Junior-Tony Dieujuste v. Sin

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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JUNIOR-TONY DIEUJUSTE, holder in due

course of ®Junior Tony Dieujuste©,

OPINION & ORDER

Plaintiff,

23-CV-7805

v. (Marutollo, M.J.)

JESSICA SIN, KEISHA KEARSE, and

all successors and assigns.

Defendants.

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JOSEPH A. MARUTOLLO, United States Magistrate Judge:

Plaintiff Junior-Tony Dieujuste, proceeding pro se, brings this action alleging trademark

infringement, slander, libel, and failure to protect or act against Defendants Judge Jessica Sin1 and

Clerk of Court Keisha Kearse of the Family Court of the State of New York (collectively,

“Defendants”). See generally Dkt. No. 1 (“Compl.”).

Currently pending before this Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Complaint.2 See

Dkt. Nos. 8, 17. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion and

dismisses Plaintiff’s Complaint with prejudice.

I. Background

A. Factual background

The following facts are taken from the Complaint and the parties’ submissions related to

Defendants’ motion to dismiss. See Dkt. Nos. 1, 8, 16, 17, 18.

1 As explained further below, at the time of the allegations in the Complaint, Judge Sin served as a Support

Magistrate in the Family Courts of Bronx, New York, and Queens counties prior to her appointment to the

bench. See, e.g., https://www.nyc.gov/site/macj/appointed/family-court.page. (last accessed Apr. 26,

2024).

2 On November 29, 2023, the parties consented to jurisdiction to the assigned United States Magistrate

Judge in this matter. Dkt. Nos. 11, 13.

On June 23, 2022, an individual identified as Keyona N. Florence filed an Initial Support

Petition in the Family Court of the State of New York (the “Family Court Petition”), seeking

current and retroactive child support from Plaintiff. See Compl, at ¶¶ 8, 21-38.3 A summons

accompanied the Family Court Petition and required Plaintiff to appear on February 22, 2023 in

the Family Court of the State of New York, County of Queens, before Judge Sin, then a Support

Magistrate. Id. at 22.

On February 22, 2023, Judge Sin issued a Temporary Order of Support directing Plaintiff

to remit ongoing child support payments. See Dkt. No. 8 at 1. On April 18, 2023, an Income

Withholding Order was issued to Plaintiff’s employer, garnishing Plaintiff’s wages for child

support. Compl. ¶¶ 10; 38-44. Additionally, on October 4, 2023, a National Medical Support

Notice was issued to Plaintiff’s employer, requiring health insurance enrollment for his children.

Id. at 45-54.

On April 27, 2023, Plaintiff served Defendants with a “New York State Department of

State Certificate of Service Mark Registration,” dated April 27, 2023, for the name “Junior-Tony

Dieujuste,” as well as “Notice of Trademark Infringement,” “Trademark License Agreement,” and

other related documents. See Compl. ¶ 11, 57-83; Dkt. No. 8 at 2.

B. Procedural history

On October 19, 2023, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed the instant Complaint against the

Defendants. See Compl., Dkt. No. 1. Read liberally, the Complaint alleges that Defendants

committed violations of federal trademark, copyright, and patent law, as well as slander, libel, and

a failure to protect or act. See Compl. at ¶¶ 24-27. In short, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’

references to his name on the Family Court documents unlawfully infringed on a service mark that

3 This Court references the ECF-generated page numbers.

Plaintiff purports to have registered on April 17, 2023 nunc pro tunc on October 27, 1980.4 Id. at

¶¶ 9, 62.

The Complaint seeks various forms of relief purportedly governed by Plaintiff’s “Fee

Schedule,” namely, damages of $50,000 per occurrence of service mark infringement and failure

to protect or act for each use of his name in court proceedings; damages of $100,000 per occurrence

of slander or libel; injunctive relief enjoining Defendants from invoking his service mark; an order

compelling Defendants to communicate the injunction to third parties, an order to “seize and

deliver” all materials with the relevant service mark to Plaintiff before destroying them; and a

declaration that Defendants’ actions and omissions are causes of action under various sections of

the United States Code. See Compl., ¶¶ 23-32.

On October 25, 2023, Plaintiff served Defendants. Dkt. No. 6.

On November 14, 2023, Defendants filed a letter-motion for a pre-motion conference letter,

which the Court deemed Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Complaint. See Dkt. No. 8.5 In their

motion to dismiss, Defendants assert that the Complaint (i) fails to establish this Court’s subject

matter jurisdiction and (ii) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Dkt. No. 8

at 2-3.

5 An in-person pre-motion conference was held before the undersigned regarding Defendants’ motion to

motions themselves – under appropriate circumstances.” Kapitalforeningen Lægernes Inv. v. United Techs.

Corp., 779 F. App’x 69, 70 (2d Cir. 2019) (affirming the district court construing pre-motion letters as the

motions themselves). “A court does not abuse its discretion in construing a pre-motion letter as the motion

itself, where the party seeking leave to file the motion had a sufficient opportunity to make the necessary

arguments to preserve its position for appellate review” Loeb v. Cnty. of Suffolk, No. 22-CV-6410 (HG),

2023 WL 4163117, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. June 23, 2023) (citing In re Best Payphones, Inc., 450 F. App’x 8, 15

(2d Cir. 2011) (affirming the district court converting a pre-motion letter to a motion). Defendants

subsequently filed a reply brief (Dkt. No. 17) and Plaintiff filed, without Court approval, a sur-reply (Dkt.

No. 18).

As a threshold matter, Defendants assert that sovereign immunity bars claims for damages

against state judges in their official capacity. Id. at 2. Specifically, as Plaintiff fails to point to a

waiver of sovereign immunity (and as a waiver does not exist in this case), Defendants contend

that Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. Additionally,

to the extent that Plaintiff seeks to hold Judge Jessica Sin accountable in her judicial capacity,

Defendants argue that such claims are barred due to the absolute immunity afforced to Support

Magistrates acting in their judicial capacity. Id. Third, Defendants argue that this Court may not

exercise federal question jurisdiction in this instance pursuant to the domestic-relations abstention

doctrine. Id. at 2-3. Finally, Defendants assert that, to the extent that Plaintiff is attempting to

invalidate his child support orders, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars Plaintiff’s claims as an

improper appeal of final state court judgments. In the alternative, Defendants assert that the instant

Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted where Plaintiff fails to provide

evidence of a “valid patent, trademark, service mark, or copyright” and his claims sounding in

“sovereign citizen theories” should be dismissed as meritless. Id. at 3.

Plaintiff, in his Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, argues that Defendants have

failed to appropriately respond and rebut the claims asserted in his Complaint. See Dkt. No. 16,

at 10-11. Further, Plaintiff asserts that the cases cited by Defendants are “an attempt to confuse

the issues of the instant matter before this court”—noting that many of the cases cited by

Defendants do not implicate a trademark or service mark. Id. at 11-13

II. Legal standards

A. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)

“When a party moves for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) and on other grounds, courts

consider the Rule 12(b)(1) challenge first.” Whyte v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC, No. 21-CV-

3301 (PKC) (LB), 2022 WL 4484664, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2022) (cleaned up). “This is

because if a court determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, then the defendant’s ‘other

defenses and objections become moot and do not need to be determined.’” Id. (quoting Daly v.

Citigroup Inc., 939 F.3d 415, 426 (2d Cir. 2019)). “Federal courts must determine that they have

jurisdiction before proceeding to the merits.” Lance v. Cojfman, 549 U.S. 437, 439 (2007).

In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), courts must “accept as true all

material factual allegations in the complaint,” and refrain from “drawing from the pleadings

inferences favorable to the party asserting jurisdiction.” Whyte, 2022 WL 4484664, at *3 (cleaned

up). “The party asserting subject matter jurisdiction has the burden of proving by a preponderance

of the evidence that it exists.” Id. (cleaned up). “Notwithstanding the liberal pleading standard

afforded pro se litigants, federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and may not preside over

cases if subject matter jurisdiction is lacking.” Id. (cleaned up).

“In resolving a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1)

a district court may consider evidence outside the pleadings.” Lee v. Banks, No. 23-CV-5800

(JLR), 2024 WL 1657908, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 2024) (citing Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank

Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 2008)). “Where, as here, the defendant moves for dismissal under

Rule 12(b)(1) as well as on other grounds, the court should consider the Rule 12(b)(1) challenge

first since if it must dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the accompanying

defenses and objections become moot and do not need to be determined.” Lee, 2024 WL 1657908,

at *3 (citations omitted).

Notwithstanding the liberal pleading standard afforded pro se litigants, federal courts are

courts of limited jurisdiction and may not preside over cases if they lack subject matter jurisdiction.

Lyndonville Sav. Bank & Trust Co. v. Lussier, 211 F.3d 697, 700-01 (2d Cir. 2000). “Although

courts hold pro se complaints ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by

lawyers,’ Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980), pro se litigants must establish subject matter

jurisdiction, see, e.g., Rene v. Citibank N.A., 32 F. Supp. 2d 539, 541-42 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).”

Panchitkhaew v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., No. 18-CV-4434 (JFB)(AKT), 2019 WL 1492780,

at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2019). If subject matter jurisdiction is lacking, the action must be

dismissed. Id. at 700-01; Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

B. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)

“To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint

must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a

‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted

unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). While “detailed factual allegations” are not

required, “[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the

elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Plaintiff’s

factual allegations must also be sufficient to give the defendant “fair notice of what the . . . claim

is and the grounds upon which it rests,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted) and must show that the court has subject matter jurisdiction. Ruhrgas AG v.

Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

“[T]he court’s task is to assess the legal feasibility of the complaint; it is not to assess the

weight of the evidence that might be offered on either side.” Lynch v. City of New York, 952 F.3d

67, 75 (2d Cir. 2020). Determining whether a complaint states a claim is “a context-specific task

that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 679. The Court must accept the well-pleaded factual allegations set forth in the

complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff; however, the court

need not “credit conclusory allegations or legal conclusions couched as factual allegations.”

Rothstein v. UBS AG, 708 F.3d 82, 94 (2d Cir. 2013).

“A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however

inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by

lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citation and internal quotations omitted).

“District courts must interpret a pro se complaint to raise the strongest claims that it suggests.”

Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir. 2011) (cleaned up); see also Chavis v. Chappius, 618

F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir. 2010). Moreover, at the pleadings stage of the proceeding, the Court must

assume the truth of “all well-pleaded, nonconclusory factual allegations” in the complaint. Kiobel

v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir. 2010), aff’d 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013)

(citation omitted).

III. Discussion

A. This Court does not possess subject matter jurisdiction over this action

As a threshold matter, this Complaint must be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction as (1) Defendants are entitled to absolute

immunity in their capacity as judicial officers, (2) the Domestic-Relations

Abstention Doctrine requires this Court to abstain from exercising its federal question jurisdiction

over squarely matrimonial matters, and (3) the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars Plaintiff’s claims to

the extent that he seeks review of state court judicial proceedings and determinations.

1. Absolute immunity

Federal subject matter jurisdiction is limited and available only when: (1) a “federal

question” is presented, 28 U.S.C. § 1331; or (2) the plaintiff and defendant are of diverse

citizenship and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). “[S]ubject-

matter jurisdiction, because it involves the court’s power to hear a case, can never be forfeited or

waived.” United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002). Courts “have an independent

obligation to determine whether subject matter jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a

challenge from any party.” Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006) (citing Ruhrgas

AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999)). As noted above, “Plaintiffs, even those

proceeding pro se, bear the burden of proving that subject matter jurisdiction exists.” Kuai Le

Chen v. Nielsen, 365 F. Supp. 3d 292, 294 (E.D.N.Y. 2019).

Here, the Complaint seeks damages from Judge Sin based on alleged conduct perpetrated

in her official capacity as a Support Magistrate in the Family Court of the State of New York,

County of Queens. See generally, Compl. Plaintiff’s claim against Judge Sin, however, may not

proceed given the sovereign and absolute immunity afforded to state judicial officials. Judges are

absolutely immune from suit for damages for any actions taken within the scope of their judicial

responsibilities. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991); accord Bliven v. Hunt, 579 F.3d 204,

209 (2d Cir. 2009). Generally, “acts arising out of, or related to, individual cases before the judge

are considered judicial in nature.” Bliven, 579 F.3d at 210; accord Kirkland v. Minihan, No. 20-

CV-8973, 2020 WL 6729409, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2020); Barton v. Clark, No. 23-CV-5827

(LGS), 2023 WL 6929178, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2023). “[E]ven allegations of bad faith or

malice cannot overcome judicial immunity.” Bliven, 579 F.3d at 209. This is because, “[w]ithout

insulation from liability, judges would be subject to harassment and intimidation.” Young v. Selsky,

41 F.3d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1994).

Judicial immunity does not apply when the judge acts outside her judicial capacity, or when

the judge takes action that, although judicial in nature, is taken “in the absence of jurisdiction.”

Mireles, 502 U.S. at 13; accord Hart v. Thompson, No. 23-CV-3289, 2023 WL 3949041, at *5

(S.D.N.Y. June 12, 2023); see also Bliven, 579 F.3d at 209-10 (describing actions that are judicial

in nature). But no such claim is plausibly raised here. Indeed, “the scope of [a] judge’s jurisdiction

must be construed broadly where the issue is the immunity of the judge.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435

U.S. 349, 356 (1978); accord Lewis v. Doe, No. 23-CV-1934, 2023 WL 3977062, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.

June 12, 2023).

Additionally, the fact that Judge Sin served as a Support Magistrate, rather than as a judge,

at the time of the allegations in the Complaint, does not render her any less entitled to judicial

immunity. As noted in a recent ruling in the case styled Cora v. Wright, No. 1:24-CV-0263 (LTS),

2024 WL 450247, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 2024),

Family Court Support Magistrates, as New York State judicial officers, enjoy []

judicial immunity, when presiding over child support proceedings. See Arce v.

Turnbull, No. 21-642, 2021 WL 5816687 (2d Cir. Dec. 8, 2021) (summary order);

Chris H. v. New York, 764 F. App’x 53, 55 (2d Cir. 2019) (summary order); Legister

v. Radowitz, No. 20-CV-9330 (LLS), 2020 WL 7405672, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16,

2020); Charles v. Lopez, No. 19-CV-8706 (CM), 2019 WL 5261154, at *2

(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2019); Roger of the Fam. Forest v. 45 C.F.R. § 75.2 IV-D

Contractor Steve Banks, No. 18-CV-10866 (CM), 2019 WL 4194332, at *4

(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2019) (collecting other district court cases within the Second

Circuit).

2024 WL 450247, at *2; see also Lomtevas v. Cardozo, 95-CV-2779, 2006 WL 229908, *5

(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2006) (“As a Support Magistrate in the Family Court, [Defendant’s] actions

were the same as those of a judge. Her decisions were both judicial in nature and subject to review.

Therefore, she is entitled to absolute immunity for her role as a Support Magistrate.”); Ramos v.

Putnam Fam. Ct., No. 15-CV-1443 (VAB), 2017 WL 3083727, at *3 (D. Conn. July 18, 2017)

(“Judicial immunity also entitles state officials that make decisions as to child support payments

and enforcement to “absolute quasi-judicial immunity” because, in that capacity, their “actions

[are] the same as those of a judge,” in that their decisions are “both judicial in nature and subject

to review.”).6 As a Support Magistrate presiding over child support proceedings, Judge Sin is

unquestionably entitled to judicial immunity. In light of her immunity, Plaintiff may not proceed

on her claims against Judge Sin.

Likewise, Plaintiff’s claims against Kearse are also barred on immunity grounds. Absolute

immunity extends to court clerks “for performance of tasks which are judicial in nature and an

integral part of the judicial process.” Rodriguez v. Weprin, 116 F.3d 62, 66 (2d Cir. 1997); see

also Raghubir v. Cogan, No. 21-CV-6705 (PKC) 2022 WL 1085298, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 11,

2022) (“The unnamed Clerk’s Office staff members who allegedly refused Plaintiff's submissions

are also absolutely immune from this lawsuit.”). “Absolute judicial immunity extends to non-

judicial officers who perform acts that are ‘functionally comparable’ to that of a judge’ or ‘are

integrally related to an ongoing judicial proceeding.’” Raghubir, 2022 WL 1085298, at *3

(quoting Mitchell v. Fishbein, 377 F.3d 157, 172 (2d Cir. 2004) (citations omitted)); see, e.g.,

Lewis v. Wolfe, No. 21-CV-6949, 2021 WL 4865317, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 2021) (holding that

6 As the Court explained in Lomtevas, “[a]bsolute immunity is accorded to grand jurors and prosecutors

under a ‘quasi-judicial’ theory so that they ‘can perform their respective functions without harassment or

intimidation.’” Lomtevas, 2006 WL 229908, at *5 (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 511 (1978)).

“Persons performing adjudicatory functions within a federal agency” are also entitled to absolute immunity,

as their role is “‘functionally comparable’ to that of a judge.’” Lomtevas, 2006 WL 229908, at *5 (citing

Butz, 438 U.S. at 513-14). Since this absolute quasi-judicial immunity is afforded to state government

officials, see, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 420-24 (1976) (quasi-judicial immunity afforded to

a state prosecuting attorney); Quartararo v. Catterson, 917 F.Supp. 919, 949 (E.D.N.Y.1996) (state parole

officers entitled to absolute immunity), the Court in Lomtevas reasonably concluded that it applied to

Support Magistrates as well. See, e.g., Oliva v. Heller, 839 F.2d 37, 39 (2d Cir. 1988) (explaining that

quasi-judicial immunity applies when individuals are “performing discretionary acts of a judicial nature.”).

court clerks “are absolutely immune from suit for functions which are administrative in nature if

the task was undertaken pursuant to the explicit direction of a judicial officer or pursuant to the

established practice of the court.”); Stephens v. Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, No. 15-CV-1251

(LGS), 2015 WL 1608427, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 2015) (judicial immunity applies to a county

clerk).

Here, as the Clerk of Court (Compl. ¶ 5), Kearse is being sued by Plaintiff for, in part,

“transmit[ing] an Income Withholding [sic] Order for Support . . . demanding garnishment of

[Plaintiff’s] wages . . .” Id. at ¶ 10. But court clerks “are absolutely immune from suit for

‘functions which are administrative in nature if the task was undertaken pursuant to the explicit

direction of a judicial officer or pursuant to the established practice of the court.’” Lewis, 2021

WL 4865317, at *2 (quoting Garcia v. Hebert, No. 08-CV-0095 (DFM), 2013 WL 1294412, at

*12 (D. Conn. Mar. 28, 2013)). As Plaintiff fails to identify any activity undertaken by Kearse

falling outside of the ambit of absolute immunity, Plaintiff may not proceed on his claims against

Kearse.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims are dismissed because both Defendants are judicially

immune from suit. See Barton, 2023 WL 6929178, at *5; See Roger of the Fam. Forrest v. 45

C.F.R.§ 75.2 IV-D Contractor Steve Banks, No. 18-CV-10866 (CM), 2019 WL 4194332, at *4

(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2019) (“Plaintiff seems to assert claims arising from the efforts of Evans, a

New York Family Court Support Magistrate, to assess and collect child support that Plaintiff owes

pursuant to a Family Court order, and the efforts of Cafasso [a current or former New York Family

Court First Deputy Clerk] to assist the Family Court in enforcing that order against Plaintiff. These

defendants are therefore immune from suit under the doctrine of judicial immunity. Accordingly,

the Court dismisses Plaintiff's § 1983 claims against these defendants under the doctrine of judicial

immunity and because these claims are frivolous.”).

2. The domestic-relations abstention doctrine

As noted above, Plaintiff’s claims are subject to dismissal on judicial immunity grounds.

But even if Defendants were not entitled to judicial immunity, Plaintiff’s claims are still subject to

dismissal. To the extent that Plaintiff’s Complaint asserts claims in which Plaintiff asks the Court

to nullify a determination of the New York state court with regard to Plaintiff’s obligation to pay

child support, the Court must abstain from exercising its federal-question jurisdiction over these

claims under the domestic-relations abstention doctrine.

“A federal court presented with matrimonial issues or issues ‘on the verge’ of being

matrimonial in nature should abstain from exercising jurisdiction so long as there is no obstacle to

their full and fair determination in state courts.” American Airlines, Inc. v. Block, 905 F.2d 12, 14

(2d Cir. 1990); see also Deem v. DiMella-Deem, 941 F.3d 618, 625 (2d Cir. 2019) (explaining that

“American Airlines continues to be the law of this Circuit” after relevant intervening Supreme

Court precedent). Federal district courts must therefore abstain from exercising federal-question

jurisdiction over claims involving domestic-relations issues and dismiss those types of claims for

lack of jurisdiction when they are asserted under diversity jurisdiction. See id. at 621-24.

Courts in this district routinely find that the domestic-relations abstention doctrine bars

federal courts from exercising federal question jurisdiction over claims that affect family court

proceedings. See Evans v. Adams, No. 22-CV-3882 (KAM) (JRC), 2024 WL 306240, at *3

(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2024) (where the district court abstained from hearing the plaintiff’s claims

when, although the allegations were framed “in constitutional terms,” the “requested relief as a

practical matter” would require the court to overturn “decisions in the underlying state court

action”); Shaheed v. Waldeier, No. 24-CV-915 (RER) (MMH), 2024 WL 964930, at *2 (E.D.N.Y.

Mar. 5, 2024) (citing American Airlines, 905 F.2d at 14) (“Although Plaintiff alleges Constitutional

violations, the requested relief would infringe on the state court’s expertise in resolving family

court matters.”)

Plaintiff, in his Complaint, notes that “[t]he instant matter before this court is not intended

to be . . . an effort to argue or consider the merits or procedures of [the Family Court Petition].”

Compl. ¶ 22. But in the same paragraph, Plaintiff notes that the Complaint “is intended to

challenge the commercial activities of NYS CHILD SUPPORT PROCESSING CENTER and

FAMILY COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, COUNTY OF QUEENS.” Id. (emphasis

in original). While it remains unclear what these “commercial activities” actually entail, Plaintiff

has requested that the Court grant relief which would invariably call the Family Court’s judgment

and determinations into question. See Compl. ¶¶ 29-31.

Therefore, to the extent that any of Plaintiff’s purported claims request that the Court

review matrimonial and child support decisions made by the Family Court on matters arising from

the Family Court Petition, this Court lacks the subject matter jurisdiction to do so. Said claims are

subject to dismissal.

3. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine

Further, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks review of previous state judicial proceedings, such

review is also barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is a doctrine of civil procedure enunciated by the United

States Supreme Court in two cases, Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) and Dist. of

Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). The doctrine holds that federal

district courts shall not sit in direct review of state court decisions unless Congress has passed a

statute to authorize such relief. Hoblock v. Albany Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 84 (2d Cir.

2005). In practice, Rooker-Feldman bars federal district courts from becoming a court of appeals

for state court decisions. Id. Instead, a person seeking relief from a state court judgment must find

a state court remedy or obtain relief from the United States Supreme Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1257. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) (“§ 1257,

as long interpreted, vests authority to review a state court’s judgment solely in [the Supreme]

Court”).

Rooker-Feldman bars federal courts from reviewing claims that were not only raised in the

state court action, but also claims that were not raised but are nonetheless “inextricably

intertwined” with the state court judgment. Hoblock, 422 F.3d at 86–87. There are four

requirements for the doctrine to apply: “(1) the plaintiff lost in state court, (2) the plaintiff

complains of injuries caused by the state court judgment, (3) the plaintiff invites district court

review of that judgment, and (4) the state court judgment was entered before the plaintiff’s federal

suit commenced.” Worthy-Pugh v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., 664 F. App’x 20, 21 (2d Cir.

2016) (quoting McKithen v. Brown, 626 F.3d 143, 154 (2d Cir. 2010)). Requirements one and

four are considered “procedural,” and elements two and three are considered “substantive.”

Hoblock, 422 F.3d at 85; Francis v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, No. 20-CV-5863 (EK) (MMH), 2023

WL 2707098, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2023). “While all four requirements must be met to

preclude jurisdiction, the second requirement is the ‘core’ requirement.” Francis, 2023 WL

2707098, at *5. “The causation requirement is only satisfied if ‘the third party’s actions are

produced by a state court judgment and not simply ratified, acquiesced in, or left unpunished by

it.’” Id. (quoting Sykes v. Mel S. Harris & Assocs. LLC, 780 F.3d 70, 94 (2d Cir. 2015)).

The long-standing Rooker-Feldman doctrine “provides that, in most circumstances, the

lower federal courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction to review final judgments of state

courts.” Morrison v. City of N.Y., 591 F.3d 109, 112 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing D.C. Court of Appeals

v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482-83 (1983), Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 414-16

(1923)). It is well settled that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes lower federal courts from

exercising jurisdiction over claims that seek to “collaterally attack”––i.e., reverse or modify––a

state court judgment. See Lipko v. Christie, 94 Fed. Appx. 12, 14 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing Rooker v.

Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923) and D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S.

462, 482 n. 16 (1983)); Davis v. Baldwin, 12-CV-6422, 2013 WL 6877560, (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 31,

2013) (applying Rooker-Feldman doctrine to review “collateral attack” of Family Court Order);

Anghel v. N. Y. State Dep’t of Health, 947 F. Supp. 2d 284 (E.D.N.Y. May 29, 2013) (Rooker-

Feldman “mandates that a federal district court may not review collateral attacks upon a state court

determination.”)

Here, while Plaintiff’s Complaint notes that his claims should not be interpreted as “an

effort to argue on consider the merits or procedures” of the Family Court Petition (Compl. ¶ 22),

Plaintiff’s requested relief requires this Court to review certain determinations made by the

Family Court. See, e.g., id. at ¶¶ 28-32. But as Plaintiff’s claims are “inextricably intertwined”

with the Family Court’s determination, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits this Court from

reviewing such determinations. Cogswell v. Rodriguez, 304 F. Supp. 2d 350, 355 (E.D.N.Y. 2004)

(citing Kropelnicki v. Siegel, 290 F.3d 118, 128 (2d Cir.2002)) (“This doctrine also prohibits a

district court review of state court judgments to claims that are “inextricably intertwined” with a

state court’s determinations.”).

Additionally, an application of the four Rooker-Feldman factors favor a finding that

Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the doctrine. First, it is clear that Plaintiff lost in state court as

Plaintiff’s own submissions (i.e. the Income Withholding Order) denote a sufficient judicial loss.

See Remy v. New York State Dep’t of Tax’n & Fin., 507 F. App'x 16, 18 (2d Cir. 2013) (rejecting

a plaintiff’s contention that a family court child support arrears order was merely administrative

or ministerial as “[t]he Family Court’s arrears order was an entirely sufficient judicial loss because

[plaintiff] had a full and fair opportunity to litigate that issue.”). Second, as outlined above,

Plaintiff’s submissions are riddled with complaints of injuries caused by the state court judgment.

See, e.g. Compl. at ¶¶ 8, 22, 29-31. Third, Plaintiff’s requested relief invariably requires this Court

to review the Family Court’s determination and call its judgments into question—a review that is

cautioned against (if not prohibited) by controlling authority in this Circuit. American Airlines,

905 F.2d at 14. Finally, the determinations at issue were made by the Family Court on February

22, 2023 (Dkt. No. 8 at 1), April 17, 2023 (Compl. ¶¶ 10; 38-44), and October 4, 2023 (Id. at 45-

54)—all of which were issued prior to the filing of the operative Complaint on October 19, 2023.

Dkt. No. 1. Therefore, to the extent that Plaintiff’s claims require this Court to review the Family

Court’s determinations, such claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and must be

dismissed.

Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to allege that this Court has subject matter over any of the

claims asserted in the Complaint. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims are dismissed for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction.

B. Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Even if the Court had subject matter jurisdiction here (and it does not), Plaintiff’s claims

are still subject to dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

1. Plaintiff’s slander, libel, and failure to protect claims

“Defamation, consisting of the twin torts of libel and slander, is the invasion of the

[plaintiff's] interest in a reputation and good name.” Albert v. Loksen, 239 F.3d 256, 265 (2d Cir.

2001) (citation omitted). Specifically, a defamatory statement is one that “exposes an individual

to hatred, shame, obloquy, contumely, odium, contempt, ridicule, aversion, ostracism, degradation,

or disgrace,” or one that would “induce[ ] an evil opinion of one in the minds of right-thinking

persons,” and deprive the plaintiff of “confidence and friendly intercourse in society.” Celle v.

Filipino Reporter Enters. Inc., 209 F.3d 163, 177 (2d Cir. 2000) (alteration and quotation marks

omitted). Because Plaintiff’s defamation allegations turn on written text produced by the Family

Court, the Court construes Plaintiff’s claim as a claim of libel. See Albert, 239 F.3d at 265

(explaining that “[g]enerally, spoken defamatory words are slander; written defamatory words are

libel”); Solstein v. Mirra, 488 F. Supp. 3d 86, 95 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (construing a pro se defamation

claims as a libel claim). “Under New York law, a plaintiff must establish five elements to recover

in libel: (1) a written defamatory statement of fact concerning the plaintiff; (2) publication to a

third party; (3) fault (either negligence or actual malice depending on the status of the libeled

party); (4) falsity of the defamatory statement; and (5) special damages or per se actionability

(defamatory on its face).” Celle, 209 F.3d at 176.

Whether particular words are defamatory presents a legal question to be resolved by the

court[ ] in the first instance.” Id. at 177 (citations omitted). Accordingly, courts should evaluate

each allegedly defamatory statement to determine whether it is actionable at the pleading stage.

See Biro v. Conde Nast, 883 F. Supp. 2d 441, 458 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (explaining that “the [c]ourt

[would] evaluate each allegedly defamatory statement (or set of statements) and determine whether

it is actionable, granting dismissal of claims based on nonactionable statements and denying

dismissal with respect to claims based on actionable statements”); Armstrong v. Simon & Schuster,

Inc., 85 N.Y.2d 373, 625 N.Y.S.2d 477, 649 N.E.2d 825, 892 (1995) (“Where a plaintiff alleges

that statements are false and defamatory, the legal question for the court on a motion to dismiss is

whether the contested statements are reasonably susceptible of a defamatory connotation.”).

Here, Plaintiff fails to assert any fact or assertion supporting a libel claim. Plaintiff

concludes, without factual support, that “Defendants Jessica Sin and Keisha Kearse have

committed the acts of … slander or libel.” Compl. ¶ 24. But no liberal reading of the Complaint

points to a libelous assertion. The Complaint also fails to identify which of Defendants’ statements

were allegedly defamatory. Additionally, Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations do not plausibly allege

that any statement made by any of the Defendants is materially false or that Plaintiff has been

financially or reputationally harmed by this purportedly false statement. See Landa v. Am.

Prospect, Inc., No. 22-CV-1825 (JMA)(ARL), 2023 WL 5266334, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 16,

2023). Accordingly, Plaintiff does not state a claim for defamation upon which relief can be

granted.

Similarly, Plaintiff fails to assert facts supporting its “failure to protect or act” claim.

Where such a claim is a mere legal conclusion, this claim must be dismissed. Weinstein Co. v.

Smokewood Ent. Grp., LLC, 664 F. Supp. 2d 332, 344 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

664 (2009)) (finding that a plaintiff cannot survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state claim on

which relief could be granted merely by alleging the violation of a legal right as legal conclusions

must be supported by factual allegations.).

Therefore, this Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to assert any facts supporting its

defamation and “failure to protect/act” claims. Such claims are hereby dismissed.

2. Plaintiff’s trademark infringement claim

The gravamen of Plaintiff’s Complaint, and his basis for federal court jurisdiction, is that

Defendants unlawfully infringed upon his registered service mark. See generally, Compl. Plaintiff

alleges, in relevant parts, that a duly-recorded service mark—bearing his full legal name—was

recorded into the “NEW YORK Register” (emphasis in original) nunc pro tunc to his date of birth.

Compare Compl. ¶ 9 and Compl., at 41. Because Plaintiff purportedly had a valid service mark,

Defendants infringed on his mark by referencing his full legal name in Family Court documents.

Id. at 10-11. Although Plaintiff tried placing Defendants on notice of infringement by serving

them with a litany of records and documents, Defendants’ failure to respond purportedly gave rise

to a cause of action for infringement requiring Plaintiff to turn to a federal district court—seeking

an order compelling the Defendants to remit payment in accordance with Plaintiff’s “Fee

Schedule.” Id. at 25-27. This Court finds that Plaintiff failed to properly plead a trademark

infringement claim.

The Court need not engage in a trademark infringement analysis as Plaintiff’s submissions

and the allegations contained therein are characteristic of claims by purported “sovereign citizens.”

See United States v. Bommer, 613 F. Supp. 3d 712, 717 (W.D.N.Y. 2020) (finding that a plaintiff’s

reference to her name as a “trademark name” and repeatedly referring to other individuals as

“corporations” as characteristic of claims by “sovereign citizens.”). The United States Court of

Appeals for the Second Circuit has described “sovereign citizens” as “a loosely affiliated group

who believe that the state and federal governments lack constitutional legitimacy and therefore

have no authority to regulate their behavior.” United States v. Ulloa, 511 F. App’x 105, 107 n.1

(2d Cir. 2013). “The ‘sovereign citizen’ belief system has been described by other courts as

‘completely without merit,’ ‘patently frivolous,’ (United States v. Jagim, 978 F.2d 1032, 1036 (8th

Cir. 1992)), and having ‘no conceivable validity in American law,’ (United States v. Schneider,

910 F.2d 1569, 1570 (7th Cir. 1990)).” Bommer, 613 F. Supp. 3d 712, 717. “[L]egal-sounding

but meaningless verbiage commonly used by adherents to the so-called sovereign citizen

movement” is nothing more than a nullity. See United States v. Wunder, No. 16-9452, 2019 WL

2928842, at *5 (D.N.J. July 8, 2019) (discussing the futility of the sovereign citizen verbiage in

collection claim for student loan).

When claims are, as here, premised on a plaintiff’s rights as a “sovereign citizen,” those

claims are dismissed as frivolous and for failure to state a claim. Id.; Barton, 2023 WL 6929178,

at *6; Garcia v. Cnty. of Bucks, No. 17-CV-3381, 2017 WL 4844293, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 26,

2017) (dismissing plaintiff’s trademark claims where plaintiff was a sovereign citizen seeking

relief under admiralty, copyright, and trademark laws); Johnson v. Scharf, No. 23-CV-4211, 2023

WL 7532488, at *1, n.1 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 13, 2023) (dismissing trademark claims where the plaintiff

represented to be a “living trust” as the “meaningless verbiage” of an adherent to the so-called

sovereign citizen movement) (citations omitted); People of New York v. Latnie, No. 1:14-CV-1581

(DNH) (DEP), 2015 WL 512800, at *1, n.1 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2015) (dismissing trademark claims

by a sovereign citizen who recorded his full legal name as a trademark).

The crux of Plaintiff’s Complaint involves a contention that Family Court child support

orders are unlawful infringements upon his state-registered service mark by the mere reference to

his full legal name. Though stylized as a trademark infringement claim, Plaintiff’s claims are, at

bottom, naked assertions that “state and federal governments lack [] legitimacy and therefore have

no authority to regulate [his] behavior.” United States v. Ulloa, 511 F. App’x 105, 106 n.1 (2d Cir.

2013) (summary order). For example, Plaintiff purports to be the “Absolute Trustee” of a

“revocable living trust” bearing his full legal name. See, e.g. Compl., at 58. Indeed, a mere cursory

review of Plaintiff’s purported “Trademark License Agreement”—as served on Defendants—

reveals that Plaintiff seeks to engage in a licensing agreement for the use of his mark—his full

legal name—with the Family Court of the State of New York, County of Queens. Id. at 59-61.

In sum, the Complaint and its supporting affidavits and exhibits make clear that Plaintiff is

an adherent to the “sovereign citizen” movement and seek to assert legally frivolous claims. As

Plaintiff fails to properly plead a trademark infringement claims, such claims are hereby dismissed

with prejudice.

IV. Leave to Amend

Generally, a court should not dismiss a pro se complaint “without granting leave to amend

at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might

be stated.” Dolan v. Connolly, 794 F.3d 290, 295 (2d Cir. 2015); accord Bey v. Trump, 850 F.

App’x 809, 810 (2d Cir. 2021) (summary order). But a court has the inherent power to dismiss

without leave to amend or replead “where the substance of the claim pleaded is frivolous on its

face,” or where amendment would otherwise be futile. Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d

Cir. 1988); accord Thomas v. Carter, 581 F. Supp. 3d 651, 656 (S.D.N.Y. 2022); see also Shapiro

v. McManus, 577 U.S. 39, 45-46 (2015) (holding that federal question jurisdiction is lacking where

the claims are “wholly insubstantial and frivolous,” “essentially fictitious,” or “obviously without

merit”). Because the asserted claims are legally frivolous and because the defects in the Complaint

cannot be cured with an amendment, any request for leave to amend the Complaint shall be denied.

See Barton, 2023 WL 6929178, at *6.

V. Conclusion

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint is GRANTED for lack

of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and

12(b)(6). Plaintiff’s claims are dismissed with prejudice. The Clerk of Court is respectfully

directed to terminate all pending deadlines and hearings in this action and to close this case.

Dated: Brooklyn, New York

April 26, 2024

SO ORDERED.

s/ Joseph A. Marutollo

JOSEPH A. MARUTOLLO

United States Magistrate Judge