Phillips Pagan v. Commissioner of the Social Security Administration

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

LISA P.,

Plaintiff,

V. 1:18-CV-890

(DJS)

ANDREW M. SAUL,! Commissioner of

Social Security,

Defendant.

APPEARANCES: OF COUNSEL:

DENNIS KENNY LAW JOSEPHINE GOTTESMAN, ESQ.

Attorney for Plaintiff

North Plank Road

Newburgh, New York 12550

U.S. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMIN. ARIELLA ZOLTAN, ESQ.

OFFICE OF REG’L GEN. COUNSEL

REGION I

Attorney for Defendant

26 Federal Plaza - Room 3904

New York, New York 10278

DANIEL J. STEWART

“| United States Magistrate Judge

* Mr. Saul became Commissioner on June 17, 2019 and is substituted as the Defendant pursuant to FED. R. CIv.

P. 25(d).

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER?’

Plaintiff brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking review of a

decision by the Commissioner of Social Security that Plaintiff was not disabled for

purposes of disability insurance benefits. Dkt. No. 1. Currently before the Court are

4) Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and Defendant’s Motion for Judgment

on the Pleadings. Dkt. Nos. 11 & 12. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff's Motion

for Judgment on the Pleadings is denied and Defendant’s Motion is granted. The

Commissioner’s decision is affirmed and the Complaint is dismissed.

I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

Plaintiff was born in 1963. Dkt. No. 8, Admin. Tr. (“Tr.”), p. 70. Plaintiff

reported having completed high school. Tr. at p. 163; but see Tr. at p. 353 (indicating

Plaintiff did not graduate from high school). She has past work experience as a clerk

and supervisor for a non-profit organization. Tr. at pp. 29-30 & 163. Plaintiff alleges

disability based upon “stress anxiety panic attacks chest pains” [sic], pain, trouble

walking, arthritis, high blood pressure, and uncontrolled diabetes. Tr. at p. 70.

? Upon Plaintiff’s consent, the United States’ general consent, and in accordance with this District’s General Order

18, this matter has been referred to the undersigned to exercise full jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73. See Dkt. No. 5 & General Order 18.

B. Procedural History

Plaintiff applied for disability and disability insurance benefits on March 31,

2015. Tr. at p. 15. She alleged a disability onset date of March 27, 2015. Tr. at p. 70.

Plaintiff's application was initially denied on June 30, 2015, after which she timely

“) requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). Tr. at pp. 80 & 92.

Plaintiff appeared at a hearing before ALJ Dennis G. Katz on June 6, 2017 at which she

and a vocational expert testified. Tr. at pp. 40-69. On October 30, 2017, the ALJ issued

a written decision finding Plaintiff was not disabled under the Social Security Act. Tr.

at pp. 15-32. On June 4, 2018, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiffs request for review,

making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner. Tr. at pp. 1-6.

C. The ALJ’s Decision

In his decision, the ALJ made the following findings of fact and conclusions of

law. First, the ALJ found that Plaintiff meets the insured status requirements of the

Social Security Act through December 31, 2019 and that she had not engaged in

substantial gainful activity since March 27, 2015, the alleged onset date. Tr. at pp. 17-

18. Second, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: cervical

spine disorder, osteoarthritis, carpal tunnel syndrome, and fibromyalgia. Tr. at p. 18.

The ALJ also found that Plaintiff had numerous non-severe impairments, including most

relevant to the issues raised in this case, diabetes and certain psychiatric conditions. Tr.

at p. 18. Third, the ALJ found that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination

of impairments that meets or medically equals one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R.

§ 404, Subpart P, App. | (the “Listings”). Tr. at pp. 22-24. Fourth, the ALJ found that

Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform the full range of

sedentary work. Tr. at p. 24. Fifth, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could perform her past

relevant work as an office clerk. Tr. at pp. 29-30. The ALJ also found that there was

other work existing in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could

perform. Tr. at pp. 30-31. The ALJ, therefore, concluded that Plaintiff is not disabled.

Tr. at p. 31.

Il. RELEVANT LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Standard of Review

A court reviewing a denial of disability benefits may not determine de novo

“| whether an individual is disabled. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Wagner v. Sec’y of Health &

Human Servs., 906 F.2d 856, 860 (2d Cir. 1990). Rather, the Commissioner’s

determination will be reversed only if the correct legal standards were not applied, or it

was not supported by substantial evidence. See Johnson v. Bowen, 817 F.2d 983, 986

(2d Cir. 1987) (“Where there is a reasonable basis for doubt whether the ALJ applied

correct legal principles, application of the substantial evidence standard to uphold a

finding of no disability creates an unacceptable risk that a claimant will be deprived of

the right to have her disability determination made according to the correct legal

principles.”); accord Grey v. Heckler, 721 F.2d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 1983), Marcus v.

Califano, 615 F.2d 23, 27 (2d Cir. 1979). “Substantial evidence” is evidence that

amounts to “more than a mere scintilla,” and has been defined as “such relevant evidence

as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v.

Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). Where evidence is deemed susceptible to more than

one rational interpretation, the Commissioner’s conclusion must be upheld. Rutherford

v. Schweiker, 685 F.2d 60, 62 (2d Cir. 1982).

“To determine on appeal whether the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial

evidence, a reviewing court considers the whole record, examining evidence from both

sides, because an analysis of the substantiality of the evidence must also include that

which detracts from its weight.” Williams v. Bowen, 859 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1988).

If supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s finding must be sustained

“even where substantial evidence may support the plaintiff's position and despite that

“| the court’s independent analysis of the evidence may differ from the [Commissioner’s].”

Rosado v. Sullivan, 805 F. Supp. 147, 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). In other words, this Court

must afford the Commissioner’s determination considerable deference, and may not

substitute “its own judgment for that of the [Commissioner], even if it might justifiably

have reached a different result upon a de novo review.” Valente v. Sec’y of Health &

Human Servs., 733 F.2d 1037, 1041 (2d Cir. 1984).

B. Standard to Determine Disability

The Commissioner has established a five-step evaluation process to determine

whether an individual is disabled as defined by the Social Security Act. 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1520, 416.920. The Supreme Court has recognized the validity of this sequential

evaluation process. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42 (1987). The five-step

process is as follows:

First, the [Commissioner] considers whether the claimant is currently

engaged in substantial gainful activity. If he is not, the [Commissioner]

next considers whether the claimant has a “‘severe impairment” which

significantly limits his physical or mental ability to do basic work

activities. If the claimant suffers such an impairment, the third inquiry is

whether, based solely on medical evidence, the claimant has an

impairment which is listed in Appendix 1 of the regulations. If the

claimant has such an impairment, the [Commissioner] will consider him

disabled without considering vocational factors such as age, education,

and work experience; the [Commissioner] presumes that a claimant who

is afflicted with a “listed” impairment is unable to perform substantial

gainful activity. Assuming the claimant does not have a listed impairment,

the fourth inquiry is whether, despite the claimant’s severe impairment, he

has the residual functional capacity to perform his past work. Finally, if

the claimant is unable to perform his past work, the [Commissioner] then

determines whether there is other work which the claimant could perform.

Under the cases previously discussed, the claimant bears the burden of the

proof as to the first four steps, while the [Commissioner] must prove the

final one.

Berry v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir. 1982); accord McIntyre v. Colvin, 758

F.3d 146, 150 (2d Cir. 2014). “If at any step a finding of disability or non-disability can

be made, the SSA will not review the claim further.” Barnhart v. Thompson, 540 U.S.

20, 24 (2003).

C. The Parties’ Briefings on Their Cross-Motions

In her brief, Plaintiff makes three principal arguments. First, she contends that

the ALJ failed to accommodate the full range of Plaintiff's documented medical

impairments. Dkt. No. 11, Pl.’s Mem. of Law, pp. 15-18. Second, Plaintiff contends

that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate her credibility. /d. at pp. 18-20. Third, Plaintiff

contends that the ALJ failed to recognize that Plaintiff's impairments are consistent with

the medical evidence. /d. at pp. 20-25.

In response, Defendant contends that the ALJ properly evaluated Plaintiff's

medical conditions at step two of the sequential analysis. Dkt. No. 12, Def.’s Mem. of

Law, pp. 4-11. Defendant also asserts that the ALJ’s RFC determination was supported

by substantial evidence. /d. at pp. 11-22. Third, Defendant contends that Plaintiff would

not be disabled even if she were more limited in her ability to walk or stand than the

ALJ found. /d. at pp. 22-24.

Il. ANALYSIS

A. The ALJ’s Severity Determination

“At step two of the sequential analysis, the ALJ must determine whether the

claimant has a ‘severe medically determinable physical or mental impairment.’” Pepper

v. Comm of Soc. Sec., 2015 WL 3795879, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. June 17, 2015) (quoting 20

C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii)).. A condition will be found not severe when it does not

significantly impact or limit the individual’s ability to do basic work. /d.; see also Royal

Astrue, 2012 WL 5449610, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 2, 2012), report and

recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 5438945 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2012). Plaintiff alleges

that the ALJ erred in not finding her diabetes and mental impairments to be severe. Pl.’s

Mem. of Law at pp. 15-18.

“The ‘mere presence of a disease or impairment, or establishing that a person has

been diagnosed or treated for a disease or impairment’ is not, itself, sufficient to deem a

condition severe.” Bergeron v. Astrue, 2011 WL 6255372, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 14,

2011) (quoting McConnell v. Astrue, 2008 WL 833968, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 27,

2008)). “The severity of an impairment is not determined merely by diagnosis, but by

the limitations imposed by the impairment.” Tillis v. Colvin, 2016 WL 8674672, at *2

S)(N.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2016). “The claimant bears the burden of presenting evidence

establishing severity.” Henry v. Astrue, 32 F. Supp.3d 170, 180 (N.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing

Miller v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2008 WL 2783418, at *6-7 (N.D.N.Y. July 16, 2008)).

“When the parties disagree over the effect of the ALJ’s failure to include a condition at

step two, resolution of this issue comes down to a question of whether there was

substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s conclusion that [the condition(s)] should not

included as a severe impairment.” Eralte v. Colvin, 2014 WL 7330441, at *10

(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2014) (quoting Hussain v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2014 WL 4230585,

at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2014)) (internal quotations omitted).

Plaintiff appears to object to the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff's diabetes and

psychiatric disorders were non-severe. Pl.’s Mem. of Law at pp. 16-18. A review of

the ALJ’s analysis of those conditions reveals no error.

As to Plaintiff’s psychiatric condition, the ALJ recognized Plaintiff's diagnosed

conditions. Tr. at pp. 19-20. The ALJ then undertook a detailed analysis of the

“Paragraph B” criteria under the regulations to assess Plaintiff's mental functioning. Tr.

at pp. 20-21. That analysis led the ALJ to conclude that Plaintiff had no more than a

mild limitation in any of the identified functional areas and, as a result, her condition

was not severe. Tr. at pp. 21-22.

In arguing that her psychiatric impairments are severe, Plaintiff cites to repeated

references to those conditions throughout the medical record. Pl.’s Mem. of Law at pp.

4) 16-17 (citing record). The ALJ did not dispute the existence of these conditions, finding

only that they did not rise to the level of severe impairments. Plaintiff alleges that the

ALJ “erroneously found that Dr. Schleuderer had not indicated any limitations in mental

functioning.” Pl.’s Mem. of Law at p. 16. Dr. Schleuderer was seen in his capacity as

a consultative examiner (“CE”). Tr. at p. 20. A review of the record, however, shows

that the ALJ was correct in reaching that conclusion — Dr. Schleuderer’s report did not,

“| in fact, indicate any mental limitations. See Tr. at pp. 353-356. Plaintiff also relies on

the medical source statement from Nurse Practitioner Delaparte which found Plaintiff

unable to work because of anxiety. Pl.’s Mem. of Law at p. 16. The ALJ did not afford

this rather conclusory statement much weight, Tr. at pp. 28-29, and it alone is no basis

for concluding that the ALJ erred in finding these conditions non-severe. Shields v.

Astrue, 2012 WL 1865505, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. May 22, 2012) (conclusory claim

insufficient to establish severity at step two). The ALJ’s analysis was detailed and

accurately reflected the record evidence. The Court finds no error in his conclusion that

these conditions were non-severe.

Plaintiff also takes exception to the ALJ’s failure to identify the specific weight

given to Dr. Schleuderer’s opinion. Pl.’s Mem. of Law at p. 16. However, “ALJs are

not required to explicitly assign weight to all medical opinions of record, particularly

those of consulting (rather than treating) medical sources, as long as the ALJ considered

the relevant medical opinions.” Batease v. Berryhill, 2017 WL 1102659, at *7 (D. Vt.

Mar. 24, 2017) (citing cases). It is clear that the ALJ did in fact consider Dr.

Schleuderer’s opinion here. See Tr. at pp. 20-21. In doing so, the ALJ simply reached

a different conclusion than Plaintiff would have preferred. The Court concludes that

this was the result of an appropriate review of the record and was not as Plaintiff argues

“merely a product of the ALJ’s imagination.” Pl.’s Mem. of Law at p. 17.

Plaintiff's argument that the CE failed to comply with a Programs Operations

Manual System (“POMS”) requirement regarding identifying an RFC as part of his

report, Pl.’s Mem. of Law at p. 16 & n. 5, is also unavailing here as “POMS guidelines

‘have no legal force, and they do not bind the Commissioner.’” Tejada v. Apfel, 167

F.3d 770, 775 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785, 789 (1981)).

Regarding Plaintiff's diabetes, the ALJ found:

no indication in the medical records the claimant required more than

conservative treatment or that medications and adherence to a proper diet

were ineffective in controlling these conditions. Moreover, lab work

” indicates the claimant’s Alc levels have decreased over time, and, as of

June 2016, her Alc level tested 7.0. Treatment notes throughout the

record indicate these conditions were well controlled with medication and

proper diet.

Tr. at p. 18 (citations omitted). Here, too, a review of the evidence cited by the ALJ

demonstrates that he accurately cited the record which adequately supports his

conclusion that Plaintiff's diabetes would not have a significant adverse impact on

10

Plaintiffs ability to work. Plaintiffs argument relies largely on citation to individual

treatment records that admittedly favor her argument, Pl.’s Mem. of Law at p. 17, but

Plaintiff is not permitted to “cherry-pick a single form from an extensive treatment

record.” Marquez v. Colvin, 2013 WL 5568718, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2013). Taken

4) in total, the record established that Plaintiffs diabetes was generally well-managed and

did not present a severe impairment. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the ALJ’s

conclusion was supported by substantial evidence. See Booker vy. Astrue, 2011 WL

3735808, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2011) (record supported finding that diabetes was

not severe impairment).

For these reasons, the Court finds no error warranting reversal at step two of the

sequential analysis. The Court notes that even if there had been an error, it “may be

deemed harmless error, particularly where the disability analysis continues and the ALJ

later considers the impairment in her RFC determination.” Pascal T. v. Berryhill, 2019

WL 316009, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2019) (citing cases). The ALJ found other severe

impairments and in reaching his ultimate determination noted that he had considered

evidence of all physical and mental limitations. Tr. at p. 28. Any error, therefore, would

have been harmless in any event.

B. Consideration of Plaintiff’s Subjective Complaints

The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff's subjective statements “concerning the

intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent

with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record.” Tr. at p. 25. Plaintiff

11

argues that this was error both factually and under SSR 16-3p, which she contends

prohibited the ALJ from making a credibility determination. Pl.’s Mem. of Law at pp.

18-20.

Plaintiff is correct that SSR 16-3p eliminated the use of the word “credibility”

from prior departmental policy statements. Debra T. v. Comm of Soc. Sec., 2019 WL

1208788, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2019). The ALJ remains obligated, however, to

“carefully consider all the evidence presented by claimants regarding their symptoms,

which fall into seven relevant factors including daily activities and the location,

duration, frequency, and intensity of their pain or other symptoms.” /d. (quoting Del

Carmen Fernandez v. Berryhill, 2019 WL 667743, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2019)

(internal quotations and alterations omitted).

The evaluation of symptoms involves a two-step process. First, the ALJ

must determine, based upon the objective medical evidence, whether the

medical impairments “could reasonably be expected to produce the pain

or other symptoms alleged....” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(a), (b); 416.929(a),

(b).

If so, at the second step, the ALJ must consider “‘the extent to which [the

claimant’s] alleged functional limitations and restrictions due to pain or

other symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the

[objective medical evidence] and other evidence to decide how [the

claimant’s] symptoms affect [her] ability to work.’” Barry v. Colvin, 606

F. App’x 621, 623 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing inter alia 20 C.F.R. §

404.1529(a); Genier v. Astrue, 606 F.3d at 49) (alterations in original). If

the objective medical evidence does not substantiate the claimant’s

symptoms, the ALJ must consider the other evidence. Cichocki v. Astrue,

534 F. App’x 71, 76 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing superseded SSR 96-7p). The

ALJ must assess the claimant’s subjective complaints by considering the

record in light of the following symptom-related factors: (1) claimant’s

daily activities; (2) location, duration, frequency, and intensity of

12

claimant’s symptoms; (3) precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) type,

dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication taken to relieve

symptoms; (5) other treatment received to relieve symptoms; (6) any

measures taken by the claimant to relieve symptoms; and (7) any other

factors concerning claimant’s functional limitations and restrictions due

to symptoms. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3), 416.929(c)(3).

Debra N. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2019 WL 1369358, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2019).

Here, the ALJ was clearly aware of the requirements of and his obligations under

SSR 16-3p, Tr. at pp. 24-25, and the Court finds no error in his evaluation of Plaintiff’s

subjective complaints that would require remand. The record indicates that the ALJ

undertook a careful consideration of relevant factors. He identified Plaintiffs daily

activities and discussed the extent to which they did, and often did not, correlate with

her subjectively reported limitations, including her ability to drive, to ambulate, and her

need for, and claimed basis for having, an assistive device. Jd. These determinations

provided evidence that Plaintiff's subjective complaints were not consistent with the

overall medical evidence in the record. The ALJ particularly took note of the extent to

which Plaintiffs subjective complaints were inconsistent with either her hearing

testimony or her reports to medical providers. Tr. at p. 25. Doing so was not only

“| consistent with, but required by, SSR 16-3p which states that the Social Security

Administration “‘will compare statements an individual makes in connection with the

individual’s claim for disability benefits with any existing statements the individual

made under other circumstances.” Soc. Sec. Ruling 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029, at *8. It

was thus “well within the ALJ’s discretion to compare contradictory statements of daily

13

activities.” Hayes v. Berryhill, 2017 WL 4326118, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2017).

While Plaintiff points to other evidence in the record which supports her position

regarding the severity of her subjective complaints, Pl.’s Mem. of Law at pp. 18-19, it

was ultimately for the ALJ, not the Court to resolve such evidentiary conflicts. Conger

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2018 WL 947662, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2018).

“The court finds that although the ALJ made a credibility determination, . . . the

ALJ correctly applied the controlling legal standard, as discussed in SSR 16-3P, when

[]he considered the entire record, including the objective medical evidence and resolved

the conflicts therein” in assessing Plaintiff's subjective complaints. Green v. Comm’r

of Soc. Sec., 2017 WL 571489, at *17 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2017).? The Court concludes

“| that the ALJ’s determination here “is sufficiently grounded in the evidence,” Morris v.

Colvin, 2016 WL 3085427, at *10 (W.D.N.Y. June 2, 2016), and remand is not

warranted.

C. Plaintiff’s Objections to the ALJ’s RFC Determination

Plaintiff's final point in support of reversal argues that the ALJ’s RFC

determination was not supported by substantial evidence. Pl.’s Mem. of Law at p. 22.

Plaintiff's brief catalogs various medical records and opinions and objects to the weight

While specifically objecting to the ALJ making any credibility findings, Plaintiff also states that her positive

work history should have “enhanced her credibility.” Pl.’s Mem. of Law at p. 20. The failure to discuss a

claimant’s prior work history is not itself a basis for reversal, however. Coty v. Colvin, 2016 WL 1211284, at *4

(W.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2016); Medovich v. Colvin, 2015 “4 1310310, at *12 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2015).

provided to them by the ALJ or argues that they suggest Plaintiff could not perform

work as the ALJ found. See id. at pp. 20-25.

Residual functional capacity is defined as “what an individual can still do despite

his or her limitations . . . Ordinarily, RFC is the individual’s maximum remaining ability

do sustained work activities in an ordinary work setting on a regular and continuing

basis.” Pardee v. Astrue, 631 F. Supp. 2d 200, 210 (N.D.N.Y. 2009) (quoting Melville

v. Apfel, 198 F.3d 45, 52 (2d Cir. 1999)). “In making a residual functional capacity

determination, the ALJ must consider a claimant’s physical abilities, mental abilities,

symptomology, including pain and other limitations which could interfere with work

activities on a regular and continuing basis.” Pardee v. Astrue, 631 F. Supp. 2d at 210

(citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)). “Ultimately, ‘[a]ny impairment-related limitations

created by an individual’s response to demands of work . . . must be reflected in the RFC

assessment.’” Hendrickson v. Astrue, 2012 WL 7784156, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 11,

2012) (quoting SSR 85-15, 1985 WL 56857, at *8).

When assessing a claimant’s RFC, an ALJ is entitled to rely on opinions from

both examining and non-examining State agency medical consultants because these

consultants are qualified experts in the field of social security disability. 20 C.F.R. §

404.1513a; see also Frey ex rel. A.O. v. Astrue, 485 Fed. Appx. 484, 487 (2d Cir. 2012)

(“The report of a State agency medical consultant constitutes expert opinion evidence

which can be given weight if supported by medical evidence in the record.”); Little v.

Colvin, 2015 WL 1399586, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2015) (“State agency physicians

15

are qualified as experts in the evaluation of medical issues in disability claims. As such,

their opinions may constitute substantial evidence if they are consistent with the record

as a whole.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). The RFC determination “must be set

forth with sufficient specificity to enable [the Court] to decide whether the determination

Sis supported by substantial evidence.” Ferraris v. Heckler, 728 F.2d 582, 587 (2d Cir.

1984).

As noted above, the ALJ in this case conducted a thorough review of the record

evidence in this case and provided a detailed explanation of his reasoning. Having

conducted its own review of the record, the Court finds no error in the ALJ’s RFC

determination.

Plaintiff cites to a variety of evidence in the record which she contends supports

a finding of disability. Much of the evidence relied upon, however, offers little to

undermine the ALJ’s conclusion. Plaintiff cites, for example, letters from May,

September, and October 1999 regarding a disabling injury suffered by Plaintiff in a 1997

car accident. See Tr. at pp. 357-361, 376-393, & 396-397. The finding of disability

articulated in these letters is not binding on the Commissioner since “[c]onclusions

about whether a claimant is disabled are not ‘medical opinions’ entrusted to experts, but

rather are reserved for the Commissioner.” Wallis v. Colvin, 191 F. Supp. 3d 208, 213

n.9 (N.D.N.Y. 2016). The letters also predate Plaintiffs alleged onset date by more than

fifteen years and so are clearly of limited relevance. Frank B. 0/b/o K.B. v. Comm of

Soc. Sec., 2019 WL 3412608, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. July 29, 2019) (“Evidence that predates

16

a claimant’s alleged disability onset period is ordinarily not relevant to evaluating a

claimant’s disability.”).

Plaintiff cites other evidence which does provide some support for her position

that she is disabled. See Pl.’s Mem. of Law at pp. 21-22. While recognizing that this

evidence supports Plaintiff’s contentions, “the Court notes that ‘[i]t is the province of

the ALJ, not the reviewing court, to weigh and evaluate evidence.’” Stacy M. v.

Berryhill, 2019 WL 1432764, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2019) (Gatien v. Berryhill, 2017

WL 6397734, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 2017)). “It is the ALJ’s sole responsibility to

weigh all medical evidence and resolve material conflicts where sufficient evidence

provides for such.” Petell v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2014 WL 1123477, at *10 (N.D.N.Y.

“| Mar. 21, 2014). As a result, the Court will not second guess the ALJ’s conclusions

regarding the evidence in the record as his conclusions are supported.

Plaintiff also objects to the ALJ’s consideration of Nurse Practitioner Delaparte’s

opinion. Pl.’s Mem. of Law at pp. 24-25. Plaintiff first takes exception to the ALJ’s

identification of Delaparte as not being a medically acceptable source. While conceding

that at the time of the ALJ’s decision Nurse Practitioners were not medically acceptable

sources, Plaintiff nonetheless argues that she should have been treated as one in any

event. Jd. at p. 24. In support of this proposition, Plaintiff cites Canales v. Comm’r of

Soc. Sec., 698 F. Supp. 2d 335 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) and SSR 06-3p, both of which call upon

ALJs to provide complete explanations for their treatment of opinions from sources who

are not recognized as acceptable medical sources. Canales v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 698

17

F. Supp. 2d at 344. The ALJ clearly met this obligation in providing a detailed

explanation of his consideration of Delaparte’s opinion. Tr. at pp. 28-29.

In considering the opinion of NP Delaparte, the ALJ noted problems with the

“checkoff’ opinion form provided by the source both because the form provided little

“narrative explanation and because it appeared to be significantly contradicted by

Delaparte’s treatment notes. Tr. at p. 29. Plaintiff objects to this finding — suggesting

both that the ALJ was wrong to afford the opinion less weight because of the form used

and by arguing that the ALJ appears not to have “taken the time to read” the treatment

notes in the record. Neither argument supports reversal. First, courts have long

recognized that “[fJorm reports of this sort are, by their nature, of limited evidentiary

“| value.” Scitney v. Colvin, 41 F. Supp. 3d 289, 301 (W.D.N.Y. 2014). Asa result, “courts

have routinely recognized the failure to provide a requested narrative explanation on a

check box form as a legitimate reason for affording a treating source opinion limited

weight.” Dawn P. v. Berryhill, 2019 WL 1024279, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2019) (citing

cases). Moreover, the ALJ clearly reviewed the accompanying treatment records as his

detailed reference to them demonstrates and which the Court’s review reveals to have

been accurate. See Tr. at p. 29.*

Plaintiff's Motion raises a variety of other distinct factual arguments which have been considered and found to

be without merit for the reasons identified in Defendant’s Motion.

18

IV. CONCLUSION

ACCORDINGLY, it is

ORDERED, that Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is DENIED;

and it is further

ORDERED, that Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is

GRANTED; and it is further

ORDERED, that Defendant’s decision denying Plaintiff disability benefits is

AFFIRMED and Plaintiff's Complaint is DISMISSED; and it is further

ORDERED, that the Clerk of the Court shall serve copies of this Memorandum-

Decision and Order on the parties.

“| Dated: September 26, 2019

Albany, New York

Da vel J. Ste art)

U.SMMagistrate Judge

a

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