Opinion

Facci-Brahler v. Montgomery County

Court
District Court, N.D. New York
Filed
Mar 22, 2024
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 27.0%

“New York courts require the same standard for claims brought under the NY[S]HRL as for those brought under Title VII.”

How later courts described this case

  • “New York courts require the same standard for claims brought under the NY[S]HRL as for those brought under Title VII.”
  • finding that a defendant’s possession of a personal cell phone constituted “dangerous contraband”
  • noting in an employment law case that “courts in the Second Circuit have recognized equal protection claims predicated on the ‘selective enforcement’ theory” (citation omitted)
  • explaining that a claim for malicious prosecution does not require a “plaintiff to show that the criminal prosecution ended with some affirmative indication of innocence”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

CHRISTINA L. FACCI-BRAHLER,

Plaintiff,

-against- 1:18-CV-941 (LEK/MJK)

MONTGOMERY COUNTY, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Christina L. Facci-Brahler commenced this civil rights action on August 8, 2018.

See Dkt. No. 1. Plaintiff later filed an amended complaint, Dkt. No. 21 (“First Amended

Complaint”), and a second amended complaint, Dkt. No. 58 (“Second Amended Complaint”),

asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the New York Human Rights Law against

Montgomery County, Montgomery County Sheriff Michael J. Amato (“Amato”), and

Montgomery County Under Sheriff Justin Cramer (“Cramer”) (collectively, “Defendants”).

Defendants now move for summary judgment, Dkt. No. 76, and have provided a memorandum

of law, Dkt. No. 76-33 (“Motion”), and a statement of material facts, Dkt. No. 76-32 (“Statement

of Material Facts” or “SMF”). Plaintiff has filed a response, Dkt. No. 80-11 (“Response”), a

response to Defendants’ Statement of Material Facts, Dkt. No. 80-10 at 1–161 (“Response to

Statement of Material Facts” or “RSMF”), and a statement of additional material facts, id. at 16–

24. Defendants have filed a reply. Dkt. No. 81 (“Reply”).

For the reasons that follow, Defendants’ Motion is granted in part and denied in part.

1 Page numbers refer to ECF pagination.

II. BACKGROUND

The Court assumes familiarity with Plaintiff’s factual allegations and the procedural

posture of this case, which are detailed in this Court’s previous Memorandum-Decisions and

Orders. See Dkt. No. 18 at 2–4; Dkt. No. 29 (“March 2021 MDO”) at 2. Relevantly, this Court

dismissed multiple claims in Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint in the Court’s March 2021

MDO. See Mar. 2021 MDO at 12.

On May 13, 2022, the Court approved a stipulation by both parties, see Dkt. No. 55

(“Stipulation”), and permitted Plaintiff to file her Second Amended Complaint. Dkt. No. 56. The

parties filed the Stipulation in response to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in

Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36 (2022), which clarified the standard for a malicious prosecution

claim under the Fourth Amendment. See Stipulation at 1; see also Thompson, 596 U.S. at 49

(explaining that a claim for malicious prosecution does not require a “plaintiff to show that the

criminal prosecution ended with some affirmative indication of innocence”). Accordingly,

Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint includes a federal constitutional claim for malicious

prosecution, in addition to the claims that survived this Court’s review in the March 2021 MDO.

See Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 73–79.

Plaintiff now maintains four claims against Defendants: (1) a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for

an equal protection violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution; (2)

discrimination in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Executive Law §

296 (“NYSHRL”); (3) retaliation in violation of the NYSHRL; and (4) a Section 1983 malicious

prosecution claim under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.

Defendants seek summary judgment on each claim.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure instructs courts to grant summary

judgment if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if it “might affect the

outcome of the suit under the governing law,” and a dispute is “‘genuine’ . . . if the evidence is

such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving part.” Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Thus, while “[f]actual disputes that are irrelevant or

unnecessary” will not preclude summary judgment, “summary judgment will not lie if . . . the

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.; see

also Taggart v. Time, Inc., 924 F.2d 43, 46 (2d Cir. 1991) (“Only when no reasonable trier of

fact could find in favor of the nonmoving party should summary judgment be granted.”).

The party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of informing a court of the basis

for the motion and identifying those portions of the record that the moving party claims will

demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

In attempting to defeat a motion for summary judgment after the moving party has met its

initial burden, the nonmoving party “must do more than simply show that there is some

metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,

475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The nonmoving party may not rely on mere conclusory allegations,

speculation or conjecture, Fischer v. Forrest, 968 F.3d 216, 221 (2d Cir. 2020), and must present

more than a mere “scintilla of evidence” supporting its claims, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. At the

same time, a court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the

nonmoving party, Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S 133, 150 (2000), and

“eschew[s] credibility assessments,” Amnesty Am. v. Town of W. Hartford, 361 F.3d 113, 122

(2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 854 (2d Cir. 1996)). Thus, a court’s duty

in reviewing a motion for summary judgment is “carefully limited” to finding genuine disputes

of fact, “not to deciding them.” Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., Ltd. P’ship, 22 F.3d 1219,

1224 (2d Cir. 1994).

IV. DISCUSSION

The Court addresses Defendants’ arguments in the order presented in the Motion.

A. Fourteenth Amendment and NYSHRL Discrimination Claims

For Plaintiff to state a claim under Section 1983, “[she] must allege two elements: (1) the

violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) the alleged

deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Collymore v. New

York, 767 Fed. App’x. 42, 45 (2d Cir. 2019) (citing Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist.,

801 F.3d 72, 87–88 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Once a plaintiff satisfies

the Section 1983 color-of-law requirement, her equal protection claim parallels her NYSHRL

claim. See Collymore, 767 Fed. App’x. at 45 (“Once the color of law requirement is met, a

plaintiff’s equal protection claim parallels her Title VII claim.”) (internal quotation marks and

alterations omitted) (citing Vega, 801 F.3d at 88); see also Leopold v. Baccarat, Inc., 174 F.3d

261, 264 n.1 (2d Cir. 1999) (“New York courts require the same standard for claims brought

under the NY[S]HRL as for those brought under Title VII.”); Sutter v. Dibello, No. 18-CV-817,

2021 WL 930459, at *20 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2021) (“Employment discrimination claims

pursuant to Title VII, Section 1983 and the NYSHRL are evaluated under essentially the same

substantive standards.” (citations omitted)).

“To state a discrimination claim under the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection

Clause, . . . plaintiffs must sufficiently allege that defendants acted with discriminatory intent.”

Id. (alteration omitted) (quoting Burgis v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Sanitation, 798 F.3d 63, 68 (2d Cir.

2015)). Where, as in the instant case, direct evidence of discrimination is lacking, “what must be

plausibly supported by facts alleged in the complaint is that the plaintiff is a member of a

protected class, was qualified, suffered an adverse employment action, and has at least minimal

support for the proposition that the defendant acted with discriminatory intent.” Id. (internal

quotation marks omitted). A plaintiff can “raise an inference of discrimination by demonstrating

the disparate treatment of at least one similarly situated employee outside [her] protected group

and sufficient facts from which it may reasonably be inferred that ‘the plaintiff’s and

comparator’s circumstances . . . bear a reasonably close resemblance.’” Id. at *21 (quoting Hu v.

City of New York, 927 F.3d 81, 96–97 (2d Cir. 2019)). Employees are “similarly situated in all

material respects when the plaintiff and the putative comparator were subject to the same

workplace standards.” Id. (quoting Donohue v. Madison, No. 13-CV-918, 2020 WL 4432661, at

*3 (N.D.N.Y. July 31, 2020)).

i. Adverse Employment Action

Defendants first argue that Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that she suffered an adverse

employment action. See Mot. at 12. Defendants posit that because Plaintiff was simply “served

with disciplinary charges,” but was never actually terminated, Plaintiff suffered no “adverse job

action.” Id. Yet Plaintiff suffered more than merely service of disciplinary charges, as she was

also suspended from her position without pay. As detailed in a June 23, 2016, email, Amato

explicitly states that Plaintiff was “on suspension without pay.” Dkt. No. 80-9. A May 20, 2016,

email from Amato also states that Plaintiff was being placed on “suspension without pay for 30

days.” Dkt. No. 80-8. It is well-established in this Circuit that “[s]uspension without pay

constitutes adverse employment action.” Benjamin v. Metro. Transp. Auth., No. 07-CV-3561,

2012 WL 3188764, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2012) (citing Lovejoy–Wilson v. NOCO Motor

Fuel, Inc., 263 F.3d 208, 223–24 (2d Cir. 2003)). A reasonable trier of fact could therefore find

that Plaintiff has established an adverse employment action.

ii. Inference of Discrimination

To raise an inference of discriminatory intent through disparate treatment, a plaintiff

“must show she was similarly situated in all material respects to the individuals with whom she

seeks to compare herself.” Mandell v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 316 F.3d 368, 379 (2d Cir. 2003)

(internal quotations omitted). “An employee is similarly situated to co-employees if they were

(1) subject to the same performance evaluation and discipline standards and (2) engaged in

comparable conduct.” Ruiz v. Cnty. of Rockland, 609 F.3d 486, 493–94 (2d Cir. 2010) (citation

and quotation marks omitted).

Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot show that Defendants acted with discriminatory

intent, as Plaintiff has failed to raise an inference of discrimination. See Mot. at 13. Plaintiff

argues that a trier of fact could find such an inference, as “Stephanie Crewell [‘Crewell’], a white

cook who brought her cell phone into the jail was not arrested, criminally charged, or served

disciplinary papers seeking her termination, was subject to the same workplace standards as

Plaintiff.” Resp. at 19. Both parties agree that Crewell was a white employee who had a personal

phone in the jail and was not terminated or suspended. See SMF ¶¶ 10–11, RSMF ¶¶ 10–11. Yet

Defendants argue that Crewell was not “similarly situated” to Plaintiff, and therefore cannot be

used as “a comparator outside of [Plaintiff’s] protected group.” Mot. at 13. Specifically,

Defendants state that Crewell only brought a personal phone into the prison, whereas Plaintiff

engaged in the “much more egregious conduct” of, inter alia, giving her phone to an inmate and

fraternizing with the inmate. Id. at 13–14. For this reason, Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot

meet the second element of the Ruiz standard, as Crewell’s conduct was not comparable to

Plaintiff’s. See id.

To support their argument, Defendants draw this Court’s attention to Cooper v.

Templeton, 629 F. Supp. 3d 223 (S.D.N.Y. 2022), aff’d sub nom. Cooper v. Franklin Templeton

Invs., No. 22-2763, 2023 WL 3882977 (2d Cir. June 8, 2023). That case focused on a plaintiff

who was fired after a video showing the plaintiff harassing an African American man in Central

Park “became international news as a racial flashpoint.” Id. at 228. The Cooper plaintiff

attempted to argue that her employer discriminated against her by pointing to employees outside

of her protected group who were not fired despite having engaged in controversial actions. See

id. at 231. The Cooper court ultimately found that these comparator employees were not

sufficiently similar to Plaintiff, as the conduct of those employees was “simply too different in

kind to be comparable to [the plaintiff’s] conduct in this case.” Id. at 232. Defendants argue that

Plaintiff’s conduct is similarly “too different in kind to be comparable” with Crewell’s conduct.

Mot. at 13.

Defendants’ Cooper analogy fails, however, because the difference in conduct in Cooper

was far starker than this case. In Cooper, the comparator employees’ conduct included being

“fined and subjected to a market ban for insider trading by the Securities and Exchange Board of

India,” making offensive sexual remarks to a client, engaging in sexual harassment, conducting

plagiarism, and having criminal records. Cooper, 629 F. Supp. 3d at 231. The Cooper court

found that this conduct did not come “close to becoming . . . international news as a racial

flashpoint” and thus was not comparable to the conduct of the plaintiff. Id. at 232. Here, by

contrast, the factual predicate between Plaintiff and Crewell is much closer. Both Plaintiff and

Crewell violated work policy by bringing phones into the jail, and it was this violation that

served as a key part of Plaintiff’s first charge in the Notice of Discipline. See SMF ¶ 21 (noting

that the first charge states that “as a Corrections Officer, you brought your personal cell phone

into the County Jail”); RSMF ¶ 21. This factual similarity leads the Court to the conclusion that a

reasonable trier of fact could find Crewell an acceptable comparator.

The Court recognizes that Plaintiff was charged with additional violations. See SMF ¶

22; RSMF ¶ 22. However, the Court cannot escape the fact that Plaintiff was explicitly charged

in the Notice of Discipline for the same activity that Crewell conducted. Furthermore, there

appears to be a factual dispute as to whether Plaintiff’s adverse employment action was in fact

the product of these additional violations. Plaintiff turns the Court’s attention to Dkt. No. 76-17

(“Criminal Information Form”) and Dkt. No. 76-19 (“Amended Criminal Information Form”),

which were filed by Cramer in support of Plaintiff’s criminal prosecution. Those documents—

which outline the alleged criminal activity conducted by Plaintiff—do not anywhere detail that

Plaintiff engaged in acts beyond bringing her personal phone into the jail. See id. These

documents could lead a reasonable fact-finder to conclude that Defendants were primarily

concerned with Plaintiff’s violation of the phone policy rather than any other violation, and that

the main purpose behind the employment actions taken against Plaintiff were largely based on

that violation (and not for the additional reasons that Defendants enumerate).

Finally, the Court emphasizes that on this particular issue, courts in this Circuit generally

find that a jury is generally best positioned to make this determination. As the Second Circuit has

stated: “Whether two employees are similarly situated ordinarily presents a question of fact for

the jury.” Graham v. Long Island R.R., 230 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). The

Court therefore declines to grant summary judgment on this issue.

iii. Qualified Immunity

Defendants argue that they “are entitled to qualified immunity for all of” Plaintiff’s

claims. Mot. at 2. A government official sued in his or her individual capacity is entitled to

qualified immunity if the “plaintiff’s right not to be subjected to [prohibited] conduct by the

defendant was not clearly established at the time it occurred” or if “the defendant’s action was

objectively legally reasonable in light of the legal rules that were clearly established at the time it

was taken.” Munafo v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 285 F.3d 201, 210 (2d Cir. 2002) (cleaned up).

Here, “the Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from racial discrimination in

employment was clearly established as of” the events of this action. Looby v. City of Hartford,

152 F. Supp. 2d 181, 189 (D. Conn. 2001). Furthermore, given that the Court has already found

that Plaintiff has developed enough of a factual record for a reasonable jury to conclude that she

was subject to racial discrimination, the Court cannot say at this juncture that Defendants’

actions were “objectively legally reasonable.” Munafo, 285 F.3d at 210; see also Denigris v.

N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 861 F. Supp. 2d 185, 196 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (finding that because

individuals have a clearly established right to be free from race discrimination and retaliation in

employment, and that genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether the defendant personally

engaged in intentional discrimination and retaliation, granting summary judgment based on

qualified immunity would be inappropriate). Thus, the Court declines to grant summary

judgment as to Plaintiff’s NYSHRL and Equal Protection discrimination claims on the basis of

qualified immunity.

B. NYSHRL Retaliation

“To state a retaliation claim under the NYSHRL, a plaintiff must allege that: ‘(1) she

engaged in protected activity; (2) the employer was aware of that activity; (3) the employee

suffered a materially adverse action; and (4) there was a causal connection between the protected

activity and that adverse action.’” Wermann v. Excel Dentistry, P.C., No. 13-CV-7028, 2014 WL

846723, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2014) (quoting Giudice v. Red Robin Int’l, Inc., 555 F. App’x

67, 68 (2d Cir. 2014)). “In this Circuit, a plaintiff can indirectly establish a causal connection to

support a discrimination or retaliation claim by showing that the protected activity was closely

followed in time by the adverse [employment] action.” Gorman-Bakos v. Cornell Co-op

Extension of Schenectady Cnty., 252 F.3d 545, 554 (2d Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks

omitted). While a “substantial time lag between the protected activity and the adverse

employment action” bodes poorly for a retaliation claim, a plaintiff may prove causation,

alternatively, “by showing . . . that other similarly situated employees were treated differently.”

Allen v. St. Cabrini Nursing Home, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 442, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (citation

omitted). Employees must be similarly “situated in all material respects.” Watson v. Arts & Ent.

Television Network, No. 04-CV-1932, 2008 WL 793596, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26,

2008), aff’d, 352 F. App’x 475 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing Graham, 230 F.3d at 39). In a case

“involving disparate treatment with regard to discipline, the plaintiff must show that the conduct

of the other employee was of comparable seriousness.” Lucibello v. Yale-New Haven Hosp., No.

03-CV-0814, 2005 WL 578324, at *6 (D. Conn. Mar. 10, 2005) (citing Padilla v. Harris, 285 F.

Supp. 2d 263, 270 (D. Conn. 2003)).

Defendants concede that Plaintiff engaged in a protected activity when she filed a

discrimination complaint in 2010. See Mot. at 17. Defendants also correctly note that Plaintiff

“attempts to prevail by pleading that a similarly situated employee (again, kitchen worker []

Crewell) was treated differently.” Id.; see also Resp. at 21–23. However, as discussed above,

Defendants argue that Crewell’s conduct is not sufficiently similar to support an inference of

causation. See Mot. at 17.

Defendants first argue that “[P]laintiff cannot establish an adverse employment action.”

Id. In making this argument, Defendants essentially restate the adverse employment action

argument made with respect to the discrimination claims. See id. at 12. Yet as explained in supra

Part IV.A.ii, Plaintiff experienced an adverse employment action when she was placed on

suspension without pay. The argument therefore fails.

Defendants next argue that Crewell is not an appropriate comparator, outlining the ways

in which Crewell’s actions differed from Plaintiff’s. See Mot. at 18. Again, this argument is

essentially the same argument Defendants made with respect to the discrimination claims. As

discussed in supra Part IV.A.ii, the Court is satisfied that a reasonable jury could find Crewell a

suitable comparator. This argument thus also fails.

Defendants next suggest that Plaintiff is essentially pursuing a selective prosecution

claim and that she did not establish the elements of such a claim. See Mot. at 18. This argument

is unavailing, as Plaintiff is not arguing selective prosecution. Selective prosecution is a federal

claim premised on a defendant’s violation of a plaintiff’s constitutional rights; in employment

contexts, this typically involves a claim of an equal protection violation. See, e.g., Sharpe v. City

of New York, No. 11-CV-5494, 2013 WL 2356063, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. May 29, 2013), aff’d, 560

F. App’x 78 (2d Cir. 2014) (noting in an employment law case that “courts in the Second Circuit

have recognized equal protection claims predicated on the ‘selective enforcement’ theory”

(citation omitted)). The Court is unaware of case law suggesting that a selective enforcement

theory may be made under NYSHRL. Furthermore, as outlined in the Court’s March 2021 MDO,

Plaintiff has in fact pled a retaliation claim. Mar. 2021 MDO at 9–10. There is thus no reason for

this Court to evaluate Plaintiff’s claim under a selective enforcement theory.

After reviewing the evidence presented by both parties, the Court is satisfied that there is

enough of a factual dispute on this issue to preclude summary judgement. Plaintiff has identified

plausible retaliatory conduct by presenting evidence of disparate treatment. A reasonable juror

could therefore come to the conclusion that Plaintiff faced retaliation.

Additionally, the Court finds that qualified immunity does not apply for this claim. This

is because “it has long been clearly established that individuals have the right to be free from

intentional race discrimination and retaliation in employment, and genuine issues of material fact

exist as to whether Defendant[s] [] personally engaged in intentional discrimination and

retaliation against Plaintiff.” DeNigris, 861 F. Supp. 2d at 196. Here, Plaintiff has presented a

plausible case that her right to be free from retaliation was violated, and thus the Court cannot

conclude at this time that Defendants’ actions were “objectively legally reasonable.” Munafo,

285 F.3d at 210. “Accordingly, a grant of qualified immunity is wholly inappropriate at this stage

of the proceedings.” DeNigris, 861 F. Supp. 2d at 196.

C. Malicious Prosecution

“A plaintiff who brings a federal malicious prosecution claim must allege all the elements

of malicious prosecution under state law.” Oxman v. Downs, 999 F. Supp. 2d 404, 412

(E.D.N.Y. 2014) (citing Fulton v. Robinson, 289 F.3d 188, 195 (2d Cir. 2002)). “Under New

York law, Plaintiff must prove four elements to establish a claim for malicious prosecution: (1)

the initiation of a proceeding, (2) termination of said proceeding favorably to the plaintiff, (3)

lack of probable cause, and (4) malice.” Folk v. City of New York, 243 F. Supp. 3d 363, 373

(E.D.N.Y. 2017) (cleaned up). “Where a Fourth Amendment violation is asserted, the plaintiff

must also plead some deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of seizure.” Id. (cleaned

up).

“[T]he existence of probable cause is a complete defense to a claim of malicious

prosecution in New York.” Savino v. City of New York, 331 F.3d 63, 72 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing

Colon v. City of New York, 60 N.Y.2d 78, 82, 468 N.Y.S.2d 453, 455, 455 N.E.2d 1248 (1983)).

“For a malicious prosecution claim, probable cause to prosecute consists of ‘facts and

circumstances [that] would lead a reasonably prudent person to believe the plaintiff guilty.’”

Ying Li v. City of New York, 246 F. Supp. 3d 578, 611 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) (citing Boyd v. City of

New York, 336 F.3d 72, 76 (2d Cir. 2003)).

Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate the third element of malicious

prosecution: lack of probable cause. Mot. at 20–21. The Court agrees. Under New York law, one

commits the misdemeanor of promoting prison contraband in the second degree occurs when an

individual “knowingly and unlawfully introduces any contraband into a detention facility.” N.Y.

Penal Law § 205.20. “Contraband” is defined as “any article or thing which a person confined in

a detention facility is prohibited from obtaining or possessing by statute, rule, regulation or

order.” N.Y. Penal Law § 205.00.3. Courts in New York have recognized that personal cell

phones are considered contraband. See, e.g., People v. Green, 119 A.D.3d 23, 25–32, 984

N.Y.S.2d 680, 681–85 (2014) (finding that a defendant’s possession of a personal cell phone

constituted “dangerous contraband”).

Here, the Criminal Information Form filed by Cramer specifically outlines that Plaintiff

was discovered to have had “in her possession her personal cell phone . . . and did introduce said

cellphone into the Montgomery County Correctional Facility.” Crim. Info. Form at 1. The

Amended Criminal Information Form similarly states that Plaintiff was discovered to have

entered into the jail with her personal phone. See Am. Crim. Info. Form at 1. Furthermore,

neither party disputes that Plaintiff knowingly had her phone in the jail. See SMF ¶ 18; RSMF ¶

18. Given that Plaintiff was allegedly discovered by Defendants to have knowingly brought her

phone into the jail—which is a violation of N.Y. Penal Law § 205.20—the Court is satisfied that

Defendants had “facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably prudent person to believe

the plaintiff guilty.” Boyd, 336 F.3d at 76 (citation omitted). In other words, Defendants had

probable cause.

Because Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that Defendants lacked probable cause, the Court

grants summary judgement on this issue and dismisses her malicious prosecution claim.

D. Damages

Finally, Defendants argue that Plaintiff is not entitled to punitive damages and certain

attorneys’ fees. Mot. at 24–25. Plaintiff argues that the Court should not consider Defendants’

argument, as “damages are not relevant to the burden of the parties on summary judgment.”

Resp. 27. Plaintiff’s argument is misplaced, however, as “[d]istrict courts may grant summary

judgment as to damages for which there exist no disputed issues of material fact.” Hart v. Rick’s

Cabaret Int’l, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 447, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). The Court therefore evaluates

whether summary judgment is appropriate with respect to both punitive damages and certain

attorney’s fees.

i. Punitive Damages

Plaintiff has requested punitive damages in the amount of $100,000.00. See Second Am.

Compl. at 18. Considering that “[i]t is undisputed that the New York State Human Rights Law

does not provide for punitive damages,” Plaintiff cannot recover punitive damages for her

NYSHRL claims. Farias v. Instructional Sys., Inc., 259 F.3d 91, 101 (2d Cir. 2001).

With respect to Plaintiff’s equal protection claim (her sole surviving federal claim),

“[p]unitive damages are available in a § 1983 action ‘when the defendant’s conduct is shown to

be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the

federally protected rights of others.’” Lee v. Edwards, 101 F.3d 805, 808 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting

Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983)). A plaintiff must “have produced evidence of a positive

element of conscious wrongdoing or malice.” Cameron v. City of New York, 598 F.3d 50, 69

(2d Cir. 2010) (cleaned up). Here, the Court concludes that a reasonably jury could find “a

positive element of conscious wrongdoing or malice” with respect to the equal protection claim.

Id. Plaintiff has pleaded that the alleged discriminatory action was taken with direct intent of

engaging in “unlawful discrimination.” Compl. ¶ 9. Furthermore, courts in this Circuit have

generally refrained from preventing prosecution of punitive damages on constitutional violation

and discrimination claims that survive summary judgment. See, e.g., Weinberg v. Vill. of

Clayton, New York, 537 F. Supp. 3d 344, 366 (N.D.N.Y. 2021) (“In this case, Plaintiffs have

raised an issue of fact regarding Ingerson’s motive in taking enforcement action against them.

Therefore, the Court denies Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the issue of punitive

damages against Ingerson.”); Ragin v. Newburgh Enlarged City Sch. Dist., No. 06-CV-2797,

2009 WL 4906111, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2009) (“Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s

demand for punitive damages under §§ 1981 and 1983 should be dismissed because both

Saturnelli and Lewis acted reasonably and appropriately under the circumstances. On the present

record, however, it cannot be said that Ragin has not raised a triable issue of fact as to whether

the Defendants acted with the requisite malicious motive or intent with respect to the claims that

have survived summary judgment.”); Lewis v. State of Connecticut Dep’t of Corr., 355 F. Supp.

2d 607, 627 (D. Conn. 2005) (“Officer Lewis has raised sufficient issues of material fact as to

whether Lieutenant Sousa displayed a malicious or reckless indifference to the racial

discrimination at issue in this case, so that the Court cannot say as a matter of law at least at this

stage that no reasonable juror could award Officer Lewis punitive damages on her claims against

Lieutenant Sousa.”).

In summary, the Court finds that Plaintiff may pursue punitive damages for her federal

discrimination claim. Plaintiff may not pursue punitive damages for her NYSHRL claims.

ii. Attorney’s Fees for NYSHRL Claims

Defendants argue that Plaintiff is not entitled to recover attorney’s fees under NYSHRL

because the statute only “provides for the award of attorney’s fees in limited cases.” Mot. at 25.

Specifically, Defendants state that NYSHRL only provides for attorney’s fees in cases involving

discrimination in housing or on the basis of sex. See id. Yet this is a misreading of the statute.

N.Y. Exec. Law § 297.10 specifically states that attorney’s fees may be awarded “[i]n cases of

employment discrimination.” And as courts in this Circuit have specifically noted, NYSHRL

“allows a prevailing party to recover attorneys’ fees in cases involving housing discrimination,

credit discrimination where sex is the basis of such discrimination, and employment

discrimination.” Panerese v. Shiekh Shoes, LLC, No. 19-CV-4061, 2020 WL 7041083, at *3

(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2020) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Thus, Plaintiff is permitted to

pursue attorney’s fees for her NYSHRL claims.

V. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is hereby:

ORDERED, that Defendants’ Motion, Dkt. No. 76, is GRANTED in part and DENIED

in part; and it is further

ORDERED, that Plaintiff's claim of malicious prosecution is DISMISSED; and it is

further

ORDERED, that Plaintiff's demand for punitive damages for her NYSHRL claims is

DENIED; and it is further

ORDERED, that the Clerk serve a copy of this Memorandum-Decision and Order on all

parties in accordance with the Local Rules.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 22, 2024

Albany, New York

LAWRENCE E. KAHN

United States District Judge

17

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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