Trapani v. Sypniewski

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

DAMIAN R. TRAPANI,

Plaintiff,

8:23-CV-1433

Vv. (LEK/DJS)

MATTHEW J. SYPNIEWSKI, Judge, ef al.,

Defendants.

APPEARANCES:

DAMIAN R. TRAPANI

Plaintiff, Pro Se

21-A-1103

“| Shawangunk Correctional Facility

P.O. Box 700

Wallkill, New York 12589

DANIEL J. STEWART

United States Magistrate Judge

REPORT-RECOMMENDATION and ORDER’

The Clerk has sent to the Court for review a Complaint submitted by pro se

«| Plaintiff asserting claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, together with an application to

proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). Dkt. No. 1 (‘Compl.”); Dkt. No. 4 (“IFP

Application’”).* By separate order, the Court approved Plaintiff's IFP Application.

' This matter was referred to the undersigned pursuant to L.R. 72.3(d).

2 The request for an extension of time to file the IFP application is denied as moot.

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I. SUFFICIENCY OF THE COMPLAINT

A. Governing Legal Standard

Section 1915(e) directs that, when a plaintiff seeks to proceed in forma pauperis,

“(2) ... the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that —. . . (B)

the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (11) fails to state a claim on which relief may

be granted; or (111) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such

relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).* Thus, even if a plaintiff meets the financial criteria

to commence an action in forma pauperis, it 1s the court’s responsibility to determine

whether the plaintiff may properly maintain the complaint that he filed in this District

before the court may permit the plaintiff to proceed with this action in forma pauperis.

See id.

Likewise, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, a court must review any “complaint in a civil

action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee

of a governmental entity” and must “identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint,

or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint . . . is frivolous, malicious, or fails to

a claim upon which relief may be granted; or . . . seeks monetary relief from a

defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A; see also Carr v. Dvorin,

171 F.3d 115, 116 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (explaining that section 1915A applies to

3 To determine whether an action is frivolous, a court must look to see whether the complaint “lacks an arguable

basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 19, 325 (1989).

all actions brought by prisoners against government officials even when plaintiff paid the

filing fee); Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007) (stating that both sections

1915 and 1915A are available to evaluate pro se prisoner complaints).

In reviewing a pro se complaint, the court has a duty to show liberality toward pro

se litigants, see Nance v. Kelly, 912 F.2d 605, 606 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam), and should

exercise “extreme caution . . . in ordering swa sponte dismissal of a pro se complaint

before the adverse party has been served and both parties (but particularly the plaintiff)

have had an opportunity to respond.” Anderson v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37, 41 (2d Cir.

1983) (internal citations omitted). Therefore, a court should not dismiss a complaint if

the plaintiff has stated “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility

when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

Although a court should construe the factual allegations in the light most favorable

«| to the plaintiff, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained

in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Jd. “Threadbare recitals of the

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”

Td. (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts

do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the

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complaint has alleged—but it has not show[n]-— that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Jd. at

679 (quoting FED. R. CIv. P. 8(a)(2)). Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

“demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

Thus, a pleading that only “tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual

enhancement” will not suffice. /d. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).

B. Summary of the Complaint

The Complaint, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law, names twenty

specifically identified Defendants and more than 100 Doe Defendants. Compl. at J§ 9-

24. It also identifies six specific legal claims, though it does not indicate which claims

apply to which Defendants. /d. at 4 78-83. Generally stated, the allegations revolve

around Plaintiff's arrest and subsequent time incarcerated at the Schenectady County

Correctional Facility or time spent in various drug treatment facilities. See generally id.

at §§] 27-77.

C. Analysis of the Complaint

1. General Pleading Standards

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require, among other things, “a short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIv.

P. 8(a)(2). Absent clarity as to the nature of the claims “defendants will not be able to

respond meaningfully to the instant complaint.” DeMarco v. City of New York, 2008 WL

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3285892, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2008). While the Complaint cites numerous federal

and state statutory and constitutional provisions, it does not provide the required clarity.

The Complaint provides detailed factual pleading, but fails to satisfy the particularity

requirement with regard to the identified legal claims. Plaintiff simply lists his legal

claims on a single page and does not specifically identify which facts relate to each claim

or identify which claims are lodged against which Defendants. That makes it

exceptionally difficult for Defendants to properly respond to the allegations in the

Complaint.

By way of example, the Complaint names numerous employees and officials with

the Schenectady County Sheriff's Office as Defendants. However, apart from an entirely

conclusory allegation that Plaintiff contracted Covid-19 because Defendants Cufari and

Guerin refused to allow Plaintiff to meet with a counselor, Compl. at § 57, the Complaint

fails to provide any notice as to the factual or legal nature of the claims lodged against

the Schenectady County Defendants. Similarly, Butler, who is alleged to be the Director

of the County’s Drug Court Program is named prominently throughout the Complaint,

though the precise nature of Plaintiff's claims against him are unclear. When a complaint

does not comply with Rule 8’s pleading requirements it presents too heavy a burden for

defendants to defend against “and provides no meaningful basis for the Court to assess

+ Plaintiff has noted the need to clarify the allegations in Complaint. Dkt. No. 6.

the sufficiency of [the plaintiffs] claims,” and may properly be dismissed. Gonzales v.

Wing, 167 F.R.D. 352, 355 (N.D.N.Y. 1996).

2. Statute of Limitations

Some of Plaintiff's claims appear, in any event, to be untimely. The statute of

limitations for a section 1983 action in New York is three years. Murphy v. Lynn, 53 F.3d

547, 548 (2d Cir. 1995). For purposes of this review, the Court will presume the

Complaint was filed November 14, 2023, the date it was signed and is postmarked from

the location of Plaintiff's incarceration at the time of the filing. Compl. at p. 20; Dkt. No.

1-1; see also Walker v. Jastremski, 430 F.3d 560, 562 (2d Cir. 2005) (discussing prison

mailbox rule). The allegations in the Complaint, however, date back as far as July 2019

when Plaintiff was arrested on charges that ultimately gave rise to the facts underlying

this action. Claims predating November 14, 2020, therefore, are untimely and should be

dismissed. This would include all claims regarding alleged retaliation in delaying

Plaintiff's release from the Schenectady County Jail in August 2019 and claims related to

Plaintiff's stay at Hospitality House in June 2020.

3. Judicial Immunity

Even to the extent not barred by the applicable statute of limitations, claims against

Defendant Sypniewski are subject to dismissal on immunity grounds. In actions brought

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 judges enjoy absolute immunity from suit for actions taken in the

performance of their duties. Young v. Selsky, 41 F.3d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1994) (noting that

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Judges enjoy absolute immunity from personal liability for ‘acts committed within their

judicial jurisdiction’”) (quoting Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967)). Here, though not

specifically outlined, the Complaint’s only allegations related to Judge Sypniewski

appear to concern his conducting proceedings related to Plaintiff's arrest. This conduct

clearly relates to the official duties of a judge and so Plaintiff's claims in this regard are

barred by absolute immunity. Bliven v. Hunt, 579 F.3d 204, 210 (2d Cir. 2009) (“acts

arising out of, or related to, individual cases before the judge are considered judicial in

nature”); Young v. Selsky, 41 F.3d at 51.

4. State Action

Any claim under section 1983 requires state action. “Because the United States

Constitution regulates only the Government, not private parties, a litigant claiming that

his constitutional rights have been violated must first establish that the challenged conduct

constitutes state action.” Flagg v. Yonkers Sav. & Loan Ass’n, FA, 396 F.3d 178, 186 (2d

Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A plaintiff pressing a claim of violation

of his constitutional rights under § 1983 is thus required to show state action.” Tancredi

«lv. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 316 F.3d 308, 312 (2d Cir. 2003). “State action requires both the

exercise of some right or privilege created by the State and the involvement of a person

who may fairly be said to be a state actor.” Meadows v. United Servs., Inc., 963 F.3d 240,

243 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting Flagg v. Yonkers Sav. & Loan Ass’n, FA, 396 F.3d at 186)

(internal quotations and alterations omitted).

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A number of the Defendants in this case are private drug treatment facilities and

their employees. The Complaint fails to allege that any of those Defendants were state

actors.

For the purposes of section 1983, the actions of a nominally private entity are

attributable to the state when: (1) the entity acts pursuant to the coercive power

of the state or is controlled by the state (the compulsion test); (2) when the

state provides significant encouragement to the entity, the entity is a willful

participant in joint activity with the state, or the entity’s functions are entwined

with state policies (the joint action test or close nexus test); or (3) when the

entity has been delegated a public function by the state, (the public function

test).

Sybalski v. Indep. Grp. Home Living Program, Inc., 546 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 2008)

(citing Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288,

(2001)) (internal quotations and alterations omitted).

Courts have repeatedly recognized that treatment facilities of the sort named as

Defendants here are not state actors. See, e.g., Byng v. Delta Recovery Servs., LLC, 2013

WL 3897485, at *8 (N.D.N.Y. July 29, 2013); Mele v. Hill Health Ctr., 609 F. Supp. 2d

248, 257 (D. Conn. 2009). “That Plaintiff opted to participate in the program at [the

Defendant treatment facilities] in lieu of completing a prison sentence does not transform

the treatment facility and its employees into state actors, nor does it render their actions

in implementing the internal requirements of the treatment program - which were not

created or directed by the court - into state action.” Vaughn v. Phoenix House Programs

of New York, ,2015 WL 5671902, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2015). Plaintiff has failed to

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allege facts that the Defendant treatment centers or its employees were state actors and,

therefore, claims against Defendants Mary Smith, Fulton Friendship House, Robert

Johnson, Thomas Ryan, Kathleen Valachovic, Victorian Manor, Inc., Doreen

Ashabranner, Deborah Todd, and Jaime Swezey should be dismissed.

5. Leave to Amend

Courts recognize that dismissal of a complaint filed by a pro se litigant “without

granting leave to amend at least once ‘when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any

indication that a valid claim might be stated’” would be inappropriate. Bruce v. Tompkins

Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. ex rel. Kephart, 2015 WL 151029, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 7,

2015) (quoting Branum v. Clark, 927 F.2d 698, 704-05 (2d Cir. 1991)). Here, Plaintiff

may be able to cure the deficiencies in his pleading related to providing insufficient

factual allegations regarding specific Defendants and may be able to allege facts to

demonstrate state action on the part of other Defendants. Accordingly, it 1s recommended

that Plaintiff be granted leave to amend to do so.

Where, however, the grounds for dismissal offer no basis for curing the defects in

«|the pleading, granting leave to amend would be futile. See Kunz v. Brazill, 2015 WL

792096, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2015). That is true here with respect to recommended

dismissals based on judicial immunity and the statute of limitations. Therefore, the

defects in the pleading are substantive, and allowing Plaintiff leave to amend the

Complaint would be futile. See Jackson v. Pfau, 523 F. App’x 736, 737 (2d Cir. 2013)

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Should Plaintiff be directed by the District Judge to file an amended complaint, I

offer the following guidance. Any such amended complaint, which shall supersede and

replace in its entirety the previous Complaint filed by Plaintiff, must clearly state the

nature of the suit and the basis for this Court's jurisdiction. The body of Plaintiff's

amended complaint must contain sequentially numbered paragraphs containing only one

act of misconduct per paragraph and should state with specificity the legal claim for relief

and the basis for damages. Plaintiff is referred to FED. R. CIV. P. 8 and 10 as to the

proper form for his pleadings.

II. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, it is hereby

RECOMMENDED, that Plaintiff's Complaint be DISMISSED with leave to

amend as set forth above pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) & 1915(A); and it is

ORDERED, that the request for additional time (Dkt. No. 3) is DENIED as moot;

and it is further

ORDERED, that the Clerk of the Court serve a copy of this Report-

«| Recommendation and Order upon the parties to this action.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have fourteen (14)° days within

which to file written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed

5 If you are proceeding pro se and are served with this Order by mail, three additional days will be added to the

fourteen-day period, meaning that you have seventeen days from the date the order was mailed to you to serve and

file objections. FED. R. Clv. P. 6(d). If the last day ofthat prescribed period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal

with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN

FOURTEEN (14) DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. Roldan v.

Racette, 984 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs.,

892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 72 & 6(a).

Dated: March 7, 2024

Albany, New York

SB

US-Magistrate Judge

holiday, then the deadline is extended until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday.

FED. R. CIV. P. 6(a)(1)(C).

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