The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
____________________________________________
WILLIAM R.,
Plaintiff,
vs. 1:18-cv-01452
(MAD)
ANDREW SAUL,
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
____________________________________________
APPEARANCES: OF COUNSEL:
LEGAL AID SOCIETY OF MARY MARTHA WITHINGTON, ESQ.
NORTHEASTERN NEW YORK
40 New Street
Saratoga Springs, New York 12866
Attorney for Plaintiff
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION DANIEL STICE TARABELLI, ESQ.
Office of the General Counsel
15 Sudbury Street
Suite 625
Boston, Massachusetts 02203
Attorney for Defendant
Mae A. D'Agostino, U.S. District Judge:
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
On May 4, 2015, Plaintiff William R. filed an application for Supplemental Security
Income ("SSI"). See Dkt. No. 8, Administrative Transcript ("Tr.") at 126. On October 22, 2015,
Plaintiff's claims were initially denied. Id. at 127–32. Plaintiff made a timely request for a
hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"), who issued an unfavorable decision on
November 1, 2017. See id. at 25–43. Plaintiff made a request to review the unfavorable decision,
and on October 11, 2018, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request to review. See id. at 6–9.
Plaintiff commenced this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3)
seeking review of the Commissioner's unfavorable decision. Currently before the Court are the
parties' briefs for judgment on the pleadings. See Dkt. Nos. 9, 14.
II. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff's date of birth is April 27, 1973, which made him approximately forty-two years
old at the time he filed for SSI on May 4, 2015. See Tr. at 126. The highest grade in school that
Plaintiff completed was eighth grade. See id. at 59. Plaintiff testified that he cannot read or write.
See id. Plaintiff testified that he is able to do basic math calculations and can handle money. See
id. Plaintiff attempted to receive a GED, but failed the test. Id. at 63. Plaintiff received job
training, specifically automotive training, in 1993. See id. at 62–63.
Plaintiff worked as an auto mechanic from the age of nineteen until approximately 2008,
which is also the claimed onset date of disability. See id. at 57. Plaintiff's work history indicated
that he worked from 2006 until 2008 as an auto technician at Kost Tire, a battery tester from 2003
to 2004 at Ultralife Battery, and from 2000 until 2004 as a technician at Jay's Tire. See id. at 214.
Plaintiff believed that he held only one other job doing drywall work over twenty years prior. See
id. at 63.
Plaintiff lived alone at the time of the hearing. See id. at 57. He was receiving temporary
assistance from Social Services and food stamps at the time of the hearing. See id. at 60. Plaintiff
indicated that he was told by his doctors not to drive because of limited range of motion in his
neck, though he did have a driver's license at the time of the hearing. See id. at 58. Plaintiff
stated he would take Medicab transportation for some appointments, but for grocery shopping, he
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drove himself. See id. Plaintiff stated that he could walk for no more than five minutes, could
stand for approximately ten minutes, and could sit for approximately twenty minutes at a time.
See id. at 67. Plaintiff had particular difficulty with certain chores, including cleaning his dishes,
bending over to pick up things, and taking the trash out, sometimes receiving assistance from his
neighbors (including on visits to the grocery store). See id. at 72.
Plaintiff had cervical surgery in May 2016 and April 2015. Id. at 796. At Plaintiff's
hearing, he described being prevented from working a full-time job because of "chronic neck pain,
chronic depression, anxiety, constant nausea . . . ." Id. at 59. Plaintiff described having difficulty
going up and down the stairs to his second floor apartment, which was exacerbated by his right
leg "giv[ing] out because of the problem in my lower back." Id. at 61. Plaintiff indicated that he
had been prescribed a cane and a walker by a doctor. See id. at 66. Plaintiff further indicated that
he had permanent tingling in multiple fingers due to his neck surgery, which interfered with his
ability to lift objects. See id. at 62. At the time of the hearing, Plaintiff stated that he took
medication for depression, anxiety, chronic pain, nausea, and acid reflux. See id. at 60. As a
result of his impairments, Plaintiff claimed that he was unable to lift and carry more than ten
pounds, and if he tried to lift more, he got a shooting pain down his right leg. See id. at 62.
Plaintiff described that he believed that, in terms of preventing his ability to try and find and keep
a job, it was a "tie" between his mental and physical problems. See id. at 64.
Plaintiff indicated that his chronic neck pain forced him to sleep in a recliner. See id. at
65. Plaintiff sleeps seven to nine hours an evening due to his medications for depression and
anxiety. See id. at 59. Plaintiff smokes approximately one pack of cigarettes a day. See id. At
the time of the hearing, Plaintiff had been in recovery for alcohol addiction for approximately
three months "this round," attending Alcoholics Anonymous meetings two times a week. See id.
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at 60–61. Since applying for disability, Plaintiff stated his longest period of sobriety was ten
months. See id. at 69. At times, Plaintiff stated he consumed approximately thirty beers per day.
See id. at 489. Plaintiff stated that his anxiety resulted in his having "a hard time going out in
public." Id. at 68. Plaintiff indicated his only hobby was using a radio-controlled car. See id. at
72.
In a decision dated November 1, 2017, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not disabled
under the Social Security Act. See id. at 25–43. Plaintiff timely filed a request for review by the
Appeals Council, see id. at 182–85, and the Appeals Council denied his request for review,
rendering the ALJ's decision the Commissioner's final decision. See id. at 6–9. In his decision,
the ALJ found the following: (1) Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since
May 4, 2015; (2) Plaintiff's severe impairments include degenerative disc disease of the cervical
spine with radiculopathy, primarily into the left upper extremity, lumbar degenerative disc disease
with radiculopathy and a herniated disc at L5-S1 on the right, anxiety disorder, panic disorder
with agoraphobia, major depressive disorder, and alcohol use disorder/alcohol dependence; (3)
Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically
equals the severity of one of the listed impairments; (4) Plaintiff has the residual functional
capacity ("RFC") to perform sedentary work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(a) with limitations
to not standing in excess of thirty minutes at a time, having the option to reposition or stand at
will, minimal interaction with the public, performance of simple, routine, and repetitive tasks, and
not performing work requiring constant movement of the head either up or down or left to right;
(5) Plaintiff's RFC renders him not capable of performing past relevant work; and (6) considering
Plaintiff's age, education, work experience, and RFC, there are jobs that exist in significant
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numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform. See id. at 30–43. Accordingly, the
ALJ found that Plaintiff is not disabled as defined in the Social Security Act. See id.
Plaintiff commenced this action for judicial review of the denial of his claims by the filing
of a complaint on December 14, 2018. See Dkt. No. 1. The parties have filed briefs for judgment
on the pleadings. See Dkt. Nos. 9, 14.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
A person is disabled when he is unable "to engage in substantial gainful activity by reason
of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in
death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12
months." 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). There is a five-step analysis for evaluating
disability claims:
In essence, if the Commissioner determines (1) that the claimant is
not working, (2) that he has a "severe impairment," (3) that the
impairment is not one [listed in Appendix 1 of the regulations] that
conclusively requires a determination of disability, and (4) that the
claimant is not capable of continuing in his prior type of work, the
Commissioner must find him disabled if (5) there is not another
type of work the claimant can do.
Green-Younger v. Barnhart, 335 F.3d 99, 106 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Draegert v. Barnhart, 311
F.3d 468, 472 (2d Cir. 2002)) (other citation omitted). "The claimant bears the burden of proof on
the first four steps, while the Social Security Administration bears the burden on the last step." Id.
(citation omitted).
In reviewing a final decision by the Commissioner under 42 U.S.C. § 405, the Court does
not determine de novo whether a plaintiff is disabled. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3);
Wagner v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 906 F.2d 856, 860 (2d Cir. 1990). Rather, the Court
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must examine the Administrative Transcript to ascertain whether the correct legal standards were
applied, and whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence. See Shaw v. Chater, 221
F.3d 126, 131 (2d Cir. 2000); Schaal v. Apfel, 134 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1998). "Substantial
evidence" is evidence that amounts to "more than a mere scintilla," and it has been defined as
"such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971).
If supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner's finding must be sustained "even
where substantial evidence may support the plaintiff's position and despite that the court's
independent analysis of the evidence may differ from the [Commissioner's]." Rosado v. Sullivan,
805 F. Supp. 147, 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (citing Rutherford v. Schweiker, 685 F.2d 60, 62 (2d Cir.
1982)) (other citations omitted). In other words, this Court must afford the Commissioner's
determination considerable deference, and may not substitute "its own judgment for that of the
[Commissioner], even if it might justifiably have reached a different result upon a de novo
review." Valente v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 733 F.2d 1037, 1041 (2d Cir. 1984)
(citation omitted).
B. The ALJ's Decision
At the first step of the sequential analysis, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since May 4, 2015, the application date. See Tr. at 30. At step two, the
ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: degenerative disc disease of
the cervical spine with radiculopathy, primarily into the left upper extremity, lumbar degenerative
disc disease with radiculopathy and a herniated disc at L5-S1 on the right, anxiety disorder, panic
disorder with agoraphobia, major depressive disorder, and alcohol use disorder/alcohol
dependence. See id. at 30–33. At step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff did not have an
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impairment or combination of impairments that functionally equals the severity of any impairment
listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. See id. at 33–35. The ALJ then found that
Plaintiff
has the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work as
defined in 20 CFR 416.967(a). Additionally, the claimant cannot
stand in excess of 30 minutes at a time and must have the option to
reposition or stand at will (i.e., a sit/stand option). The claimant can
have minimal (i.e., brief and superficial) interaction with the public.
He can perform simple, routine, and repetitive tasks. He cannot do
work requiring constant movement of the head either up or down or
left to right.
Id. at 35. At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was unable to perform any past relevant work.
See id. at 42. At the fifth and final step of the analysis, the ALJ solicited the testimony of a
vocational expert. See id. at 42–43. The vocational expert testified that a hypothetical individual
of Plaintiff's age, with his education, past relevant work experience, and RFC (as described above)
could perform the representative occupations of surveillance systems monitor, call out operator,
escort vehicle driver, and possibly a document preparer. See id. at 43 The ALJ relied on this
testimony to determine that Plaintiff was not disabled as defined by the Social Security Act. See
id.
C. Analysis
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ's determination denying his disability application should be
remanded back to the Commissioner for the following reasons: (1) the ALJ did not consider the
cumulative effect of Plaintiff's impairments; (2) Plaintiff met the criteria for a Listed Impairment
under § 12.04 depressive, bipolar and related disorders and § 12.06 anxiety and obsessive-
compulsive disorders1; (3) the RFC is not supported because the ALJ gave improper weight to
1 The Court notes that both parties argued about Plaintiff's qualifications under Listings
(continued...)
7
Plaintiff's subjective complaints and failed to engage in the proper analysis under Social Security
Ruling 16-3; (4) the ALJ committed reversible error in finding the RFC to perform sedentary
work in occupations identified by the vocational expert; and (5) the ALJ's decision is against the
substantial weight of the evidence and is incorrect as a matter of law. See Dkt. No. 9 at 17–26.
1. Combined Impact of Plaintiff's Impairments
Plaintiff summarily alleges that the ALJ failed to consider the combined effect of
Plaintiff's impairments, particularly focusing on the combination of physical and mental
impairments, leading to an erroneous decision that Plaintiff is not impaired. See Dkt. No. 9 at
18–19. This argument is without merit.
The ALJ noted the effect of Plaintiff's impairments in combination in Plaintiff's
evaluation. Throughout the ALJ's decision, he noted that he was, in fact, required to consider
Plaintiff's impairments in combination. See Tr. at 28, 29, 30, 33, 34. At step two, the ALJ
discussed a connection between Plaintiff's alcoholism and his gastritis and pancreatitis. See Tr. at
32, 673, 687. At step four, the ALJ further discussed that, at times when Plaintiff was drinking
heavily, it "appears [it] was contributing to his abdominal pain and nausea." Id. at 40, 687–88.
Again at step four, the ALJ explicitly stated that Plaintiff "reported taking medication for nausea,
which he associated with anxiety." Id. at 40, 416. The ALJ further acknowledged that he
"considered all symptoms and the extent to which these symptoms can be reasonably accepted as
consistent with the objective medical evidence and other evidence." Id. at 35. Thus, "[w]hen
taken together, the ALJ's [complete] analysis sufficiently assessed the plaintiff's impairments in
1(...continued)
12.04 and 12.05. See Dkt. No. 9 at 19–20; Dkt. No. 4 at 3–6. The ALJ, however, clearly
discussed Plaintiff's qualifying under Listings 12.04 and 12.06 (not 12.05). See Tr. at 34–35.
Despite this error on the part of both parties, the Court will analyze the correct Listings evaluated
by the ALJ.
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combination at several points in his decision. The ALJ also examined plaintiff's medical records.
Accordingly, [the Court] finds that the ALJ's assessment of the plaintiff's combination of
impairments was sufficient." DeJesus v. Astrue, No. 3:10-CV-705, 2011 WL 2076447, *3 (D.
Conn. May 26, 2011) (citing Gooch v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 833 F.3d 589, 591–92
(6th Cir. 1987) ("The ALJ's decision not to reopen [the plaintiff's] earlier application for disability
benefits was made after 'a thorough review of the medical evidence of record,' and the fact that
each element of the record was discussed individually hardly suggests that the totality of the
record was not considered, particularly in view of the fact that the ALJ specifically referred to 'a
combination of impairments' in deciding that [the plaintiff] did not meet the 'listings.'")).
2. Plaintiff's Impairments
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred at step three of the sequential evaluation. Plaintiff
contends that his depression and anxiety meet the criteria of Listing 12.04 (depressive, bipolar and
related disorders) and Listing 12.06 (anxiety and obsessive-compulsive disorders), and that this
demonstrates that he was unable to engage in substantial gainful activity. See Dkt. No. 9 at
19–20. The Court finds this argument unpersuasive.
The Listing of Impairments, set forth in Appendix 1 of 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P,
describes for each of the major body systems impairments that are considered severe enough to
prevent an individual from performing any gainful activity, regardless of his or her age, education
or work experience. In order to meet or equal Listing 12.04, Plaintiff had to show that his
depressive, bipolar, or related disorder satisfied the requirements of paragraphs A and B, or A and
C, as set forth below:
A. Medical documentation of the requirements of paragraph 1 or 2:
1. Depressive disorder, characterized by five or more of the following:
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a. Depressed mood;
b. Diminished interest in almost all activities;
c. Appetite disturbance with change in weight;
d. Sleep disturbance;
e. Observable psychomotor agitation or retardation;
f. Decreased energy;
g. Feelings of guilt or worthlessness;
h. Difficulty concentrating or thinking; or
i. Thoughts of death or suicide.
2. Bipolar disorder, characterized by three or more of the following:
a. Pressured speech;
b. Flight of ideas;
c. Inflated self-esteem;
d. Decreased need for sleep;
e. Distractibility;
f. Involvement in activities that have a high probability of painful
consequences that are not recognized; or;
g. Increase in goal-directed activity or psychomotor agitation.
AND
B. Extreme limitation of one, or marked limitation of two, of the
following areas of mental functioning:2
1. Understand, remember, or apply information.
2. Interact with others.
3. Concentrate, persist, or maintain pace.
4. Adapt or manage oneself.
OR
C. Your mental disorder in this listing category is "serious and
persistent;" that is, you have a medically documented history of the
existence of the disorder over a period of at least 2 years, and there
is evidence of both:
2 An "extreme limitation" means that an individual is "not able to function in this area
independently, appropriately, effectively, and on a sustained basis." Appendix 1 to 20 C.F.R. Part
404, Subpart P, § 12.00(F)(2)(e). A "marked limitation" means that an individual's "functioning
in this area independently, appropriately, effectively, and on a sustained basis is seriously
limited." Appendix 1 to 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, § 12.00(F)(2)(d).
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1. Medical treatment, mental health therapy, psychosocial support(s), or a
highly structured setting(s) that is ongoing and that diminishes the
symptoms and signs of your mental disorder; and
2. Marginal adjustment, that is, you have minimal capacity to adapt to
changes in your environment or to demand that are not already part of your
daily life.
Appendix 1 to 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, § 12.04 (internal citations omitted).
In order to meet or equal Listing 12.06, Plaintiff had to show that his anxiety and
obsessive-compulsive disorder satisfied the requirements of paragraphs A and B, or A and C, as
set forth below:
A. Medical documentation of the requirements of paragraph 1, 2, or
3:
1. Anxiety disorder, characterized by three or more of the following:
a. Restlessness;
b. Easily fatigued;
c. Difficulty concentrating;
d. Irritability;
e. Muscle tension; or
f. Sleep disturbance.
2. Panic disorder or agoraphobia, characterized by one or both:
a. Panic attacks followed by a persistent concern or worry about
additional panic attacks or their consequences; or
b. Disproportionate fear or anxiety about at least two different
situations (for example, using public transportation, being in a
crowd, being in a line, being outside your home, being in open
spaces).
3. Obsessive-compulsive disorder, characterized by one or both:
a. Involuntary, time-consuming preoccupation with intrusive,
unwanted thoughts; or
b. Repetitive behaviors aimed at reducing anxiety.
AND
B. Extreme limitation of one, or marked limitation of two, of the
following areas of mental functioning:3
3 See supra, note 2.
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1. Understand, remember, or apply information.
2. Interact with others.
3. Concentrate, persist, or maintain pace.
4. Adapt or manage oneself.
OR
C. Your mental disorder in this listing category is "serious and
persistent;" that is, you have a medically documented history of the
existence of the disorder over a period of at least 2 years, and there
is evidence of both:
1. Medical treatment, mental health therapy, psychosocial support(s), or a
highly structured setting(s) that is ongoing and that diminishes the
symptoms and signs of your mental disorder; and
2. Marginal adjustment, that is, you have minimal capacity to adapt to
changes in your environment or to demand that are not already part of your
daily life.
Appendix 1 to 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, § 12.06 (internal citations omitted).
For a claimant to show that his impairment meets a Listing, the claimant must meet all of
the specified medical criteria of that Listing. See Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 530–31
(1990). An impairment that manifests some but not all of the Listing's criteria does not qualify.
See id.
In the present matter, the ALJ thoroughly explained why Plaintiff's impairments failed to
satisfy the criteria for paragraphs B and C of Listings 12.04 and 12.06, which are identical. With
regards to the criteria for paragraph B, the ALJ analyzed each area of mental functioning in turn,
citing to multiple instances in the record that demonstrate that Plaintiff failed to satisfy the
necessary standard. See Tr. at 34. The ALJ's conclusion that "[b]ecause the claimant's mental
impairments do not cause at least two 'marked' limitations or one 'extreme limitation, the
'paragraph B' criteria are not satisfied" is supported by substantial evidence. Id. With regards to
the criteria for paragraph C, the ALJ cites to multiple instances in the record that demonstrate that
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Plaintiff failed to demonstrate evidence of marginal adjustment, a requirement he had to meet. Id.
at 35. The ALJ's conclusion that "the claimant's ability to handle difficulties without
decompensating" is, therefore, also supported by substantial evidence. Id.
3. Plaintiff's subjective complaints and SSR 16-3
Plaintiff argues that the Residual Functional Capacity ("RFC") is not supported because
the ALJ gave improper weight to Plaintiff's subjective complaints and failed to engage in the
proper analysis under Social Security Ruling 16-3. See Dkt. No. 9 at 20–22. Between steps three
and four, the ALJ must determine a claimant's RFC. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e) and
416.920(e). The RFC is based on all relevant evidence of record, which includes the claimant's
credible testimony regarding the limiting effects of his impairments, both those deemed severe
and non-severe at step two, objective medical evidence documenting signs and symptoms of
impairments and functional limitations, and medical opinion from treating and consulting sources
regarding the claimant's ability to function. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545 and 416.945. The RFC
assessment also considers exertional and non-exertional work functions. See 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1569(a) and 416.969(b). Pain, and other subjective symptoms related to a medically
determinable impairment, may affect both the exertional and non-exertional functions of work,
and are also factored into the residual functional capacity assessment. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529
and 416.929. The ALJ's decision must address complaints and pain, and other symptoms, and
determine whether such subjective complaints are credible and affect the claimant's RFC.
The Social Security Act provides that "[a]n individual's statement as to pain and other
symptoms shall not alone be conclusive evidence of disability. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A).
Rather, "there must be medical signs and findings, established by medically acceptable clinical or
laboratory diagnostic techniques, which show the existence of a medical impairment that results
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from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which could reasonably be
expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged. . . ." Id.
The ALJ found that Plaintiff had the RFC
to perform sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(a).
Additionally, the claimant cannot stand in excess of 30 minutes at a
time and must have the option to reposition or stand at will (i.e., a
sit/stand option). The claimant can have minimal (i.e., brief and
superficial) interaction with the public. He can perform simple,
routine, and repetitive tasks. He cannot do work requiring constant
movement of the head either up or down or left to right.
Tr. at 35. The ALJ further highlighted the following evidence in support of his determination that
the medical record did not support the alleged severity of Plaintiff's subjective back, neck, and
mental symptoms: (1) Plaintiff initially reported having good results after his April 2014 neck
surgery (see Tr. at 36, 416, 718–19); (2) objective physical examinations of Plaintiff that were
largely normal (see id. at 36–38, 415–16, 644, 651, 697, 698, 704, 713, 719, 720); (3) Plaintiff
improving "tremendously" after his second neck surgery in May 2016 (see id. at 37, 697–98, 706);
(4) negative EMG testing on Plaintiff's right arm (see id. at 37, 711); (5) Plaintiff's participation in
daily activities, including working on a car (see id. at 38, 741) and competing in model car races
(see id. at 39, 723); (6) "the October 2015 examination by Albert Paolano, M.D., who found no
limitations on clinical examination apart from some limitation in cervical range of motion" (id. at
39, 474); (7) "statements of the claimant's mental health treatment provider that the claimant did
not appear overtly disabled and suggested he try to obtain vocational rehabilitation for a job less
physically demanding than an auto mechanic" (id. at 39, 434, 437, 734); (8) Plaintiff's primary
care physician refusing to give him a handicapped parking permit, which "suggests that he
believed the claimant capable of walking greater distances than he testified" (id. at 39, 738); (9)
Plaintiff indicating that his antidepressant medication was effective (see id. at 40, 444); (10)
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Plaintiff reporting "'ok' control of his depression on medication and 'ok' control of anxiety,
although he indicated that he was still getting very nervous around people in general and crowds
in particular" (id. at 40, 416, 418); (11) Plaintiff's therapist "seem[ing] to believe the claimant
would be capable of working, contrary to his assertions, and encourag[ing] him to find alternative
employment, perhaps part-time work or low stress work. She also suggested less physically
demanding work, indicating that she did not think him mentally incapable of working" (id. at 40,
434–34, 734); (12) Plaintiff's "largely unremarkable" mental status examinations (id. at 40, 411,
438–39, 484, 742–43, 745, 747–50, 752, 767, 770); (13) Plaintiff's "ability to maintain and
establish new romantic relationships, maintain friendships, and interact with neighbors indicates
that he is not very limited around familiar people" (id. at 408–21, 426–44, 722–53, 662); (14) the
opinion of Dr. L. Hoffman, Ph.D., who "opined that the claimant could understand and follow
instructions, maintain attention and concentration, adapt to basic change, and handle brief contact
with the public" (id. at 41, 112–25).
The ALJ properly determined that Plaintiff's subjective complaints were not supported by
his treatment records. Vasequez v. Berryhill, No. 16 Civ. 6707, 2017 WL 1592761, *18
(S.D.N.Y. May 1, 2017). Therefore, while the ALJ found that Plaintiff's "medically determinable
impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms . . . the claimant's
statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limited effects of these symptoms are not
entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record. . . ." Tr. at 42.
The Court finds that, when the ALJ rejected Plaintiff's testimony in light of "objective medical
evidence and any other factors deemed relevant, he [did] explain that decision 'with sufficient
specificity to enable the [reviewing] Court to decide whether there [were] legitimate reasons for
the ALJ's disbelief' and whether his decision [was] supported by substantial evidence." Calzada
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v. Astrue, 753 F. Supp. 2d 250, 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (quoting Fox v. Astrue, No. 6:05-CV-1599,
2008 WL 828078, *12 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2008)).
4. RFC and representative occupations
At step five of the analysis, the ALJ found that – considering Plaintiff's age, education,
work experience, and RFC – jobs that Plaintiff can perform exist in significant numbers in the
national economy. See Tr. at 42–43. The ALJ's findings were based upon the vocational expert's
testimony that jobs, as a surveillance systems monitor, call out operator, escort vehicle driver, and
possibly a document preparer, are available for a person of Plaintiff's age, education, work
experience, and RFC. See id.
Plaintiff contends that he is unable to perform the basic demands of sedentary work
because he does not have the ability to perform the walking/standing component, the prolonged
sitting required, and his cervical and lumbar degenerative disc disease prevent him from engaging
in any repetitive movement of his upper extremities "generally associated with work at all
exertional levels." Dkt. No. 9 at 23. Essentially, Plaintiff argues that substantial evidence does
not support the RFC. See id. Plaintiff further argues that the ALJ committed reversible error in
finding the RFC to perform sedentary work in occupations identified by the vocational expert.
See id. at 22–24.
At the hearing, the ALJ asked Margaret Heck, the vocational expert, whether jobs exist in
the national economy for an individual with Plaintiff's age, education, work experience, and
residual functional capacity. See Tr. at 78–85. The vocational expert testified that, given the
above factors, Plaintiff would be able to perform the requirements of surveillance systems
monitor, call out operator, escort vehicle driver, and possibly a document preparer. Id. The
vocational expert also testified in response to various hypothetical questions from the ALJ,
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including as related to absences from work three days per month due to "symptoms of
exacerbation like pain," being off task twenty percent of the day, limited contact with the public,
and movement of the neck. See id.
"At Step Five, the Commissioner must determine that significant numbers of jobs exist in
the national economy that the claimant can perform." McIntyre v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 146, 151 (2d
Cir. 2014) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v)). "An ALJ may make this
determination either by applying the Medical Vocational Guidelines or by adducing testimony of a
vocational expert." McIntyre, 758 F.3d at 151. "An ALJ may rely on a vocational expert's
testimony regarding a hypothetical as long as 'there is substantial record evidence to support the
assumption[s] upon which the vocational expert based his opinion,' . . . and accurately reflect the
limitations and capabilities of the claimant involved[.]" Id. (internal quotation and other citation
omitted).
In the present matter, the ALJ provided the vocational expert with Plaintiff's physical and
mental abilities in posing his hypothetical questions. See Tr. at 78–85. Using this information,
the vocational expert indicated that Plaintiff would be suitable for a sedentary occupation and
provided considerable details regarding the available jobs in the nation, including in response to
Plaintiff's questions. See id. Since there was substantial evidence in the record supporting the
assumptions upon which the hypothetical question was based, the ALJ properly relied on the
vocational expert's testimony in response to the hypothetical questions. See McIntyre, 758 F.3d at
151–52.4
4 Furthermore, while Plaintiff argues that the Court and the ALJ should consider the
Directory of Occupational Titles ("DOT"), "an ALJ can take administrative notice of job data
from 'various governmental and other publications' including the DOT." Allen o/b/o Allen v.
Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 5:16-CV-1207, 2017 WL 6001830, *7 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2017)
(continued...)
17
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the ALJ properly relied on the vocational
expert's opinion.
5. Weighing the Evidence
Plaintiff argues that the decision of the ALJ is against the substantial weight of the
evidence and is incorrect as a matter of law. See Dkt. No. 9 at 24–25. As stated previously, the
Second Circuit has explained that upholding a determination based on the substantial evidence
standard where the legal principals may have been misapplied "creates an unacceptable risk that a
claimant will be deprived of the right to have her disability determination made according to the
correct legal principles." Johnson, 817 F.2d at 986. However, if the record is such that the
application of the correct legal principles "could lead to only one conclusion, there is no need to
require agency reconsideration." Id.
"Substantial evidence" is evidence that amounts to "more than a mere scintilla," and it has
been defined to be "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion." Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401. This Court must afford the Commissioner's
determination considerable deference, and may not substitute "its own judgment for that of the
[Commissioner], even if it might justifiably have reached a different result upon a de novo
review." Valente, 733 F.2d at 1041. This very deferential standard of review means that "once an
4(...continued)
(quoting 20 C.F.R. § 416.966(d)(1)). Even if the Court were to accept Plaintiff's argument that
the positions of surveillance system monitor and call out operator "no longer exist in significant
numbers in the national economy," see Dkt. No. 9 at 24 n.27, Tr. at 322–23, the vocational expert
testified that 68,649 document preparer and escort vehicle driver positions remain in the national
economy. Tr. at 79–82. "Courts have held that numbers varying from 9,000 upwards constituted
'significant.'" Rosa v. Comm'r of Social Security, No. 3:14-CV-1145, 2015 WL 7574516, *6
(N.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2015), R&R adopted 2015 WL 7573222 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 2015). The Court
finds that the ALJ correctly determined that, based on the vocational experts testimony, significant
numbers of positions still exist for Plaintiff in the national economy.
18
ALJ finds facts, [the Court] can reject those facts 'only if a reasonable factfinder would have to
conclude otherwise." Brault, 683 F.3d at 448 (quoting Warren 29 F.3d at 1290).
The Court finds that, for the reasons stated throughout its decision, substantial evidence
permeates the ALJ's thorough record and decision, and therefore the Court defers to the ALJ.
IV. CONCLUSION
After carefully reviewing the entire record 1n this matter, the Parties’ submissions, and the
applicable law, and for the above-stated reasons, the Court hereby
ORDERS that the Commissioner's decision denying Supplemental Security Income is
AFFIRMED; and the Court further
ORDERS that the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment and close this case; and the
Court further
ORDERS that the Clerk of the Court shall serve a copy of this Memorandum-Decision
and Order on all parties in accordance with the Local Rules.
IT IS SO ORDERED. :
Dated: January 8, 2020 J) 4 i dist ‘
Albany, New York ae = Si pes
U.S. District Judge
19