Golden v. Gagne

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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RODERICK GOLDEN,

Plaintiff,

-v-

JOHN GAGNÉ, Field Investigator, and

DETECTIVE WILLIAM ROOT,

Onondaga County Sheriff’s Department.

Defendants.

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DETECTIVE WILLIAM ROOT,

Onondaga County Sheriff’s Department,

Cross Claimant,

-v-

JOHN GAGNÉ, Field Investigator.

Cross Defendant.

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APPEARANCES: OF COUNSEL:

RODERICK GOLDEN

Plaintiff Pro Se

208 Melrose Avenue

Syracuse, New York 13206

HON. LETITIA JAMES MELISSA A. LATINO, ESQ.

Attorney General for the State of Assistant Attorney General

New York

The Capitol

Albany, New York 12224

ONONDAGA COUNTY DEPARTMENT KATHERINE B. FELICE, ESQ.

OF LAW JOHN E. HEISLER, Jr., ESQ.

John H. Mulroy Civic Center

421 Montgomery Street, Tenth Floor

Syracuse, New York 13202

DAVID N. HURD

United States District Judge

MEMORANDUM-DECISION and ORDER

INTRODUCTION

On January 25, 2021, plaintiff Roderick Golden (“Golden” or “plaintiff”)

filed the present complaint. At its core, that complaint alleges constitutional

deprivations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“§ 1983”) against defendants John

Gagné (“Gagné”), a field investigator for New York State’s Department of

Motor Vehicles (the “DMV”) and Detective William Root (“Root”), a deputy in

the Onondaga County Sheriff’s Department. Essentially, plaintiff takes issue

with his being arrested and charged with possession of a forged instrument

on December 5, 2016, as well as the resulting legal process until that charge

was dismissed on January 23, 2018.

On December 31, 2021, Gagné moved to dismiss Golden’s complaint under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction and Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. That motion,

having been fully briefed, will now be decided on the submissions and

without oral argument.

II. BACKGROUND

On December 5, 2016, Golden was in trial before the Syracuse City

Court-Small Claims as a pro se plaintiff.! Dkt. 11 (““Compl.”), 44 1, 3.

Though plaintiffs current complaint is silent as to what motivated the suit,

at least it is clear that its defendant was a local car repair shop called

Tri-Count Auto. Id. ¥ 3.

According to Golden, Gagne was also at the trial as a witness that

Tri-Count had subpoenaed to testify. Compl. § 4. However, plaintiff claims

that while the court was in recess, Gagné, Root, and two other officers

suddenly arrested him. Jd. §§ 1-2, 5. From there, plaintiff was taken to the

nearby Onondaga County Justice Center, where he was booked pending

arraignment. Id. { 6.

Golden claims that he spent the next twenty-two hours in jail, though no

one told him why. Compl. § 10. Finally, plaintiff alleges that he was brought

back to the Syracuse City Court, where he was arraigned and charged with

Criminal Possession of a Forged Instrument in the Second Degree under New

York Penal Law § 170.25, a class D felony. Id.

At its core, the criminal complaint against Golden claimed that he had

driven a vehicle to Tri-Count Auto bearing a counterfeit inspection sticker

1 The facts are taken from plaintiffs complaint and read in the light most favorable to him, as is

appropriate on a motion to dismiss.

some fourteen months prior to his arrest. Compl. ¶ 11. Gagné’s criminal

complaint bears this out: that document alleges that plaintiff drove a vehicle

with a forged inspection sticker to Tri-Count Auto on October 6, 2015.

Dkt. 34-2, p. 4.2

Golden further alleges that the arraignment proceeding provided no

explanation of the “factual underpinnings” of his charge or otherwise

discussed the probable cause that allegedly supported his arrest.

Compl. ¶ 13. After pleading not guilty, plaintiff was held on bail of $7,500,

which took him some two to three days to pay. Id. ¶¶ 14, 16.

Once Golden was back out in the world, his criminal proceedings

continued apace. On December 9, 2016, plaintiff was summoned to court so

that an order of protection could issue in favor of a Jonathan Zerbel

(“Zerbel”), a deponent in plaintiff’s criminal case. Compl. ¶ 23. As best the

Court can glean, Zerbel was a witness in the criminal case against him that

had taken a deposition which was instrumental in assembling the case

against him. Id. ¶ 24. According to plaintiff, that deposition was

instrumental in putting the case against him together, so his being barred

2 Pagination corresponds with CM/ECF. The Court will also consider Gagné’s felony complaint

because a document not included in a plaintiff’s complaint but upon whose terms and effect that

complaint relies may properly be considered at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage. See Chambers v. Time

Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 2002). As will be discussed further below, the felony

complaint fits that bill because plaintiff uses that document to argue that the charges against him

were spurious from the start.

from contacting Zerbel frustrated his ability to investigate. See id. at

¶¶ 24, 27.

Next, Golden alleges that he was again haled into court for a pretrial

conference on May 18, 2017. Compl. ¶ 29. According to plaintiff, the main

topic of discussion was whether his felony charge should be reduced. Id.

Although plaintiff alleges that the prosecution began the discussion of a

reduced charge, he also claims that its motives for doing so were less than

pure. Id. ¶¶ 29-30. Specifically, he alleges that the prosecution was trying to

reduce the charges to cover for the fact that it had failed to comply with

certain procedural mechanisms, including presentation before a grand jury

and preparing a “replacement accusatory instrument.” Id. ¶ 30.

Finally, on January 23, 2018, Golden alleges that the presiding judge

dismissed all charges against him upon the agreement of all parties.

Compl. ¶ 31.

On January 25, 2021, Golden filed a complaint in this district alleging a

range of constitutional violations against a number of defendants. Dkt. 1.

More specifically, plaintiff alleges a ranging conspiracy to improperly

prosecute him, which he bases on the alleged procedural irregularities in his

prosecution, the involvement of Tri-Count Auto as both the defendant in his

civil suit and a driving force behind his criminal case, and a complaint he had

filed against the DMV in 2012 allegedly earning him that department’s ire.

Compl. J 34-36.

After Golden amended his complaint and the magistrate judge assigned to

this case performed her initial review, the only claims that remain are for

false arrest and malicious prosecution under § 1983 against Gagné and Root.

Dkts. 11; 18; 15. On December 10, 2021, defendant Root answered the

amended complaint and asserted a crossclaim for contribution against Gagné.

Dkt. 29. On December 31, 2021, Gagné moved to dismiss plaintiffs

complaint as against him. Dkt. 34. This decision now follows.

Ill. LEGAL STANDARD

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6),? “a complaint must

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

That factual matter may be drawn from “the facts alleged in the complaint,

documents attached to the complaint as exhibits, and documents

3 Gagné also argues that the complaint should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction to the extent that the complaint tries to hold him liable in his official

capacity. Of course, suits under § 1983 against state actors in their official capacities are

functionally claims brought against the state itself and thus barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

See Vincent v. Yelich, 718 F.3d 157, 177 (2d Cir. 2013). As a consequence, any official capacity claims

against Gagné must be dismissed. Jd. Thus, the remainder of this opinion assumes that plaintiffs

claims against Gagné are asserted against him in his individual capacity. See Hafer v. Melo,

502 U.S. 21, 23 (1991) (holding that sovereign immunity does not protect officials from § 1983 suits

in their individual capacities).

incorporated by reference in the complaint.” DiFolco v. MSNBC Cable L.L.C.,

622 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir. 2010).

Importantly, “the complaint is to be construed liberally, and all reasonable

inferences must be drawn in the plaintiffs favor.” Ginsburg v. City of Ithaca,

839 F. Supp. 2d 587, 540 (N.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing Chambers v. Time Warner,

Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 2002)). If the complaint and its additional

materials—when viewed through that pro-plaintiff lens—are not enough to

raise the plaintiffs right to relief on a claim above the speculative level, that

claim must be dismissed. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555

(2007).

IV. DISCUSSION

Gagné makes three arguments in his efforts to see Golden’s complaint

dismissed. First, he argues that both of plaintiffs claims run aground on the

statute of limitations. Second, he argues that even if plaintiff's complaint is

read in the light most favorable to him, he still does not state a plausible

cause of action. And third, Gagné argues that even if plaintiff does plausibly

allege claims against him, he should be protected by qualified immunity.

A. False Arrest

A plaintiff claiming false arrest under § 1983must show: “(1) the

defendant intended to confine the plaintiff; (2) the plaintiff was conscious of

the confinement; (3) the plaintiff did not consent to the confinement; and

(4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged.” Barnes v. City of N.Y.,

2021 WL 260092, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2021) (internal quotation marks

omitted) (citing Broughton v. State, 335 N.E.2d 310, 314 (N.Y. 1975)).

Gagné begins his assault on Golden’s false arrest claim not on its merits,

but by arguing that his complaint is untimely. To that end, § 1983 claims in

New York are subject to a three-year statute of limitations. Patterson v.

Cnty. of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 225 (2d Cir. 2004). The clock begins to tick on

those three years from the date that the cause of action accrues, or in other

words once the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the harm. Eagleston

v. Guido, 41 F.3d 865, 871 (2d Cir. 1994). In the case of a false arrest, that

means that the statute of limitations begins to run “when the alleged false

imprisonment ends.” Frederick v. City of N.Y., 2016 WL 8711395, at *8

(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2016).

In total, Golden alleges four wrongful confinements: (1) his arrest on

December 5, 2016; (2) his being held on bail from December 6-9, 2016; (3) the

protection order blocking plaintiff from contacting Zerbel; and (4) the hearing

to dismiss the charges on January 23, 2018.4 In truth, though, only one can

qualify as a false arrest. After all, because “false imprisonment consists of

4 Although plaintiff’s complaint clearly explains which events alleged in the complaint constitute

the first three seizures he alleges, the fourth is not quite so clearly defined. It is also possible that

the May 18, 2017 pretrial conference was plaintiff’s claimed fourth seizure. Compl. ¶ 29. However,

for the reasons about to be discussed, any seizure prior to the January 23, 2018 hearing must be

dismissed in any case, so the point is largely moot.

detention without legal process, a false imprisonment ends once the victim

becomes held pursuant to such process . . . .” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384,

389 (2007). In other words, any unlawful detention after a plaintiff is

arraigned is no longer a false arrest, but rather functions as proof of

additional damages “for the ‘entirely distinct’ tort of malicious prosecution[.]”

Id. at 390.

Thus, although Golden may object that his arraignment failed to discuss

the evidence that supported probable cause, the case against him was

reviewed by a judicial officer during his arraignment. Compl. ¶¶ 10, 13. Any

potentially unlawful detention after his arraignment only goes to damages for

his potential malicious prosecution claim: it does not support an independent

false arrest claim. Kato, 549 U.S. at 390.

In other words, the only potentially viable false arrest claim to which

Golden points is his actual arrest on December 5, 2016. Compl. ¶ 1. And

because an unlawful confinement comes to an end once an arraignment

makes it lawful, the statute of limitations began to run once plaintiff was

arraigned on December 6, 2016. Id. ¶ 10; Kato, 549 U.S. at 389. Plaintiff’s

statute of limitations thus ran out on December 6, 2019, and his false arrest

claim against Gagné must be dismissed.5 See, e.g., Frederick,

2016 WL 8711395, at *8-10 (dismissing false arrest claim where arraignment

occurred in 2009 at latest and complaint was not filed until 2013).

B. Malicious Prosecution

The Court turns next to Golden’s malicious prosecution claim. To that

end, there are four elements to a malicious prosecution claim under § 1983:

(1) the initiation of a proceeding; (2) that terminated favorably to plaintiff;

(3) lacking probable cause; and (4) malice. Savino v. City of N.Y.,

331 F.3d 63, 72 (2d Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).

Gagné once again begins his efforts to see Golden’s complaint dismissed by

arguing that it comes too late. After all, by plaintiff’s own allegations, his

charges were dismissed on January 23, 2018. Compl. ¶ 31. And because a

malicious prosecution claim accrues upon the termination of the charges in

the plaintiff’s favor, he was obliged to file his claim no later than January

23, 2021. See Spak v. Phillips, 857 F.3d 458, 462 (2d Cir. 2017). But plaintiff

did not file his initial complaint until January 25, 2021. Dkt. 1.

5 In deference to plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court has also considered whether equitable tolling

might permit his statute of limitations to be extended. However, no matter how favorably the Court

may read plaintiff’s complaint, it can see no “fraud, misrepresentation[ ] or deception” that might

justify equitable tolling. Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 642 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal citations and

quotation marks omitted). Nor can the Court discern any other extraordinary reason that might

justify reprieve from the statute of limitations. See Bolarinwa v. Williams, 593 F.3d 226, 231

(2d Cir. 2010) (explaining that rare and exceptional circumstances might justify tolling statute of

limitations). Finally, the Court notes that, contrary to plaintiff’s argument, the continuing violation

doctrine does not apply to false arrest claims. See, e.g., Harrison v. New York, 95 F. Supp. 3d

293, 327 n.13 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). Thus, his claimed false arrest must be treated as a discrete act, and

there is no viable escape hatch to save him from the statute of limitations.

As Golden correctly notes, though, January 23, 2021 was a Saturday.

Thus, the period for him to file his complaint remained open until the next

day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday.

FED. R. CIV. P. 6(a)(1)(C). As it happens, the next day fitting that bill was

Monday, January 25, 2021, the day plaintiff filed. His malicious prosecution

claim was thus timely. See id.; Dkt. 1.

Even so, Gagné argues that Golden’s complaint still failed to sufficiently

state a claim for malicious prosecution. The Court disagrees. Plaintiff of

course alleges that he was charged with a crime in part through Gagné’s

efforts, establishing the first element of initiating a criminal prosecution.

Compl. ¶¶ 5, 11; Savino, 331 F.3d at 72.

Golden also alleges that all charges against him were dismissed, but

whether that is enough to meet his obligation to establish favorable

termination is not so obvious a question as it seems. Compl. ¶ 31; Savino,

331 F.3d at 72. After all, to establish favorable termination in the § 1983

context, a plaintiff must prove that the criminal charges against him were

terminated in a way that indicates that he was not guilty of the charged

offense. Lanning v. City of Glens Falls, 908 F.3d 19, 27 (2d Cir. 2018). In the

usual case, merely claiming that charges were dismissed without more may

not be enough to clear that threshold. See id. at 28 (finding malicious

prosecution claim inadequately alleged where plaintiff only alleged that

charges were dismissed after jury trial without more).

In this case, however, reading Golden’s pro se complaint to raise the

strongest arguments that it suggests, and especially considering his

allegations about the curious origins and prosecution of the charges against

him, the Court concludes that he has sufficiently alleged favorable

termination at this juncture to survive Gagné’s motion to dismiss. Triestman

v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that

submissions of pro se litigant must be construed liberally).

Finally, Golden alleges that Gagné conspired with Tri-Count Auto to

falsely charge him with a crime. Compl. ¶¶ 11, 20. Gagné nevertheless

chafes that these allegations, standing alone, do not satisfy the elements of

malice and a lack of probable cause. Savino, 331 F.3d at 72. Gagné is

mistaken. Reading plaintiff’s complaint liberally—as this Court must—

plaintiff alleges that Gagné conspired with Tri-Count Auto to manufacture a

baseless criminal charge. See Triestman, 470 F.3d at 474; Compl. ¶¶ 20, 34

(plaintiff alleging that Gagné conspired with Tri-Count Auto and claiming

that charge was “baseless and spurious”). Given the curious timing of

plaintiff’s arrest during the middle of a trial against Tri-Count Auto for an

offense that allegedly took place some fourteen months earlier, those

allegations clear the low bar of plausibility.

Thus, all four elements of malicious prosecution are therefore met on the

face of the complaint, and Gagné has as of yet still failed to provide a justified

basis for dismissing this claim. See, e.g., Greathouse v. Vasquez,

2021 WL 6334689, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2021) (finding malicious

prosecution claim adequately alleged by pro se plaintiff who claimed

dismissal where allegations of complaint suggested that dismissal met

Lanning’s requirements), report and recommendation adopted,

2022 WL 83663 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2022).

As a final proposed basis for dismissing Golden’s amended complaint,

Gagné invokes qualified immunity to protect him from plaintiff’s suit.

“Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil damages liability

unless the official violated a statutory or constitutional right that was clearly

established at the time of the challenged conduct.” Brown v. City of New

York, 862 F.3d 182, 190 (2d Cir. 2017) (citing Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S.

658, 664 (2012)). Functionally speaking, determining whether to grant

qualified immunity to a defendant requires a court to consider: (1) “whether

the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, makes out a

violation of a statutory or constitutional right”; and (2) “whether that right

was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.” Tracy v.

Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 96 (2d Cir. 2010).

“To be clearly established, a right must be sufficiently clear that every

reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that

right.” Brown, 862 F.3d at 190 (cleaned up and internal citations and

quotation marks omitted). The borders of those rights can become clearly

established through controlling caselaw, but “existing precedent must have

placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Ashcroft v.

al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011).

However, the Supreme Court cautions that lower courts are “not to define

clearly established law at a high level of generality,” al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742,

but must instead consider the particular circumstances of the case, Brown,

862 F.3d at 190. In practice, the qualified immunity inquiry is intended to

shield “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the

law.” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015).

In the malicious prosecution context, qualified immunity can attach if “it

was objectively reasonable for [an arresting officer] to believe” they had

probable cause to arrest a suspect or initiate a prosecution. Zellner v.

Summerlin, 494 F.3d 344, 369 (2d Cir. 2007). Under Golden’s facts, Gagné

conspired with Tri-Count Auto to invent a spurious criminal charge.

Compl. ¶¶ 20, 34. Because it would not be objectively reasonable for Gagné

to believe he had probable cause based on fraudulent evidence, qualified

immunity would not attach to those facts. Zellner, 494 F.3d at 369. Gagné’s

motion to dismiss plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim must therefore be

denied.

C. Claims against Root

Yet curiously enough, defendant Root has remained silent thus far,

content to answer Golden’s complaint and leave Gagné holding the bag.

Because plaintiff’s false arrest claims are unavoidably time-barred on their

face, the Court will nevertheless dismiss those claims sua sponte as to Root as

well. After all, plaintiff was given an opportunity to defend the timeliness of

these claims in responding to Gagné’s motion, but failed to do so. Abbas,

480 F.3d at 640 (holding that though sua sponte dismissal based on statute of

limitations is typically improper, courts may nevertheless dismiss complaints

that are untimely on their face when plaintiff has notice of defect and was

given opportunity to respond).

As for the malicious prosecution claim against Root, Golden’s complaint

says precious little about him other than that he was present for the

December 5, 2016 arrest. Compl. ¶ 2. His name is not on the criminal

complaint. Dkt. 34-2, p. 4. And nowhere does plaintiff allege that he

participated in the alleged conspiracy with Tri-County Auto. See

Compl. ¶ 34.

Even so, that claim must stand. The Court is happy to reduce the load on

the magistrate by narrowing the issues in this case in advance of discovery

and limiting the relevant questions to plaintiff’s malicious prosecution

claims. But it cannot abide rewarding Root’s counsel’s slothful approach to

litigation.

This is not the first time this Court has found itself confounded by this

particular office’s methods in navigating a case. See Alexander v. City of

Syracuse, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2021 WL 5628726, at *23

(N.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2021) (this Court lamenting need to move for summary

judgment sua sponte to close case because same attorneys failed to

meaningfully defend against obviously defective claim). Its strategy of filing

no motions and relying exclusively on crossclaims for contribution does a

powerful disservice to its clients while showing a profound disrespect for this

Court’s time and resources by saddling it with the burden of cleaning up

claims and cases that have no business proceeding forward.

Root’s counsel are attorneys appearing before a federal court. As a result,

they have an obligation to zealously represent their clients. The Court hopes

that they rise to that obligation going forward. If they do not, the

consequences might grow beyond needing to conduct discovery on what is

likely a futile claim. In any case, Golden’s malicious prosecution claim

against Root must proceed.

V. CONCLUSION

Despite Gagné’s best arguments to the contrary, Golden has plausibly

alleged a malicious prosecution claim against him. Meanwhile, the malicious

prosecution claim against Root—though on much more awkward footing—

must also proceed given his failure to move to dismiss that claim. This case

must therefore proceed to discovery against both defendants.

Therefore, it is

ORDERED that

1. Defendant John Gagné’s motion to dismiss plaintiff Roderick Golden’s

amended complaint is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part;

2. Plaintiff Roderick Golden’s Fourth Amendment claims for false arrest

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are DISMISSED against all defendants;

3. Plaintiff Roderick Golden’s claims for malicious prosecution under

42 U.S.C. § 1983 remain for discovery against both defendants; and

4. Defendant John Gagné is directed to answer plaintiff Roderick Golden’s

amended complaint no later than Monday, February 21, 2022.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 10, 2022 Ge

Utica, New York. U.S. District Judge

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