Martinaj v. Uhler

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

BERNARDO MARTINAJ, STEVE ARMENTO, PHILLIP

COPELAND, ANTHONY MACK, SCOTT ROSS, and

CHARLES W. TOLAND, JR., 9:18-cv-257 (BKS/DJS)

Plaintiffs,

v.

DONALD UHLER and JOSEPH BELLNIER,

Defendants.

Appearances:

For Plaintiffs:

Alan D. Levine

Office of Alan D. Levine

118-21 Queens Boulevard, Suite 504

Forest Hills, NY 11375

For Defendants:

Letitia A. James

Attorney General of the State of New York

Kostas D. Leris

Assistant Attorney General, of Counsel

David C. White

Assistant Attorney General, of Counsel

The Capitol

Albany, NY 12224

Hon. Brenda K. Sannes, Chief United States District Judge:

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

This action arises from alleged constitutional violations that occurred at Clinton

Correctional Facility (“Clinton”) and Upstate Correctional Facility (“Upstate”) in the aftermath

of David Sweat and Richard Matt’s escape from Clinton in June 2015. The case is set for trial on

December 4, 2023, on: (1) the Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claims of

Plaintiffs Martinaj, Armento, Copeland, Mack, and Ross against Defendants Uhler and Bellnier;

and (2) Plaintiff Toland’s First Amendment free exercise of religion claim against Defendant

Uhler.

Presently before the Court are the parties’ motions in limine. (Dkt. Nos. 177, 181).

Plaintiffs move to (1) preclude evidence of their criminal records; and (2) establish permission to

request specific amounts in damages. (Dkt. No. 181). Defendants move to (1) dismiss Plaintiffs

Martinaj, Armento, Copeland, Mack, and Ross’ Fourteenth Amendment due process claims on

the basis of qualified immunity; (2) admit into evidence Plaintiffs’ felony convictions;

(3) preclude evidence regarding claims previously dismissed in this case; (4) preclude evidence

regarding Defendants’ disciplinary histories, personnel files, or other lawsuits; (5) preclude

evidence regarding the potential indemnification of any Defendant; and (6) preclude Plaintiffs

from requesting specific amounts in damages. (Dkt. No. 177). The Court heard oral argument on

the parties’ motions at the final pretrial conference on November 20, 2023. For the following

reasons, the parties’ motions are granted in part and denied in part.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine

1. Plaintiffs’ Criminal Records

Plaintiffs move to preclude evidence of their criminal records, contending that because

this case “does not concern a violent incident or a disciplinary proceeding[,] . . . there should be

no mention to the jury whatsoever of the reasons any of them were incarcerated.” (Dkt. No. 181,

at 1–2). Defendants correspondingly move to admit into evidence Plaintiffs’ felony convictions.

(Dkt. No. 177, at 7–11). Citing Rule 609 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Defendants argue that

since the resolution of Plaintiffs’ claims will “turn in large part on the jury’s assessment of the

parties’ credibility,” “it is entirely appropriate that Defendants be permitted to inquire into all of

Plaintiffs’ convictions.” (Id. at 11) (emphasis in original).

Although Plaintiffs’ motion in limine does not specify each Plaintiff’s convictions,

Defendants’ motion in limine indicates that Plaintiff Martinaj was convicted in 2002 of murder

in the second degree and assault in the first degree and sentenced to a term of 37 years and 6

months to life; Plaintiff Armento was convicted in 2008 of murder in the first degree and

sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole; Plaintiff Copeland was convicted in

1989 of murder in the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree

and sentenced to a term of 25 years to life; Plaintiff Mack was convicted in 2008 of attempted

robbery in the second degree, subsections two and three, and sentenced to a term of 14 years to

life (Plaintiff Mack was released to parole on June 24, 2021); Plaintiff Ross was convicted in

2000 of murder in the second degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the second and third

degree, intimidating a victim/witness in the third degree, and assault in the second degree and

sentenced to a term of 51 years and 6 months to life; and Plaintiff Toland was convicted in 1996

of two counts of murder in the second degree, kidnapping in the first degree, assault in the first

degree, and unlawful imprisonment in the first degree and sentenced to a term of 55 years to life.

(See id. at 7–8).

Rule 609(a)(1) provides that, in a civil case, “subject to Rule 403,” evidence of a prior

criminal conviction “must be admitted” to impeach a witness where the conviction was “for a

crime that . . . was punishable . . . by imprisonment for more than one year.” Fed. R. Evid.

609(a)(1)(A). “The Rule requires district courts to admit the name of a conviction, its date, and

the sentence imposed unless the district court determines that the probative value of that

evidence ‘is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,

or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless

presentation of cumulative evidence.’” United States v. Estrada, 430 F.3d 606, 620–21 (2d Cir.

2005) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 403). Rule 609(a)(2) provides that, “for any crime regardless of the

punishment,” evidence of a criminal conviction “must be admitted if the court can readily

determine that establishing the elements of the crime required proving—or the witness’s

admitting—a dishonest act or false statement.” Fed. R. Evid. 609(a)(2). Unlike Rule 609(a)(1),

Rule 609(a)(2) does not require a balancing under Rule 403: “evidence of conviction of a certain

type of crime[,] one involving dishonesty o[r] false statement[,] must be admitted, with the trial

court having no discretion.” United States v. Bumagin, 136 F. Supp. 3d 361, 375 (E.D.N.Y.

2015) (first and third alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Hayes, 553 F.2d 824, 827

(2d Cir. 1977)).

The applicability of Rule 609(a) is, however, limited by Rule 609(b), which provides that

“if more than 10 years have passed since the witness’s conviction or release from confinement

for it, whichever is later,” then “[e]vidence of the conviction is admissible only if . . . its

probative value, supported by specific facts and circumstances, substantially outweighs its

prejudicial effect.” Fed. R. Evid. 609(b)(1).

As an initial matter, Plaintiffs Martinaj, Armento, Copeland, Ross, and Toland have not

yet been released from confinement, while Plaintiff Mack was only released to parole on June

24, 2021. (See Dkt. No. 177, at 7–8). Accordingly, Rule 609(a), rather than Rule 609(b), applies.

See Fed R. Evid. 609. Furthermore, none of Plaintiffs’ convictions required admitting a dishonest

act or false statement. See Estrada, 430 F.3d at 614. Therefore, Rule 609(a)(1) is applicable, not

Rule 609(a)(2). See Fed. R. Evid. 609. Thus, the Court must balance the probative value of

introducing evidence of each conviction against its prejudicial effect under Rule 403. See

Brandon v. Kinter, No. 13-cv-939, 2021 WL 3032693, at *2, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133484, at

*4 (N.D.N.Y. July 19, 2021); see also Estrada, 430 F.3d at 615–16.

The Court recognizes that convictions for crimes of violence and weapons possession

bear only “marginally on [propensity for] honesty or veracity.” Estrada, 430 F.3d at 618. And

the Court has considered the fact that Plaintiffs’ convictions—the most recent of which occurred

approximately fifteen years ago—are relatively remote in time and are therefore of lesser

probative value than would be more recent convictions. See Twitty v. Ashcroft, No. 04-cv-410,

2010 WL 1677757, at *2, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40499, at *6 (D. Conn. Apr. 23, 2010) (“[T]he

‘probative value of a conviction decreases as its age increases.’” (quoting 4 Weinstein’s Federal

Evidence § 609.05(3)(d) at 609–41 (2d ed. 2010))). In this case, however, the jury will be

required to assess Plaintiffs’ credibility against that of Defendants to resolve factual disputes on

the due process claims, such as disputes concerning the conditions of Plaintiffs’ confinements

and whether the confinements presented an atypical and significant hardship. Similarly, the jury

will have to consider the credibility of Plaintiff Toland against the credibility of Defendant Uhler

to decide Toland’s free exercise of religion claim. Plaintiffs’ character for veracity is therefore a

central issue in this case, and the existence of prior felony convictions has some probative value

of Plaintiffs’ credibility. See Estrada, 430 F.3d at 617 (“Rule 609(a)(1) presumes that all felonies

are at least somewhat probative of a witness’s propensity to testify truthfully.”); Crenshaw v.

Herbert, 409 F. App’x 428, 431–32 (2d Cir. 2011) (summary order) (finding no abuse of

discretion in admitting evidence of a prior conviction in a § 1983 case because “[e]vidence of

[the plaintiff’s prior conviction] was probative of his veracity, a central issue in this case because

the jury was required to choose between two contradictory versions of the underlying incident”

(internal citation omitted)). Moreover, the jury will know by the nature of Plaintiffs’ claims that

Plaintiffs were convicted of crimes and serving prison sentences, which limits prejudicial effect.

See Espinosa v. McCabe, No. 10-cv-497, 2014 WL 988832, at *6, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

31741, at *16 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2014). Therefore, the Court finds that the probative value of

the fact of Plaintiffs’ felony convictions is not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice or

the other evils Rule 403 seeks to avoid.

However, the Court also finds that introducing the names of these convictions for crimes

of violence and weapons possession poses a risk of an inflammatory impact on the jury and

resulting unfair prejudice. See Thomas v. Leifeld, No. 12-cv-321, 2018 WL 3387690, at *3, 2018

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116008, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. July 12, 2018) (finding that introducing evidence of

crimes of violence may “inflame[ ] the jurors’ prejudice against” a plaintiff as a result of an

“emotional response to . . . event[s] otherwise factually unconnected to [the plaintiff’s] testimony

or the facts of the case eclipsing whatever veracity [the plaintiff] may otherwise have had in their

eyes” (quoting United States v. Devery, 935 F. Supp. 393, 408 (S.D.N.Y. 1996))). Moreover,

“the factor[ ] of . . . cumulative evidence militate[s] against admitting evidence of each of

Plaintiff’s felony convictions.” Espinosa, 2014 WL 988832, at *6, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

31741, at *16.

Thus, after weighing all of the factors under Rule 403, the Court concludes that evidence

of Plaintiffs’ felony convictions is admissible to impeach Plaintiffs but that Defendants may only

inquire into the dates of the convictions and the sentences imposed and, to the extent there were

multiple felony convictions, may only refer to “felony convictions”; Defendants may not inquire

into the names or nature of the crimes or the number of convictions. See United States v. Brown,

606 F. Supp. 2d 306, 312 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (“In the Second Circuit, it is within the discretion of

the district courts to further limit the evidence of the prior conviction to exclude the nature or

statutory name of the offense.”); Lewis v. Velez, 149 F.R.D. 474, 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (“[W]hile

the fact that Mr. Lewis is a convicted felon serving a sentence of eleven years to life may be

elicited, the charge on which he was convicted may not.”).

2. Specific Amounts in Damages

Plaintiffs move to establish permission to request specific amounts in damages, noting

that the Second Circuit in Lightfoot v. Union Carbide Corp. “declined ‘to adopt a per se rule

prohibiting counsel from suggesting a specific sum as damages.’” (Dkt. No. 181, at 3) (quoting

110 F.3d 898, 912 (2d Cir. 1997)). Defendants correspondingly move to preclude Plaintiffs from

requesting specific amounts in damages. (Dkt. No. 177, at 14).

In the Second Circuit, the decision of whether to permit an attorney to argue for specific

amounts in damages “is best left to the discretion of the trial judge, who may either prohibit

counsel from mentioning specific figures or impose reasonable limitations, including cautionary

jury instructions.” Lightfoot, 110 F.3d at 912. However, as Defendants correctly point out,

“specifying target amounts for the jury to award is disfavored.” (Dkt. No. 186, at 2) (quoting

Consorti v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 72 F.3d 1003, 1016 (2d Cir. 1995)). Target amounts

“anchor the jurors’ expectations of a fair award at the place set by counsel, rather than by the

evidence.” Ferreira v. City of Binghamton, No. 13-cv-107, 2016 WL 4991600, at *5, 2016 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 126011, at *14 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2016) (quoting Consorti, 72 F.3d at 1016).

As a preliminary matter, Plaintiffs have not identified what compensable damages they

will be seeking. The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) provides, in relevant part, that

“[n]o Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other

correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior

showing of physical injury.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). The PLRA’s limitation on recovery “is

generally interpreted to preclude a prisoner complaining of mental and emotional injury during

imprisonment, without a showing of physical injury, from receiving an award of compensatory

damages.” Walker v. Schult, 45 F.4th 598, 612 (2d Cir. 2022).

A plaintiff must prove more than a violation of their constitutional rights to recover

compensatory damages in a § 1983 action; they must also demonstrate that the constitutional

deprivation caused them an actual injury. Miner v. City of Glens Falls, 999 F.2d 655, 660 (2d

Cir. 1993). “Absent a showing of causation and actual injury, a plaintiff is entitled to only

nominal damages.” Id. As a result, a finding that Plaintiffs have been deprived of a constitutional

right does not automatically entitle them to a substantial award of damages. See Kerman v. City

of New York, 374 F.3d 93, 123 (2d Cir. 2004).

If a plaintiff was deprived of liberty or property without constitutionally adequate due

process but the deprivation would have taken place even if adequate process had been provided,

the plaintiff is not entitled to recover damages as compensation for injuries caused by the

deprivation because the failure to provide adequate process cannot properly be viewed as the

cause of the deprivation. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 260 (1978). Consequently, if

Plaintiffs would have been transferred to the Special Housing Unit (“SHU”) at Upstate even had

they been provided all process allegedly due—as Plaintiffs’ attorney appeared to have conceded

at the final pretrial conference—compensatory damages cannot be awarded for the transfers that

allegedly occurred without adequate process.

Therefore, this portion of Plaintiffs’ motion seems premature and the Court reserves

ruling on it until trial.

B. Defendants’ Motion in Limine

1. Qualified Immunity

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs Martinaj, Armento, Mack, Copeland, and Ross’

Fourteenth Amendment due process claims on the basis that Defendants are entitled to qualified

immunity with respect to such claims because “the process due to Plaintiffs was not clearly

established and, as such, no reasonable person in Defendants’ position would have known that

their conduct was unlawful.” (Dkt. No. 177, at 5). At the final pretrial conference, Plaintiffs

opposed Defendants’ argument, citing Soto v. Walker, 44 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 1995).

As an initial matter, the Court notes that this appears to be a motion to reconsider the

Court’s ruling on summary judgment, and that it is untimely, N.D.N.Y. Local Rule 60.1

(requiring motions for reconsideration to be filed within fourteen days), and fails to meet the

standard for reconsideration, see United States v. Zhu, 41 F. Supp. 3d 341, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)

(citing as bases for reconsideration an intervening change of controlling law, the availability of

new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice); see also

American Home Assur. Co. v. Merck & Col, Inc., 462 F. Supp. 2d 435, 444 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)

(declining to address a motion in limine that “is in large part a disguised motion for summary

judgment, or a motion for reconsideration”).1 While the Court declines, for these reasons, to

reconsider its ruling on summary judgment, the Court addresses the issue of qualified immunity

here to provide guidance to the parties.

Public officials are entitled to qualified immunity on a § 1983 claim “unless (1) they

violated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of their conduct was

clearly established at the time.” Radwan v. Manuel, 55 F.4th 101, 113 (2d Cir. 2022) (internal

quotation marks omitted) (quoting District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589 (2018));

1 In their earlier motion for summary judgment, Defendants argued that “no reasonable officer in Defendant Uhler or

Bellnier’s position would believe that temporarily housing Plaintiffs in SHU while DOCCS and the New York State

Police investigated an escape that Plaintiffs may have had information concerning implicated their protected liberty

interest.” (Dkt. No. 117-33, at 35–36). While Plaintiffs Martinaj, Armento, Copeland, Mack, and Ross were confined

in SHU for relatively short periods of time, Defendants’ argument did not address how they are entitled to qualified

immunity given the factual disputes concerning the conditions of Plaintiffs’ confinements and whether the

confinements presented an atypical and significant hardship. Nor did Defendants’ argument address the process that

was due. Accordingly, the Court denied Defendants motion as to the due process claims. Martinaj v. Uhler, No. 18-

cv-257S, 2023 WL 2984449, at *20, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68167, at *67–68 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2023).

see also generally Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Qualified immunity is an

affirmative defense on which defendants bear the burden of proof. Vincent v. Yelich, 718 F.3d

157, 166 (2d Cir. 2013).

Qualified immunity is inappropriate when there are material factual disputes as to a

defendant’s conduct. See Franco v. Gunsalus, 972 F.3d 170, 174 (2d Cir. 2020) (noting that,

where there “remains a genuine factual dispute, the existence of qualified immunity cannot be

determined until the factual dispute is resolved”). “If there are unresolved factual issues which

prevent an early disposition of the defense [of qualified immunity], the jury should decide these

issues on special interrogatories.” Jones v. Treubig, 963 F.3d 214, 225 (2d Cir. 2020).

Here, the five due process claimants challenge the lack of process in their transfers to

SHU at Upstate. The record does not appear to be fully developed on the circumstances or timing

of these transfers—six to nine days after the escape—which are relevant factors in the due

process analysis. See, e.g., Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 473 (1983), abrogated in part on

other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995). It does not appear that the record

reflects the basis for the transfers to SHU. Defendant Bellnier, who had the authority to transfer

inmates, testified that he did not recall why inmates—including Plaintiffs—were designated for

being housed in SHU. (Dkt. No. 138-15, at 51). Bellnier testified that he gave verbal approval for

a transfer because the investigators requested that “a group of inmates” be transferred for further

investigation and “it was a reasonable request given that” the escapees had been in “close

proximity” to and “lived among the inmates who were being interviewed.” (Id. at 51–56).

Bellnier said that “it was reasonable to want them removed from the facility for further

investigation . . . in case they were involved in some way.” (Id.; Dkt. No. 135, ¶ 7). The record

also does not reflect the reason for the lengths of time Plaintiffs were held in SHU—which

ranged from fourteen days to thirty-two. Cf. Proctor v. LeClair, 846 F.3d 597, 609 (2d Cir. 2017)

(noting that there is “a constitutional ceiling on” DOCCS officials’ “substantial discretion in

deciding whether to impose an Ad Seg term”; “[t]o ensure that a state prison facility does not use

Ad Seg as a pretext to commit an inmate to the SHU indefinitely, the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment mandates that prison officials periodically review whether an inmate

continues to pose a threat to the facility.”) (citing Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 477 n.9).

There are also factual questions regarding whether the conditions in SHU constituted an

atypical and significant hardship which was substantially more grave that the hardship an inmate

was likely to endure under typical SHU conditions or in general population. Finally, Plaintiffs

dispute whether Defendants complied with the New York regulation governing “other

admissions” to SHU, 7 N.Y.C.R.R. § 301.7, i.e., whether Plaintiffs had a meaningful

“opportunity to be interviewed . . . concerning [their] placement in an SHU.”

As the Court noted at the final pretrial conference, the parties can propose factual

interrogatories for the jury, to assist the Court in resolving the issue of qualified immunity, and

the Court will discuss these interrogatories at the jury instruction conference at the close of the

evidence. See Jones, 963 F.3d at 225. Defendants have already submitted proposed

interrogatories. (Dkt. No. 176-1).

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity is denied at this

time.

2. Defendants’ Remaining Arguments

In their motion in limine, Defendants also seek to preclude Plaintiffs from introducing

evidence regarding claims previously dismissed in this case, (Dkt. No. 177, at 11–12);

Defendants’ disciplinary histories, personnel files, or other lawsuits, (id. at 12–13); and the

potential indemnification of any Defendant, (id. at 13–14). Plaintiffs’ attorney stated at the final

pretrial conference that he will not seek to admit any of this evidence. Accordingly, Defendants’

motion on this evidence is denied as moot.

I. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, it is hereby

ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ motion in limine, (Dkt. No. 181), and Defendants’ motion in

limine, (Dkt. No. 177), are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as set forth above.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 27, 2023

Syracuse, New York

PALA ba. IC Annee

Brenda K. Sannes

Chief U.S. District Judge

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