Opinion

Yaromich v. Commissioner of Social Security

Court
District Court, N.D. New York
Filed
Jun 24, 2022
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 26.9%

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

_________________________

LYUBOV R. Y.,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No.

6:20-CV-1443 (DEP)

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant.

__________________________

APPEARANCES: OF COUNSEL:

FOR PLAINTIFF

OFFICE OF PETER W. PETER W. ANTONOWICZ, ESQ.

ANTONOWICZ

148 West Dominick Street

Rome, NY 13440

FOR DEFENDANT

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMIN. CANDACE LAWRENCE, ESQ.

625 JFK Building

15 New Sudbury St

Boston, MA 02203

DAVID E. PEEBLES

U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ORDER

Currently pending before the court in this action, in which plaintiff

seeks judicial review of an adverse administrative determination by the

Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”), pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 405(g), are cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings.1 Oral

argument was heard in connection with those motions on June 22, 2022,

during a telephone conference conducted on the record. At the close of

argument, I issued a bench decision in which, after applying the requisite

deferential review standard, I found that the Commissioner=s determination

resulted from the application of proper legal principles and is supported by

substantial evidence, providing further detail regarding my reasoning and

addressing the specific issues raised by the plaintiff in this appeal.

After due deliberation, and based upon the court=s oral bench

decision, which has been transcribed, is attached to this order, and is

incorporated herein by reference, it is hereby

ORDERED, as follows:

1) Defendant=s motion for judgment on the pleadings is

GRANTED.

2) The Commissioner=s determination that the plaintiff was not

1 This matter, which is before me on consent of the parties pursuant to 28

U.S.C. ' 636(c), has been treated in accordance with the procedures set forth in

General Order No. 18. Under that General Order, once issue has been joined, an

action such as this is considered procedurally as if cross-motions for judgment on the

pleadings had been filed pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure.

disabled at the relevant times, and thus is not entitled to benefits under the

Social Security Act, is AFFIRMED.

3) The clerk is respectfully directed to enter judgment, based

upon this determination, DISMISSING plaintiff's complaint in its entirety.

David E. Peebles

U.S. Magistrate Judge

Dated: June 24, 2022

Syracuse, NY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

------------------------------------------------------x

LYUBOV Y.,

Plaintiff,

-v- 6:20-CV-1443

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant.

------------------------------------------------------x

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

BEFORE THE HONORABLE DAVID E. PEEBLES

June 22, 2022

100 South Clinton Street, Syracuse, New York

For the Plaintiff:

(Appearance by telephone)

LAW OFFICE OF PETER W. ANTONOWICZ

148 West Dominick Street

Rome, New York 13440

BY: PETER W. ANTONOWICZ, ESQ.

For the Defendant:

(Appearance by telephone)

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

J.F.K. Federal Building

Room 625

Boston, Massachusetts 02203

BY: CANDACE LAWRENCE, ESQ.

Hannah F. Cavanaugh, RPR, CRR, CSR, NYACR, NYRCR

Official United States Court Reporter

100 South Clinton Street

Syracuse, New York 13261-7367

(315) 234-8545

1 (The Court and all parties present by telephone.

2 Time noted: 11:11 a.m.)

3 THE COURT: Let me begin by thanking both counsel for

4 excellent and spirited presentations.

5 Plaintiff has commenced this proceeding pursuant to

6 42, United States Code, Section 405(g) to challenge an adverse

7 determination by the Acting Commissioner finding that she was

8 not entitled to the disability insurance benefit, Title II

9 benefits, that she applied for.

10 The background is as follows: Plaintiff was born in

11 July of 20 -- I'm sorry, 1970. She's currently 51 years of age.

12 She was 47 at the alleged onset of her disability in March of

13 2017. Plaintiff is originally from Belarus and came to the

14 United States in roughly 2018 -- no, I'm sorry, she has been --

15 as of 2018, she had been here for 29 years. Plaintiff stands

16 5'6" in height and weighs 238 pounds, which qualifies her as

17 obese. Plaintiff attended college in Latvia and graduated with

18 some sort of culinary degree in baking and/or cooking. While in

19 school, she attended regular classes.

20 Plaintiff lives in Deerfield, New York. It's

21 unclear, but it appears she may be separated. She has six

22 children, all or some of whom in 2018 were residing with her.

23 Plaintiff drives. Plaintiff worked as a nurse's aide between

24 May of 2004 and March of 2017. She was engaged in home care for

25 the disabled. Plaintiff suffered a Workers' Compensation

1 on-the-job injury on January 11, 2017, when she slipped on ice

2 causing injury to her head, neck, back, and bilaterally to her

3 legs.

4 Physically, plaintiff suffers from degenerative disc

5 disease of the cervical and lumbar spine, hypertension, obesity,

6 and a history of kidney cysts. The plaintiff underwent MRI

7 testing of the cervical and lumbar spines in January of 2018 and

8 again, it appears, in April of 2019 with mild to moderate

9 results. Plaintiff refused, however, an EMG nerve conduction

10 study and injections, claiming that she is afraid of needles.

11 Plaintiff mentally suffers from depression and anxiety, but has

12 undergone no specialized treatment or psychiatric

13 hospitalization. Plaintiff has undergone chiropractic

14 treatment, as well as physical therapy for her lumbar and

15 cervical spine issues.

16 Plaintiff has treated with Mohawk Valley Nephrology

17 for her history of kidney cysts, Slocum-Dickson Medical Group,

18 including Dr. Kenneth Visalli, who's her primary caretaker, and

19 Dr. Prasanna Kumar. She has also treated with neurologist,

20 Mr. Ramesh Cherukuri, and on one occasion with Dr. Nicholas

21 Qandah on February 5, 2018.

22 In terms of activities of daily living, plaintiff is

23 able to dress, to bathe, although she requires assistance in the

24 shower, groom, drive short distances, watch television, and

25 spend time with family. Her family, however, does most of the

1 cooking, cleaning, and laundry.

2 Procedurally, plaintiff applied for Title II benefits

3 under the Social Security Act on February 5, 2018, alleging an

4 onset date of March 9, 2017. She claims disability based on

5 back issues, high blood pressure, leg and arm pain,

6 fibromyalgia, and kidney cysts. A hearing was conducted by

7 Administrative Law Judge, or ALJ, Elizabeth Koennecke. ALJ

8 Koennecke issued an unfavorable decision on February 20, 2020.

9 That decision became a final determination of the agency on

10 October 20, 2020, when the Social Security Administration

11 Appeals Council denied plaintiff's application for a review.

12 This action was commenced on November 23, 2020, and is timely.

13 In her decision, ALJ Koennecke applied the familiar

14 five-step sequential test for determining disability. She first

15 determined that plaintiff retains insured status through

16 December 31, 2022. At step one, she concluded that plaintiff

17 had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since March 9,

18 2017, her alleged onset date.

19 At step two, she determined that plaintiff does

20 suffer from severe impairments that impose more than minimal

21 limitations on her ability to perform basic work functions,

22 including mild degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine and

23 the cervical spine, as well as hypertension.

24 At step three, ALJ Koennecke concluded that

25 plaintiff's conditions do not meet or medically equal any of the

1 listed presumptively disabling conditions set forth in the

2 Commissioner's regulations, specifically focusing on listing

3 1.04. After surveying the evidence of record, ALJ Koennecke

4 concluded that plaintiff retains the residual functional

5 capacity, or RFC, to perform light work as defined in the

6 regulations with the exception that she is only able to

7 occasionally stoop.

8 Applying that RFC finding at step four, ALJ Koennecke

9 concluded that plaintiff is incapable of performing her past

10 relevant work as a nurse assistant and proceeded to step five

11 where she concluded based upon the Medical-Vocational Guidelines

12 set forth in the Commissioner's regulations, and specifically

13 guideline or Grid Rule 202.21, that plaintiff is not disabled.

14 In arriving at that determination and after noting

15 the Commissioner's burden of proof at step five, ALJ Koennecke

16 concluded that the additional limitation of only occasional

17 stooping has little or no effect on the occupational base on

18 which the grids are predicated, citing Social Security Ruling

19 83-10.

20 As you know, the Court's function in this instance is

21 to determine two things, whether correct legal principles were

22 applied and whether the resulting determination is supported by

23 substantial evidence, which is defined as such relevant evidence

24 as a reasonable mind would find sufficient to support a

25 conclusion. As the Second Circuit has noted in Brault v. Social

1 Security Administration Commissioner, 683 F.3d 443 from the

2 Second Circuit, 2012, this is a demanding, very deferential

3 standard. And under that standard, once a fact is found by an

4 ALJ, that fact can be rejected only if a reasonable factfinder

5 would have to conclude otherwise.

6 In this case, the plaintiff raises three arguments.

7 First, she claims error in the Administrative Law Judge's

8 weighing of the medical evidence of record, specifically

9 focusing on medical source statements from two treating sources,

10 Dr. Kenneth Visalli and Dr. Ramesh Cherukuri. And that's

11 spelled C-H-E-R-U-K-U-R-I, despite what I said earlier. She

12 also notes that Dr. Wolf found moderate limitations that are

13 inconsistent with light work, and further notes that there was

14 no mention by the Administrative Law Judge of an IME report of

15 Dr. Bradley Wiener who conducted an examination in connection

16 with plaintiff's Workers' Compensation claim. The second

17 argument raised is that the Administrative Law Judge improperly

18 analyzed and considered plaintiff's subjective complaints of

19 symptomology. And the third is that it was error for the

20 Administrative Law Judge to rely on the grids or

21 Medical-Vocational Guidelines without consulting with a

22 vocational expert in order to determine at step five whether

23 there was work available that plaintiff is capable of

24 performing.

25 Because of the date on which this application in this

1 case was filed, the new amended regulations that took effect in

2 March of 2017 apply to consideration of medical opinions in the

3 record. Under those regulations, an ALJ does not defer or give

4 any specific evidentiary weight, including controlling weight,

5 to any medical opinions or prior administrative medical

6 findings, including those from a claimant's medical sources, 20

7 C.F.R. Section 404.1520(c)(A). Instead, an ALJ must consider

8 those opinions and apply relevant factors, including primarily

9 supportability and consistency of those opinions. The ALJ must

10 articulate how persuasive he or she found each medical opinion

11 and must explain how he or she considered the supportability and

12 consistency of those medical opinions. The ALJ may also, but is

13 not required to, explain how he or she considered other relevant

14 factors which are set forth in the regulations.

15 There are five opinions in the record concerning

16 plaintiff's physical capabilities. The first is from -- and I'm

17 not taking these necessarily chronologically, state agency

18 consultant Dr. R. Pradhan from July 3, 2013. It appears in the

19 record as part of Exhibit 2A and also is reiterated in

20 Exhibit 9F. Essentially, that's at page 58 to 72 and 755 to

21 756. It concludes that plaintiff is capable of performing light

22 work, except she can only occasionally stoop. It is fully

23 consistent with the RFC determination. The Administrative Law

24 Judge concluded that Dr. Pradhan's opinion was very persuasive

25 at page 17.

1 I note that while Dr. Pradhan did not examine the

2 plaintiff, nonetheless, his or her opinion being a state agency

3 consultant familiar with the regulations and having reviewed

4 available medical records can supply substantial evidence and

5 can even trump a medical source opinion from a treating source,

6 Heim v. Commissioner of Social Security, 2018 WL 1621521 from

7 the Northern District of New York, March 29, 2018, Camille v.

8 Colvin, 652 F. App’x 25 from the Second Circuit, 2016, and A.D.

9 v. Commissioner of Social Security, 2018 WL 3232347 from the

10 Northern District of New York, June 29, 2018.

11 The second opinion is from Dr. Kautilya Puri from

12 August 9, 2017. It appears at 271 to 275 of the Administrative

13 Transcript. Dr. Puri does find moderate limitations in

14 plaintiff's ability to squat, bend, stoop, and kneel and mild

15 limitations to lifting weights. The administrative -- I'm

16 sorry, the Administrative Law Judge did find the opinion of Dr.

17 Puri persuasive, but noted at page 17 that it would not preclude

18 plaintiff's ability to perform light work.

19 The third is from Dr. Ivan Wolf, June 11, 2018. It

20 appears at 748 to 754 of the Administrative Transcript. Dr.

21 Wolf finds moderate limitations in plaintiff's ability to --

22 among other things, overhead motion of her arms, squatting,

23 repetitive forward bending, kneeling, and climbing. The

24 Administrative Law Judge concluded that the opinion was

25 persuasive at page seven, but, again, did not preclude

1 plaintiff's ability to perform light work.

2 Dr. Kenneth Visalli issued a medical source statement

3 on February -- December 13, 2019. It appears at 818 to 819. It

4 is basically a checkbox form. It is extremely limiting. It

5 limits plaintiff to, for example, lift and carry on an

6 occasional basis less than five pounds, can only stand or walk

7 without leaning or supportive device one hour or less, can only

8 sit for four hours or less in an eight-hour workday, has severe

9 limitations in reaching, handling, fingering, and feeling, and

10 would be likely absent more than four days per month. The

11 Administrative Law Judge found that the opinion was not

12 persuasive, was not consistent with the record, and cited some

13 examples of treatment notes and records that would not support

14 Dr. Visalli's opinion.

15 The fifth was from Dr. Ramesh Cherukuri from

16 January 2, 2020. It appears at 923 to 924. It is, again, on a

17 checkbox form and very limiting, essentially similar to Dr.

18 Visalli's in terms of the limitations noted. ALJ Koennecke

19 found it was not persuasive or consistent with the record at

20 page 18 of the Administrative Transcript.

21 In the first instance, of course, it is for the

22 Administrative Law Judge to weigh conflicting medical opinions,

23 Veino v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 578, from the Second Circuit, 2002,

24 and it is not the Court's function to reweigh the medical

25 opinions.

1 In terms of supportability, as the Administrative Law

2 Judge noted, the opinion of Dr. Pradhan that was relied on for

3 the RFC determination is supported by MRI testing, which showed

4 only mild to moderate abnormal findings, the fact that

5 Dr. Cherukuri, plaintiff's neurologist, recommended only

6 conservative treatment, the fact that plaintiff declined EMG and

7 nerve conduction studies, as well as injections, the fact she

8 was referred to physical therapy and chiropractic care,

9 conservative -- relatively conservative treatment, and the fact

10 that the treatment notes do not support the more significant

11 limitations set forth in those two findings from medical source

12 statements from plaintiff's physicians.

13 The only significant supporting treatment note,

14 really, from Dr. Visalli occurs on the day that he rendered his

15 medical source statement. Those two opinions are not consistent

16 with the opinions of Dr. Cherukuri, Dr. Wolf, or Dr. Pradhan.

17 It's -- there is an argument that was raised by the plaintiff

18 that there are limitations in Dr. Puri and Dr. Wolf's medical

19 source statements that were not adopted and included in the RFC.

20 It's well established, however, that an ALJ is not required to

21 adopt every portion of an opinion that is found to be

22 persuasive. In this case, Dr. Pradhan's opinion was found very

23 persuasive and does support the RFC finding.

24 I note, moreover, that if there was error in not

25 including moderate limitations in standing, walking, sitting,

1 lifting, pushing, or pulling, that would be harmless. Such

2 limitations do not preclude the ability to perform light work,

3 Raymonda C. v. Commissioner of Social Security, 2020 WL 42814,

4 Northern District of New York, January 1, 2020, and April B. v.

5 Saul, 2019 WL 4736243 from the Northern District of New York,

6 September 27, 2019.

7 I am unable to say that a reasonable factfinder would

8 have to conclude that plaintiff cannot perform light work with

9 only occasional stooping, White v. Brault -- Berryhill, I'm

10 sorry, 753 F. App’x 80 from the Second Circuit, Court of

11 Appeals, February 7, 2019, and Brault, which I cited earlier.

12 In terms of squatting and kneeling, limitations that

13 were opined by Dr. Puri under SSR 83-14, climbing, kneeling, and

14 crawling limitations have little or no effect on light work job

15 base. Similarly, under Social Security Ruling 85-15, squatting

16 and kneeling limitations would similarly have little effect.

17 The moderate -- when it comes to the moderate limitation in

18 reaching, the ALJ accepted Dr. Pradhan's opinion and, obviously,

19 it is in conflict with one medical opinion, but it was for the

20 ALJ to resolve that inconsistency. In any event, if it was

21 error, it was harmless. It was plaintiff's burden to establish

22 the limitation in the ability to overhead reach and that it

23 would preclude light work, and there's no proof that a

24 limitation -- a moderate limitation in overhead reaching would

25 preclude light work, Michael M. v. Saul, 2019 WL 6611302 from

1 the -- from the Northern District of New York, December 5, 2019.

2 There was an argument that Dr. Wiener's opinion was

3 not referenced in the -- in the ALJ's decision, which, of

4 course, is true. Dr. Bradley Wiener issued an opinion after

5 conducting an independent medical examination on October 25,

6 2017. It appears at 329 to 334 of the Administrative

7 Transcript. The conclusion reached by Dr. Wiener is that the

8 claimant demonstrates a temporary total disability, however, the

9 claimant's disability is predominantly due to her non-orthopedic

10 conditions. The claimant has poorly controlled hypertension, as

11 well as significant subjective complaints of pain without

12 objective corroboration. The conclusion that plaintiff is

13 incapable of returning to work in any capacity and is

14 temporarily totally disabled, it opines on an issue that is

15 specifically reserved to the Commissioner and there's no duty

16 for the ALJ to weigh that opinion, 20 C.F.R. Section

17 404.1520(b)(C)(3)(i). Although, I would agree that it probably

18 would have been a better practice for the Administrative Law

19 Judge to reference the opinion and to say just that.

20 Nonetheless, I don't find error and if there was error, it is

21 harmless error.

22 In terms of weighing plaintiff's symptomology, what

23 we used to consider or call credibility, an ALJ is required to

24 take into account any subjective complaints by a claimant of

25 pain when a -- making a five step disability analysis, but is

1 not required to blindly accept the subjective testimony of a

2 claimant. Instead, the ALJ retains broad discretion to evaluate

3 a claimant's subjective testimony, including testimony

4 concerning pain and when doing that, must consider a variety of

5 factors which would ordinarily inform the issue of credibility

6 in any context, including the claimant's credibility, his or her

7 motivation, and the medical evidence in the record, and, of

8 course, must explain the finding and must -- the finding must be

9 supported by substantial evidence.

10 Relevant factors to be considered when evaluating a

11 claimant's subjective symptomology claims include daily

12 activities; location, duration, frequency, and intensity of the

13 symptoms; precipitating and aggravating factors; type, dosage,

14 effectiveness, and side effects of any medications taken; other

15 treatment received; and other measures taken to relieve the

16 symptoms.

17 In this case, the Administrative Law Judge followed

18 the two-step protocol that is prescribed for evaluating

19 plaintiff's reported symptomology. The decision of the

20 Administrative Law Judge is entitled to considerable deference,

21 Penfield v. Colvin, 563 F. App’x 839, Second Circuit, 2014.

22 In this case, ALJ Koennecke cited medical findings,

23 mild to moderate findings on MRI testing, the refusal of

24 plaintiff to undergo EMG and nerve conduction studies and to

25 take epidural injections, the inconsistency of those opinions

1 with Dr. Wolf, Dr. Puri, Dr. Pradhan, and the conservative

2 treatment recommended, including by his neurologist. I note

3 that plaintiff was referred to a chiropractor on several

4 occasions as reflected in 347, 764, and 784 of the

5 Administrative Transcript. That, notwithstanding any argument

6 to the contrary by the plaintiff, is a proper consideration when

7 evaluating reports of pain, 20 C.F.R. Section 404.1529, Riley v.

8 Barnhart, 2008 WL 10655336 from the Northern District of New

9 York, 2008.

10 The last argument is the step five argument.

11 Clearly, it is the Commissioner's burden at step five to

12 determine the availability of work in the -- available in the

13 national economy that plaintiff is capable of performing that

14 can be satisfied by resorting to the medical vocational

15 guidelines. The only additional nonexertional limitation in the

16 RFC is occasional stooping, which under SSR 83-10 and 85-15,

17 does not significantly reduce the job base on which the grids

18 are predicated. Accordingly, I find no error in relying on the

19 grids to find no disability.

20 In sum, I conclude that correct legal principles were

21 applied in this case and the resulting determination is

22 supported by substantial evidence. I will therefore grant

23 judgment on the pleadings to the defendant and order dismissal

24 of plaintiff's complaint.

25 Thank you, both. I hope you have a good afternoon.

1 MR. ANTONOWICZ: Thank you, Judge.

2 MR. LAWRENCE: Thank you.

3 (Time noted: 11:40 a.m.)

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4 CERTIFICATE OF OFFICIAL REPORTER

5

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7 I, HANNAH F. CAVANAUGH, RPR, CRR, CSR, NYACR,

8 NYRCR, Official U.S. Court Reporter, in and for the United

9 States District Court for the Northern District of New York, DO

10 HEREBY CERTIFY that pursuant to Section 753, Title 28, United

11 States Code, that the foregoing is a true and correct transcript

12 of the stenographically reported proceedings held in the

13 above-entitled matter and that the transcript page format is in

14 conformance with the regulations of the Judicial Conference of

15 the United States.

16

17 Dated this 22nd day of June, 2022.

18

19 s/ Hannah F. Cavanaugh______________________

20 HANNAH F. CAVANAUGH, RPR, CRR, CSR, NYACR, NYRCR

21 Official U.S. Court Reporter

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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