Greathouse v. Meddaugh

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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LEON GREATHOUSE,

Plaintiff,

-v- 9:21-CV-1223

SGT. K. MEDDAUGH, RN MARY

THOMPSON, OFFICER DRAKE,

SORC O’BRIEN, SORC L. O’HARA,

SGT. PHILLIPS, and JOHN/JANE

DOES 1-4,

Defendants.

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APPEARANCES: OF COUNSEL:

RICKNER PLLC ROBERT RICKNER, ESQ.

Attorneys for Plaintiff

14 Wall Street, Suite 1603

New York, NY 10005

HON. LETITIA JAMES MATTHEW GALLAGHER, ESQ.

New York State Attorney General Ass’t Attorney General

Attorneys for Defendants

The Capitol

Albany, NY 12224

DAVID N. HURD

United States District Judge

MEMORANDUM-DECISION and ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

On November 11, 2021, plaintiff Leon Greathouse (“Greathouse” or

“plaintiff”), a former prison inmate, filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging

that officials employed by the New York State Department of Corrections and

Community Supervision (“DOCCS”) violated his Fourteenth Amendment

rights during a prison disciplinary hearing that resulted in, inter alia, a

twenty-three day delay in his release to parole. Dkt. No. 1.

On March 24, 2022, defendants moved under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure to dismiss the complaint. Dkt. No. 9. The motion has

been fully briefed and will be considered on the basis of the submissions

without oral argument.

II. BACKGROUND

On November 29, 2020, Greathouse was housed at Mohawk Correctional

Facility in Rome, New York. Compl. ¶ 1.1 Plaintiff has a “number of

underlying medical issues for which he was taking medication.” Id. ¶ 19. At

about 4:20 a.m., plaintiff “awoke to a bloody nose and suddenly collapsed onto

the floor of his dorm.” Id. ¶ 18. According to plaintiff, the responding staff

1 The complaint becomes mis-numbered beginning after paragraph 10. However, for

consistency’s sake, the Court adopts the numbering in the pleading.

members “made a conclusory determination that [he] was under the influence

of an intoxicant” and “immediately restrained and cuffed” him. Id. ¶ 19.

Greathouse alleges that defendant Sergeant K. Meddaugh (“Sgt.

Meddaugh”) forwarded this “unfound[ed] assumption” about plaintiff’s

intoxication to staff at the Walsh Regional Medical Unit (the “RMU”), where

plaintiff was taken for observation. Compl. ¶ 20. There, defendant

Registered Nurse Mary Thompson (“RN Thompson”) “conducted a visual

examination” of plaintiff and concluded “that he was under the influence of

an ‘unknown substance.’” Id. ¶ 21.

Greathouse denied using any drugs or alcohol, but none of the staff at the

RMU believed him. Compl. ¶ 23. Plaintiff alleges that he never received “a

full evaluation or physical examination to determine the cause of the medical

event.” Id. Further, plaintiff alleges that defendants ignored him when he

“expressed concern that he may have experienced some sort of seizure.” Id.

Greathouse alleges that neither RN Thompson nor any other DOCCS

employee followed DOCCS policies, which required confirmatory “[urinalysis]

testing upon any suspicion of intoxication.” Compl. ¶ 22. Instead, defendants

“merely stated, without more, that they believed Plaintiff was guilty of this

violation.” Id. Plaintiff was eventually released from medical observation a

few hours later. Id. ¶ 23.

On November 30, 2020, Greathouse was issued a disciplinary ticket that

accused him of “ingesting intoxicants in violation of the prison’s Rule

113.13.” Compl. ¶ 27. Plaintiff alleges that this disciplinary proceeding

violated DOCCS policies. Id. ¶¶ 24–25. As plaintiff explains, DOCCS had

suspended “all disciplinary actions regarding intoxication until further

notice” because of issues with the reliability of the test used to confirm the

presence or absence of drugs. See id.

Nevertheless, on December 2 and 3, 2020, Greathouse participated in a

disciplinary hearing on misbehavior ticket. Compl. ¶ 28. Plaintiff alleges he

was denied his right to call witnesses on his behalf. Id. ¶ 31. In addition,

plaintiff alleges he was not allowed to “meaningfully question” RN Thompson

“or inquire as to why he was not given a drug test.” Id. ¶ 29.

Ultimately, defendant Officer Drake, the hearing officer, found

Greathouse guilty of the ticket. Compl. ¶ 32. Plaintiff was sentenced to 30

days of keeplock2 in the Special Housing Unit (“SHU”). Id. ¶ 33. Plaintiff

also lost 60 days of good-time credit. Id. Plaintiff “handwrote an appeal to

the Commissioner the same day.” Id. ¶ 32.

On December 4, 2020, defendant Supervising Offender Rehabilitation

Coordinator (“SORC”) O’Brien (“SORC O’Brien”), at the direction of SORC

2 Keeplock is “a form of administrative segregation in which the inmate is confined to his cell,

deprived of participation in normal prison routine, and denied contact with other inmates.” Jenkins

v. Haubert, 179 F.3d 19, 21 (2d Cir. 1999) (cleaned up).

O’Hara, delivered to Greathouse a “Notice of Suspension or Ineligibility of

Parole Release” that suspended his January 4, 2021 release date. Id. ¶ 23.

On December 17, 2020, defendant Sgt. Phillips notified Greathouse that

his “Certificate of Earned Eligibility” had been “denied as a result of [the]

disciplinary charges.” Compl. ¶ 35. Plaintiff was released to parole on

January 27, 2021, twenty-three days later than planned. Id. ¶ 36. Plaintiff

spent the final month of his incarceration in “the ‘box,’ also known as the

SHU.” Id.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the complaint’s factual

allegations must be enough to elevate the plaintiff’s right to relief above the

level of speculation. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). So

while legal conclusions can provide a framework for the complaint, they must

be supported with meaningful allegations of fact. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 679 (2009). In short, a complaint must contain “enough facts to state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

To assess this plausibility requirement, the court must accept as true all of

the factual allegations contained in the complaint and draw all reasonable

inferences in the non-movant’s favor. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94

(2007). In doing so, the court generally confines itself to the facts alleged in

the pleading, any documents attached to the complaint or incorporated into it

by reference, and matters of which judicial notice may be taken. Goel v.

Bunge, Ltd., 820 F.3d 554, 559 (2d Cir. 2016).

IV. DISCUSSION

Greathouse’s one-count complaint alleges that defendants denied him due

process in connection with the disciplinary hearing and, as a result, he was

deprived of his liberty interests in (1) freedom from disciplinary segregation

absent sufficient process; and/or (2) release to parole. Compl. ¶¶ 37–42.

Defendants contend the complaint must be dismissed because Greathouse

has failed to plead a viable claim. Defs.’ Mem., Dkt. No. 9-1 at 6–7.3 First,

defendants argue that relatively short durations of confinement in the SHU

do not trigger a protected liberty interest absent plausible allegations of an

“atypical and significant hardship.” Id. Second, defendants argue that a

prisoner in New York does not have a cognizable liberty interest in release to

parole. Id. at 7–8. Third, defendants argue that defendants SORC O’Brien,

SORC O’Hara, and Sgt. Phillips were not “personally involved” in any of the

alleged misconduct. Id. at 8–10.

In opposition, Greathouse contends that he was entitled to confirmatory

urinalysis testing under New York’s regulatory scheme before being

disciplined under DOCCS rules. Pl.’s Opp’n, Dkt. No. 13 at 7–8. In plaintiff’s

3 Pagination corresponds to CM/ECF.

view, the fact defendants disciplined him for alleged intoxication despite “the

internal prohibition on charges related to intoxication” amounts to “a

complete indifference to [his] right to be free from unjust punishment.” Id. at

8. Plaintiff further argues the “atypical and significant hardship” analysis is

a fact-bound inquiry that requires discovery. Id. at 8–9.

Alternatively, Greathouse contends that he had a distinct liberty interest

subject to due process protections arising from his scheduled release to

parole. Pl.’s Opp’n at 9–10. Finally, although plaintiff concedes that his

claims against defendants SORC O’Brien and SORC O’Hara must be

dismissed, Id. at 5 n.1, he maintains that Sgt. Phillips was “personally

involved” in the alleged violation because he “personally rescinded” plaintiff’s

Certificate of Earned Eligibility despite knowing “that discipline was

improper absent confirmatory testing,” Id. at 10.

The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the states from “depriv[ing] any

person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST.

amend. XIV, § 1. “Federal courts ‘examine procedural due process questions

in two steps: the first asks whether there exists a liberty or property interest

which has been interfered with by the State; the second examines whether

the procedures attendant upon that deprivation were constitutionally

sufficient.’” Francis v. Fiacco, 942 F.3d 126, 141 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting Ky.

Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989)).

1. Edwards v. Balisok

As an initial matter, however, in their reply memorandum defendants

assert that Greathouse’s § 1983 procedural due process claim is barred by the

Supreme Court’s decision in Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997), which

precludes an inmate from asserting a § 1983 claim related to alleged

deficiencies in a prison disciplinary hearing unless the sanction has been

overturned, either through administrative channels or in a habeas corpus

proceeding in state or federal court. See Defs.’ Reply, Dkt. No. 14 at 3–4.

In Edwards, the prisoner-plaintiff was found guilty of breaking certain

prison rules and sentenced to 10 days in isolation, 20 days in segregation,

and the loss of 30 days of good-time credit. 520 U.S. at 643. After his prison

administrative appeal failed, the plaintiff filed a § 1983 action alleging that

the procedures employed at the prison disciplinary proceeding violated his

procedural due process rights. Id. at 644. The Supreme Court rejected the

prisoner’s § 1983 claim, concluding it was not cognizable because it would

“necessarily imply the invalidity of the punishment imposed.” Id. at 648.

If that “implied invalidity” language sounds familiar, it is because the rule

adopted by the Supreme Court in Edwards was an outgrowth of two separate

strands of existing precedent that sharply limited which § 1983 claims can be

brought by prisoner-plaintiffs: Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973), and

Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).

First, in Preiser, state prisoners filed suit under § 1983 seeking injunctive

relief to compel the restoration of good-time credit they had lost as a result of

prison disciplinary proceedings. 411 US. at 476. The Supreme Court rejected

their claim, concluding that when a prisoner challenges “the very fact or

duration of his physical imprisonment, the relief he seeks is a determination

that he is entitled to immediately release or a speedier release from that

imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.” Id. at 500.

Later, in Heck, a prisoner filed suit under § 1983 seeking money damages

against law enforcement officials who had engaged in unlawful acts during

his state court prosecution. 512 U.S. at 478–79. The Supreme Court rejected

this claim too, reasoning that a § 1983 claim for money damages is not

cognizable if “a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the

invalidity of his conviction or sentence” unless the plaintiff can demonstrate

the conviction or sentence has been invalidated. Id. at 487.

“These cases, taken together, indicate that a state prisoner’s § 1983 action

is barred (absent prior invalidation)—no matter the relief sought (damages or

equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner’s suit (state conduct

leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings)—if success in that action

would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its

duration.” Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81–82 (2005) (emphasis in

original).

Based on the facts alleged in the complaint, Edwards would likely apply to

Greathouse’s § 1983 procedural due process claim. Plaintiff alleges that he

was deprived of due process at the prison disciplinary hearing, which resulted

in the loss of good-time credit and delayed his release to parole. However,

plaintiff has not alleged that the disciplinary hearing has been overturned or

otherwise expunged. Absent that kind of showing, plaintiff likely cannot

maintain this claim. As the Second Circuit has explained:

The case law is clear that when a prisoner’s challenge

either to the process or the result of a prison

disciplinary proceeding necessarily implies the

invalidity of a sanction that affects the duration of his

sentence, such as the deprivation of good-time credits,

the prisoner may not maintain an action under § 1983

unless he has shown that the sanction (or the

procedures that led to it, if the procedural defect at

issue was critical to the imposition of the sanction)

have been overturned through administrative

channels or by a state or federal court.

Peralta v. Vasquez, 467 F.3d 98, 100 (2d Cir. 2006).

Upon review, however, the Court declines to apply Edwards at this

time. There are two reasons for this conclusion. First, defendants failed to

raise Edwards in their opening brief, which has deprived Greathouse of an

opportunity to distinguish it. Although the precise impact of Edwards might

be clear if plaintiff were still in custody at Mohawk or some other DOCCS

facility, plaintiff’s complaint alleges he is now on some kind of parole status.

Although Edwards will not bar a claim for which habeas corpus relief is

unavailable, a parolee (as Greathouse apparently is) is typically considered

“in custody” for the purpose of a habeas proceeding. Webster v. Himmelbach,

271 F. Supp. 3d 458, 469 (W.D.N.Y. 2017); see also Nowakowski v. New York,

835 F.3d 210, 216 (2d Cir. 2016) (“[A] variety of nonconfinement restraints on

liberty satisfy the custodial requirement.”).

“For challenges to an underlying conviction, courts have found petitioners

to be ‘in custody’ for purposes of habeas not only when they are incarcerated

but also when they are on parole or supervised release.” Opperisano v. P.O.

Jones, 286 F. Supp. 3d 450, 455 n.7 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (emphasis in original)

(collecting cases). “However, petitioners challenging their parole revocation

would not appear to be ‘in custody’ for purposes of habeas after release on

parole.” Id.

Greathouse challenges events that led to a change in the duration of his

incarceration on an underlying conviction—he lost good-time credit that

delayed his release. That fact pattern would seem to satisfy the “in custody”

requirement, which in turn would trigger the requirements of Edwards. And

if Edwards applies, plaintiff cannot proceed with this § 1983 claim to the

extent that it involves durational sanctions; i.e., the loss of good-time credit

and/or his delayed release to parole. However, because this change in

plaintiff’s status might well impact the applicability of Edwards, the parties

and the Court would be better served with adversarial briefing on the

question before reaching that conclusion.

Second, even if Edwards did apply to the facts alleged by Greathouse, the

Second Circuit’s holding in Peralta v. Vasquez, 467 F.3d 98 (2006), would still

allow him to proceed with his § 1983 procedural due process claim as long as

he agreed to limit it to the conditions-of-confinement component of the

disciplinary sanction he received: the 30 days he spent in the SHU.

In Peralta, the Second Circuit concluded that a prisoner subject to “mixed

sanctions” i.e., “sanctions that affect both (a) the duration of his

imprisonment and (b) the conditions of his confinement” was still able to

“proceed separately, under § 1983, with a challenge to the sanctions affecting

his conditions of confinement without satisfying the favorable termination

rule.” 467 F.3d at 104. Importantly, however, to do so “the prisoner must

abandon, not just now, but also in any future proceeding, any claims he may

have with respect to the duration of his confinement that arise out of the

proceeding he is attacking in his current § 1983 suit.” Id.

“This allowance for forfeiture of duration claims in procedural due process

cases brought pursuant to § 1983 has come to be known as a ‘Peralta

waiver.’” Balkum v. Leonard, 2020 WL 372914, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 23,

2020). “In other words, if a plaintiff forever abandons any claims with

respect to the duration of his confinement that arise out of the disciplinary

proceeding challenged, he may pursue a procedural due process claim with

respect to that disciplinary proceeding to challenge the conditions of his

confinement.” Id. (emphases in original).

2. Liberty Interest

However, even if Greathouse agreed to limit his § 1983 procedural due

process claim in this manner, it would still be subject to dismissal as it is

insufficiently pleaded.

“A prisoner’s restricted confinement within a prison does not give rise to a

liberty interest, warranting procedural due process protection, unless the

conditions and duration of the prisoner’s confinement ‘impose[ ] atypical and

significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of

prison life.’” Sealey v. Giltner, 197 F.3d 578, 583 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting

Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995)).

“Factors relevant to determining whether the plaintiff endured an

‘atypical and significant hardship’ include the extent to which the conditions

of the disciplinary segregation differ from other routine prison conditions and

the duration of the disciplinary segregation imposed compared to

discretionary confinement.” Davis v. Barrett, 576 F.3d 129, 133 (2d Cir. 2009)

(cleaned up).

“The Second Circuit has not provided a bright-line rule as to what period

of time in segregated confinement implicates a prisoner’s constitutional

rights, but the case law provides helpful guideposts.” Vogelfang v. Capra,

889 F. Supp. 2d 489, 510–11 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). As relevant here, however, the

Second Circuit has repeatedly concluded that “restrictive confinements of less

than 101 days do not generally raise a liberty interest warranting due

process protection, and thus require proof of conditions more onerous than

usual.” Davis, 576 F.3d at 133 (citation omitted).

Greathouse alleges that he spent 30 days in the SHU as a result of being

found guilty on the disciplinary charge. But he does not allege any facts to

suggest that this relatively short period of disciplinary segregation posed the

kind of “atypical and significant hardship” necessary to trigger a protected

liberty interest. See, e.g., Israel v. Bradt, 228 F. Supp. 3d 237, 239 (W.D.N.Y.

2017) (“In line with Second Circuit precedent, district courts within this

circuit have repeatedly held that sentences of . . . –two months—do not,

absent some unusually harsh conditions, implicate a protected liberty

interest.” (collecting cases)).

Thus, although Greathouse may be correct that the “atypical and

significant hardship” inquiry ultimately involves a fact-bound examination of

the conditions of confinement, see, e.g., Sealey, 116 F.3d at 52, on a motion to

dismiss the plaintiff must still allege facts that plausibly suggest the

relatively short period of confinement at issue—30 days—involved some kind

of “atypical and significant hardship.”

3. Parole Status

As a final matter, Greathouse contends that he enjoyed a distinct liberty

interest arising from his scheduled release to parole. To make this argument,

plaintiff relies on Victory v. Pataki, 814 F.3d 47 (2d Cir. 2016), where the

Second Circuit analyzed the point at which New York’s statutory parole

scheme triggered a protected liberty interest. As relevant here, Victory

concluded that, “[u]nlike a mere applicant for parole, a New York inmate who

has been granted an open parole release date has a legitimate expectancy of

release that is grounded in New York’s regulatory scheme.” Id. at 60.

The problem with this argument is twofold. First, Victory’s holding is

about the procedural due process owed in the context of a parole rescission

hearing, not a prison disciplinary proceeding. See 814 F.3d at 60 (“We

therefore conclude that a New York ‘parole grantee has a protectable liberty

interest that entitles him to due process in the [Board of Parole’s] parole

rescission hearings.’”).

Greathouse has not challenged the results of any parole hearing. And the

cases citing Victory do not seem to rely on it for the premise advanced by

plaintiff here; i.e., that a plaintiff’s liberty interest in parole permits him to

proceed on a § 1983 claim related to a prison disciplinary hearing

notwithstanding the procedural bar set forth in Edwards and/or the minimal

threshold showing of “atypical and significant hardship” established by the

Supreme Court in Sandin.

Second, even assuming the logic of Victory authorized an end run around

these two Supreme Court precedents, Greathouse has alleged little in the

way of facts related to his release to parole. Although he mentions that a

Certificate of Earned Eligibility was “denied,” compl. ¶ 35, and his release

date was delayed as a result, id. ¶ 34, it is worth noting that even “the receipt

of an earned eligibility certificate does not preclude the Board from denying

parole, nor does it eliminate the Board’s discretion in making the release

decision.” Wills v. Microgenetics Corp., 2021 WL 3516419, at *3 (E.D.N.Y.

Aug. 10, 2021) (quoting Wallman v. Travis, 794 N.Y.S.2d 381, 386 (N.Y. App.

Div. 1st Dep’t 2005)).

Thus, absent some additional factual allegations about how far along in

the parole determination process Greathouse was at the time of his unknown

medical incident, it is hard to conclude that plaintiff possessed a cognizable

liberty interest under the Second Circuit’s reasoning in Victory.4 Cf. Delaney

v. Perez, 2021 WL 3038642, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2021) (extending Victory

to a § 1983 claim that prisoner was improperly incarcerated despite being

sentenced to parole supervision).

4 Even assuming otherwise, the “flexible, context-dependent approach” to procedural due

process claims “makes particularly fertile ground for qualified immunity.” Francis, 942 F.3d at 149.

V. CONCLUSION

Greathouse’s complaint must be dismissed. However, because the facts

alleged in the complaint suggest that plaintiff might still be able to plead a

viable § 1983 procedural due process claim against one or more of the

defendants, he will be given leave to amend his complaint.

Therefore, it is

ORDERED that

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED;

2. Plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED;

3. Plaintiff shall have thirty days from the date of this decision in which

to file an amended complaint; and

3. If plaintiff does not file an amended complaint within this time period,

the Clerk of the Court is directed to enter a judgment dismissing the

complaint and close the file without further Order of this Court.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 5, 2022 sp . Yl

Utica, New York. U.S. District Judge

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