Briggs v. Bass

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

VERON BRIGGS,

Plaintiff,

1:22-CV-1065

Vv. (DJS)

“| THOMAS BASS, et al.,

Defendants.

APPEARANCES: OF COUNSEL:

VERON BRIGGS

Plaintiff, Pro Se

Troy, New York 12182

PATTISON SAMPSON GINSBERG & RHIANNON I. GIFFORD, ESQ.

GRIFFIN PLLC

Attorney for Defendants

P.O. Box 208

22 First Street

Troy, New York 12180

DANIEL J. STEWART

United States Magistrate Judge

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER!

Pro se Plaintiff Veron Briggs brings this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights action

alleging that Defendants falsely arrested him in violation of his constitutional rights. See

generally Dkt. No. 1, Compl. Pending before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment seeking dismissal of the Complaint in its entirety. Dkt. Nos. 25 &

' Upon the parties’ consent this matter has been referred to the undersigned to exercise full jurisdiction pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Federal Rule of Crvil Procedure 73. See Dkt. No. 18.

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25-14, Defs.” Mem. of Law. Plaintiff filed an opposition to the Motion to which

Defendants replied. Dkt. No. 36-1, Pl.’s Opp.; Dkt. No. 40. Plaintiff's opposition is

styled as a cross-motion for summary judgment. See generally Pl.’s Opp.

For the reasons set forth below, the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

is GRANTED and Plaintiffs Cross-Motion is DENIED.’

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges that on January 23, 2022, he was falsely arrested by Defendants

after they arrived on the scene of a domestic dispute between Plaintiff and Ms. Nevaeh

Wright. Compl. at pp. 2-3; Dkt. No. 36-2 at pp. 1-2. When Defendants arrived on the

scene, Ms. Wright informed them that Plaintiff hit her, and she had an Order of Protection

_| against him. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 25-1 at 5. Ms. Wright later told Defendants that Plaintiff

had broken her phone and kicked her. /d. at § 8. When Defendants attempted to speak

with Plaintiff, he admittedly left the scene. Dkt. No. 25-3 at 6; Compl. at p. 3. Acting

on the above information, Defendants later arrested Plaintiff and charged him with (1)

criminal contempt in the first degree for violating the active Order of Protection; (2)

harassment in the second degree; (3) criminal mischief in the fourth degree with intent to

damage property; and (4) criminal mischief with intent to disable equipment to prevent a

request for emergency assistance. Dkt. Nos. 25-3, 25-7, 25-8, 25-9, & 25-10. Plaintiff

argues that his arrest violated his Fourth and Eight Amendment rights. Compl. at pp. 3-

4.

2 The Court notes that Plaintiffs Cross-Motion is untimely because it was filed after the response date set by the

Court. Dkt. No. 34. Nor does it comply with the Court’s Local Rules for filing a cross-motion. See L.R. 7.1(c).

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Il. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate only where “there is no genuine dispute as to

any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIv.

P. 56(a). The moving party bears the burden to demonstrate through “pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with . □ .

affidavits, if any,” that there is no genuine issue of material fact. F.D.L.C. v. Giammettei,

34 F.3d 51, 54 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323

(1986)). To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the non-movant must set out specific

facts showing that a genuine issue exists and cannot rest merely on allegations or denials

of the facts submitted by the movant. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); see also Scott v. Coughlin,

344 F.3d 282, 287 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Conclusory allegations or denials are ordinarily not

sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment when the moving party has set out a

documentary case.’’).

When considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must resolve all

ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant. Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). “[T]he trial court’s task at the summary

judgment motion stage of the litigation is carefully limited to discerning whether there

are any genuine issues of material fact to be tried, not to deciding them. Its duty, in short,

is confined at this point to issue-finding; it does not extend to issue-resolution.” Gallo v.

Prudential Residential Servs., Ltd. P’ship, 22 F.3d 1219, 1224 (2d Cir. 1994).

Furthermore, where a party 1s proceeding pro se, the court must “read [his or her]

supporting papers liberally, and . . . interpret them to raise the strongest arguments that

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they suggest.” Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994), accord, Soto v.

Walker, 44 F.3d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1995). Nonetheless, summary judgment is appropriate

“Tw]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the

non-moving party.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

587 (1986).

I. DISCUSSION

Defendants seek summary judgment arguing that Plaintiff was not subject to false

arrest as a matter of law, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, and any Eighth

Amendment claim is baseless. See generally Defs.’” Mem. of Law. For the reasons that

follow, Defendants’ Motion is granted.

A. False Arrest

“To establish a § 1983 claim for false arrest, [Plaintiff] must adduce evidence that:

(1) the [Defendants] intended to confine [him]; (11) [Plaintiff was] conscious of the

confinement; (iii) [Plaintiff] did not consent to being confined; and (iv) the confinement

was not otherwise privileged.” Berg v. Kelly, 897 F.3d 99, 106 (2d Cir. 2018). “The

existence of probable cause to arrest constitutes justification and is a complete defense to

an action for false arrest, whether that action is brought under state law or under § 1983.”

Covington v. City of New York, 171 F.3d 117, 122 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks

omitted); see also Singer v. Fulton Cnty. Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110, 118 (2d Cir. 1995) (“There

can be no federal civil rights claim for false arrest where the arresting officer had probable

cause.”’).

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[P]robable cause to arrest exists when the officers have knowledge or

reasonably trustworthy information of facts and circumstances that are

sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that the

person to be arrested has committed or is committing a crime .. . . The

question of whether or not probable cause existed may be determinable

as a matter of law if there is no dispute as to the pertinent events and the

knowledge of the officers[.]

Maron v. Cnty. of Albany, 166 F. App’x 540, 541-42 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

The Supreme Court has emphasized that probable cause to arrest does not require

“an actual showing of [criminal] activity,” “only a probability or substantial chance of

criminal activity.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 57 (2018). Thus, where

officers may “reasonably infer” criminal activity, probable cause exists. See Kee v. City

of New York, 12 F.4th 150, 160-61 (2d Cir. 2021) (affirming grant of summary judgment

in officers’ favor where “the uncontroverted facts established probable cause” for the

subject arrest). When the undisputed facts leading to an arrest suggest that probable cause

exists, granting summary judgment in defendants’ favor is appropriate. See Campanaro

City of Rome, 999 F. Supp. 277, 280 (N.D.N.Y. 1998); Hotaling v. LaPlante, 167 F.

Supp. 2d 517, 521 (N.D.N.Y. 2001) (“Even viewing the facts and inferences in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff, the record reflects that [the defendant] did have probable

cause to arrest . . . [b]ecause a reasonable person would find that the statements of the

alleged victim and witnesses to the incident constitute knowledgeable and trustworthy

sources.”). Moreover, where a victim provides a written statement in support of charging

someone with a crime, the arresting officer “has probable cause to effect an arrest absent

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circumstances that raise doubts as to the victim’s veracity.” Singer v. Fulton Cnty. Sheriff,

63 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 1995).

Here, the existence of probable cause justifies the arrest at issue. Upon arrival to

the scene, Ms. Wright, the alleged victim, informed Defendants that Plaintiff hit her and

that she had an Order of Protection against him. Dkt. No. 25-2 at 95. She then provided

a written statement alleging that Plaintiff broke her phone to prevent her from calling 911.

Dkt. No. 25-5 at p. 2. Therein, Ms. Wright also alleged that “[a]fter [Plaintiff] broke [her]

phone he. . . kicked [her] in [her] left leg causing substantial pain.” Dkt. No. 25-5 at p.

2. When Defendants attempted to speak to Plaintiff about the situation Plaintiff left the

scene. /d. at § 6; Compl. at p. 3. Given the circumstances, Plaintiff was detained. Dkt.

_| No. 25-2 at 7. While detained, Defendants were able to determine that Ms. Wright did

in fact have an active Order of Protection against Plaintiff. Dkt. No. 25-11.

Ms. Wright’s written statement, the active Order of Protection, and Plaintiffs

conduct at the scene provided probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for criminal contempt in

the first degree for violating the active Order of Protection. Dkt. No. 25-7; N.Y. Penal

Law § 215.51(b)(v) (physical assault in violation of protective order). Ms. Wright’s

allegations that Plaintiff kicked her also provided probable cause to arrest and charge

Plaintiff with harassment in the second degree. Dkt. No. 25-10; N.Y. Penal Law §

120.26(1) (“A person is guilty of harassment in the second degree when, with intent to

harass, annoy or alarm another person: (1) he or she strikes, shoves, kicks or otherwise

subjects such other person to physical contact, or attempts or threatens to do the same.”).

Further, Plaintiff's conduct in breaking Ms. Wright’s phone provided Defendants with

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probable cause to arrest Plaintiff and charge him with both criminal mischief in the fourth

degree with intent to damage property and criminal mischief with intent to disable

equipment to prevent the request for emergency assistance. Dkt. Nos. 8-9; N.Y. Penal

Law § 145.00(1) & (4) (“A person is guilty of criminal mischief in the fourth degree when,

having no right to do so nor any reasonable ground to believe that he or she has such right,

he or she: (1) Intentionally damages property of another person; or . . . (4) With intent to

prevent a person from communicating a request for emergency assistance, intentionally

disables or removes telephonic, TTY or similar communication sending equipment while

that person: (a) 1s attempting to seek or is engaged in the process of seeking emergency

assistance from police, law enforcement, fire or emergency medical services personnel.’’).

Thus, Plaintiffs arrest was supported by probable cause. Moreover, the above facts

are uncontroverted because Plaintiff's version of events is identical, only differing by

asserting Defendants abused their authority when arresting Plaintiff and should have

known Plaintiff was “the protected party.” Compl. at pp. 1-3; Dkt. No. 36-4 at p. 12.

Because the undisputed facts leading to the arrest show that probable cause existed, the

Court grants Defendants’ Motion on this ground.

B. Qualified Immunity

Even if probable cause did not exist, summary judgment is still warranted.

Qualified immunity shields a defendant from liability where it is “objectively reasonable

for [the defendant] to believe that his acts did not violate [the plaintiffs] rights.” Robison

v. Via, 821 F.2d 913, 921 (2d Cir. 1987). In the false arrest context, arresting officers are

entitled to qualified immunity if “arguable probable cause” existed at the time of arrest.

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Triolo v. Nassau Cnty., 24 F.4th 98, 107 (2d Cir. 2022). “Arguable probable cause exists

if either (a) it was objectively reasonable for the officer to believe that probable cause

existed, or (b) officers of reasonable competence could disagree on whether the probable

cause test was met.” Myers v. Patterson, 819 F.3d 625, 633 (2d Cir. 2016) (internal

quotation marks omitted). Whether an officer’s belief that probable cause existed was

reasonable is determined by looking to “the facts known to the police” at the time of

arrest. See, e.g., Zalaski v. City of Hartford, 723 F.3d 382, 393 (2d Cir. 2013). “[I]n

situations where an officer may have reasonably but mistakenly concluded that probable

cause existed, the officer is nonetheless entitled to qualified immunity.” Caldarola v.

Calabrese, 298 F.3d 156, 162 (2d Cir. 2002). “If there remains an objective basis to

_| Support arguable probable cause, remaining factual disputes are not material to the issue

of qualified immunity and summary judgment should be granted to the defendant on the

basis of qualified immunity.” Escalera v. Lunn, 361 F.3d 737, 744 (2d Cir. 2004).

Here, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. The undisputed facts,

explicitly corroborated by Plaintiff, paint a simple picture as detailed above. In sum, Ms.

Wright provided a written statement alleging that Plaintiff physically assaulted her and

damaged her property. Dkt. No. 25-5 at p. 2. When confronted by Defendants, Plaintiff

scurried away. Dkt. No. 25-1 4 6; Compl. at p. 3. A search of the Order of Protection

Registry also revealed that Ms. Wright had an active Order of Protection against Plaintiff,

further corroborating her story. /d. at] 9. Acting on the allegations made, the information

obtained, and Plaintiff's conduct, Defendants arrested Plaintiff. /d. at 4] 11. For the same

reasons detailed above, it was reasonable for Defendants to believe probable cause to

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arrest Plaintiff existed. For this reason, the Court grants summary judgment on this

ground.

C. Eighth Amendment

The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from “cruel and unusual punishment”

at the hands of prison officials. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 296-97 (1991); Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976). The keyword is prisoner. It is well-settled that the

Eighth Amendment “does not apply to individuals who are detained pre-trial as they ‘have

not been convicted of a crime and thus may not be punished in any manner—neither

cruelly and unusually nor otherwise.’” Laurent v. Edwin, 528 F. Supp. 3d 69, 85

(E.D.N.Y. 2021) (quoting Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 29 (2d Cir. 2017)). While a

false arrest claim implicates the Fourth Amendment it does not implicate the Eighth. See,

Micalizzi v. Ciamarra, 206 F. Supp. 2d 564, 579 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). Thus, summary

judgment should be granted where a plaintiff does not state an Eighth Amendment claim.

Thomas v. City of New York, 2012 WL 4889257, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2012).

Here, Plaintiff asserts that his alleged false arrest violated his Eighth Amendment

rights. Compl. at pp. 3-4. However, it is undisputed that Plaintiff was a mere pre-trial

detainee upon his arrest. Plaintiff does not allege any facts suggesting that he was a

prisoner subject to cruel and unusual punishment. See generally Compl.; Pl.’s Opp.

Given the fact that the Eighth Amendment does not apply to Plaintiff's claim, and he has

failed to plead any facts suggesting otherwise, summary judgment is granted on this

ground.

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IV. CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, it is hereby

ORDERED, that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 25-14) is

GRANTED; and it is further

ORDERED, that Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 36)

is DENIED; and it is further

ORDERED, that the Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) is DISMISSED; and it is

ORDERED, that the Clerk of the Court serve a copy of this Memorandum-

Decision and Order upon the parties to this action.

Dated: April 10, 2024

Albany, New York

ZL,

US-Magistrate Judge

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