is no genuine dispute as to

any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV.

P. 56(a). The moving party bears the burden to demonstrate through “pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with .. .

affidavits, if any,” that there is no genuine issue of material fact. □□ D.C. v. Giammettei,

34 F.3d 51, 54 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323

(1986)). To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the non-movant must set out specific

facts showing that a genuine issue exists and cannot rest merely on allegations or denials

of the facts submitted by the movant. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); see also Scott v. Coughlin,

344 F.3d 282, 287 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Conclusory allegations or denials are ordinarily not

sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment when the moving party has set out a

documentary case.”’).

When considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must resolve all

ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant. Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). “[T]he trial court’s task at the summary

judgment motion stage of the litigation is carefully limited to discerning whether there

are any genuine issues of material fact to be tried, not to deciding them. Its duty, in short,

is confined at this point to issue-finding; it does not extend to issue-resolution.” Gallo v.

Prudential Residential Servs., Ltd. P’ship, 22 F.3d 1219, 1224 (2d Cir. 1994).

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Furthermore, where a party is proceeding pro se, the court must “read [his or her]

supporting papers liberally, and . . . interpret them to raise the strongest arguments that

they suggest.” Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994), accord, Soto v.

Walker, 44 F.3d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1995). Nonetheless, summary judgment is appropriate

here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the

non-moving party.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

587 (1986).

I. DISCUSSION

Defendants seek summary judgment arguing that probable cause supported

Plaintiff's arrest, Defendants are nevertheless entitled to qualified immunity, and any

_| Eighth Amendment claim is baseless. See generally Defs.’ Mem. of Law. For the reasons

set forth below, Defendants’ Motion is granted.

A. False Arrest

“To establish a § 1983 claim for false arrest, [Plaintiff] must adduce evidence that:

(i) the [Defendants] intended to confine [him]; (11) [Plaintiff was] conscious of the

confinement; (iii) [Plaintiff] did not consent to being confined; and (iv) the confinement

”“) was not otherwise privileged.” Berg v. Kelly, 897 F.3d 99, 106 (2d Cir. 2018). “The

existence of probable cause to arrest constitutes justification and is a complete defense to

an action for false arrest, whether that action is brought under state law or under § 1983.”

Covington v. City of New York, 171 F.3d 117, 122 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks

omitted); see also Singer v. Fulton Cnty. Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110, 118 (2d Cir. 1995) (“There

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can be no federal civil rights claim for false arrest where the arresting officer had probable

cause.”).

[P]robable cause to arrest exists when the officers have knowledge or

reasonably trustworthy information of facts and circumstances that are

sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that the

person to be arrested has committed or is committing a crime... . The

question of whether or not probable cause existed may be determinable

as a matter of law if there is no dispute as to the pertinent events and the

knowledge of the officers. ]

Maron v. Cnty. of Albany, 166 F. App’x 540, 541-42 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

The Supreme Court has emphasized that probable cause to arrest does not require

“an actual showing of [criminal] activity,” “only a probability or substantial chance of

_| criminal activity.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 57 (2018). Thus, where

officers may reasonably infer criminal activity, probable cause exists. See, e.g., Hotaling

v. LaPlante, 167 F. Supp. 2d 517, 521 (N.D.N.Y. 2001) (“Even viewing the facts and

inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the record reflects that [the

defendant] did have probable cause to arrest . . . [b]Jecause a reasonable person would find

that the statements of the alleged victim and witnesses to the incident constitute

knowledgeable and trustworthy sources.”). Moreover, where a victim provides a written

statement in support of charging someone with a crime, the arresting officer “has probable

cause to effect an arrest absent circumstances that raise doubts as to the victim’s veracity.”

Singer v. Fulton Cnty. Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 1995).

Here, the existence of probable cause justifies Plaintiff's arrest. Soon after

Defendants arrived on the scene, Ms. Wright provided a written statement alleging that

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Plaintiff slapped and punched Ms. Wright in the face and choked her while threatening to

end her life. Dkt. No. 25-4 at p. 2. As a result of the physical assault, Ms. Wright suffered

a cut lip and facial pain. /d. Defendants did not speak to or arrest Plaintiff because he

was “not on the scene at the time [Defendants] arrived.” Dkt. No. 25-1 at 8. However,

the facts presented above provided probable cause for Defendants to reasonably believe

Plaintiff violated New York law by: (1) intentionally, knowingly, and unlawfully

committing the misdemeanor of criminal obstruction of breathing or blood circulation,

with the intent to impede the normal breathing or circulation of the blood of another by

applying pressure on the throat or neck of such person in violation of New York Penal

Law § 121.11(a) when he allegedly choked Ms. Wright; and (2) intentionally, knowingly,

_| and unlawfully committing the misdemeanor of assault in the third degree with intent to

cause physical injury in violation of New York Penal Law § 120.00 when he allegedly

punched and slapped Ms. Wright in the face.

Moreover, Plaintiff's claim must relate to Defendants’ role in obtaining the search

warrant that led to his arrest — not merely the alleged false arrest. The issuance of an arrest

warrant alone, “which depends on a finding of probable cause, creates a presumption that

“it was objectively reasonable for the officers to believe that there was probable cause.”

Washington v. Napolitano, 29 F.4th 93, 105 (2d Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks and

alterations omitted). “To overcome this presumption, a plaintiff must show that the

officers knowingly or recklessly omitted material information from the warrant affidavit.”

See Mara v. Rilling, 921 F.3d 48, 73 (2d Cir. 2019). Plaintiff's Amended Complaint and

Opposition allege only that Defendants acted both negligently and maliciously when

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“falsif[ying] [a] crime against [P]laintiff ultimately leading to Plaintiff[’s] false arrest.”

Am. Compl. at p. 1; Dkt. No. 33-4 at p. 2. Plaintiff's conclusory allegations are

insufficient to rebut the presumption of probable cause because the Defendants’ affidavits

are wholly consistent with Ms. Wright’s written statement. See generally Dkt. No. 25-1;

Dkt. No. 25-2; Dkt. No. 25-4. Thus, Plaintiff's conclusory allegations, without more, do

not create a genuine issue of material fact as to Defendants’ conduct. In fact, the parties

are in complete agreement regarding the facts here, as Plaintiff's version of events is

identical to Defendants, only differing by asserting Defendants abused their authority

when arresting Plaintiff and should have known Plaintiff was “the protected party.”” Am.

Compl. at p. 3; Pl.’s Opp. at pp. 7-8. Because the undisputed facts leading to the arrest

_| warrant and ultimate arrest show that probable cause existed, the Court grants Defendants’

Motion on this ground.

B. Qualified Immunity

Even if probable cause did not exist, summary judgment is still warranted.

Qualified immunity shields a defendant from liability where it is “objectively reasonable

for [the defendant] to believe that his acts did not violate [the plaintiff’s] rights.” Robison

“\y. Via, 821 F.2d 913, 921 (2d Cir. 1987). It is well settled that “the issuance of a[n]

[arrest] warrant... which depends on a finding of probable cause, creates a presumption

that it was objectively reasonable for the officers to believe that there was probable

cause,” such that the officers are entitled to qualified immunity. See, e.g., Golino v. City

of New Haven, 950 F.2d 864, 870 (2d Cir. 1991). As previously discussed, to overcome

this presumption, a plaintiff must show that the officers knowingly or recklessly omitted

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material information from the warrant affidavit. Washington v. Napolitano, 29 F.4th at

105.

Here, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. In sum, Ms. Wright provided

a written statement alleging that Plaintiff physically assaulted her. Dkt. No. 25-4 at p. 2.

Because Plaintiff was not at the scene, Defendants applied for an arrest warrant. Dkt. No.

25-1 at § 9. Finding that probable cause for the arrest existed, the arrest warrant was

issued by Judge Anne Coonrad. Dkt. No. 25-7. This alone entitles Defendants to

qualified immunity. Golino v. City of New Haven, 950 F.2d at 870. Once again,

Plaintiff's conclusory allegations do nothing to suggest otherwise. Moreover, acting on

the allegations made by Ms. Wright, and for the same reasons detailed above, it was

_| reasonable for Defendants to believe that Plaintiff violated New York Penal Law creating

probable cause to apply for the arrest warrant. For these reasons, the Court grants

summary judgment on this ground.

C. Eighth Amendment

The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from “cruel and unusual punishment”

at the hands of prison officials. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 296-97 (1991); Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976). The keyword is prisoner. It is well-settled that the

Eighth Amendment “does not apply to individuals who are detained pre-trial as they “have

not been convicted of a crime and thus may not be punished in any manner—neither

cruelly and unusually nor otherwise.’” Laurent v. Edwin, 528 F. Supp. 3d 69, 85

(E.D.N.Y. 2021) (quoting Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 29 (2d Cir. 2017)). While a

false arrest claim implicates the Fourth Amendment it does not implicate the Eighth. See,

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e.g., Micalizzi v. Ciamarra, 206 F. Supp. 2d 564, 579 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). Thus, summary

judgment should be granted where a plaintiff does not state an Eighth Amendment claim.

Thomas v. City of New York, 2012 WL 4889257, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2012).

Here, Plaintiff asserts that his alleged false arrest violated his Eighth Amendment

rights. Am. Compl. at p. 4. However, it is undisputed that Plaintiff was a mere pre-trial

detainee upon his arrest. Plaintiff does not allege any facts suggesting that he was a

prisoner subject to cruel and unusual punishment. See generally Am. Compl.; Pl.’s Opp.

Given the fact that the Eighth Amendment does not apply to Plaintiffs claim, and he has

failed to plead any facts suggesting otherwise, summary judgment is granted on this

ground.

an

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IV. CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, it is hereby

ORDERED, that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 25) is

GRANTED; and it is further

ORDERED, that Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 33)

is DENIED; and it is further

ORDERED, that the Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 20) is DISMISSED; and it

1S

ORDERED, that the Clerk of the Court serve a copy of this Memorandum-

Decision and Order upon the parties to this action.

_| Dated: May 1, 2024

Albany, New York

ZL,

US-Magistrate Judge

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