Weaver v. New York State Office of Court Administration

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

____________________________________________

EVERETTE WEAVER,

Plaintiff,

v. 1:22-CV-0293

(GTS/DJS)

NEW YORK STATE OFFICE OF COURT ADMIN.;

NEW YORK STATE UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM;

EDWARD T. MCLOUGHLIN; and

CHRISTI J. ACKER,

Defendants.

____________________________________________

APPEARANCES: OF COUNSEL:

EVERETTE WEAVER

Plaintiff, Pro Se

827 Route 82

Hopewell Junction, NY 12533

HON. LETITIA A. JAMES SHANNAN C. KRASNOKUTSKI, ESQ.

Attorney General for the State of New York Assistant Attorney General

Counsel for Defendants

The Capitol

Albany, NY 12224

GLENN T. SUDDABY, United States District Judge

DECISION and ORDER

Currently before the Court, in this civil rights action filed pro se by Everette Weaver

(“Plaintiff”) against the New York State Office of Court Administration (“OCA”), the New York

State Unified Court System (“UCS”), New York State Supreme Court Justice Edward T.

McLoughlin, and New York State Supreme Court Justice Christi J. Acker (together

“Defendants”), is Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, insufficient

service of process, and failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2), (5) and (6).

(Dkt. No. 15.) For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ motion is granted.

I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND

A. Summary of Plaintiff’s Complaint

Generally, liberally construed, Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that, through their actions in

one or more prior mortgage-foreclosure actions in New York State Supreme Court for Dutchess

County occurring between 2009 and 2021, Defendants conspired with each other to “steal

properties from Blacks and give [them] to Whites for Pennies on the Dollar, by using the Court

as a Vehicle,” and to “alter[]” and/or destroy “public records” in order to “silenc[e]” Plaintiff and

“put[] his case into the sewer system.” (See generally Dkt. No. 1, at 6 [Plf.’s Compl.].)

Generally, based on these factual allegations, Plaintiff asserts the following four claims: (1) a

claim that Defendants violated his right against national origin discrimination (in the form of a

“hostile court environment”) under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”); (2) a

claim that Defendants violated his right against racial discrimination under Title VII; (3) a claim

that Defendants violated his rights to equal protection under the law and due process of law

under the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (4) a claim that Defendants violated

his right against racial discrimination under New York Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. L. § 296.

(See generally Dkt. No. 1 [Plf.’s Compl.] [emphasis added].) Familiarity with these claims and

the factual allegations supporting them in Plaintiff’s Complaint is assumed in this Decision and

Order, which is intended primarily for the review of the parties. (Id.)

B. Summary of Parties' Briefing on Defendants' Motion

1. Defendants' Memorandum of Law-in Chief

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Generally, in support of their motion to dismiss, Defendants assert the following four

arguments. (See generally Dkt. No. 15, Attach. 2 [Defs.’ Memo. of Law].) First, Defendants

argue that, as a threshold matter, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants OCA and UCS should be

dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction, because those Defendants have not been properly

served with process under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(j)(2) and New York C.P.L.R. § 307(2). (Id. at 13-

15.)1

Second, Defendants argue that, in any event, all (or almost all) of Plaintiff’s claims are

barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which directs federal courts to abstain from exercising

jurisdiction over challenges to prior state-court judgments. (Id. at 15-16.)

Third, Defendants argue that, in any event, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Acker

and McLoughlin are barred by the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity. (Id. at 16-18.)

Fourth, and finally, Defendants argue that, in any event, Plaintiff’s claims otherwise fail

to state a cause of action, because (a) Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against Defendants OCA

and UCS and the individual Defendants in their official capacities are barred by the Eleventh

Amendment to the United States Constitution, (b) Plaintiff fails to state a claim under Title VII

(which prohibits discrimination only by an employer, employment agency, and union) and N.Y.

Exec. L. § 296 (which prohibits discrimination only by an employer, licensing agency,

employment agency, union, or employment agency), and (c) to the extent that Plaintiff invokes

additional statutes (such as N.Y. Exec. L. § 54, Article 4-A of the New York Executive Law, S.

2987-A/A.5678, and S. 70-A/A.2230), no private right of action exists under those statutes. (Id.

1 Page citations in this Decision and Order refer to the screen numbers on the

Court's Case Management / Electronic Case Filing (“CM/ECF”) System, not to the page numbers

on the documents contained therein.

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at 18-22.)

2. Plaintiff’s Opposition Memorandum of Law

Generally, in response to Defendants’ motion, Plaintiff asserts the following six

arguments. (See generally Dkt. No. 16 [Plf.’s Opp’n Memo. of Law].) First, Plaintiff argues,

through their alleged actions in state court, Defendants conspired to “put this case into the sewer

system.” (Id. at 8-71.)

Second, Plaintiff argues, Defendants OCA and UCS were properly served or waived

service by requesting an extension of time to answer, because (a) defense counsel is applying a

different standard for service of process than the standard that governed service of process on

Plaintiff in one or more of the state court actions, (b) in support of their argument that Plaintiff’s

service of process was insufficient, Defendants rely on a declaration that is unverified, (c)

defense counsel became aware of the case before requesting an extension of time by which to file

an Answer, and (d) by requesting such an extension, Defendants waived service. (Id. at 72-79.)

In the alternative to dismissal for insufficient service, Plaintiff requests an extension of time to

effect service. (Id. at 108.)

Third, Plaintiff argues, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply to this case, because

(a) the doctrine does not prevent federal district courts from reviewing state court judgments that

were allegedly procured through fraud, and (b) here, Defendants conspired to alter court records,

“block discovery,” and “put [Plaintiff’s] case into the sewer system.” (Id. at 79-89.)

Fourth, Plaintiff argues, his claims against Defendants Acker and McLoughlin are not

barred by the doctrine of judicial immunity, because those Defendants’ actions were taken (a)

outside of their roles as judges, and (b) in the complete absence of jurisdiction. (Id. at 89-95.)

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Fifth, Plaintiff argues, his Complaint states several causes of action, because (a) the

Eleventh Amendment does not apply to this case, (b) he is of African descent and was not

represented by counsel in the state court actions, and (c) under the doctrine of respondeat

superior, an employer is legally responsible for the wrongful acts of its employees. (Id. at 95-

102.)

Sixth, and finally, Plaintiff argues, non-parties Ricky and Kristin Daeira are in criminal

possession of stolen property in violation of N.Y. Penal L. § 165.52. (Id. at 102-07.)

3. Defendants’ Reply Memorandum of Law

Generally in their reply, Defendants assert the following five arguments. (See generally

Dkt. No. 17 [Defs.’ Reply Memo. of Law].) First, Defendants argue, Plaintiff’s 109-page

opposition memorandum of law should largely be disregarded, because it violates the District’s

25-page limitation on such memoranda of law. (Id. at 3.) Similarly, Defendants argue,

Plaintiff’s 132 pages of exhibits should not be considered, because (a) such consideration is

inappropriate on Defendants’ motion to dismiss, and (b) those documents either are more than

four years old or were created after the filing of the current action. (Id.)

Second, Defendants argue, Plaintiff’s arguments about service of process are without

merit, because (a) awareness of an action by means other than those authorized by statute does

not bring a defendant within the jurisdiction of the Court, and (b) requesting an extension of time

to answer or otherwise respond does not constitute a waiver of personal jurisdiction. (Id. at 3-5.)

Third, Defendants argue, Plaintiff’s arguments about the Rooker-Feldman doctrine are

without merit, because (a) as recognized by other district courts in the Second Circuit, allegations

that a mortgage-foreclosure judgment was procured by fraud will not suffice to provide a court

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with jurisdiction under the doctrine, and (b) in any event, Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) requires a party to

“state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake,” which Plaintiff’s

conclusory allegations fail to do. (Id. at 5-6.) Similarly, Defendants argue, to the extent that

Plaintiff argues that proceedings in one or more state-court actions remain ongoing, any claims

by Plaintiff based on those proceedings are barred by the doctrine of Younger abstention. (Id. at

6.)

Fourth, Defendants argue, Plaintiff’s arguments about the doctrine of absolute judicial

immunity are without merit, because (a) his arguments that Defendants McLoughlin and Acker

engaged in conduct outside their roles as judicial officers is both conclusory and implausible, and

(b) contrary to Plaintiff’s arguments, all of the conduct he alleges is precisely the type of

conduct protected by judicial immunity. (Id. at 6-8.)

Fifth, and finally, Defendants argue, Plaintiff’s arguments about his failure to state a

claim are without merit, because (a) Plaintiff does not respond to Defendants’ argument about

Section 1983 in an intelligible manner, and it remains clear that such claims are barred as against

Defendants OCA and UCS and the individual Defendants in their official capacities, (b) Plaintiff

does not allege any employment relationship with any of the Defendants for purposes of his

claims under Title VII and N.Y. Exec. L. § 296, and (c) Plaintiff’s opposition does not address

any of his additional statutory claims, and all of these claims are subject to dismissal for the

reasons set forth in Defendants’ memorandum of law-in chief. (Id. at 8-9.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD GOVERNING MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO

STATE A CLAIM

It has long been understood that a dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief

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can be granted, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), can be based on one or both of two grounds:

(1) a challenge to the "sufficiency of the pleading" under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); or (2) a

challenge to the legal cognizability of the claim. Jackson v. Onondaga Cnty., 549 F. Supp.2d

204, 211, nn. 15-16 (N.D.N.Y. 2008) (McAvoy, J., adopting Report-Recommendation on de

novo review).

Because such dismissals are often based on the first ground, some elaboration regarding

that ground is appropriate. Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a

pleading contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to

relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) [emphasis added]. In the Court’s view, this tension between

permitting a “short and plain statement” and requiring that the statement “show[]” an entitlement

to relief is often at the heart of misunderstandings that occur regarding the pleading standard

established by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

On the one hand, the Supreme Court has long characterized the “short and plain” pleading

standard under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) as "simplified" and "liberal." Jackson, 549 F. Supp.2d at

212, n.20 (citing Supreme Court case). On the other hand, the Supreme Court has held that, by

requiring the above-described "showing," the pleading standard under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)

requires that the pleading contain a statement that "give[s] the defendant fair notice of what the

plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Jackson, 549 F. Supp.2d at 212, n.17

(citing Supreme Court cases) (emphasis added).2

The Supreme Court has explained that such fair notice has the important purpose of

2 Accord, Flores v. Graphtex, 189 F.R.D. 54, 54 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (Munson, J.);

Hudson v. Artuz, 95-CV-4768, 1998 WL 832708, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 1998); Powell v.

Marine Midland Bank, 162 F.R.D. 15, 16 (N.D.N.Y.1995) (McAvoy, C.J.).

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“enabl[ing] the adverse party to answer and prepare for trial” and “facilitat[ing] a proper decision

on the merits” by the court. Jackson, 549 F. Supp.2d at 212, n.18 (citing Supreme Court cases);

Rusyniak v. Gensini, 629 F. Supp.2d 203, 213 & n.32 (N.D.N.Y. 2009) (Suddaby, J.) (citing

Second Circuit cases). For this reason, as one commentator has correctly observed, the “liberal”

notice pleading standard "has its limits." 2 Moore’s Federal Practice § 12.34[1][b] at 12-61 (3d

ed. 2003). For example, numerous Supreme Court and Second Circuit decisions exist holding

that a pleading has failed to meet the “liberal” notice pleading standard. Rusyniak, 629 F.

Supp.2d at 213, n.22 (citing Supreme Court and Second Circuit cases); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-52 (2009).

Most notably, in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the Supreme Court reversed an appellate

decision holding that a complaint had stated an actionable antitrust claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1.

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007). In doing so, the Court "retire[d]" the

famous statement by the Court in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957), that "a complaint

should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the

plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief."

Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1968-69. Rather than turn on the conceivability of an actionable claim,

the Court clarified, the "fair notice" standard turns on the plausibility of an actionable claim. Id.

at 1965-74. The Court explained that, while this does not mean that a pleading need "set out in

detail the facts upon which [the claim is based]," it does mean that the pleading must contain at

least "some factual allegation[s]." Id. at 1965. More specifically, the "[f]actual allegations must

be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level [to a plausible level]," assuming

(of course) that all the allegations in the complaint are true. Id.

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As for the nature of what is “plausible,” the Supreme Court explained that “[a] claim has

facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). “[D]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for

relief . . . [is] a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial

experience and common sense. . . . [W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to

infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged–but it has not

show[n]–that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950 [internal quotation marks

and citations omitted]. However, while the plausibility standard “asks for more than a sheer

possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully,” id., it “does not impose a probability

requirement.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.

Because of this requirement of factual allegations plausibly suggesting an entitlement to

relief, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in the complaint

is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,

supported by merely conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. Similarly,

a pleading that only “tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement” will not

suffice. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (internal citations and alterations omitted). Rule 8 “demands

more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. (citations

omitted).

Finally, a few words are appropriate regarding what documents are considered when a

dismissal for failure to state a claim is contemplated. Generally, when contemplating a dismissal

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) or Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c), the following matters outside the

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four corners of the complaint may be considered without triggering the standard governing a

motion for summary judgment: (1) documents attached as an exhibit to the complaint or answer,

(2) documents incorporated by reference in the complaint (and provided by the parties), (3)

documents that, although not incorporated by reference, are “integral” to the complaint, or (4)

any matter of which the court can take judicial notice for the factual background of the case.3

III. ANALYSIS

After carefully considering the matter, the Court finds that Defendants’ motion should be

granted for each of the several alternative reasons stated in their memoranda of law: (1)

3 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c) (“A copy of any written instrument which is an exhibit

to a pleading is a part thereof for all purposes.”); L-7 Designs, Inc. v. Old Navy, LLC, No. 10-

573, 2011 WL 2135734, at *1 (2d Cir. June 1, 2011) (explaining that conversion from a motion

to dismiss for failure to state a claim to a motion for summary judgment is not necessary under

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12[d] if the “matters outside the pleadings” in consist of [1] documents attached

to the complaint or answer, [2] documents incorporated by reference in the complaint (and

provided by the parties), [3] documents that, although not incorporated by reference, are

“integral” to the complaint, or [4] any matter of which the court can take judicial notice for the

factual background of the case); DiFolco v. MSNBC Cable L.L.C., 622 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir.

2010) (explaining that a district court considering a dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. 12(b)(6)

“may consider the facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached to the complaint as

exhibits, and documents incorporated by reference in the complaint. . . . Where a document is

not incorporated by reference, the court may neverless consider it where the complaint relies

heavily upon its terms and effect, thereby rendering the document ‘integral’ to the complaint. . . .

However, even if a document is ‘integral’ to the complaint, it must be clear on the record that no

dispute exists regarding the authenticity or accuracy of the document. It must also be clear that

there exist no material disputed issues of fact regarding the relevance of the document.”) [internal

quotation marks and citations omitted]; Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d

Cir. 2009) (“The complaint is deemed to include any written instrument attached to it as an

exhibit or any statements or documents incorporated in it by reference.”) (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted); Int'l Audiotext Network, Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 62 F.3d 69, 72

(2d Cir.1995) (per curiam) (“[W]hen a plaintiff chooses not to attach to the complaint or

incorporate by reference a [document] upon which it solely relies and which is integral to the

complaint,” the court may nevertheless take the document into consideration in deciding [a]

defendant's motion to dismiss, without converting the proceeding to one for summary

judgment.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

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ineffective service of process; (2) preclusion under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine (and Younger

doctrine); (3) preclusion under the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity; and (4) failure to state

a claim upon which relief can be granted (due to the Eleventh Amendment, the lack of an alleged

employment relationship, and the lack of a private right of action). See, supra, Parts I.B.1. and

I.B.3. of this Decision and Order. To those reasons, the Court adds only four brief points.

First, as a threshold matter, the Court exercises its discretion to disregard pages “27”

through “102” of Plaintiff’s opposition memorandum of law (whose body starts at page “2”).

(Dkt. No. 16.) Before filing his opposition, Plaintiff received a courtesy copy of, among other

things, both Local Rule 7.1 of the District’s Local Rules of Practice and page “40” of the

District’s Pro Se Handbook (which each clearly advised Plaintiff of the 25-page limitation on

memoranda of law). (Dkt. No. 3, at 2.) Furthermore, he did not request an enlargement of the

25-page limitation imposed by Local Rule 7.1(b)(1). (See generally Docket Sheet.) Unfair

prejudice to Defendants is clear, given the breadth of irrelevant material contained in his

opposition. (Compare Dkt. No. 16 [Plf.’s 102-page Opp’n] with Dkt. No. 17, at 3 [Defs.’ Reply

Memo. of Law, complaining of lack of relevance].)

Second, the Court would render the same finding as stated in the first paragraph of Part III

of this Decision and Order even if the Court were to consider (a) all of the arguments set forth in

Plaintiff’s opposition (as the Court has done in Part I.B.2. of this Decision and Order), (b) the

factual allegations set forth in that opposition as effectively amending the factual allegations of

the Complaint (to the extent that the former are consistent with the latter), and (c) the 132 pages

of exhibits attached to that opposition as effectively amending the factual allegations of the

Complaint (again, to the extent that the former are consistent with the latter). Indeed, the Court

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finds that the flaws in Plaintiffs claims become even more apparent if one were to consider that

material.

Third, Plaintiff is mistaken that the declaration of OCA Deputy Counsel Craig E. Penn is

“unsworn.” (Compare Dkt. No. 16, at 74 [asserting argument] with Dkt. No. 15, Attach. 1

[attaching declaration, which is sworn pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746].)

Fourth, and finally, the Court denies Plaintiffs alternative request for an extension of

time to effect service of his Complaint, given (a) his failure to offer a cognizable excuse for his

failure to timely serve his Complaint, (b) the unfair prejudice that Defendants would experience

if such a request were granted, and (c) the substantive defects in his claims (referenced above in

Parts I.B.1. and I.B.3. of this Decision and Order). Zapata v. City of New York, 502 F.3d 192,

195-99 (2d Cir. 2007).

ACCORDINGLY, it is

ORDERED that Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 15) is GRANTED; and it is

further

ORDERED that Plaintiff's Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) is DISMISSED.

Dated: March 7, 2023

Syracuse, New York

US. Distt Judge 4

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