The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_____________________________________
BRUCE INGRAHAM; HOLLY INGRAHAM,
Plaintiffs,
v.
1:20-CV-1188
SUSAN CASEY; JOHN CASEY, (BKS/CFH)
Defendants.
_____________________________________
APPEARANCES:
Bruce & Holly Ingraham
P.O. Box 861
Lake Pleasant, New York 12108
Plaintiffs pro se
CHRISTIAN F. HUMMEL
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
REPORT-RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER
I. In Forma Pauperis
Plaintiffs pro se Bruce Ingraham and Holly Ingraham (“Plaintiffs”) purported to
commence this action against Susan Casey and John Casey (“Defendants”) on
September 18, 2020, by filing a complaint. Dkt. No. 1. In lieu of paying this Court’s
filing fee, plaintiffs each filed Motions to Proceed in Forma Pauperis (“IFP”). Dkt. Nos.
7, 9. After reviewing Plaintiffs’ IFP applications, Dkt. Nos. 7, 9, the undersigned
determines that Plaintiffs qualify to proceed IFP for purposes of filing.1
1 Plaintiffs are advised that, despite being granted IFP status, they will still be required to pay any fees
and costs they may incur in this action, including, but not limited to, copying fees, transcript fees, and
witness fees.
II. Initial Review
A. Legal Standard
Section 1915 of Title 28 of the United States Code directs that, when a plaintiff
seeks to proceed IFP, “the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court
determines that . . . the action or appeal (i) is frivolous or malicious, (ii) fails to state a
claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant
who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Thus, it is a court’s
responsibility to determine whether a plaintiff may properly maintain his complaint
before permitting him to proceed with his action.
Where, as here, the plaintiff proceeds pro se, “the court must construe his
submissions liberally and interpret them to raise the strongest arguments that they
suggest.” Kirkland v. Cablevisions Sys., 760 F.3d 223, 224 (2d Cir. 2014) (per curiam)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Although detailed allegations are not required at the
pleading stage, the complaint must still include enough facts to provide the defendants
with notice of the claims against them and the grounds upon which these claims are
based. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 556 (2007). Ultimately, the plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
Pleading guidelines are set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Fed. R.
Civ. P.”). Specifically, Rule 8 provides that a pleading which sets forth a claim for relief
shall contain, among other things, “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). “The purpose . . . is to give fair
notice of the claim being asserted so as to permit the adverse party the opportunity to
file a responsive answer, prepare an adequate defense and determine whether the
doctrine of res judicata is applicable.” Flores v. Graphtex, 189 F.R.D. 54, 54 (N.D.N.Y.
1999) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Rule 8 also requires the
pleading to include:
(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s
jurisdiction . . .
(2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief; and
(3) a demand for the relief sought . . . .
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a). Although “[n]o technical form is required,” the Federal Rules make
clear that each allegation contained in the pleading “must be simple, concise, and
direct.” Id. at 8(d)(1).
Further, Rule 10 of the Federal Rules provides in pertinent part that:
[a] party must state its claims or defenses in numbered paragraphs, each
limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances. A later
pleading may refer by number to a paragraph in an earlier pleading. If
doing so would promote clarity, each claim founded on a separate
transaction or occurrence – and each defense other than a denial – must
be stated in a separate count or defense.
FED. R. CIV. P. 10(b). This serves the purpose of “provid[ing] an easy mode of
identification for referring to a particular paragraph in a prior pleading[.]” Flores, 189
F.R.D. at 54 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
A complaint that fails to comply with the pleading requirements “presents far too
heavy a burden in terms of defendants’ duty to shape a comprehensive defense and
provides no meaningful basis for the Court to assess the sufficiency of their claims.”
Gonzales v. Wing, 167 F.R.D. 352, 355 (N.D.N.Y 1996). As the Second Circuit has
held, “[w]hen a complaint does not comply with the requirement that it be short and
plain, the court has the power, on its own initiative . . . to dismiss the complaint.”
Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). However,
“[d]ismissal . . . is usually reserved for those cases in which the complaint is so
confused, ambiguous, vague, or otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is
well disguised.” Id. (citations omitted). A court should not dismiss a complaint if the
plaintiff has stated “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant
is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at
556).
B. Plaintiff’s Complaint2
Under the “Facts” section of Plaintiffs’ complaint, they provide a list of apparent
claims: “unwarranted eviction,” “animal cruelty,” “deplation [sic] of chartcher [sic],” “civil
prevition [sic],” “housing discrimination,” and “pre estate tempering [sic].” Dkt. No. 1 at
2-6. Under the “Prayer for Relief” section of the form complaint, Plaintiffs seek
damages for “unpaided [sic] medical [expenses] in 2 hundered [sic] and 40 million and
or attorney [sic] fees.” Dkt. No. 1 at 7.
C. Analysis
2 The Court notes that Plaintiffs have commenced several actions in this District, many of which have
been dismissed. See Ingraham v. Red Carpet Housing Corp., 1:17-CV-1076 (GLS/CFH) (dismissed Dec.
21, 2017); Ingraham v. Cumo et al., 1:20-CV-147 (TJM/CFH) (dismissed Aug. 31, 2020); Ingraham v.
Mayfield State Troppers et al., 1:20-CV-1186 (GLS/TWD) (dismissed Jan. 25, 2021); Ingraham v.
Palentine Motel, 1:20-CV-1187 (GLS/ML) (pending), 20-CV-1187 (pending), Ingraham v. St. Mary Hosp.,
et al., 1:20-CV-1189 (MAD/CFH) (pending).
First, Plaintiffs’ complaint fails to comply with Rule 10. FED. R. CIV. P. 10. Their
claims are listed in one long paragraph, and it is unclear which factual allegations are
intended to support each of Plaintiffs’ claims. See Dkt. No. 1. Even applying special
solicitude, Plaintiffs’ claims are not presented in a way that “promote[s] clarity.” FED. R.
CIV. P. 10(b). As such, the complaint fails to meet the form for pleadings set out in Rule
10.
Second, Plaintiffs’ complaint fails to meet the guidelines of Rule 8 or the pleading
requirements set out by the Supreme Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. Plaintiffs may be seeking to plead claims for
wrongful eviction and battery based on the allegations of an “unwarranted eviction” and
the mention of medical bills. Dkt. No. 1 at 2, 7. However, Rule 8 requires that a plaintiff
establish “the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction,” and Plaintiffs fail to establish that this
Court has jurisdiction. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(1). To establish this Court’s jurisdiction, a
plaintiff must show that the claims arise from a federal question, as set out in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331, or that the requirements for diversity jurisdiction, as set out in 28 U.S.C. § 1332,
are met. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, § 1332(a).
Plaintiffs’ complaint is filed on a form complaint for civil rights violations under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a cause of action when a person “under
color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . .
subjects . . . any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Plaintiffs’ complaint does not indicate that Defendants acted under the color of state law
in causing the alleged harm, or that any of the harms Plaintiffs allegedly suffered involve
rights secured by the Constitution. Dkt. No. 1 at 2-5. It is well settled that “the under-
color-of-state-law element of § 1983 excludes from its reach merely private conduct, no
matter how discriminatory or wrongful.” 7 Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S.
40, 50 (1999) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, a plaintiff must
allege facts showing that a defendant was a state actor or a private party acting under
color of state law. Ciambriello v. County of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 323 (2d Cir. 2002);
United States v. Int'l Broth. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of
Am., 941 F.2d 1292, 1295-96 (2d Cir. 1991) (“Because the United States Constitution
regulates only the Government, not private parties, a litigant claiming that his
constitutional rights have been violated must first establish that the challenged conduct
constitutes ‘state action.’ ”). As there is no indication that Defendants are state actors or
private parties acting under the color of state law nor any suggestion that Defendants
deprived Plaintiffs of rights or privileges secured by the Constitution or federal law,
Plaintiffs fail to demonstrate that their complaint arises under section 1983. Plaintiffs’
complaint also fails to set forth any claims suggesting that it arises under any other
federal statute. See Dkt. No. 1. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, “district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution [or] laws . . . of the
United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. As will be discussed further below, it appears
Plaintiffs are seeking redress for eviction, battery, and defamation, claims which would
arise under state law. See Dkt. No. 1. As Plaintiffs do not establish that any of their
claims arise under any Constitutional provision or federal statute, they have not
demonstrated federal question jurisdiction.
To establish diversity jurisdiction, a plaintiff must show that there is complete
diversity among the parties and that the amount in question in the case exceeds
$75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Plaintiffs provide that both they and Defendants reside
in New York. Dkt. No. 1 at 1. Thus, the action is not between “citizens of different
[s]tates,” and Plaintiffs cannot establish diversity jurisdiction. U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). As
Plaintiffs have not established federal question or diversity jurisdiction, their complaint
fails to demonstrate the grounds for jurisdiction. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(1) (noting that
a pleading must contain “a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s
jurisdiction[.]”).
In addition, Plaintiffs complaint must fail because they do not set forth a short and
plain statement showing that they are entitled to relief not set forth any factual content
allowing the Court to “draw the reasonable inference that” Defendants are liable for the
allegations presented. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly,
550 U.S. at 556); see Dkt. No. 1 at 2-6. Plaintiffs support their apparent claim for
unwarranted eviction with an allegation that they were served with orders to vacate from
an unspecified individual. Dkt. No. 1 at 2. The complaint provides no context for this
statement; no indication as to how the eviction violates any right protected by the
Constitution, federal statute, or state law; nor any cognizable factual support for how, if
at all, Defendants were involved in the eviction or any other alleged wrong. Thus, the
complaint does not allow the Court to reasonably infer that Defendants violated any
federal statute or state law through their apparent service of an eviction notice. Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678; Dkt. No. 1 at 2-3.
Similarly, Plaintiffs appear to seek to set forth a state law claim for battery with
their allegation that an unidentified individual kicked in their door and injured Ms.
Ingraham. Dkt. No. 1 at 2-3. However, Plaintiffs again fail to plead that Defendants
were even the ones who kicked in the door. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2); Dkt. No. 1 at 2-
3. Finally, it is possible that Plaintiffs are seeking to set forth a claim for defamation
insofar as they state “deplation [sic] of chartcher.” Dkt. No. 1 at 3. However, Plaintiffs
provide no context or decipherable facts for what would be this state law claim. Id.
Plaintiffs also seek damages for claims such as “civil prevtion [sic]” and “pre estate
tempering [sic].” Dkt. No. 1 at 6. These allegations are indecipherable. See Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678. As such, these claims also fail to give the Court grounds to reasonably
infer that Defendants are liable to Plaintiffs for these claims. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Even if, arguendo, Plaintiffs had set forth sufficient facts to support their apparent
eviction, defamation, or battery claims, these are state law claims. As Plaintiffs have
not pleaded a viable federal claim establishing that this Court has federal question
jurisdiction and cannot establish diversity jurisdiction, the Court need not exercise its
supplemental jurisdiction to review the state law claims. 28 U.S.C. § § 1332(a);
1367(a).
Generally, a court should not dismiss a complaint filed by a pro se litigant without
granting leave to amend at least once “when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any
indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Branum v. Clark, 927 F.2d 698, 704-05
(2d Cir. 1991). However, an opportunity to amend is not required where “[t]he problem
with [the plaintiff’s] cause[] of action is substantive” and cannot be cured because the
plaintiff “is unable to allege any fact sufficient to support [his] claim.” Cuoco v.
Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000); Cortec Indus. Inc. v. Sum Holding L.P., 949
F.2d 42, 48 (2d Cir. 1991).
In sum, Plaintiffs fail to establish either diversity or federal question jurisdiction.
Even if Plaintiffs were able to present a clearer picture of the facts and claims through
an amended pleading, because they plead only state law claims relating to an apparent
eviction, battery, and defamation of character, because this Court does not have subject
matter jurisdiction, an amended pleading will be futile. Accordingly, the undersigned
recommends that the complaint be dismissed with prejudice and without opportunity to
amend.
III. Conclusion
WHEREFORE, for the reasons stated herein, it is hereby
ORDERED, that Plaintiffs’ motions to proceed IFP (Dkt. Nos. 7, 9) be GRANTED
for the purposes of this filing only; and it is
RECOMMENDED, that Plaintiffs’ complaint (Dkt. No. 1) be DISMISSED with
prejudice, and it is
ORDERED, that the Clerk of the Court serve this Report-Recommendation &
Order on Plaintiffs in accordance with the Local Rules.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), Plaintiffs have FOURTEEN (14) days within
which to file written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed
with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN
FOURTEEN (14) DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. Roldan v. Racette,
984 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 892
F.2d 15, 16 (2d Cir. 1989)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. Civ. P. 72 & 6(a).°
Dated: May 12, 2021
Albany, New York
Christian F. Hummel
USS. Magistrate Judge
3 If you are proceeding pro se and are served with this Report-Recommendation & Order by mail, three
(3) additional days will be added to the fourteen (14) day period, meaning that you have seventeen (17)
days from the date the Report-Recommendation & Order was mailed to you to serve and file objections.
FED. R. Civ. P. 6(d). If the last day of that prescribed period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday,
then the deadline is extended until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal
holiday. Id. § 6(a)(1)(c).
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