Dow v. Commissioner of Social Security

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

SHYLA D.,

Plaintiff,

V. 3:20-CV-1295

(DJS)

KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner of

Social Security,

Defendant.

APPEARANCES: OF COUNSEL:

LAW OFFICES OF KENNETH HILLER JUSTIN M. GOLDSTEIN, ESQ.

Attorney for Plaintiff KENNETH HILLER, ESQ.

“| 6000 North Bailey Avenue, Suite 1A

Amherst, New York 14226

U.S. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMIN. CHRISTOPHER POTTER, ESQ.

OFFICE OF REG’L GEN. COUNSEL

Attorney for Defendant

J.F.K. Federal Building - Room 625

15 New Sudbury Street

Boston, Massachusetts 02203

DANIEL J. STEWART

“| United States Magistrate Judge

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER!

Plaintiff brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking review of a

decision by the Commissioner of Social Security that Plaintiff was not disabled. Dkt.

' Upon Plaintiff's consent, the United States’ general consent, and in accordance with this District’s General Order

18, this matter has been referred to the undersigned to exercise full jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73. See Dkt. No. 5 & General Order 18.

No. 1. Currently before the Court are Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

and Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. Dkt. Nos. 16 & 22. For the

reasons set forth below, the Commissioner’s determination is affirmed. Accordingly,

Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is denied and Defendant’s Motion is

4) granted.

I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND

A. Procedural History

Plaintiff applied for disability and disability insurance benefits, as well as

supplemental security income in January 2018. Dkt. No. 12, Admin. Tr. (“Tr.”), pp.

161-74. Plaintiff alleges disability based upon anxiety, depression, obsessive

compulsive disorder, and post-traumatic stress disorder. Tr. at p. 195. She alleged a

disability onset date of January 19, 2018. Tr. at p. 191. Plaintiff's applications were

initially denied in June 2018, after which she timely requested a hearing before an

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). Tr. at pp. 76-85. Plaintiff appeared at a hearing

before ALJ Stanley K. Chin on December 6, 2019 at which Plaintiff and a vocational

expert (“VE”) testified. Tr. at pp. 33-51. On January 14, 2020, the ALJ issued a written

decision finding Plaintiff was not disabled under the Social Security Act. Tr. at pp. 12-

26. On September 10, 2020, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review,

making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner. Tr. at pp. 1-5.

]

B. The ALJ’s Decision

In his decision, the ALJ made the following findings of fact and conclusions of

law. First, the ALJ found that Plaintiff met the insured status requirements of the Social

Security Act through June 30, 2023. Tr. at p. 15. Second, the ALJ found that Plaintiff

not engaged in substantial gainful activity since her alleged onset date. /d. Third,

the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: cervical spine

disorder, left shoulder disorder, major depressive disorder, post-traumatic stress

disorder, and anxiety disorder. /d. Fourth, the ALJ found that Plaintiff does not have

an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals one of the

listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, App. 1 (the “Listings”’). Tr. at pp. 15-

The ALJ then found that Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to

perform light work except that

The claimant is limited to frequent reaching and overhead reaching with the

left upper extremity. The claimant is limited to simple and repetitive tasks

in a routine work setting, performed in a work environment free of fast-paced

production requirements, involving only simple work-related decisions and

infrequent and gradual workplace changes, and occasional interaction with

the public, coworkers, and supervisors.

”| Tr. at p. 18. Next, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could not perform her past relevant work.

Tr. at p. 24. Finally, the ALJ went on to find that there was also other work existing in

significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform. Tr. at p. 25.

The ALJ, therefore, concluded that Plaintiff is not disabled. Jd.

Il. RELEVANT LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Standard of Review

A court reviewing a denial of disability benefits may not determine de novo

whether an individual is disabled. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Wagner v. Sec’y of Health &

Human Servs., 906 F.2d 856, 860 (2d Cir. 1990). Rather, the Commissioner’s

determination will be reversed only if the correct legal standards were not applied, or it

was not supported by substantial evidence. See Johnson vy. Bowen, 817 F.2d 983, 986

(2d Cir. 1987) (“Where there is a reasonable basis for doubt whether the ALJ applied

correct legal principles, application of the substantial evidence standard to uphold a

finding of no disability creates an unacceptable risk that a claimant will be deprived of

“| the right to have her disability determination made according to the correct legal

principles.”); accord Grey v. Heckler, 721 F.2d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 1983); Marcus v.

Califano, 615 F.2d 23, 27 (2d Cir. 1979). “Substantial evidence” is evidence that

amounts to “more than a mere scintilla,” and has been defined as “such relevant evidence

as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v.

Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). Where evidence is deemed susceptible to more than

one rational interpretation, the Commissioner’s conclusion must be upheld. Rutherford

v. Schweiker, 685 F.2d 60, 62 (2d Cir. 1982).

“To determine on appeal whether the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial

evidence, a reviewing court considers the whole record, examining evidence from both

sides, because an analysis of the substantiality of the evidence must also include that

which detracts from its weight.” Williams v. Bowen, 859 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1988).

If supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s finding must be sustained

“even where substantial evidence may support the plaintiff's position and despite that

the court’s independent analysis of the evidence may differ from the [Commissioner’s].”

Rosado v. Sullivan, 805 F. Supp. 147, 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). In other words, this Court

must afford the Commissioner’s determination considerable deference, and may not

substitute “its own judgment for that of the [Commissioner], even if it might justifiably

have reached a different result upon a de novo review.” Valente v. Sec’y of Health &

Human Servs., 733 F.2d 1037, 1041 (2d Cir. 1984).

B. Standard to Determine Disability

The Commissioner has established a five-step evaluation process to determine

whether an individual is disabled as defined by the Social Security Act. 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1520, 416.920. The Supreme Court has recognized the validity of this sequential

evaluation process. Bowen vy. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42 (1987). The five-step

process is as follows:

First, the [Commissioner] considers whether the claimant is currently

engaged in substantial gainful activity. If he is not, the [Commissioner]

next considers whether the claimant has a “severe impairment” which

significantly limits his physical or mental ability to do basic work

activities. If the claimant suffers such an impairment, the third inquiry is

whether, based solely on medical evidence, the claimant has an

impairment which is listed in Appendix 1 of the regulations. If the

claimant has such an impairment, the [Commissioner] will consider him

disabled without considering vocational factors such as age, education,

and work experience; the [Commissioner] presumes that a claimant who

is afflicted with a “listed” impairment is unable to perform substantial

gainful activity. Assuming the claimant does not have a listed impairment,

the fourth inquiry is whether, despite the claimant’s severe impairment, he

has the residual functional capacity to perform his past work. Finally, if

the claimant is unable to perform his past work, the [Commissioner] then

determines whether there is other work which the claimant could perform.

Under the cases previously discussed, the claimant bears the burden of the

proof as to the first four steps, while the [Commissioner] must prove the

final one.

Berry v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir. 1982); accord McIntyre v. Colvin, 758

F.3d 146, 150 (2d Cir. 2014). “If at any step a finding of disability or non-disability can

be made, the SSA will not review the claim further.” Barnhart v. Thompson, 540 U.S.

20, 24 (2003).

I. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ’s RFC determination was not supported by

substantial evidence. Dkt. No. 16, Pl.’s Mem. of Law at pp. 11-25. Defendant, in turn,

submits that the proper legal standards were applied and that the decision should be

affirmed as supported by substantial evidence. Dkt. No. 22, Def.’s Mem. of Law at pp.

3-18.

A claimant’s RFC is the most she can still do despite her limitations. Penny Ann

v. Berryhill, 2018 WL 6674291, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2018). If supported by

substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s finding must be sustained “even where

substantial evidence may support the plaintiff's position and despite that the court’s

independent analysis of the evidence may differ from the [Commissioner’s].” Rosado

v. Sullivan, 805 F. Supp. at 153. The Court will not reweigh the evidence that was before

the ALJ. Warren v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2016 WL 7223338, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 18,

2016), report and recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 7238947 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 13,

2016) (“When applying the substantial evidence test to a finding that a plaintiff was not

disabled, the Court ‘will not reweigh the evidence presented at the administrative

hearing, . . . nor will it determine whether [the applicant] actually was disabled. [Rather],

[a]bsent an error of law by the Secretary, [a] court must affirm her decision if there is

substantial evidence [in the record] to support it.’”) (quoting Lefford v. McCall, 916 F.

Supp. 150, 155 (N.D.N.Y. 1996)); Vincent v. Shalala, 830 F. Supp. 126, 133 (N.D.N.Y.

1993) (“[I]t 1s not the function of the reviewing court to reweigh the evidence.”) (citing

Carroll v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 705 F.2d 638, 642 (2d Cir. 1983)).

“(I]t was within the ALJ’s purview to review the opinions of record and weigh

them accordingly along with Plaintiff's testimony, reports, and treatment history to

determine her RFC.” WNesiba O. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2019 WL 464882, at *7

(N.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2019); see also Jennifer Lee W. v. Berryhill, 2019 WL 1243759, at

*6 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2019) (itis the ALJ’s role “to choose between properly submitted

medical opinions.”). Additionally, “[i]t is the province of the ALJ to resolve genuine

conflicts in the record.” Clemons v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2017 WL 766901, at *4

(N.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2017) (citing Veino v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 578, 588 (2d Cir. 2002)).

As a result, when the ALJ’s conclusions find reasonable support in the record, courts

“will defer to the ALJ’s resolution” regarding the appropriate weight to be afforded to

various medical opinions. Teresa L. v. Comm of Soc. Sec., 2020 WL 6875254, at *7

(W.D.N.Y. Nov. 23, 2020).

A. Plaintiff’s Physical RFC

Physically, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could perform light work, though with

certain limitations on her ability to reach. Tr. at p. 18. Broadly summarized, Plaintiff

objects that the ALJ improperly rejected the opinion of a treating provider and then

reached conclusions about her physical abilities without benefit of a medical opinion.

Pl.’s Mem. of Law at pp. 12-21. Having reviewed the record, the Court concludes that

there is no basis for remand.

1. Preliminary Arguments

Defendant makes two threshold arguments to support the ALJ’s decision to find

the opinion of Dr. Melissa Thibault unpersuasive. First, Defendant argues that the time

of the opinion, at a time when Plaintiff was working, renders it deficient. Def.’s Mem.

of Law at p. 4. Second, Defendant submits that the opinion was also deficient because

it was provided on a check-box form without specific explanation of its rationale. Jd. at

pp. 4-5. The ALJ, however, cited neither of these concerns as a basis for discounting

Dr. Thibault’s opinion. Tr. at p. 21. Because “[t]he ALJ did not articulate this reasoning

in h[is] decision . . . the Court will not consider post hoc rationalizations.” Elizabeth P.

v. Comm ’r of Soc. Sec., 2022 WL 507367, at *13 n. 12 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2022); see

also Kristie B. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2019 WL 6768567, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 12,

2019).

2. The Consideration of Plaintiff’s Treating Doctor

The parties agree this case is controlled by the new Social Security

Administration regulations governing evaluation of medical opinions. Pl.’s Mem. of

Law at p. 11-12; Def.’s Mem. of Law at p. 5. “Under the new regulations, the treating

physician rule no longer applies.” Smith v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2022 WL 421136, at

*10 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2022). “Therefore, no special deference is given to the treating

physician’s opinion.” /d. (citing, inter alia, 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(a)). The regulations,

however, continue to require Defendant to consider many of the same factors previously

addressed under the treating physician rule including the supportability and consistency

of an opinion with other evidence, the relationship of the medical provider with the

patient, and the extent, if any, of a doctor’s specialization. Compare 20 C.F.R. §

416.920c(a) & (c) with Greek v. Colvin, 802 F.3d 370, 375 (2d Cir. 2015) (outlining

factors relevant under treating physician rule). Under the new regulations supportability

and consistency are “[t]he most important factors.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(a). “Both

supportability and consistency in part require comparison of the medical opinions with

other medical sources.” Mark K. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2021 WL 4220621, at *4

(W.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2021) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(1)-(2)).

The record reflects that the ALJ carefully considered the opinion of Dr. Thibault.

He identified the limitations stated in Dr. Thibault’s opinion and recognized that Dr.

Thibault had personally examined Plaintiff, but went on to conclude that the limitations

opined by Dr. Thibault were neither fully supported by the objective evidence in the

record nor consistent with it. Tr. at p. 21. In doing so, the ALJ considered the most

important factors addressed by Defendant’s new regulations for evaluating medical

opinions. In discounting Dr. Thibault’s medical opinion, the ALJ relied on what he

found to be “mostly unremarkable findings” despite some limitations. /d. A review of

“)the medical record themselves demonstrate that the ALJ’s conclusions are clearly

supported by substantial evidence. Those records include notations about what Dr.

Thibault found to be “the relatively benign nature of [Plaintiff's] symptoms” in

September 2018. Tr. at p. 540. Those notes further reflected that in December 2018,

when Plaintiff next saw Dr. Thibault, she was experiencing intermittent tingling in her

arms, as well as neck, shoulder, and back pain. Tr. at p. 545. None of that pain is

“| recorded as causing Plaintiff the type of severe pain reflected in Dr. Thibault’s 2019

medical opinion. /d. In fact, some pain was characterized as being present “every few

days for just 5-10 minutes.” /d. At that time Plaintiffs left shoulder pain was “much

better.” Tr. at p. 546. Upper arm pain was “mild and relatively infrequent.” Jd. This

record, as cited to and explained by the ALJ, amply supported his conclusion that the

medical opinion proffered by Dr. Thibault was neither supported by nor consistent with

the objective evidence in the record.”

The ALJ also noted a conservative course of treatment, Tr. at p. 21, but contrary

to Plaintiff's suggestion, the existence of a conservative course of treatment “is one

? Because Plaintiff seeks a close period of disability, Tr. at p. 46, these examinations are the most relevant to

analyzing the ALJ’s decision.

factor an ALJ may consider in determining whether a treating provider’s opinion is well-

supported and consistent with other substantial evidence in the record.” Becky Sue H.

v. Kijakazi, 2022 WL 304518, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2022) (citing cases); see also

Jaworski v. Colvin, 2015 WL 5750041, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2015) (conservative

“| course of treatment may be relevant to analyzing subjective complaints). Here, this was

one of just many factors the ALJ considered in his thorough review of Dr. Thibault’s

opinion and it was not a factor disputed by Plaintiff.

Nor does the failure to have expressly referenced Dr. Thibault’s specialty provide

a basis for remand because “under the new regulations, the ALJ is required to consider,

but need not explicitly discuss” the specialization factor. Jackson v. Kijakazi, 2022 WL

620046, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2022). Plaintiffs medical records, which the ALJ

considered in detail, make clear the nature of Dr. Thibault’s practice and it is clear that

her specialty was considered in any event.

Plaintiff also argues that the RFC was not supported by substantial evidence.

This argument is based primarily, however, on the assumption that the ALJ should have

included the limitations opined by Dr. Thibault. P1l.’s Mem. of Law at pp. 19-21. Having

concluded that the ALJ did not err in finding Dr. Thibault’s opinion unpersuasive, it was

likewise not error for the ALJ not to credit the limitations identified in that opinion in

assessing Plaintiff's RFC.

Finally, Plaintiff maintains that remand is required because the ALJ’s RFC

determination is not based on any medical opinion. Pl.’s Mem. of Law at pp. 18-19.

10

“TT ]here is no legal requirement that the ALJ rely on a medical opinion in every case to

formulate the RFC. Rather, the ALJ has the responsibility of reviewing all the evidence

before him, resolving inconsistencies, and making a determination consistent with the

evidence as a whole.” April B. v. Saul, 2019 WL 4736243, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 27,

4/2019) (citing cases). “[T]he RFC is an administrative finding reserved to the

Commissioner and not a medical finding.” Desirae D. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2021

WL 2042576, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. May 21, 2021) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)). Asa

result, “an ALJ is free to reach an RFC finding even without any supporting medical

source opinions.” Nersinger v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2020 WL 1151459, at *4

(W.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2020) (citing Second Circuit decisions). Where, as here, the ALJ

“| reaches an RFC determination based on a careful review of the medical evidence and

the entire record viewed as a whole, remand is not required. Cook v. Comm’r of Soc.

Sec., 818 Fed. Appx. 108, 110 (2d Cir. 2020); Patrick S. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2021

WL 5357942, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2021).

B. Plaintiff?s Mental RFC

The ALJ considered the opinions of three individuals assessing Plaintiff's mental

capacity. Dr. Momot-Baker, the state agency review psychologist, Dr. Amanda Slowik,

a consultative examiner, and Andrea Lajoie, Plaintiff's treating therapist. Plaintiff

makes several arguments regarding the ALJ’s consideration of these opinions, but none

is a basis for remand.

11

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in finding the opinion of Dr. Momot

persuasive. Pl.’s Mem. of Law at pp. 22-23. Principally, Plaintiff objects that Dr.

Momot did not have all of Andrea Lajoie’s treatment notes available for review at the

time of the opinion. /d. Because Ms. Lajoie is a treating therapist, Plaintiff maintains

that the lack of access to a complete record undercuts Dr. Momot’s opinion. Jd. The

ALJ, however, specifically recognized that Dr. Momot’s opinion was based only on the

“evidence available in the record at the time his opinion was rendered” and weighed it

accordingly. Tr. at p. 22. He went on to carefully explain his consideration of Dr.

Momot’s opinion and provided a specific basis for his conclusions regarding that

opinion. /d. While the ALJ considered inconsistencies between Dr. Momot’s opinion

those of Ms. Lajoie as one basis for discounting the latter’s opinion, it was clearly

not the sole basis for doing so and so Dr. Momot’s lack of complete records does not

render this conclusion unsupported by the record. Tr. at p. 23. There is no question that

“an ALJ is entitled to rely on opinions from both examining and non-examining State

agency medical consultants because these consultants are qualified experts in the field

of social security disability.” Moxham v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2018 WL 1175210, at

*7 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2018) (citing cases); Conger v. Comm of Soc. Sec., 2018 WL

947662, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2018). The ALJ did so here and provided sufficient

reasons for proceeding in that manner.

Next, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in finding the opinion of Dr. Slowik

consistent with that of Dr. Momot because Dr. Slowik’s opinion was more limiting.

12

Pl.’s Mem. of Law at pp. 24-25. The fact that one medical opinion contains greater

limitations than another does not preclude a finding that the two are generally consistent.

See Allen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2014 WL 5288999, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2014).

The ALJ also provided a detailed discussion of the basis for his evaluation of Dr.

4) Slowik’s opinion. Tr. at pp. 22-23. Plaintiff argues that finding Dr. Slowik’s opinion

persuasive is inconsistent with his failure to include greater limitations in his RFC. Pl.’s

Mem. of Law at p. 24. This argument overlooks two bedrock principles underlying

court review of ALJ determinations. First, an ALJ need not adopt every limitation stated

in any particular medical opinion. Jennifer Lee W. v. Berryhill, 2019 WL 1243759, at

Second, Plaintiff's position is essentially that Dr. Slowik’s opinion was actually

more aligned with that of Ms. Lajoie than that of Dr. Momot, but this is a quintessential

example of a request that the Court reweigh the evidence which the Court declines to

do. Joanne R. v. Kijakazi, 2021 WL 5629077, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2021) (citing

cases); Alfred M. v. Saul, 2020 WL 3545565, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. June 30, 2020) (citing

cases).

Finally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly relied on certain mental status

examinations in rejecting Ms. Lajoie’s opinions. Pl.’s Mem. of Law at p. 25. Plaintiff

claims that doing so resulted in the ALJ substituting his opinion for those of Ms. Lajoie.

Id. It is the ALJ’s role “to choose between properly submitted medical opinions.”

Jennifer Lee W. v. Berryhill, 2019 WL 1243759, at *6. As a result, when the ALJ’s

conclusions find reasonable support in the record, courts “will defer to the ALJ’s

13

resolution” regarding the appropriate weight to be afforded to various medical opinions.

Teresa L. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2020 WL 6875254, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 23, 2020).

The ALJ carefully discussed the various mental health evaluations in the record,

discussing both the limitations found and facts suggesting Plaintiffs functional capacity

4) was greater than opined by some. Tr. at pp. 21-23. Plaintiffs citation to the decision in

Dany Z. v. Saul is unavailing because the court there emphasized that normal mental

status findings might be insufficient to support a finding of no disability, but did so with

the caveat “where other evidence in the record was ignored.” 531 F. Supp. 3d 871, 885

(D. Vt. 2021). Here, Plaintiff cannot show that other relevant record evidence was

ignored, only that she believes it should have been weighed differently. The ALJ

highlighted specific areas of Plaintiff's functional ability that he believed demonstrated

inconsistencies between Ms. Lajoie’s treatment notes and her opinion, Tr. at p. 23, but

Plaintiff does not take issue with any specific aspect of that finding. Instead, she cites

only to caselaw demonstrating the general proposition that some positive mental

findings do not per se exclude a finding of disability. See Pl.’s Mem. of Law at p. 25.

On the record before the Court, however, the ALJ’s conclusion cannot be read as

contrary to that general point, but to conclude in light of the entire record that despite

recognized mental and emotional difficulties Plaintiff retains the functional capacity to

work. That determination is supported by substantial evidence and must be affirmed.

14

IV. CONCLUSION

ACCORDINGLY, it is

ORDERED, that Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is DENIED;

and it is further

ORDERED, that Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is

GRANTED; and it is further

ORDERED, that Defendant’s decision denying Plaintiff disability benefits is

AFFIRMED; and it is further

ORDERED, that the Clerk of the Court shall serve copies of this Memorandum-

Decision and Order on the parties.

“| Dated: March 16, 2022

Albany, New York

Daf Nart) “

U.SMMfagistrate Judge

15