DiResta Martin v. Martin Jr.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

____________________________________________

JEAN DiRESTA MARTIN,

Plaintiff,

v. 6:21-CV-0981

(GTS/ATB)

PAUL J. MARTIN, JR.,

Defendant.

____________________________________________

APPEARANCES: OF COUNSEL:

JEAN DiRESTA MARTIN

Plaintiff and Counter Defendant, Pro se

84 Maple St.

Oneonta, NY 13820

PAUL J. MARTIN, JR.

Defendant and Counter Claimant, Pro se

4 Collamer Rd.

Malta, NY 12020

GLENN T. SUDDABY, United States District Judge

DECISION and ORDER

Currently before the Court, in this civil rights action filed by Jean DiResta Martin

(“Plaintiff”) against Paul J. Martin, Jr. (“Defendant”) is Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s

Complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and a motion for

sanctions.1 (Dkt. No. 8.) For the reasons set forth below, Defendant’s motion to dismiss is

granted in part and denied in part.

1 Although Defendant’s motion to dismiss does not cite Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), he seeks a

“dispositive motion for dismissal, a ruling that the complaint was knowingly submitted without

merit . . . and . . . for frivolous[ness] . . . .” (Dkt. No. 8-1, at 2.)

I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND

A. Plaintiff’s Complaint and Relevant Procedural History

Generally, liberally construed, Plaintiff’s pro se Complaint filed on September 1, 2021,

asserts a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant (Plaintiff’s ex-husband)

regarding his attempted enforcement of an allegedly fraudulent court order (“the Order”)

requiring Plaintiff to pay a certain sum to the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”). (Dkt. No. 1, at

2-3.) As relief, Plaintiff seeks the following three forms of relief: (1) an injunction barring

Defendant from enforcing the Order; (2) res judicata (citing Internal Revenue Code §

6015(g)(2)); and (3) monetary damages from Defendant in the amount of $33,000, stemming

from lost income due to litigating this matter. (Id. at 4.)

On November 16, 2021, Defendant filed his motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). (Dkt. No. 8.) On November 29, 2021, Defendant filed his

Answer to Plaintiff’s Complaint, in which he does not answer all of the allegations set forth in

Plaintiff’s Complaint but, among other things, restates his contention that “[P]laintiff does not

state an actual civil rights violation” and includes a counterclaim against Plaintiff “for frivolous

use of the Federal Court System[.]” (Dkt. No. 11, at 3, 5-6.) Defendant’s Answer also includes a

request for “sanctions against the plaintiff so she does not continue a pattern of filing frivolous

actions.” (Id.)

On December 1, 2021, Plaintiff filed her opposition to Defendant’s motion. (Dkt. No.

12.) On December 9, 2021, Defendant filed his reply to Plaintiff’s opposition. (Dkt. No. 15.)

B. Summary of Parties’ Briefing on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss

1. Defendant’s Memorandum of Law

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Generally, in support of his motion to dismiss, Defendant sets forth eight arguments.

(Dkt. No. 8-1.)

First, Defendant argues that due process by the Saratoga County Supreme Court is not a

civil rights violation. (Id. at 3.) More specifically, Defendant argues that Plaintiff does not cite

any law or rule that he violated, and that Plaintiff had an opportunity to appeal the Order in the

proper venue (i.e., the state court issuing the Order), but abandoned that process. (Id.) Defendant

argues that the action Plaintiff challenges (i.e., the Order issued by the Saratoga County Supreme

Court requiring Plaintiff to pay a portion of the IRS tax debt attributed to Defendant) was taken

by a state court, not Defendant. (Id.)

Second, Defendant argues that federal court is the wrong venue for a post-divorce marital

issue. (Id.) More specifically, Defendant argues that, because the issue in this lawsuit is a post-

divorce matter in the Saratoga County Supreme Court, the Court does not have federal-question

jurisdiction. (Id. at 4.)

Third, Defendant argues that he is not a proper party for Plaintiff’s lawsuit. (Id.) More

specifically, Defendant argues that he did not issue the Order that Plaintiff currently challenges.

(Id.) Defendant also argues that, based on his contention that Plaintiff lied on a federal IRS form,

he hired an attorney to file an order to show cause in the Saratoga County Supreme Court, and

that this participation in the legal process did not conflict with the U.S. Constitution or any other

federal law. (Id.)

Fourth, Defendant argues that, contrary to Plaintiff’s contention that the IRS decision is

one from a higher court, the IRS is not a judicial branch of government. (Id. at 5.) Defendant

argues that the section of the IRC Code that Plaintiff cites in her Complaint is not applicable to

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the proceedings in the Saratoga County Supreme Court. (Id.)

Fifth, Defendant argues that there is no justification for Plaintiff’s request for monetary

damages. (Id.) More specifically, Defendant argues that Plaintiff attempts to use the federal court

system to enrich herself and asks the Court to deny her request as frivolous. (Id.)

Sixth, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s Complaint provides no basis for an injunction

against him. (Id. at 6.) More specifically, Defendant argues that he has a civil right to use both

the state and federal judicial systems to remedy Plaintiff’s false claims against him. (Id.)

Seventh, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s Complaint is frivolous. (Id.) More specifically,

Defendant argues that Plaintiff filed her Complaint to obstruct the Saratoga County Supreme

Court and to harass Defendant. (Id.)

Eighth, Defendant argues that the Court should sanction Plaintiff for using the federal

court system in a frivolous manner. (Id. at 7.) More specifically, Defendant argues that, as a

small-business owner, searching for attorneys and defending himself in this lawsuit took time

away from his ability to work. (Id.)

2. Plaintiff’s Opposition Memorandum of Law

Generally, in support of her opposition, Plaintiff argues that she filed her innocent spouse

claim outside of the post-marital case that occurred in the Saratoga County Supreme Court and

was awarded equitable relief under Title 26 – Internal Revenue Code § 6015. (Id. at 1-2.)

Plaintiff argues that neither the Separation Agreement or the Divorce Decree directs her on how

to file or pay the 2015 tax return at issue, and therefore, federal laws and procedures take

precedence regarding the 2015 tax filing. (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff argues that Defendant participated in

the innocent spouse proceedings before the IRS and was non-meritorious. (Id.) Plaintiff argues

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that, upon receipt of the Saratoga County Supreme Court order dated April 27, 2020 (i.e., the

Order at issue in this lawsuit), Plaintiff contacted the IRS, which informed her of the following

four points: (1) that the Order was in direct violation of her civil rights; (2) that the Order

emanated from the wrong legal jurisdiction; (3) that she was not (and would not be) required to

pay Defendant’s tax bill from 2015; and (4) that her innocent spouse final determination was

promulgated devoid of influence by the New York State Supreme Court divorce decree and post-

marital proceedings. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff argues that Defendant failed to provide proof to

substantiate any of his claims, and also argues that he is the correct defendant in this lawsuit

because he is threatening to penalize Plaintiff for following the Order and for proceeding in

accordance with the advice she received from the IRS. (Id.)

3. Defendant’s Reply Memorandum of Law

Generally, in support of his reply, Defendant sets forth the following four arguments: (1)

this Court is not the proper venue, because the parties signed a separation agreement (which was

made part of the divorce order) in Saratoga County Supreme Court and the agreement addresses

the tax consequences to each party as part of the divorce; (2) Defendant proved Plaintiff’s

innocent spouse form was fraudulent, and he then had to remedy this issue by seeking legal

action in the divorce court (as the parties agreed in the separation agreement); (3) Plaintiff

produced no documentation regarding the “legal direction” she allegedly received from the IRS,

and, based on his phone call with an IRS representative, he was made aware that (a) it is against

IRS rules to give legal advice, and (b) the IRS routinely considers determinations from divorce

courts when addressing innocent spouse claims; and (4) Defendant is not the correct party for

this action, because he did not issue the Order that Plaintiff challenges. (Dkt. No. 15, at 1-3.)

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II. RELEVANT PROCEDURAL LEGAL STANDARDS

It has long been understood that a dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), can be based on one or both of two grounds:

(1) a challenge to the “sufficiency of the pleading” under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); or (2) a

challenge to the legal cognizability of the claim. Jackson v. Onondaga Cnty., 549 F. Supp. 2d

204, 211, nn. 15-16 (N.D.N.Y. 2008) (McAvoy, J., adopting Report-Recommendation on de

novo review).

Because such dismissals are often based on the first ground, some elaboration regarding

that ground is appropriate. Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a

pleading contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to

relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). In the Court’s view, this tension between

permitting a “short and plain statement” and requiring that the statement “show[]” an entitlement

to relief is often at the heart of misunderstandings that occur regarding the pleading standard

established by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

On the one hand, the Supreme Court has long characterized the “short and plain”

pleading standard under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) as “simplified” and “liberal.” Jackson, 549 F.

Supp. 2d at 212, n. 20 (citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513-514 (2002)). On

the other hand, the Supreme Court has held that, by requiring the above-described “showing,”

the pleading standard under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) requires that the pleading contain a statement

that “give[s] the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which

it rests.” Id. at 212, n.17 (emphasis added).2

2 Accord, Flores v. Graphtex, 189 F.R.D. 54, 55 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (Munson, J.); Hudson v.

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The Supreme Court has explained that such fair notice has the important purpose of

“facilitat[ing] the adverse party to answer and prepare for trial” and “facilitat[ing] a proper

decision on the merits” by the court. Id. at 212, n.18 (citing Supreme Court cases); Rusyniak v.

Gensini, 629 F. Supp. 2d 203, 213 & n.32 (N.D.N.Y. 2009) (Suddaby, J.) (citing Second Circuit

cases). For this reason, as one commentator has correctly observed, the “liberal” notice pleading

standard “has its limits.” 2 Moore’s Federal Practice § 12.34[1][b] at 12-61 (3d ed. 2003). “As

a result, numerous Supreme Court and Second Circuit decisions exist holding that a pleading has

failed to meet this liberal notice pleading standard.” Rusyniak, 629 F. Supp. 2d at 214; Ashcroft

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-83, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-52 (2009).

Most notably, in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the Supreme Court reversed an

appellate decision holding that a complaint had stated an actionable antitrust claim under 15

U.S.C. § 1. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007). In doing so, the

Court “retire[d]” the famous statement by the Court in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46

(1957), that “a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears

beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would

entitle him to relief.” Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1968-69. Rather than turn on the conceivability of

an actionable claim, the Court clarified, the “fair notice” standard turns on the plausibility of an

actionable claim. Id. at 1965-74. The Court explained that, although this does not mean that a

pleading need “set out in detail the facts upon which [the claim is based],” it does mean that the

pleading must contain at least “some factual allegation[s].” Id. at 1965. More specifically, the

Artuz, 95-CV-4768, 1998 WL 832708, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 1998); Powell v. Marine

Midland Bank, 162 F.R.D. 15, 16 (N.D.N.Y.1995) (McAvoy, C.J.).

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“[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level [to a

plausible level],” assuming (of course) that all the allegations in the complaint are true. Id.

As for the nature of what is “plausible,” the Supreme Court explained that “[a] claim has

facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at

1949 (2009). “[D]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief . . . [is] a

context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and

common sense. . . . [W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the

mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged–but it has not show[n]–that the pleader

is entitled to relief.” Id. at 1950 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). However,

although the plausibility standard “asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has

acted unlawfully,” id., it “does not impose a probability requirement.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at

556.

Because of this requirement of factual allegations plausibly suggesting an entitlement to

relief, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in the complaint

is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,

supported by merely conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.

Similarly, a pleading that only “tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement”

will not suffice. Id. (internal citations and alterations omitted). Rule 8 “demands more than an

unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. (citations omitted).

This pleading standard applies even to pro se litigants. While the special leniency

afforded to pro se civil rights litigants somewhat loosens the procedural rules governing the form

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of pleadings (as the Second Circuit has observed), it does not completely relieve a pro se

plaintiff of the duty to satisfy the pleading standards set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 8, 10, and 12.3

Rather, as both the Supreme Court and Second Circuit have repeatedly recognized, the

requirements set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 8, 10, and 12 are procedural rules that even pro se civil

rights plaintiffs must follow.4 Stated more simply, when a plaintiff is proceeding pro se, “all

normal rules of pleading are not absolutely suspended.” Jackson, 549 F. Supp. 2d at 124, n. 28

(citations omitted).5

Finally, a few words are appropriate regarding what documents are considered when a

dismissal for failure to state a claim is contemplated. Generally, when contemplating a dismissal

3 See Vega v. Artus, 610 F. Supp. 2d 185, 196 & nn. 8-9 (N.D.N.Y. 2009) (Suddaby, J.)

(citing Second Circuit cases); Rusyniak, 629 F. Supp. 2d at 214 & n. 34 (citing Second Circuit

cases).

4 See Rosendale v. Brusie, 374 F. App’x 195, 196 (2d Cir. 2010) (“[A]lthough the courts

remain obligated to construe a pro se complaint liberally, . . . the complaint must contain

sufficient factual allegations to meet the plausibility standard.”); Vega, 610 F. Supp. 2d at 196, n.

10 (citing Supreme Court and Second Circuit cases); Rusyniak, 629 F. Supp. 2d at 214 & n. 34

(citing Second Circuit cases).

5 It should be emphasized that Fed. R. Civ. P. 8’s plausibility standard, explained in

Twombly, was in no way retracted or diminished by the Supreme Court’s decision (two weeks

later) in Erickson v. Pardus, in which (when reviewing a pro se pleading) the Court stated,

“Specific facts are not necessary” to successfully state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (emphasis added). That statement was merely

an abbreviation of the often-repeated point of law—first offered in Conley and repeated in

Twombly—that a pleading need not “set out in detail the facts upon which [the claim is based]”

in order to successfully state a claim. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1965, n. 3 (citing Conley, 355 U.S.

at 47) (emphasis added). That statement did not mean that all pleadings may achieve the

requirement of “fair notice” without ever alleging any facts whatsoever. Clearly, there must still

be enough fact set out (however set out, whether in detail or in a generalized fashion) to raise a

right to relief above the speculative level to a plausible level. See Rusyniak, 629 F. Supp. 2d at

214 & n. 35 (explaining holding in Erickson).

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pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) or Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c), the following matters outside the

four corners of the complaint may be considered without triggering the standard governing a

motion for summary judgment: (1) documents attached as an exhibit to the complaint or answer,

(2) documents incorporated by reference in the complaint (and provided by the parties), (3)

documents that, although not incorporated by reference, are “integral” to the complaint, or (4)

any matter of which the court can take judicial notice for the factual background of the case.6

III. ANALYSIS

A. Whether the Court Should Grant Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s

Complaint

6 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c) (“A copy of any written instrument which is an exhibit to a

pleading is a part thereof for all purposes.”); L-7 Designs, Inc. v. Old Navy, LLC, No. 10-573,

2011 WL 2135734, at *1 (2d Cir. June 1, 2011) (explaining that conversion from a motion to

dismiss for failure to state a claim to a motion for summary judgment is not necessary under Fed.

R. Civ. P. 12[d] if the “matters outside the pleadings” in consist of (1) documents attached to the

complaint or answer, (2) documents incorporated by reference in the complaint (and provided by

the parties), (3) documents that, although not incorporated by reference, are “integral” to the

complaint, or (4) any matter of which the court can take judicial notice for the factual

background of the case); DiFolco v. MSNBC Cable L.L.C., 622 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir. 2010)

(explaining that a district court considering a dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. 12(b)(6) “may

consider the facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached to the complaint as exhibits, and

documents incorporated by reference in the complaint. . . . Where a document is not

incorporated by reference, the court may nevertheless consider it where the complaint relies

heavily upon its terms and effect, thereby rendering the document ‘integral’ to the complaint. . . .

However, even if a document is ‘integral’ to the complaint, it must be clear on the record that no

dispute exists regarding the authenticity or accuracy of the document. It must also be clear that

there exist no material disputed issues of fact regarding the relevance of the document.”)

[internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147,

152 (2d Cir. 2009) (“The complaint is deemed to include any written instrument attached to it as

an exhibit or any statements or documents incorporated in it by reference.”) (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted); Int'l Audiotext Network, Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 62 F.3d 69, 72

(2d Cir.1995) (per curiam) (“[W]hen a plaintiff chooses not to attach to the complaint or

incorporate by reference a [document] upon which it solely relies and which is integral to the

complaint,” the court may nevertheless take the document into consideration in deciding [a]

defendant's motion to dismiss, without converting the proceeding to one for summary

judgment.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

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After carefully considering the matter, the Court answers the question in the affirmative

for the reasons stated in Defendant’s memorandum of law. (Dkt. No. 8-1.) To those reasons, the

Court adds the following analysis.

Even granting Plaintiff the special solicitude to which she is entitled as a pro se litigant,

her Complaint does not contain the requisite factual allegations to support a claim under 42

U.S.C. § 1983. “By this statute, Congress ‘establishe[d] a cause of action for “the deprivation of

any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United

States.’” Smiley v. Golub Corp., 14-CV-0641, 2015 WL 566323, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2015)

(Suddaby, C.J.) (quoting German v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 885 F. Supp. 537, 573

(S.D.N.Y. 1995)). “Relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is premised upon a showing, first, that the

defendant has denied the plaintiff a constitutional or federal statutory right and, second, that such

denial was effected under color of state law.” Fluent v. Salamanca Indian Lease Auth., 847 F.

Supp. 1046, 1056 (W.D.N.Y. 1994).

Here, Plaintiff did not, nor can she, allege that Defendant deprived her of “a

constitutional or federal statutory right,” or that he “acted under the color of state law.” Fluent,

847 F. Supp. at 1056; Smiley, 2015 WL 566323, at *5. At its core, Plaintiff’s Complaint

challenges the Order issued by the Saratoga County Supreme Court awarding Defendant “monies

from [Plaintiff] to be paid to the IRS.” (Dkt. No. 1, at 2.) Plaintiff argues that she has a valid,

fully executed innocent spouse determination from the IRS dated January 2, 2018, and brought

this lawsuit because “[Defendant] notified [her] that he is engaging in enforcement of the

fraudulent order,” which she claims “violates [her] civil rights of a lawful order from a higher

court.” (Id.)

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Even if the Court were to find that Plaintiff sufficiently pled a deprivation of her

constitutional or federal statutory rights, she has not sufficiently alleged that Defendant deprived

her of these alleged rights. Smiley, 2015 WL 566323, at *5; Fluent, 847 F. Supp. at 1056.

Rather, Plaintiff’s Complaint (as well as her opposition) take issue with the Order issued by the

Saratoga County Supreme Court; her allegations against Defendant stem solely from him seeking

to enforce that Order. (Dkt. No. 1, at 2; Dkt. No. 12, at 2 [stating that “Defendant is the correct

person to file this complaint against” because he is “threatening to penalize me for following the

letter of the New York State Supreme Court Order and for proceeding as [she] was advised by

the IRS”.) Defendant’s hiring of an attorney to help enforce a presumptively valid court order

from the Saratoga County Supreme Court is not a violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional or federal

statutory rights, but rather is a legal mechanism for him to collect the portion of the IRS tax debt

Plaintiff has allegedly failed to pay in compliance with that Order. (Dkt. No. 8-1, at 2-3

[highlighting that Plaintiff has failed to pay any portion of the amount ordered by the Saratoga

County Supreme Court and that Defendant “retained an attorney to prepare a demand letter to the

plaintiff”].) Should Plaintiff believe the Saratoga County Supreme Court erred with respect to the

Order regarding her tax liability (an issue this Court does not address, because the issue is not

properly before it), Plaintiff’s remedy was to file an appeal from the Order in the appropriate

state court, not file a lawsuit in federal court against Defendant.

Further, Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged that Defendant—her ex-husband—acted

under color of state law at any point, much less when he allegedly deprived her of her

constitutional or federal statutory rights. (Dkt. No. 1, at 2.) Plaintiff’s failure to allege these facts

is fatal to her Section 1983 claim. Smiley, 2015 WL 566323, at *5 (“It is well-settled that parties

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may not be held liable under section 1983 unless it can be established that they have acted under

the color of state law. State action is an essential element of any § 1983 claim.”) (internal

citations omitted).

Accordingly, the Court grants Defendant’s motion to dismiss.

B. Whether Plaintiff Should Be Granted Leave to Amend

After carefully considering the matter, the Court answers the question in the negative, for

the reasons set forth below.

Ordinarily, the Court would grant Plaintiff leave to move to amend her Complaint before

dismissing it. However, such leave is not required where the defects in a complaint are

substantive rather than merely formal, such that any amendment would not cure them. As the

Second Circuit has explained, “[w]here it appears that granting leave to amend is unlikely to be

productive, ... it is not an abuse of discretion to deny leave to amend.” Ruffolo v. Oppenheimer &

Co., 987 F.2d 129, 131 (2d Cir. 1993), accord, Brown v. Peters, 95-CV-1641, 1997 WL 599355,

at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 1997) (Pooler, J.) (“[T]he court need not grant leave to amend where it

appears that amendment would prove to be unproductive or futile.”). This rule applies even to

pro se plaintiffs. See, e.g., Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding the pro

se plaintiff’s “problem with [her] causes of action [was] substantive” and that “better pleading

[would] not cure it”); Brown, 1997 WL 599355, at *1.

Here, the Court cannot imagine how, under the circumstances, Plaintiff could cure the

deficiencies with respect to her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim. Because Plaintiff challenges the validity

of the Order with respect to her innocent spouse determination from the IRS, and her only

contention against Defendant is that he seeks to enforce that presumptively valid order, the Court

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cannot see how Plaintiff may amend her Complaint to adequately cure the deficiency regarding

Defendant’s alleged deprivation of Plaintiff’s civil rights. Further, Plaintiff cannot show

Defendant acted under color of state law at any point with respect to events underlying this

lawsuit.

Therefore, the Court finds that no amendment could cure the deficiencies identified

herein.

C. Whether the Court Should Grant Defendant’s Request for Sanctions in His

Motion to Dismiss

After carefully considering the matter, the Court answers the question in the negative for

the reasons set forth below.

In his motion to dismiss, Defendant requests that the Court sanction Plaintiff “for using

the [f]ederal [c]ourt system in a [f]rivolous manner and causing [him] to spend excess time to

respond to a frivolous claim.”7 (Dkt. No. 8-1, at 7.) The Court recognizes that sanctions may be

appropriate in certain circumstances where a plaintiff files a frivolous lawsuit or motion. See

N.D.N.Y. L.R. 7.1(i) (“A party who presents vexatious or frivolous motion papers or fails to

comply with this Rule is subject to discipline as the Court deems appropriate, including sanctions

and the imposition of costs and attorney’s fees to the opposing party.”); Logan v. Town of

Windsor, N.Y., 19-CV-1590, 2020 WL 4049943, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. July 20, 2020) (Suddaby, C.J.);

Hong Mai Sa v. Doe, 406 F.3d 155, 158 (2d Cir. 2005). The Court finds that those circumstances

are not present in the current case, however, because Plaintiff’s pleading deficiencies may be

7 Defendant also requested similar relief in his counterclaim. (Dkt. No. 11, at 5 [“I ask for

sanctions against the plaintiff so she does not continue a pattern of filing frivolous actions.”].)

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wholly attributable to her pro se status.

ACCORDINGLY, it is

ORDERED that Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Section 1983 claim pursuant

to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (Dkt. No. 8) is GRANTED; and it is further

ORDERED that Defendant’s motion for sanctions (Dkt. No. 8) is DENIED; and it is

further ordered

ORDERED that Plaintiff's Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) is DISMISSED without prejudice.

Date: September 13, 2022

Syracuse, New York

Glenn T. Suddaby ;

U.S. District Judge

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