The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
________________________________
LONNIE LEE HAMILTON,
as Administrator of the Estate
of Lonnie Lamont Hamilton,
9:19-cv-257
Plaintiff, (GLS/ATB)
v.
JOSEPH MEAD et al.,
Defendants.
________________________________
APPEARANCES: OF COUNSEL:
FOR THE PLAINTIFF:
Office of Richard L. Giampa RICHARD L. GIAMPA, ESQ.
860 Grand Concourse
Suite 1H
Bronx, NY 10451
FOR THE DEFENDANTS:
Hon. Letitia James BRENDA T. BADDAM
New York State Attorney General C. HARRIS DAGUE
The Capitol Assistant Attorneys General
Albany, NY 12224
Gary L. Sharpe
Senior District Judge
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
I. Introduction
Plaintiff Lonnie Lee Hamilton (hereinafter “plaintiff”), as administrator
of the estate of Lonnie Lamont Hamilton (hereinafter “Hamilton”),
commenced this civil rights action against defendants Joseph Mead and
Alfred Zeina in the New York State Supreme Court, Bronx County.
(Compl., Dkt. No. 1, Attach. 1.) Defendants subsequently removed the
action to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. (Dkt. No. 1.) Shortly
thereafter, defendants filed a motion to change venue, which was granted,
and the action was transferred to this District. (Dkt. Nos. 13, 27.) Now
pending is defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment. (Dkt.
No. 48.) For the reasons that follow, the motion is denied.
II. Background1
Hamilton was an inmate incarcerated at Marcy Correctional Facility
(hereinafter “Marcy C.F.”), where he was serving an indeterminate
sentence of two-to-six years for robbery. (Defs.’ Statement of Material
1 Plaintiff’s opposition to defendants’ motion fails to comply with Local Rule 56.1. (See
generally Dkt. No. 51.) According to the Local Rules of this District, the party opposing a
summary judgment motion must file a separate response to the statement of material facts,
and that response “shall mirror the movant’s [s]tatement of [m]aterial [f]acts by admitting
and/or denying each of the movant’s assertions in a short and concise statement, in matching
numbered paragraphs.” N.D.N.Y. L.R. 56.1(b). If the opposing party fails to do so, as plaintiff
did here, “[t]he [c]ourt may deem admitted any properly supported facts set forth in the
[s]tatement of [m]aterial [f]acts that the opposing party does not specifically controvert.” Id.
Accordingly, the court deems admitted defendants’ statement of material facts, which are
properly supported and unopposed.
2
Facts (SMF) ¶¶ 1-2, Dkt. No. 48, Attach. 1.) Hamilton, who had previously
stated that he wanted to “hurt himself,” was considered an Office of Mental
Health (OMH) Level 2 inmate, “which describes an individual who needs or
may need psychiatric treatment for a major mental disorder and requires
housing in a facility with full time OMH staff.”2 (Dkt. No. 51 at 4.) On
March 15, 2016, he was found “attempting to tie a sheet around his neck,”
and was placed on “1:1 watch by OMH staff.” (Id.) However, Hamilton
was removed from that watch the next day, and his prescriptions for
Prozac and Haldol were discontinued. (Id.)
On March 18, 2016, at approximately 11:24 A.M., while Mead was
conducting an “observational round” of Marcy C.F.’s Special Housing Unit
(SHU), Mead observed Hamilton “hanging from a ceiling grate by a ligature
made from a bed sheet tied around his neck.” (Defs.’ SMF ¶¶ 3-5.) One of
Hamilton’s legs was touching the bed, “causing [d]efendants uncertainty as
2 Notably, plaintiff’s counsel has violated the Local Rules by filing an attorney affidavit
replete with legal arguments, in which he also includes his statement of additional facts rather
than as a separate document. (See generally Dkt. No. 51); N.D.N.Y. L.R. 7.1(b)(2) (“An
affidavit must not contain legal arguments but must contain factual and procedural background
that is relevant to the motion the affidavit supports.”). Ordinarily, the affidavit would not be
considered. See N.D.N.Y. L.R. 7.1(a)(3); Bruno v. City of Schenectady, No. 12-CV-0285,
2014 WL 2707962, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. June 16, 2014) (“[B]riefadavits . . . are impermissible in this
District.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). However, here, the court
considered it out of solicitude to plaintiff and in the interest of judicial economy. Additionally,
as defendants chose not to file a reply in further support of their motion for partial summary
judgment, the additional facts proffered by plaintiff are unopposed.
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to whether [he] was faking a suicide attempt.” (Id. ¶ 7.) Mead notified
Zeina, who instructed the SHU “bubble officer” to contact a supervisor,
Sergeant Keith Marshall. (Id. ¶¶ 6, 8-9.) Marshall arrived a few minutes
later, at which time, he, along with Mead and Zeina, entered Hamilton’s cell
and cut the ligature down. (Id. ¶¶ 9-11.) A call for medical emergency
response was made at the same time. (Id. ¶ 12.)
Marshall and Mead started CPR at approximately 11:29 A.M. while
Zeina retrieved the AED and “Ambu bag,” and Marcy C.F. nurses arrived
four minutes later to assist. (Id. ¶¶ 13, 15-16.) External EMS was called
for further assistance shortly thereafter. (Id. ¶ 17.) Hamilton was declared
dead approximately one hour after Mead found him. (Dkt. No. 51 at 4.)
According to plaintiff, the following testimony was gleaned from a
subsequent investigation: (1) inmates housed near Hamilton testified that
defendants had a “personal vendetta” against Hamilton and denied him
recreation time and lunch on the day of his suicide; (2) the same inmates
testified that Hamilton was heard “complaining about not receiving
recreation and lunch as well as threatening several times to hang himself if
he does not get food”; (3) an inmate testified that he heard an officer
respond to Hamilton’s complaints by yelling “aren’t you supposed to be
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killing yourself”; and (4) a different inmate testified that, in response to
Hamilton’s complaints, defendants made additional negative comments
such as “save [your] breath,” “you don’t need food, you’re going to be dead
anyway,” “you should just kill yourself,” and “do us a favor and kill yourself.”
(Id. at 5.)
The investigation also resulted in testimony from certain inmates that,
when Mead saw Hamilton standing on his bed at 11:00 A.M., defendants
said “he is trying to kill himself,” but they did not check on him again until
“some twenty minutes later.” (Id. at 6.) According to an inmate, Mead told
Zeina not to call for help because “it’s going to be a lot of paper work.”
(Id.) Plaintiff asserts that Hamilton’s cell door was opened for at least
twenty-eight minutes after Mead first observed Hamilton standing on his
bed, and several minutes after he observed Hamilton hanging before he
was provided medical care. (Id.)
Plaintiff commenced this action on October 23, 2018, alleging an
Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to medical needs claim and a
First Amendment claim, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Compl. ¶¶ 32-56.)
Defendants now move for partial summary judgment, asserting that
plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim should be dismissed. (Dkt. No. 48.)
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III. Discussion
Defendants contend that plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim should
be dismissed on the merits, or, in the alternative, based on the doctrine of
qualified immunity. (See generally Dkt. No. 48, Attach. 2.)
A. Deliberate Indifference
Under the Eighth Amendment, a claim of deliberate indifference to
serious medical needs has two requirements. See Spavone v. N.Y. State
Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 719 F.3d 127, 138 (2d Cir. 2013). “The first
requirement is . . . [that] the alleged deprivation of adequate medical care
must be sufficiently serious.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). “The second requirement is . . . [that] the [defendants] must be
subjectively reckless in their denial of medical care.” Id. (citation omitted).
Thus, the deliberate indifference standard has both objective and
subjective components. See id.
“The objective component requires that the alleged deprivation must
be sufficiently serious, in the sense that a condition of urgency, one that
may produce death, degeneration, or extreme pain exists.” Hill v.
Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). In situations where medical attention is given, but is
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alleged to be objectively inadequate, “the seriousness inquiry focuses on
the challenged delay or interruption in treatment rather than the prisoner’s
underlying medical condition alone.” Davis v. Parker, No. 9:16-CV-1474,
2020 WL 5848779, at * 6 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2020) (internal quotation marks,
alteration, and citation omitted). In these cases, “the relevant time period
begins when a defendant becomes aware of facts from which he could,
and does, infer that a substantial risk of serious harm exists.” Id. (citation
omitted).
The subjective component requires a plaintiff to demonstrate “that
the defendant acted with the requisite culpable mental state similar to that
of criminal recklessness.” Shabazz v. Howard, No. 9:12-CV-1372, 2015
WL 5604662, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2015) (citations omitted); see also
Lawrence v. Evans, 669 F. App’x 27, 28 (2d Cir. 2016) (“To satisfy the
subjective component, a plaintiff must establish the equivalent of criminal
recklessness, i.e., that the charged official act[ed] or fail[ed] to act while
actually aware of a substantial risk that serious inmate harm will result.”
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). In this regard, “[a] plaintiff
must demonstrate that a defendant acted with reckless disregard to a
known risk of substantial harm.” Shabazz, 2015 WL 5604662, at *4
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(citation omitted).
Defendants concede for purposes of their motion that the objective
component of plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim is satisfied, as suicide
and “a history of depression and suicide attempts” constitute a sufficiently
serious medical condition. (Dkt. No. 48, Attach. 2 at 7 (citation omitted).)
However, they contend that the complaint does not satisfy the subjective
component because they “acted immediately upon discovering [Hamilton]
to obtain supervisory assistance,” and, thus, “acted constitutionally.” (Id.)
In response, plaintiff contends that correction officers, like defendants,
have a duty to administer life-saving care and are forbidden from waiting
for medical staff to arrive before initiating that care. (Dkt. No. 51 at 8-9.)
Plaintiff also notes that “it is important to consider the events leading to
plaintiff committing suicide,” which are unaddressed by defendants. (Id. at
4.)
Notably, in his complaint, plaintiff supports his Eighth Amendment
claim with many allegations that take place prior to Hamilton’s suicide,
including that Hamilton had previously attempted suicide and was
threatening to do so again, and that, to “punish” him for the “trouble” this
caused defendants, they “denied [him] food and recreation time and
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goaded and encouraged [him] to commit suicide.” (Compl. ¶ 20.) Indeed,
plaintiff alleges that defendants “sprayed [Hamilton] with a fire
extinguisher” and “blasted the air conditioning to freeze him and prevent
him from talking with other inmates through the vents.” (Id. ¶¶ 22, 24.)
And, upon Hamilton’s request for food, defendants said, “I thought you’re
going to kill yourself,” “you should just kill yourself,” “you don’t need food,
you’re going to be dead anyway,” and “do us a favor and kill yourself.” (Id.
¶ 23.) Plaintiff also alleges that Hamilton was left unattended from
11:00 A.M. to 11:24 A.M. despite the fact that he was threatening suicide
and had a history of suicidal ideation. (Id. ¶¶ 16-17, 29-30.)
Despite all of these allegations, defendants do not mention any facts
in support of the pending motion other than those that took place from the
moment they found Hamilton hanging in his cell to the moment he was
declared deceased. (See generally Dkt. No. 48.) Indeed, they expressly
state that, in their view, those facts are all that is necessary to resolve the
pending motion. (Id., Attach. 2 at 4.) But it is clear from a review of
plaintiff’s counsel’s opposition affidavit, (See generally Dkt. No. 51), that
more facts exist that are crucial to determining whether plaintiff has
satisfied the subjective component of his Eighth Amendment claim. That is
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to say, it may or may not be true that defendants acted constitutionally
upon finding Hamilton hanging from the ceiling grate, but the additional
facts that could establish plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim are simply
unaddressed by them.
Accordingly, there is an issue of fact with respect to whether
defendants were reckless as to a known risk of substantial harm, see
Lawrence, 669 F. App’x at 28; Shabazz, 2015 WL 5604662, at *4, and,
thus, whether defendants acted, or failed to act, with the requisite
subjective intent. On the one hand, defendants have set forth supported
and unopposed facts to show that defendants did not immediately render
aid because they thought Hamilton could be faking his suicide attempt and
wanted to wait for a supervisor, (Def.’s SMF ¶¶ 7-8), which they argue was
reasonable and not reckless, (Dkt. No. 48, Attach. 2 at 6-11). On the other
hand, plaintiff has set forth unopposed facts to show that defendants acted
with recklessness in that they were aware of a substantial risk of suicide,
and, instead of addressing that concern, they refused him food, mocked
him and encouraged him to commit suicide, and left him unattended for
more than twenty minutes after seeing him standing on his bed and
threatening suicide. (Dkt. No. 51 at 5-6.)
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Accordingly, there is a genuine issue as to a material fact with
respect to this aspect of plaintiff’s claim, and defendants’ motion for partial
summary judgment is denied. See Zimmerman v. Pautz, No. 12-CV-
00763A, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97763, at *49 (W.D.N.Y. Jun. 2, 2020)
(denying summary judgment and finding that the unopposed fact “that
Plaintiff not only was threatening to take his own life, but also had the
means to do so, raises an issue of fact as to whether [defendant]’s
asserted response, i.e., alerting prison staff to Plaintiff’s condition and
requesting additional rounds to check on Plaintiff, was sufficient” (citation
omitted)); Barrett v. Livingston County, No. 14-CV-6593, 2019 WL
1083027, at *11 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2019) (denying summary judgment and
finding that “a reasonable jury could find that [the defendant] acted with
deliberate indifference,” where there was evidence that the defendant
“knew there was an acute risk that [the plaintiff] would attempt suicide,”
and “took no action in response”); Engles v. Jones, No. 6:13-cv-6461, 2018
WL 6832085, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 2018) (finding that a genuine issue
of material fact existed where inmate threatened suicide and correctional
officer took no action).
B. Qualified Immunity
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Qualified immunity shields government employees from liability under
Section 1983 in two circumstances: “(1) their conduct did not violate clearly
established rights of which a reasonable person would have known, or (2)
it was objectively reasonable to believe that their acts did not violate these
clearly established rights.” Cornejo v. Bell, 592 F.3d 121, 128 (2d Cir.
2010) (internal quotation marks, alteration, and citations omitted). “A right
is clearly established when the contours of the right are sufficiently clear
that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates
that right.” Jackler v. Byrne, 658 F.3d 225, 242 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal
quotation marks, alterations, and citation omitted).
Qualified immunity attaches if “officers of reasonable competence
could disagree on the legality of the action at issue in its particular factual
context.” Dancy v. McGinley, 843 F.3d 93, 106 (2d Cir. 2016) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). In essence, the doctrine of qualified
immunity provides protection to “all but the plainly incompetent or those
who knowingly violate the law.” Id. (citation omitted).
Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity
because there exists “a profound lack of clarity” in the case law as to
whether there is “a constitutional obligation for a law enforcement official to
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perform CPR before the imminent arrival of medical personnel.” (Dkt.
No. 48, Attach. 2 at 11-12.) In response, plaintiff argues that qualified
immunity does not apply here because Second Circuit case law “was well
established ‘that prison officials have a duty to administer life-saving care
even in the absence of a pulse or respiration where circumstances indicate
the possibility of a very recent death and the individuals are available to
give such care.” (Dkt. No. 51 at 3 (citation omitted).)
The doctrine of qualified immunity does not bar plaintiff’s Eighth
Amendment claim because, as explained above, there are unaddressed
issues of fact with respect to events that took place before Hamilton was
found hanging from the ceiling grate. As such, it is unclear whether
defendants were not “plainly incompetent” or did not “knowingly violate the
law” in their actions and inactions. See Dancy, 843 F.3d at 106.
IV. Conclusion
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment
(Dkt. No. 48) is DENIED; and it is further
ORDERED that this case is now deemed trial ready and a trial
scheduling order will be issued in due course; and it is further
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ORDERED that the clerk provide a copy of this Memorandum-
Decision and Order to the parties.
IT 1S SO ORDERED.
September 7, 2021
Albany, New York
D.Disinict Judge
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