Opinion

Sripirom v. Rivers Casino and Resort

Court
District Court, N.D. New York
Filed
Dec 10, 2019
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 26.8%

holding that a pro se party's failure to object to a report and recommendation does not waive his right to appellate review unless the report explicitly states that failure to object will preclude appellate review and specifically cites 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rules 72, 6(a

How later courts described this case

  • holding that a pro se party's failure to object to a report and recommendation does not waive his right to appellate review unless the report explicitly states that failure to object will preclude appellate review and specifically cites 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rules 72, 6(a
  • "As a rule, a party's failure to object to any 3 purported error or omission in a magistrate judge's report waives further judicial review of the point"

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

____________________________________________

COOMPORN SRIPIROM,

Plaintiff,

vs. 1:19-cv-317

(MAD/ATB)

RIVERS CASINO AND RESORT,

Defendant.

____________________________________________

APPEARANCES: OF COUNSEL:

COOMPORN SRIPIROM

2115 Central Avenue, Apt. 2A

Schenectady, New York 12304

Plaintiff, pro se

Mae A. D'Agostino, U.S. District Judge:

DECISION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Coomporn Sripirom commenced this action pro se on March 13, 2019, by filing a

42 U.S.C. § 1983 form complaint. See Dkt. No. 1. Magistrate Judge Andrew T. Baxter reviewed

the complaint and concluded that Plaintiff may have also been attempting to interpose an

employment discrimination claim against Defendant Rivers Casino and Resort. See Dkt. No. 8 at

1. Magistrate Judge Baxter directed the Clerk to send Plaintiff materials to amend the complaint

to state such a claim, along with an Order granting Plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis

("IFP") and denying Plaintiff's request for court-appointed counsel. See id. at 1-2. That

correspondence was returned undeliverable. See id. at 2. Now before the Court is Magistrate

Judge Baxter's August 29, 2019, Report-Recommendation in which it is recommended that the

Court dismiss Plaintiff's complaint without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and

due to his failure to update his address with the Court. See id. at 5-6.

II. BACKGROUND

In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant unfairly fired him for saying a "bad

word" while at work. See Dkt. No. 1 at 2. Plaintiff states that at the time of the alleged incident,

he had been with a coworker whom Defendant did not terminate. See id. Plaintiff then went to

collect unemployment and was denied. See id. Plaintiff became upset, forcing Defendant to call

security. See id. Plaintiff's causes of action are 1) that he was unfairly terminated, 2) that he was

denied unemployment when he was terminated, and 3) that he will suffer because of the loss of

his full time job. See id. at 3. Plaintiff seeks relief in the form of lost wages and income. See id.

at 4.

In his April 1, 2019, Decision and Order, Magistrate Judge Baxter granted Plaintiff

permission to proceed IFP, but denied Plaintiff's request for court-appointed counsel as

premature. See Dkt. No. 6 at 8-9. Because Magistrate Judge Baxter granted Plaintiff IFP status,

he was compelled to consider the sufficiency of Plaintiff's complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).

See id. at 3. Magistrate Judge Baxter found that Plaintiff's complaint did not state a 42 U.S.C. §

1983 ("Section 1983") or employment discrimination claim. See Dkt. No. 6 at 4-6. Magistrate

Judge Baxter sent to Plaintiff forms for complaints under Title VII, the Americans with

Disabilities Act, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act; referred Plaintiff to the Pro Se

Assistance Program; and gave Plaintiff forty-five days to amend his complaint. Id. at 9. The

Clerk of the Court mailed the forms with Magistrate Judge Baxter's Order on the same day the

Order was issued, but all were returned undeliverable. See Dkt. No. 8 at 2 & n.2.

2

Magistrate Judge Baxter issued his Report-Recommendation on August 29, 2019, finding

that Plaintiff's failure to maintain a current address violates Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure and Local Rules 10.1(b) and 41.2(b), and thus militates in favor of dismissal. See

Dkt. No. 8 at 2-3. Magistrate Judge Baxter further recommended dismissal of the Section 1983

claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because the claim involves private conduct, which

Section 1983 does not reach. See id. at 3. Finally, Magistrate Judge Baxter found that Plaintiff

did not allege facts related to three out of four elements of an employment discrimination claim,

and recommended dismissal. See id. at 5. Neither party has lodged objections to Magistrate

Judge Baxter's Report-Recommendation within the statutory fourteen-day period.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

When a party files specific objections to a magistrate judge's order and report-

recommendation, the district court "make[s] a de novo determination of those portions of the

report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made." 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1)(C). However, "[g]eneral or conclusory objections, or objections which merely recite

the same arguments presented to the magistrate judge, are reviewed for clear error." O'Diah v.

Mawhir, No. 9:08-CV-322, 2011 WL 933846, *2 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2011) (citations and

footnote omitted). After the appropriate review, "the court may accept, reject, or modify, in

whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge." 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1)(C).

A litigant's failure to file objections to a magistrate judge's report and recommendation,

even when that litigant is proceeding pro se, waives any challenge to the report on appeal. See

Cephas v. Nash, 328 F.3d 98, 107 (2d Cir. 2003) ("As a rule, a party's failure to object to any

3

purported error or omission in a magistrate judge's report waives further judicial review of the

point") (citation omitted). A pro se litigant must be given notice of this rule; notice is sufficient if

it informs the litigant that the failure to timely object will result in the waiver of further judicial

review and cites pertinent statutory and civil rules authority. See Frank v. Johnson, 968 F.2d 298,

299 (2d Cir. 1992); Small v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 892 F.2d 15, 16 (2d Cir. 1989)

(holding that a pro se party's failure to object to a report and recommendation does not waive his

right to appellate review unless the report explicitly states that failure to object will preclude

appellate review and specifically cites 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rules 72, 6(a), and former 6(e)

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).

Magistrate Judge Baxter's Report-Recommendation adequately notifies the parties of the

deadline for the filing of objections and the waiver of appellate review that failure to file brings.

See Dkt. No. 8 at 6. As neither litigant filed objections, the Court reviews Magistrate Judge

Baxter's Report-Recommendation for clear error.

B. Dismissal for Failure to Update Address

A court may dismiss an action or claim for failure to prosecute or for failure to comply

with a court order or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). The Local

Rules of the Northern District of New York require pro se litigants to inform the Court

immediately of any change of address, and authorize dismissal of an action for failing to do so.

See N.D.N.Y. L.R. 10(c)(2), 41.2(b).

Since the return of the employment discrimination complaint forms and IFP Order

strongly suggests Plaintiff moved without leaving a forwarding address with the Court,

Magistrate Judge Baxter did not clearly err in recommending dismissal of this action without

prejudice for violation of the Local Rules.

4

C. Dismissal of Section 1983 Claim for Lack of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

Section 1983 authorizes a right of action against a defendant who under color of state law

violates a plaintiff's rights, privileges, or immunities secured by federal statute or the U.S.

Constitution. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012); Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-

50 (1999). "[M]erely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful," falls outside

the scope of Section 1983. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 526 U.S. at 50 (quoting Blum v. Yaretsky,

457 U.S. 991, 1005 (1982)).

Generally, district courts have original jurisdiction over Section 1983 claims. See 42

U.S.C. § 1343(a). However, where the complaint fails to allege that the defendant acted under

color of state law, the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the claim. See Polk County v.

Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 336 (1981).

Here, Defendant is a private entity alleged to have terminated Plaintiff's private

employment, which is a claim "manifestly devoid of merit" under Section 1983's under color of

state law requirement. Thus, Magistrate Judge Baxter did not err in his review of Plaintiff's

complaint and the Court accepts his recommendation to dismiss Plaintiff's Section 1983 action

without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

D. Employment Discrimination

Generally, to satisfactorily plead a claim of employment discrimination under Title VII,

"absent direct evidence of discrimination, what must be plausibly supported by facts alleged in

the complaint is that the plaintiff is a member of a protected class, was qualified, suffered an

adverse employment action, and has at least minimal support for the proposition that the

employer was motivated by discriminatory intent." Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297,

311 (2d Cir. 2015).

5

In the present matter, Magistrate Judge Baxter did not err in finding that Plaintiff's

liberally construed complaint does not sufficiently plead an employment discrimination cause of

action. While the complaint mentions disparate treatment, the best that can be plausibly gleaned

from the pleading is that Plaintiff was terminated for swearing at work, Plaintiff thinks he should

have faced some lesser sanction than termination for that behavior, and that Plaintiff's coworker

was not terminated despite possibly committing the same violation. Those facts alone do not

plausibly allege all of the elements of an employment discrimination claim. As such, Magistrate

Judge Baxter correctly determined that, to the extent Plaintiff is attempting to bring an

employment discrimination claim under Title VII, the claim must be dismissed.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the Court hereby

ORDERS that Magistrate Judge Baxter's Report-Recommendation (Dkt. No. 8) is

ADOPTED in its entirety for the reasons stated therein; and the Court further

ORDERS that Plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice; and the Court

further

ORDERS that the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment in Defendant's favor and close

this case; and the Court further

ORDERS that the Clerk of the Court shall serve a copy of this Decision and Order on the

parties in accordance with the Local Rules.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 10, 2019 7 of

Albany, New York J) 4 ie DP (fps ote, :

Mae A. D‘ Agostino”

U.S. District Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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