Doyley v. City of New York

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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PHILLIP DOYLEY, et al.,

Plaintiffs, MEMORANDUM & ORDER

20-CV-3109(EK)(MJ)

-against-

CITY OF NEW YORK, et al.,

Defendants.

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ERIC KOMITEE, United States District Judge:

Plaintiffs Phillip Doyley, Latoya Doyley, and their

minor child, K.G., bring claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for

violations of their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights

against the City of New York and eleven individual police

officers.1 They also assert state-law claims for false arrest

and false imprisonment. Id. The plaintiffs allege that the

defendants executed a search warrant on their home in an

unreasonable manner, including by forcing Latoya Doyley to

remain unclothed for a period of time in the presence of

officers and by removing Phillip from the premises without

justification.

1 The defendants are the City of New York, Detective Brandon Agosto,

Detective Ramon Garcia, Detective Etasham Khan, Captain Roderick Dantini,

Detective Howard Kwok, Detective Derek Sambolin, Detective Vincent Ferrante,

Detective Edward Washa, Detective Warren Brown, Captain Paul Muggeo, and

Detective Stephen Jones.

All defendants now move for summary judgment, arguing

that the plaintiffs have adduced insufficient evidence of any

constitutional violation. The individual defendants also

contend that even if a constitutional violation occurred, they

are entitled to qualified immunity as to Phillip Doyley’s

federal claims.

For the reasons that follow, the motions for summary

judgment are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

Background2

Sometime around six in the morning on April 13, 2019,

police officers executed a no-knock search warrant on the

Doyleys’ multi-story house in Queens. Pl. 56.1 ¶ 2; Dep. Of

Latoya Doyley (“Latoya Dep.”) Tr. 36:16; Dep. Of Phillip Doyley

(“Phillip Dep.”) Tr. 36:15; McGuire Decl., Ex. D, Search Warrant

for 135-16 221 Street, Queens, New York (“Search Warrant”).

They obtained the warrant based on information that Andrew

Doyley, Phillip Doyley’s adult son, was selling narcotics in the

area, and that evidence of such activity would be found at the

Doyley home. See Search Warrant. The warrant authorized a

2 The facts in this order are drawn from the parties’ submissions in

connection with the motion for summary judgment, including Defendants’ Local

Rule 56.1 Statement (“Def. 56.1” (ECF No. 72)) and plaintiffs’ response to

this statement (“Pl. 56.1” (ECF No. 75)). The court views the facts in the

light most favorable to the plaintiffs. Citations to a party’s Rule 56.1

Statement incorporate by reference the documents cited therein.

search of the entire Doyley house. Id. Although Andrew3 was not

in the residence at the time, Phillip, Latoya, K.G. (who was

under the age of fourteen), and Phillip and Latoya’s seven-

month-old baby were upstairs. Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 8, 15.

After searching the first level for occupants, police

officers went to the upper level and found plaintiffs, who were

all in a single bedroom at the time. Id. ¶¶ 13, 15, 19. The

parties diverge — or disagree outright — about at least three

aspects of the ensuing events as to Latoya: (i) her state of

dress when initially confronted by the officers; (ii) how long

she remained in that state before being permitted to dress; and

(iii) the sequence of events between her being handcuffed and

her being permitted to dress.

The parties agree that Latoya was at least partially

unclothed when officers first entered the bedroom. Latoya Dep.

Tr. 47:21-48:01; Dep. of. Det. Brown (“Brown Dep.”) Tr. 51:15.

Latoya asserts that she was wearing “nothing” at the time.

Latoya Dep. Tr. 47:21-23. Detective Brown stated that he did

not remember exactly what she was wearing, but thought she had

on “her underwear and I think maybe like a tank top.” Brown

Dep. Tr. 51:15-52:11. They do agree that Detective Brown

3 Because Phillip, Latoya, and Andrew Doyley share a surname, this order

refers to them by their first names.

remained in the room with Latoya and the two children during the

execution of the search. Pl. 56.1 ¶ 29.

The testimony diverges, however, regarding the length

of time that Latoya remained unclothed in the officers’

presence. Detective Brown stated that Latoya was “partially

clothed” for “[a]pproximately 30 to maybe 45 seconds.” Brown

Dep. Tr. 15:15, 86:13. In her deposition, Latoya expressed

uncertainty about how long she was made to wait before dressing,

stating: “I am not sure . . . approximately how long . . . .”

Latoya Dep. 48:6-8. She elaborated that she “kept asking, can I

just put something on, I feel uncomfortable.” Id.

This was not, however, Latoya’s only evidence on this

point. Earlier, she had given testimony about the same events

in a “50-h hearing” — an inquiry pursuant to state law as part

of the claims process. There, she estimated that she was

allowed to dress only after approximately thirty minutes. 50-h

Hr’g Testimony of Latoya Doyley (“Latoya 50-h”) Tr. 26:3-20, ECF

76-5.

Finally, Detective Brown testified that officers

permitted Latoya to dress before handcuffing her. Brown Dep.

Tr. 86:13-19. Latoya, in contrast, asserts that she was

handcuffed while completely naked, Latoya Dep. 47:21-25, and

that in response to being handcuffed, she asked “can I get

dressed, can I put some clothes on.” Id. 47:19-20. She

additionally explained that, when she was ultimately allowed to

dress she required the assistance of Detective Brown to do so,

due to the handcuffs. Latoya 50-h Tr. 26:3-20.

Meanwhile, one of the other officers handcuffed

Phillip and brought him into another room shortly after the

officers entered the second floor. Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 16, 30.

Detective Agosto instructed Phillip to call Andrew and ask him

to come home to babysit the children. Id. at ¶¶ 30-31. Andrew

apparently agreed; once this call was complete, Phillip was

escorted downstairs and outside to a prisoner van, which was

parked in front of the Doyleys’ house. Id. ¶¶ 32-34.

Upon learning that Andrew was coming home, Detective

Khan told Detective Kwok, who was assigned to the prisoner van

at the time, to move the vehicle. Id. ¶¶ 35-36. Detective Kwok

then drove the van, with Phillip inside, approximately three

blocks away from the house. Id. ¶¶ 37. Phillip stayed at that

location for approximately two hours, handcuffed the entire

time. He was directed to call Andrew four or five additional

times while in the van. Id. ¶¶ 42-43, 71. Ultimately, the

police drove the van back to the house, Phillip was released,

and his handcuffs were removed. Id. ¶ 45. Andrew was already

at the house when Phillip returned, and was placed under arrest

for drug-related charges. No one else at the premises was

formally arrested. Id. ¶¶ 47, 52, 53.

All told, the search lasted somewhere between two and

three-and-a-half hours. Id. ¶¶ 42, 57. Officers recovered a

plastic bag of cocaine, credit card skimming devices, laptops,

over $500 in cash, a credit card embossing machine, cell phones,

thirty-five fraudulent credit cards, twenty blank credit cards,

and a gun cartridge during the search. Id. ¶ 49.

Plaintiffs filed suit in July 2020 and amended the

complaint in February 2021. Following the conclusion of

discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment on all

claims. Def.’s Mot. for Summary J., ECF 70.

Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when the record

demonstrates that “there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law.” Fed R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A fact is material for these

purposes if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the

governing law. An issue of fact is genuine if the evidence is

such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the

nonmoving party.”4 Lovejoy–Wilson v. NOCO Motor Fuel, Inc., 263

F.3d 208, 212 (2d Cir. 2001).

4 Unless otherwise noted, when quoting judicial decisions this order

accepts all alterations and omits all citations, footnotes, and internal

quotation marks.

The moving party has the burden of demonstrating the

absence of a dispute of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986).

If the movant carries

that burden, at least in a prima facie

sense, “the nonmoving

party must come forward with admissible evidence sufficient to

raise a genuine issue of fact for trial in order to avoid

summary judgment.” Jaramillo v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 536 F.3d 140,

145 (2d Cir. 2008). If the non-moving party fails to do so, the

court should grant summary judgment. In performing this

analysis, the court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all

inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Gallo v.

Prudential Residential Servs., Ltd. P’ship, 22 F.3d 1219, 1223

(2d Cir. 1994). And courts may not “weigh evidence or assess

the credibility of witnesses at the summary judgment

stage.” Jeffreys v. City of New York, 426 F.3d 549, 551 (2d

Cir. 2005).

Discussion

Defendants move for summary judgment on all of the

plaintiffs’ claims, arguing that the plaintiffs were not falsely

arrested or imprisoned under either Section 1983 or New York

law. In particular, the defendants argue that (1) the

plaintiffs’ initial detention was proper, as it was made

pursuant to a valid search warrant, (2) Latoya’s claim that she

was unclothed in front of a male defendant should fail, as no

reasonable jury could conclude, based on the evidence adduced,

that the period of time was unreasonable, (3) Phillip’s false

detention claim should fail because he remained within the

“immediate vicinity” of the home throughout, and (4) the officer

plaintiffs are entitled to qualified immunity as to Phillip’s

claim of detention. Defs.’ Mem. of L. in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot.

for Summary J. (“Defs. Mem.”).

A. Personal Involvement

Before proceeding to the merits, we consider the

extent to which the plaintiffs have adduced sufficient evidence

concerning the various defendants’ “personal involvement” in the

conduct underlying their claims. It has long been “settled in

this Circuit that personal involvement of defendants in alleged

constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of

damages” under Section 1983. Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 501

(2d Cir. 1994). “There is no special rule for supervisory

liability” in this context. Tangreti v. Bachman, 983 F.3d 609,

618 (2d Cir. 2020). Instead, the plaintiffs must demonstrate

that “each Government-official defendant, through the official’s

own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Id. at

612 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009)).

The amended complaint does not specify which causes of

action are asserted against which defendants. See, e.g., Am.

Compl. ¶ 75 (claiming that “[t]he individual defendants violated

plaintiffs’ rights” in a variety of ways). The defendants have

thus sought summary judgment on several claims for failure to

adduce any — let alone sufficient — evidence of personal

involvement. Those are: all claims against Captains Muggeo and

Dantini, and against Detectives Jones, Washa, Ferrante,

Sambolin, and Agosto. Defs. Mem. 18-21. In response, the

plaintiffs provided some clarity: specifically, they continue to

assert only that “Detective Brown violated Latoya Doyley’s

fourth amendment right,” Pls. Mem. 4, and that Phillip is

proceeding only against Defendants Agosto, Khan, Kwok and

Garcia. Id. at 11.

Thus, of the individuals who move for summary judgment

for lack of involvement, the plaintiffs dispute only Detective

Agosto. Summary judgment is therefore granted in favor of

defendants Dantini, Jones, Washa, Ferrante, Sambolin, and

Muggeo.5

B. Legal Authority to Detain Incident to Search

1. Fourth Amendment Considerations

We thus proceed to consider defendant Brown and

defendants Agosto, Khan, Kwok, and Garcia’s motions for summary

judgment on Latoya’s and Phillip’s claims, respectively, as well

5 These defendants would be dismissed even absent the plaintiffs’

concession, given the plaintiffs’ abandonment of the claims against them.

See Fantozzi v. City of New York, 343 F.R.D. 19, 32 (S.D.N.Y. 2022) (“Courts

may, and generally will, deem a claim abandoned when a plaintiff fails to

respond to a defendant’s arguments that the claim should be dismissed.”).

as the City’s motion as to all claims. We begin with certain

established legal principles concerning law enforcement

officers’ authority to detain the occupants of a premises

subject to search.

Plaintiffs do not dispute the validity of the search

warrant itself. See Pl. 56.1 ¶ 6; Am. Compl., Ex. A. And they

acknowledge that “a warrant to search for contraband founded on

probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority

to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is

conducted.” Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 (1981); see

Pl. Mem. of Law in Opp. to Defs. Mot. for Summary J. (“Pl.

Mem.”) at 5. That detention is justified, despite the absence

of probable cause to seize the affected individuals, for

specific purposes articulated in Summers. These are: the needs

to (1) prevent the occupants’ flight, in the event that

incriminating evidence is discovered, (2) minimize risk of harm

to officers, and (3) facilitate the orderly completion of the

search. Summers, 452 U.S. at 702-03.

The Supreme Court further explained that this

authority to detain during a search “is categorical; it does not

depend on the quantum of proof justifying detention or the

extent of the intrusion to be imposed by the seizure.” Muehler

v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 98 (2005). In other words, officers may,

generally speaking, detain occupants who are not themselves

suspected of the crime being investigated. Id. This

“categorical” approach extends only to the simple authority of

officers to detain an occupant during a search warrant

execution, not to the method of detention, which must still be

reasonable. Id.

Here, plaintiffs assert that they were detained

unreasonably — Latoya because (broadly speaking) she was not

permitted to dress, and Phillip because he was removed from the

search premises for an improper purpose. Am. Compl.

Reasonableness is assessed objectively under the Fourth

Amendment; it “requires a careful balancing of the nature and

quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment

interests against the countervailing governmental interests at

stake.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989).

This balancing does not lend itself to bright-line

rules, and the Supreme Court has found that the “duration of a

detention can, of course, affect the balance of interests under

Graham.” Muehler, 544 U.S. at 100. Among other things, it is

settled that detention incident to search cannot continue beyond

the duration of the search itself. Id. at 100-01; Rodriguez v.

United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354-55 (2015); Illinois v.

Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005). However, the Court has also

explicitly found a “2-to-3-hour detention in handcuffs” during a

search to be reasonable, given “the government’s continuing

safety interest” throughout that period. Muehler, 544 U.S. at

100.

This reasonableness analysis is informed by the

criminal conduct described in the warrant affidavit. Of

relevance here, even when “no special danger to the police is

suggested by the evidence in [the] record, the execution of a

warrant to search for narcotics is the kind of transaction that

may give rise to sudden violence or frantic efforts to conceal

or destroy evidence.” Summers, 452 U.S. at 702.

2. New York State Law

“A § 1983 claim for false arrest, resting on the

Fourth Amendment right of an individual to be free from

unreasonable seizures . . . is substantially the same as a claim

for false arrest under New York law.” Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d

845, 852 (2d Cir. 1996). A false arrest claim under New York

law requires a showing that “the defendant intentionally

confined him without his consent and without justification.”

Id. Further, the “common law tort of false arrest is a species

of false imprisonment,” Singer v. Fulton Cnty. Sheriff, 63 F.3d

110, 118 (2d Cir. 1995), and the two may be treated as a single

claim, Williams v. City of New York, No. 10-CV-2676, 2012 WL

511533, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2012). The parties do not make

independent arguments about the state law claims. They are

therefore analyzed alongside the plaintiffs’ constitutional

claims.

C. Latoya’s Privacy Claim

Latoya contends that her Fourth Amendment right to

bodily privacy was violated when she was made to stand unclothed

in front of a male officer during the search warrant’s

execution. See Pl. Mem. 4-11. Following the “personal

involvement” colloquy described above, she now asserts this

claim only against Detective Brown and the City.

The Second Circuit has recognized a “right to privacy

in one’s unclothed or partially unclothed body, regardless [of]

whether that right is established through the auspices of the

Fourth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment.” Poe v. Leonard,

282 F.3d 123, 138-39 (2d Cir. 2002). The Supreme Court has

applied the same principle, explaining that the detention of an

unclothed occupant is reasonable only so long as officers do not

“prevent[] [Plaintiffs] from dressing longer than necessary to

protect their safety.” Los Angeles Cnty., California v.

Rettele, 550 U.S. 609, 615 (2007). In Rettele, the Court

ultimately found it reasonable that the officers involved

detained the occupants in a state of undress for two-to-three

minutes while assessing potential danger. Still, the Court

added that “[t]his is not to say, of course, that the deputies

were free to force [the occupants] to remain motionless and

standing for any longer than necessary. We have recognized that

special circumstances, or possibly a prolonged detention, might

render a search unreasonable.” Id.

Lower courts have applied this reasoning to conclude

that lengthier detention of unclothed occupants can violate the

Fourth Amendment. For example, the district court in Brown v.

City of New York denied summary judgment on the basis that a

plaintiff’s detention without clothes for approximately forty-

five minutes would violate her “clearly established right not to

be detained in the nude for longer than necessary to achieve

valid law enforcement purposes.” No. 11-CV-1068, 2013 WL

491926, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2013) (citing Summers, 452 U.S.

692; Muehler, 544 U.S. 93; Rettele, 550 U.S. 609).

Similarly, a plaintiff’s claim that she was made to

stand nude for “maybe five to ten minutes” during a search

survived summary judgment, as this span of time was longer than

that in Rettele, and may have been longer than the officers

needed to ensure their own safety under the circumstances.

Thomas v. City of New York, No. 17-CV-8593, 2020 WL 6712306, at

*4-*6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2020); see also Scott v. City of New

York, No. 16-CV-834, 2020 WL 208915, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 14,

2020) (denying summary judgment on a privacy claim when there

was “no discernable reason why [the female plaintiff] had to

remain nude for several minutes . . . after she had expressed

that she was uncomfortable”).

The question therefore is whether there is a genuine

dispute as to the length of time that Latoya was held unclothed

in the presence of male officers. The relevant evidence comes

from the statements made by Latoya and Detective Brown. Latoya

did not specify a particular length of time in her deposition in

this case. When asked how long she was unclothed, Latoya

responded as follows:

A. I am not sure in, approximately how long, but I kept

asking, can I just put something on, I feel

uncomfortable.

Q. And do you know about how long you were handcuffed

without clothes?

A. I am not sure.

Latoya Dep. 48:6-11. She also testified that she was wearing

“nothing” at the time that she was handcuffed. Id. 46:21-25.

Before her deposition, however, Latoya sat for a 50-h

hearing pursuant to New York General Municipal Law 50h(1), which

calls for examinations of claimants in cases against

municipalities. As defendants acknowledge, this testimony, too,

is cognizable on a motion for summary judgment.6 In her 50-h

examination, Latoya stated that she was detained while nude for

6 See Codling v. City of New York, 68 F.App’x 227, 229 (2d Cir. 2003)

(“A plaintiff’s testimony in a 50-h hearing may be considered by the Court on

a motion for summary judgment.”); Defs. Letter, ECF 87.

“[m]aybe 30 minutes.” Latoya 50-h, Tr. 26:3. She further

explained — consistently with her deposition testimony here —

that because she was handcuffed, she was able to dress only with

the aid of Detective Brown, which made her uncomfortable, and

that the handcuffs were removed to allow her to put a shirt on

and then refastened. Id. at 26:15-27:3.

In contrast, Detective Brown testified at his

deposition that Latoya was unclothed for only about thirty to

forty-five seconds, and was never handcuffed while undressed.

Brown. Dep. 86:13-19. Brown argues that this length of time was

reasonable to allow Detective Brown to calm Latoya and ensure

she was not a danger to the officers. Defs. Mem. 11-12. This

testimony contradicts Latoya’s both in terms of the duration

that she was unclothed, and the sequence of her handcuffing

relative to being allowed to dress.

The defendants do not argue that Latoya’s 50-h or

deposition testimony should be disregarded. See Defs. Letter,

ECF 87. It is true that in certain “rare circumstance[s],” a

plaintiff’s uncorroborated testimony may be insufficient to

raise a genuine dispute of material fact. Jeffreys, 426 F.3d at

554. That would be the case, for example, when such testimony

is squarely contradicted by either other objective evidence, or

earlier statements made by the plaintiff. See, e.g., Rojas v.

Roman Cath. Diocese of Rochester, 660 F.3d 98, 105 (2d Cir.

2011); Cruz v. Reiner, No. 11-CV-2131, 2013 WL 5676303, at *1

(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2013). And several cases have found such a

contradiction when, for example, a plaintiff professes not to

remember a given fact in deposition testimony and then submits a

subsequent affidavit expressing a recollection of that fact.

E.g., Kennedy v. City of New York, 570 F. App’x 83, 84-85 (2d

Cir. 2014); Butler v. Raytel Med. Corp., 150 F. App’x 44, 46 (2d

Cir. 2005); Raskin v. Wyatt Co., 125 F.3d 55, 63 (2d Cir. 1997).

However, when the evidence presents “a question of ‘he

said, she said,’ . . . the court cannot . . . take a side at the

summary judgment stage.” Fincher v. Depository Tr. & Clearing

Corp., 604 F.3d 712, 726 (2d Cir. 2010); see also Vital v.

Interfaith Med. Ctr., 168 F.3d 615, 622 (2d Cir. 1999)

(“Assessments of credibility and choices between conflicting

versions of the events are matters for the jury, not for the

court on summary judgment.”). The Second Circuit has held that

“[i]f there is a plausible explanation for discrepancies in a

party’s testimony, the court considering a summary judgment

motion should not disregard the later testimony because of an

earlier account that was ambiguous, confusing, or simply

incomplete.” Langman Fabrics v. Graff Californiawear, Inc., 160

F.3d 106, 112 (2d Cir. 1998); see also Frost v. New York City

Police Dep't, 980 F.3d 231, 246 (2d Cir. 2020) (“[W]here the

contradictions are not real, unequivocal, and inescapable, the

general rule remains that a district court may not discredit a

witness’s deposition testimony [or declaration] on a motion for

summary judgment, because the assessment of a witness’s

credibility is a function reserved for the jury.”); Hayes v. New

York City Dep't of Corr., 84 F.3d 614, 620 (2d Cir. 1996) (two

sets of deposition testimony should have been considered because

they were “only arguably contradictory”).

Here, Latoya’s two statements are in tension with one

another as to the precise timing. But they are not directly

inconsistent. She asserted in both contexts that she was

handcuffed before being allowed to dress. And she was

consistent in her assertion that she remained unclothed for some

length of time during which she was uncomfortable and requested

clothing. Her deposition testimony can be read to suggest,

among other things, that she remained unclothed in at least two

locations — “at first,” when she was face-down on the floor by

the left side of the bed, and “then,” after she asked to change

positions, sitting down. Latoya Dep. 47:7-16. As noted above,

even short periods of unclothed detention can suffice for

liability on a privacy claim if the record reveals insufficient

reason for the given duration. See Thomas, 2020 WL 6712306, at

*4-*6 (unclothed detention of “maybe five to ten minutes”

sufficient to survive summary judgment); see also Scott, 2020 WL

208915, at *11 (same for unclothed detention lasting “several

minutes”). Thus, this testimony — taken together with Latoya’s

50-h testimony — is sufficient to survive summary judgment.7

The defendants also argue that the relevant question

is not how long Latoya was unclothed, but rather the amount of

time she was witnessed unclothed. See Defs. Letter, ECF 87 at 3

(citing Hutchinson, 436 F. App’x 210, 216 (4th Cir. 2011)

(“There, Ms. Hutchinson alleges, she was required to lie naked

on the floor, in the presence of her stepfather, brother,

fiancé, and eight male officers, for an unnecessary and

unreasonable period of time.”)); Thomas, 2020 WL 6712306, at *5.

Because Detective Brown testified that he witnessed Latoya

unclothed for less than a minute, and the record does not

establish that other officers witnessed her nude, defendants

argue, there is no material dispute. However, both Detective

Brown and Latoya stated that Detective Brown remained in the

room with her for the duration of the search, which lasted

roughly two to three and a half hours. Brown Dep. 87:9-11 (“I

don’t remember exactly how long it was. But I know I was with

her the entire search warrant.”); Latoya Dep. 54:11-13. Thus, a

jury could reasonably conclude that, if Latoya was nude for an

7 In this context, it is worth noting that Detective Brown, too,

acknowledged uncertainty in his deposition testimony about the unclothed

detention. See, e.g., Brown Dep. Tr. 51:20-23 (testifying that Latoya was

“[p]artially clothed. If I remember correctly, she was in like her underwear

and I think maybe like a tank top, if I remember correctly. I don’t

remember.”).

unreasonable period, that occurred in the presence of Detective

Brown.

Based on this factual dispute, defendants have failed

to carry their burden of demonstrating no genuine dispute of

material fact. The motion for summary judgment is therefore

denied as to Latoya’s claims of violation of bodily privacy.

D. Phillip’s Detention Claim

Phillip claims that his detention in the prisoner van

constituted false arrest and imprisonment, and violated his

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 59, 61-

68, 75. On this claim, he is proceeding against defendants

Agosto, Khan, Kwok, and Garcia, as well as the City. The

defendants respond that no reasonable jury could conclude that a

constitutional violation occurred. In addition, the individual

defendants argue that even if a constitutional violation could

be established, it would not be a violation of “clearly

established” law, and they are thus entitled to qualified

immunity. I consider these arguments in turn.8

8 District courts are of course free to take up the issue of qualified

immunity — whether the constitutional principle underpinning the alleged

violation was clearly established — prior to assessing the violation itself.

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009). Here, however, it is beneficial to

first examine the question of whether a violation occurred, as the City

remains a defendant as to these claims and is not entitled to qualified

immunity. Further, the assessment of the violation informs the qualified

immunity analysis below.

1. Whether a Constitutional Violation Occurred

Phillip invokes the Supreme Court’s decision in

Bailey, supra, for the proposition that a detention conducted

outside the “immediate vicinity” of the search premises is

constitutionally unreasonable. 568 U.S. 186 (2013). In

addition to this “spatial” limitation on detention incident to a

search, Bailey also recognized a temporal limitation: “Because

detention is justified by the interests in executing a safe and

efficient search, the decision to detain must be acted upon at

the scene of the search and not at a later time in a more remote

place.” Id. at 201-02.

a. Spatial Considerations

As regards the spatial issue, Bailey presented the

reverse situation from Phillip’s: there, the individuals were

detained far outside the search premises and brought back to

them. Specifically, two occupants left the subject apartment

before the search began, but officers followed them and stopped

them “about a mile” from the location of the search. Id. The

Supreme Court found that this detention did not fit any of the

justifications laid out in Summers – namely, ensuring the safety

of the officers conducting the search, preventing flight, or

allowing for orderly completion of the search. Id. at 196-97.

Phillip invokes this holding to argue that moving him three

blocks from the house contravened the Fourth Amendment. The

defendants argue that Phillip was in fact at all times within

the “immediate vicinity” of the searched premises — even parked

three blocks away. Defs. Mem. 13-15.

The Supreme Court declined to define “immediate

vicinity” in Bailey, given its view that the distance from the

premises in that case was “beyond any reasonable understanding

of the immediate vicinity of” the search premises. 568 U.S. at

201. The Court did, however, provide some guidance:

In closer cases courts can consider a number of

factors to determine whether an occupant was detained

within the immediate vicinity of the premises to be

searched, including the lawful limits of the premises,

whether the occupant was within the line of sight of

his dwelling, the ease of reentry from the occupant’s

location, and other relevant factors.

Id.

Based on these factors, it is overwhelmingly likely

that Phillip remained within the “immediate vicinity” of the

house when he was initially placed in the prisoner van directly

in front of the house. Pl. 56.1 ¶ 12; see Muehler, 544 U.S. at

96 (occupant was removed from her bedroom, where she was

sleeping, to a “converted garage” on the premises); Summers, 452

U.S. at 702 n. 16 (“We do not view the fact that respondent was

leaving his house when the officers arrived to be of

constitutional significance. The seizure of respondent on the

sidewalk outside was no more intrusive than the detention of

those residents of the house whom the police found inside.”);

United States v. Broussard, 80 F.3d 1025, 1033 (5th Cir. 1996)

(defendant remained in immediate vicinity when he “was taken to

the driveway while officers searched the house and garage”).

The defendants argue that this was true even after the

van was moved, given that they parked an “approximately one

minute [] drive” or “three to four minute[]” walk from the

Doyley home. Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 37, 39-41. This view is probably

wrong. Cases in this circuit that have held distances similar

to, or even closer than, the three-block distance here to be

outside the immediate vicinity of a search premises.

One district court found the detention of an

individual “around the block” from a searched location to be

outside the immediate vicinity. Cabral v. City of New York, No.

12-CV-4659, 2014 WL 4636433, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2014),

adhered to, No. 12-CV-4659, 2015 WL 4750675 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11,

2015), and aff'd, 662 F. App'x 11 (2d Cir. 2016). Another judge

came to the same conclusion regarding a detention conducted only

100-200 feet from the given premises, given the government’s

failure to justify the need for such a detention under the

Summers factors. United States v. Gildersleeve, No. 11-CR-211A,

2013 WL 1908049 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2013), report and

recommendation adopted, No. 11-CR-211A, 2013 WL 1908310

(W.D.N.Y. May 7, 2013).9 Given the considerations laid out in

Bailey, and the thrust of subsequent case law, it seems clear

that Phillip was removed from the “immediate vicinity” of his

home.

Importantly, the decision to move the prisoner van

(with Phillip inside) cannot be supported by Summers’

justifications for detention incident to search. At oral

argument in this case, the court requested that the defendants

submit a letter pointing to any record evidence that would

explain why Phillip was placed in the van and then driven away

from the house. ECF Dkt. Entry Dated 1/10/2024. The defendants

responded simply that “it is common practice to remove occupants

of a home to a prisoner van once they are detained pursuant to a

search warrant” to prevent the destruction of contraband or

evidence. ECF 87 at 2. This may explain why Phillip was

removed to the van, but it does not explain the need to move the

van itself to a further location (let alone point to relevant

evidence).

In their brief, the defendants argue that it was

reasonable to move the van because the officers had learned that

Andrew was coming home, and they wanted to prevent him — Andrew

— from fleeing or becoming aggressive upon his return. Defs.

9 But cf. Thomas v. City of New York, No. 14-CV-7513, 2019 WL 3491486,

at *5 (E.D.N.Y. July 31, 2019) (finding that alleys behind the backyard of an

apartment and abutting the premises were within the immediate vicinity).

Mem. 14. This rationale does not comport with the established

purposes for detention incident to search. As the Court wrote

in Bailey, “[e]ven if” the challenged detention “could

facilitate a later arrest if incriminating evidence is

discovered, the mere fact that law enforcement may be made more

efficient can never by itself justify disregard of the Fourth

Amendment.” 568 U.S. at 199 (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437

U.S. 385, 393, (1978)); see also id. at 206 (Scalia, J.,

concurring) (noting that “the ordinary interest in apprehending

suspects” does not support application of the Summers

exception).

For these reasons, the decision to move Phillip in the

van was not authorized by Summers or its progeny. That does not

necessarily mean, however, that it was unconstitutional. Unlike

the defendant in Bailey, whose case establishes the limiting

principle on Summers that is at issue here, Phillip was

appropriately detained incident to the search in the first

instance. See Bailey, 568 U.S. at 193 (distinguishing “Summers

and later cases” on the basis that “the occupants detained were

found within or immediately outside a residence at the moment

the police officers executed the search warrant”) (emphasis

added). The parties here agree as much. And so the analysis of

whether Phillip’s constitutional rights were violated must focus

on the incremental burden imposed by his being moved three

blocks.

This need to focus on incremental burden is one lesson

of Summers itself. Summers held that detention incident to

search is constitutional because (among other things) it

“represents only an incremental intrusion on personal liberty

when the search of a home has been authorized by a valid

warrant.” 452 U.S. at 703. Likewise, in Muehler, the Section

1983 plaintiff complained that, after detaining her incident to

search, the officers proceeded to question her about her

immigration status. The Court held that this contention rested

on the “faulty” premise that such questioning constituted a

“discrete Fourth Amendment event” at all. 544 U.S. at 100-01.

Here, given that Phillip had already been lawfully seized per

Summers, it is not immediately clear that the incremental three-

block move constituted a new Fourth Amendment event, either.

In the end, this particular question does not need to

be resolved, because — for the reasons set out in Section E,

below — the individual officers are entitled to qualified

immunity on the claim that Phillip’s detention in the van

violated the spatial limitations established in Bailey. Thus,

we proceed to consider whether Phillip’s detention violated the

temporal limitations in Bailey and its progeny.

b. Temporal Restrictions

Bailey suggests a temporal limitation on the authority

to detain incident to search, in addition to the spatial

limitation discussed above. The Court concluded in Bailey that

it was “necessary to confine the Summers rule to those who are

present when and where the search is being conducted.” 568 U.S.

at 197 (emphasis added); see also Muehler, 544 U.S. at 101 (“As

the Court of Appeals did not hold that the detention was

prolonged by the questioning [about plaintiff’s immigration

status], there was no additional seizure within the meaning of

the Fourth Amendment.”) (emphasis added).

The record suggests a sufficient basis from which a

jury could conclude that Phillip’s detention was prolonged by

the ulterior effort to arrest Andrew. For example, the parties

agree that Phillip called Andrew four or five times, at the

instruction of police, during the two hours that he was confined

to the prisoner van. Pl. 56.1 ¶ 42-43. They further agree that

Phillip was driven back to the house only after Andrew had

arrived, and that Andrew was arrested at the scene. Id. ¶¶ 45-

47. Finally, the complaint alleges that Andrew arrived home

sometime after 8:49 A.M., and Phillip was brought back sometime

after that and asked to sign the search warrant, following which

the officers left the house at about 9:30 A.M. Am. Compl.

¶¶ 66-73. This indicates that the search of the home may have

been completed by the time Phillip was returned and released —

perhaps significantly earlier. Therefore, it is possible that

Phillip’s detention was impermissibly prolonged. Phillip may

present this question to the jury.

E. Qualified Immunity

The defendants argue that the individual defendants

are entitled to qualified immunity on Phillip’s claims. Defs.

Mem. 15-18. In this context, too, I consider the two theories

on which his detention would have violated the Fourth Amendment

(spatial and temporal) separately.

“A police officer is entitled to qualified immunity

where (1) his conduct does not violate clearly established

statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person

would have known, or (2) it was objectively reasonable for him

to believe that his actions were lawful at the time of the

challenged act.” Jenkins v. City of N.Y., 478 F.3d 76, 87 (2d

Cir. 2007). In assessing this standard, the Supreme Court has

admonished courts “not to define clearly established law at a

high level of generality, since doing so avoids the crucial

question whether the official acted reasonably in the particular

circumstances that he or she faced.” Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572

U.S. 765, 779 (2014). Given these dictates, it is of course

incumbent on a court that would deny qualified immunity to state

the clearly established legal principle that a reasonable jury

could — on the facts alleged or adduced — find a given defendant

to have violated.

Spatial violations of the Bailey rule. As discussed

above, Bailey clearly established the proposition that a

claimant’s Fourth Amendment rights are violated when he or she

is initially detained incident to a search warrant execution

outside the immediate vicinity of the searched premises.

However, neither the parties nor the court has identified a case

in which such a violation was found when the claimant is

initially detained within the searched premises, pursuant to

Michigan v. Summers, and removed from the immediate vicinity

thereafter, as was the case here.

The difference matters because, as noted above, it is

undisputed in this case that the detention at issue was

initially authorized. Thus the constitutional violation, if one

were to have occurred in this instance, would have arisen from

the incremental effect of Phillip’s having been driven the three

blocks at issue.

The plaintiff has pointed to no clearly established

law that would support such a violation. And there is some

authority that is, if anything, to the contrary: See Illinois v.

Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005); Muehler, 544 U.S. 93 (2005).

Likewise, the continuation of at-home detention during a search

is less likely to carry stigmatic harm than detention on the

street. See Bailey, 568 U.S. at 200. Here, Phillip was already

in the van at the time it was moved, and there is no indication

that anyone could see in, or that the moving of the van three

blocks away made his detention more public.

Therefore, “officers of reasonable competence could

disagree on the legality of the action at issue in its

particular factual context.” Dancy v. McGinley, 843 F. 3d 93,

106 (2d Cir. 2016). Given the lack of case law directly on

point, the individual defendants are entitled to qualified

immunity with respect to Phillip’s claims that the spatial

element of his detention constituted a violation, and the motion

for summary judgment as to these claims and these defendants is

granted.

Temporal violations of the Bailey rule. It is clearly

established, however, that a detention incident to search cannot

proceed longer than the length of the search itself. See

discussion above in Section D.1(b) (citing Bailey, 568 U.S. at

197; Muehler, 544 U.S. at 101).

As noted above, the factual record at this stage is

such that a reasonable jury could conclude that the endpoint of

Phillip’s detention coincided with Andrew’s arrest, rather than

the completion of the search. In particular, Phillip was

detained in the van for two hours, made to call his son four or

five additional times, was only returned after Andrew had

arrived back home and was being arrested, and the officers left

shortly thereafter. Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 42-47; Am. Compl. ¶¶ 66-73.

Accordingly, summary judgment is denied with respect to the

alleged temporal violations of Phillip’s detention.

F. The City’s Liability

Defendants do not argue that the City should not be

held liable under Monell. Nor could they, on this record.

Monell dictates that a municipality does not have respondeat

superior liability for the constitutional violations of its

agents. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436

U.S. 658, 691-94 (1978). Instead, municipality liability

requires that the violation result from a “policy or custom.”

Id. at 694. Thus, the “critical question” is “whether there is

sufficient evidence in the record of municipal policy, custom,

or practice, so that a jury could reasonably infer that the

individual conduct in this case was causally connected to the

policy.” Gentile v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 926 F.2d 142, 153 (2d

Cir. 1991); see also Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d

567, 579 (5th Cir. 2001) (a policy or custom under Monell can be

demonstrated by “a persistent, widespread practice of City

officials or employees”).

Here, in their supplemental letter to the court, the

city’s attorneys expressly acknowledge such a policy or custom.

They wrote that “it is common practice to remove occupants of a

home to a prisoner van once they are detained pursuant to a

search warrant,” ECF 87 (quoting Deposition Tr. of Detective

Agosto, 65:10-66:6), and that “it is appropriate for Your Honor

to conclude that plaintiff Phillip Doyley’s removal from the

home was . . . consistent with NYPD’s policy,” id.; see also

Khan Deposition Tr. 66:3-9 (“[M]ost of the time pending the

search of the premises, we do remove the occupants so we can

conduct the search.”). This acknowledgment does not indicate

whether or not it is NYPD practice to drive the prisoner van

away from the search premises once a detainee is inside, which

is ultimately the basis for the constitutional violation in this

case. However, given the defendants’ failure to assert a

defense under Monell, and the evidence from defendants

themselves suggesting that it is city policy to at least remove

detainees from search premises, the motion to dismiss Phillip’s

detention claims as to the City is denied.10

G. Alleged Threats to Remove the Doyleys’ Children

In their complaint and opposition brief, the

plaintiffs appear to reference a constitutional violation based

on the fact that the defendants allegedly threatened Latoya and

Phillip Doyley with the removal of their children if they did

10 It may be — or many not — that Phillip’s damages are limited; it

remains unclear at this stage how he was harmed by the incremental step of

driving the prisoner van three blocks from his house. It is possible he was

detained longer than necessary to complete the search. Moreover, nominal

damages are appropriate. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266-67 (1978).

not cooperate with police instructions, including signing the

search warrant and calling Andrew. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 55, 75

(alleging that “defendants violated plaintiffs’ rights,

guaranteed to them by the fourth and fourteenth amendments” in

part because they “threatened to take their children from

them”); Pls. Mem. 14-15. While the plaintiffs argue that such

alleged coercion was “violative of the due process clause of the

fourteenth amendment,” id., they cite no authority for this

proposition. Instead, they cite two criminal cases in which

similar remarks regarding the removal of children were used to

coerce confessions. See Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528

(1963); United States v. Tingle, 658 F. 2d 1332 (9th Cir. 1981).

But no such violation is at issue here, and the Amended

Complaint contains no independent cause of action relating to

this alleged conduct. Am. Compl. Given the lack of clear

grounds for this alleged violation, the motion for summary

judgment is granted as to the plaintiffs’ coercion claim.

H. K.G.’s Claims

The plaintiffs have likewise abandoned any claims

brought by K.G. by failing to demonstrate a violation of the

child’s rights and failing to respond to the defendants’

argument for dismissal. Defs. Mem. 7-10; see generally, Pl.

Mem.; Fantozzi, 343 F.R.D. 19. Therefore, the motion to dismiss

K.G.’s claims is granted.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the defendants’ motion for

summary judgment is DENIED as to Latoya’s claim for violation of

her bodily privacy against Detective Brown and the City of New

York and as to Phillip’s claim against the City of New York that

his removal from the home in the prisoner van constituted false

imprisonment and a violation of his constitutional rights.

Finally, the motion is DENIED as to Phillip’s claim against

Detectives Agosto, Khan, Kwok, and Garcia that his detention

violated the temporal limits of reasonable seizure. The motion

is GRANTED as to all other claims.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Eric Komitee__________

ERIC KOMITEE

United State s District Judge

D ated: March 5, 2024

Brooklyn, New York