The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
------------------------------------------------------X
LUBAVITCH OF OLD WESTBURY, INC.
and RABBI AARON KONIKOV,
Plaintiffs, MEMORANDUM OF
DECISION & ORDER
-against- 08-CV-5081 (GRB)(LGD)
INCORPORATED VILLAGE OF OLD
WESTBURY, NEW YORK,
Defendant.
-----------------------------------------------------X
GARY R. BROWN, United States District Judge:
According to the official history of the Incorporated Village of Old Westbury, the area was
settled by Quakers, after which for “the next 225 years Old Westbury remained virtually isolated
by choice from any contact with the outside world.”1 Then, according to Old Westbury’s historical
narrative, came the “Estates Era,” beginning in the 1890s, during which “new large estates were
[sic] from prominent New York City families.”2 Following World War II, the story goes,
development in the region “ushered in the third and present way of life for Old Westbury which
led to the breaking up of these large estates into two-acre residential subdivisions,” but then, “[i]n
1987, the Village up-zoned to four-acre residential properties.”3 Against the backdrop of this case,
the Village’s self-view proves curious.
1 Richard Gachot, History of Old Westbury, Village of Old Westbury https://www.villageofoldwestbury.org/175/Histo
ry-of-Old-Westbury.
2 Id.
3 Id. According to a report commissioned by the Village, there are several different residential districts, requiring a
minimum of one, two or four acres for construction of a residence. VHB Engineering, Village of Old Westbury: Land
Use and Zoning Study, June 2021 at 11, https://www.villageofoldwestbury.org/DocumentCenter/View/773/VOW-
Land-Use-and-Zoning-Study-June-Update-PDF [hereinafter Land Use Study].
The Village Board confers at public meetings and } □□
ef
(presumably) executive sessions at the Village Hall, located at 1 th
. . . wae dy ah □□□ □□□ □□ =
Store Hill Road. At that address lies a multi-use facility that not , Foie sy 9
, I | oe □□ □□
only accommodates the needs of the Village Board, but also TT a | /
ee eT □□
cpypemmmammmg, ROUSES the Village’s Police ee
ee UP oe A Old Westbury Village Hall with integrated Post
a | Ey See Department (which employs 35 fice facility.
ee i
□□ □ nal on wee individuals and includes a detective bureau, a patrol bureau and a
communications center‘), Administration
ea par 4 _ □ tia, □□
Police Vehicles at Village Hall Building, Building Department, Water BT oa ie
eS
Department, Justice Court, Department of Public Works with a heavy [RAURSs@)\q) "tsi
. Public Works Equipment
equipment yard,” as well as several offices and at Village Hall
warehouses and even a branch of the United States Post Office.
ee Satellite imagery of the facilities reveals an impressive array of
aa x 3 4
— * oS buildings, vehicles, mounds of construction material and ample
□□ er a
Peed hie . . woe
Pant parking spaces to accommodate the multitude of activities.
% a
“AY. Za Thus, the Village Hall represents a public epicenter, a hive
Rea Y uA
= en ae of governmental, administrative, legal and community affairs. And
ae re ae all of this action takes place on a lot that consists of, according to
eee oe
Nassau County records, 7.63 acres of land.® Nestled in that facility, though, the Village Board
* https://www.villageofoldwestbury.org/156/Police-Department.
5 https://www.villageofoldwestbury.org/155/Department-of-Public- Works
° https://Irv.nassaucountyny.gov/info/19++D++00710/. Ironically, this is approximately the same size as the parcels
owned by plaintiffs and subject of this litigation.
decided that to construct any kind of religious facility in the Village requires a minimum of 12
acres of land.7
Somehow, that does not seem right.
Presently before the Court is a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) of United States
Magistrate Judge Lee G. Dunst providing recommendations regarding defendant’s motion to
dismiss the Second Amended Complaint (SAC) in this 16-year-old civil action, which represents
the oldest matter on this Court’s docket. The R&R8 describes the unacceptably long history of
this case. See DE 188 (“R&R”) at 1-2. Even a cursory review of this woeful tale makes it plain
that this matter must be moved forward with deliberate speed. First, however, the Court must
consider the pending motion and Magistrate Judge Dunst’s recommendations.9
In reviewing a Report and Recommendation, the district court “may accept, reject, or
modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Both parties have filed objections to the R&R, DE 192 and DE 193, thus
requiring de novo review of the matters raised. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c); Fed. R. Civ. P.
72(b)(3) (requiring de novo review after objections). Importantly, the R&R follows a thoughtful,
thorough Memorandum and Order by the Honorable Denis R. Hurley, which permitted the filing
of the SAC and reviewed many of the issues dispositive of the instant motions. See Lubavitch of
Old Westbury, Inc. v. Inc. Vill. of Old Westbury, New York, No. 08-CV-5081 (DRH)(ARL), 2021
7 Of course, the so-called Places of Worship Law (bearing the unfortunate acronym “POW”) contains other requisites
for those who would attempt to construct a place of religious worship. The acreage restriction, which appears relevant
to this dispute, see Docket Entry (“DE”) 110 at 139, represents a simple metric for the purpose of discussion. There
are other issues. For example, the statute also provides that 35% of a 12-acre parcel must remain natural and
undeveloped, and only 4% may be covered with a structure of any sort. Old Westbury, N.Y., Code § 216-111.2. The
full code of the Village, including the POW Law, may be accessed at: https://ecode360.com/OL0821#OL0821.
8 Lubavitch of Old Westbury, Inc. v. Inc. Vill. of Old Westbury, New York, No. 08-CV-5081 (GRB)(LGD), 2023 WL
9058143 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2023).
9 Appendix A offers a table providing an overview of Magistrate Judge Dunst’s 42-page R&R and his
recommendations regarding the disposition of the 17 causes of action contained in the SAC.
WL 4472852 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2021) (Lubavitch I).10 In fact, Judge Hurley presents a thorough
summary of the allegations of the 121-page SAC and an expertly-crafted overview of the
procedural history of this matter, which are incorporated by reference herein.
Plaintiffs have filed objections solely to the recommendation concerning Count 3 of the
Second Amended Complaint. See generally DE 193. Evidencing a predilection for overlitigation
and elevation of form over substance, defendant objects to numerous recommendations, including
recommendations that portions of its motion to dismiss should be granted. See generally DE 192.
To the extent the parties have not filed specific objections to certain recommendations, those are
reviewed under a clear error standard.
Facial Challenges and Ripeness of As-Applied Challenges to the Places of Worship Law
Defendant’s primary objections, as well as much of the instant motions, appear rooted in
purported jurisdictional challenges based on ripeness, as well as continuing arguments as to
whether plaintiffs have properly raised facial challenges to the POW Law. Following a de novo
review, Judge Hurley persuasively and eloquently determined that “[t]he SAC challenges the POW
Law as unconstitutional on its face and alleges injury independent of Defendants’ handling of
Plaintiffs’ land-use application,” thereby averting any ripeness issue.11 Defendant, however,
continues to press these arguments, even though Judge Hurley largely resolved these questions in
his Memorandum and Order.
10 While defendant argues that Judge Hurley’s determinations were made pursuant to a different legal standard, the
analysis contained in that decision nonetheless proves immensely helpful here.
11 Lubavitch I, 2021 WL 4472852 at *12 (citing cases involving Equal Protection challenges under both the federal
and state constitution, as well as Free Speech, Free Exercise and Free Association clauses under the First Amendment
and under RLUIPA, equal terms claims under RLUIPA, and substantive due process claims).
A. The Validity of Facial Challenges
On this motion, defendant endeavors to reargue the sufficiency of plaintiffs’ allegations
supporting a facial challenge to the POW Law, principally by relying on another district court
opinion which, in a somewhat different context, found the POW Law facially neutral.12 DE 181-
5 at 18 (citing Roman Catholic Diocese of Rockville Center v. Incorporated Village of Old
Westbury, 128 F. Supp. 3d 566 (E.D.N.Y. 2015)). With respect to this case, there are several
distinguishing features and parts of the analysis with which this Court is forced to disagree.
First, in reaching its conclusion, the Roman Catholic Diocese decision accepted
defendant’s apparently unchallenged argument that, under the POW Law, “places of worship are
treated the same as, or better than, not-for-profit schools, which are the only other institutions
allowed in the Village's Residential Districts,” Roman Catholic Diocese, 128 F. Supp. 3d at 583,
an argument repeatedly made in this proceeding. See, e.g., 181-5 at 9 (“The POW Law imposed
more stringent requirements for the development of non-profit schools.”). The argument proves
misleading.13 The POW Law does include requisites for the development of private schools that
are either coextensive or, in some instances, more restrictive than those imposed on places of
worship in that amendment to its zoning code. See DE 181-4 (text of POW Zoning Amendment).
12 Defendant also raises entirely nonsensical arguments, such as the claim that “plaintiffs’ facial challenges to the
POW Law are not ripe,” DE 181-5 at 17, when, of course, facial challenges “are generally ripe the moment the
challenged regulation or [law] is passed.” Lubavitch I, 2021 WL 4472852, at *11 (citations omitted). Other assertions
made by defendant, such as the claim that the Court should upend the determinations by Judge Hurley “in light of . . .
documentary evidence [purportedly demonstrating] that the POW Law did not have a discriminatory intent or impact,”
DE 181-5 at 18, suggests that counsel fails to comprehend the meaning of a “facial” challenge.
13 This, sadly, is not the only misleading argument raised by defendant here. For example, in connection with
plaintiffs’ freedom of association claim, counsel boldly asserts that “Plaintiffs’ claim for violation of the right to
freedom of association fails because they do not allege facts demonstrating direct and substantial interference with
associational rights. [ ] Plaintiffs are still able to associate in connection with their religious activities.” DE 181-5 at
23. Yet, annexed to the SAC is a letter from the Village advising Rabbi Konikov and his wife, who were going to
hold a Torah dedication ceremony in their home, that such uses were prohibited as “the Village has not issued a permit
for a religious use.” DE 110 at 141. Furthermore, as defendant endeavors to distinguish Congregational Rabbinical
College of Tartikov v. Pomona, 915 F.Supp.2d 574 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), defense counsel bizarrely asserts that “Tartikov
involved a school. The free speech involved was educational, which required a school building for instruction and
study.” DE 192 at 20. So too, generally speaking, do religious ceremonies.
However, the comparison between the provisions applied to places of worship and private schools
is solely a creation of the Board’s action in formulating the POW Law—the Trustees could have,
just as easily, created an amendment affecting the construction of religious edifices and, say, iron
smelting facilities, which would have almost certainly created a favorable comparison.
The Village’s action in enacting contemporaneous amendments affecting religious institutions and
private schools does not limit the universe of analysis of a facial challenge, as the POW Law is
part of a larger, coherent zoning code regulating land use. A review of that zoning code reveals
that the Village imposes less onerous requisites on landowners who opt to develop land for
residential purposes, see Old Westbury, N.Y., Code § 216-13, a distinction that might be justifiable
given that private residential uses and more public uses of land can implicate different concerns.
However, the Village Code also provides far more generous provisions for many types of non-
residential, commercial and public development. The Roman Catholic Diocese case, accepting
the apparently unchallenged assertions by defendants, found that the POW Law “treats places of
worship better than many other secular institutional uses, such as theaters, recreational clubs,
membership organizations, and entertainment venues, which are not permitted in the Village at
all.” See Roman Cath. Diocese, 128 F. Supp. 3d at 583 (citing “Def. Opp. at 11.”). In fact, the
Village’s zoning code permits many types of non-residential development in its so-called
“residential” zones and imposes seemingly more stringent requirements on religious uses than it
does on professional offices, public schools, public utility facilities, farms, private and commercial
horse stables,14 and the Village’s own “municipal uses and purposes,” a few of which are described
above. See Old Westbury, N.Y., Code §§ 216-11, -12; Tandon v. Newsom, 593 U.S. 61, 62 (2021)
14 Remarkably, facilities for the commercial training and boarding of horses—an endeavor not specifically protected
by the U.S. Constitution—may include buildings of up to 35 feet in height, whereas places of worship are limited to
25 feet. Compare Old Westbury, N.Y., Code § 216-111, with id. § 216-111.2.
(“government regulations are not neutral and generally applicable, and therefore trigger strict
scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause, whenever they treat any comparable secular activity more
favorably than religious exercise”).
Roman Catholic Diocese also holds that “the POW Law must be analyzed in the context
of New York State public policy.” 128 F. Supp. 3d at 582. The decision suggests that “the
enactment of the POW Law [ ] to ensure the development of these institutions in a manner
consistent with the residential character of the Village and to mitigate the adverse impacts related
to these institutional uses” was consistent with New York State public policy. See id. However,
a state court considering the POW Law noted that “in New York[,] as a matter of public policy,
religious uses of land are presumptively beneficial to the public.” McGann v. Inc. Vill. of Old
Westbury, 186 Misc. 2d 661, 662, 719 N.Y.S.2d 803 (Nassau Cty. Sup. Ct. Nov 9, 2000) (“So
strong is the presumption of public benefit that ordinarily such factors bearing on public health,
safety and welfare as neighborhood appearances, adverse effect on property values, loss of tax
revenue, decreased enjoyment of neighboring properties and traffic hazards are insufficient to
rebut the presumption.”) (citing Diocese of Rochester v. Plan. Bd. of Town of Brighton, 1 N.Y.2d
508, 525, 136 N.E.2d 827 (1956)). Thus, it is difficult to reconcile the POW Law with state policy
on the development of religious facilities.
Furthermore, in finding the POW Law facially neutral, Roman Catholic Diocese notes that
“the POW Law does not apply exclusively to Plaintiff or the Roman Catholic religion, but applies
equally to all religious institutions.” 128 F. Supp. 3d at 581 (citing Church of the Lukumi Babalu
Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 538–39 (1993)). This determination was based on
defendant’s argument, again repeated here, that “the ordinances in Lukumi were non-neutral
‘because their burden fell on “almost” no one but the disfavored religious group.’” DE 192 at 16-
17 (quoting Central Rabbinical Congress v. N.Y.C. Dept. of Health, 763 F.3d 183, 196 (2d Cir.
2014)). Yet defendant’s selective quotations from Lukumi misstate the meaning of the case, in
which the Court held that “[a]t a minimum, the protections of the Free Exercise Clause pertain if
the law at issue discriminates against some or all religious beliefs or regulates or prohibits conduct
because it is undertaken for religious reasons.” Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 532 (emphasis added) (further
noting “[t]hese principles, though not often at issue in our Free Exercise Clause cases, have played
a role in some”). Moreover, as may not have been the case in Roman Catholic Diocese, the SAC
makes specific allegations describing the Village’s financial interest in discouraging and limiting
development not only the development of plaintiffs’ proposed facilities,15 but of all religious
institutions16 due to the exemption of property from its tax base.
Based on the foregoing, this Court must agree with the determination by Judge Hurley and
find that the plaintiffs have adequately alleged a facial challenge to the POW Law. Therefore, the
motion to dismiss must be denied in this respect.
B. Ripeness and the As-Applied Challenges
In Lubavitch I, Judge Hurley further explored the question of as-applied claims, finding
that such claims, as alleged in the SAC, were unquestionably ripe. “Many courts have noted that
futility follows from ‘considerable’ delay,” Judge Hurley observed.17 And over three years ago,
15 See, e.g., DE 110 at 230 (Draft Environmental Impact Statement stating “[t]he property tax exemption eliminates
any net tax benefits associated with the proposed additions”).
16 See, e.g., id. at 15 (providing examples of other religious institutions purportedly pressured by the Village to
downsize projects and rezone portions as residential properties, make payments in lieu of taxes or abandon projects
altogether); id. at 24 (describing steps “intended to discourage religious land use”); id. at 50 (alleging that “Defendants
favor secular uses before any religious land uses”); cf. VHB Engineering, Village of Old Westbury: Land Use and
Zoning Study, June 2021 at 11, https://www.villageofoldwestbury.org/DocumentCenter/View/773/VOW-Land-Use-
and-Zoning-Study-June-Update-PDF at 43 (describing the Village’s religious institutions as “assets,” yet concluding
that “[r]esidents are experiencing increased pressure on property taxes for a variety of reasons, including . . . a large
inventory of tax-exempt properties due to the conversion of larger properties to tax-exempt institutional uses”).
17 Lubavitch I, 2021 WL 4472852 at *13.
Judge Hurley determined that “[t]he twenty-year delay here, even attributing some portion thereof
to Plaintiffs’ conduct, easily clears the ‘considerable’ bar.”18
On this motion, defendant attempts to reset the clock through the submission of several
conclusory declarations with exhibits, which counsel claims establish that “[o]ver a three-year
period, the Village timely carried its review and did not place any brick walls in Plaintiffs’ path,”
and during that limited window the “process proceeded normally.” DE 192 at 13, 16. The Village
attempts to fit this Court with a set of judicial blinders, asserting that the undersigned should
consider only this limited window, reject Judge Hurley’s thoughtful analysis of this question and
find that the plaintiffs’ claims are not yet ripe. While the arguments raised here are spurious in
several respects, perhaps the most audacious and revealing is that involving the history of this case:
counsel for the Village rely upon the “critical” status reports filed in this case to “refute Plaintiff’s
claims of an on-going pattern of abuse, mistreatment and obstruction.” Id. at 13. Defendant cannot
reap a substantive benefit from the fact that a former presiding judge saw fit to place this action in
“administrative hold”19 for more than a decade; contrary to counsel’s assertion, whatever
proceeding occurred during this period was not “under the supervision of this Court without
incident.” Id. at 15.
18 Id.
19 While there appears to be little precedent for placing a case into “administrative hold,” the concept seems most
closely akin to “administratively closing” an action. See, e.g., In re Barkany, 542 B.R. 662, 681 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
2015). Such a directive “functionally amount[s] to a stay of the proceedings,” does not represent a “final decision or
any other order that is appealable” and carries “no jurisdictional significance.” Zimmerman v. UBS AG, 789 F. App’x
914, 915 (2d Cir. 2020). That hold was expressly imposed as part of a Stipulation and Order in 2009 providing that it
would extend “while the Plaintiffs file a special use permit application for the development of the parcel located at
267 Glen Cove Road, Village of Old Westbury, New York and until a determination is made by the Board of Trustees
for the Village of Old Westbury with respect thereof.” DE 30. For defendant to now claim that the intervening period
and the formulaic status reports filed represent some form of judicial oversight of its processes is preposterous.
The Court has examined the materials submitted by defendant. Nothing contained therein
warrants disturbing Judge Hurley’s careful determination. Thus, plaintiff’s as-applied challenges
are ripe and not subject to dismissal.
The Remaining Counts and Challenges
The parties, as noted, have raised other miscellaneous objections to the R&R; few are
worthy of extended comment. The Magistrate Judge correctly determined that the third claim fails
to allege sufficient facts to warrant an “intimate association” claim but should otherwise proceed;
plaintiffs’ objection thereto is inapposite and therefore denied.
Defendant correctly notes that the Magistrate Judge’s consideration of Count Four using a
sua sponte Pyke analysis denied the parties a reasonable opportunity to contest this construct and
therefore that portion of the R&R is rejected. Count Four otherwise rests on a selective
enforcement theory; not only have plaintiffs failed to allege comparators, but the SAC identifies
religious-use landowners who were also allegedly subject to the same wrongful treatment. Thus,
Count Four is properly dismissed.
As to Count Nine, Magistrate Judge Dunst recommended dismissing much of this claim.
As plaintiffs filed no objection, and not finding any clear error, that portion of the R&R is adopted.
Defendant objects that the remaining portion of Count Nine—relating to direct retaliation arising
from the efforts to develop the property for religious purposes—should also be dismissed, but the
reasons provided are not cognizable at this juncture. As such, the Court adopts the R&R in this
respect, granting the motion to dismiss to the extent noted. In sum, the Court will adopt the
recommendations as set forth in Appendix A.
The Path Forward
The allegations raise serious issues of constitutional magnitude, and this matter has
lingered far too long. That ends now. Counsel will be expected to work diligently to bring this
matter to resolution—in whatever form that might occur—with all deliberate speed.
In this respect, plaintiffs’ counsel included a rather extraordinary statement in its
objections:
Plaintiffs intend to replead Counts 9-12 in the SAC as to Defendants Carillo,
Malatino, Baker, and Novick, as allowed at ECF 169, pages 36-37 and the Order
dated March 23, 2023. They propose to do so after this motion, first filed in tandem
with the individual defendants’ since decided motion, is determined. Plaintiffs
invite the Court’s further direction, if any.
DE 193 at 2 n.1. After fourteen years of litigation, and more than a year ago, Magistrate Judge
Dunst issued an R&R, which recommended all individual claims against these individual
defendants be dismissed. See DE 169 at 34-37. Notably, in making this recommendation,
Magistrate Judge Dunst held that plaintiffs had “resort[ed] to group pleadings,” failed to make any
individual allegations against these defendants and had relied on “a tactic which is expressly
disfavored with respect to Section 1983 proceedings.” Id. Perhaps out of an abundance of caution,
Magistrate Judge Dunst did not recommend a dismissal with prejudice as to these defendants
(though he made such a recommendation with respect to many of plaintiffs’ other improper claims
against individual defendants). These recommendations were adopted by the undersigned via
Electronic Order dated March 23, 2023. In the interim, plaintiffs’ counsel made no mention of
potential repleading until now, at which point counsel alludes to an intention to replead at an
unspecified time in the future.
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2), such an amendment is permissible only with leave of court
and “when justice so requires.” While leave to amend is generally freely granted, such leave may
be denied where the movant acts with undue delay and where leave would unfairly prejudice an
adverse party. Ambac Assurance Corp. v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, No. 17-CV-2614 (WHP), 2020
WL 42245, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 2020). Here, plaintiffs waited far too long to make the application.
As to the prejudice to the individual defendants, the pendency of unjustified Section 1983 litigation
against officials results in significant—and too often overlooked—hardships on those individuals.
Corso v. Cnty. of Suffolk, No. CV 19-3189 (GRB), 2021 WL 972745, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 16,
2021) (denying leave and collecting cases). Moreover, further delay and additional complication
of these proceedings cannot possibly serve the interests of justice.
These factors, combined with the substantive deficiencies identified by Magistrate Judge
Dunst counsel against granting leave to replead at this late date. Thus, leave to replead is denied.
Magistrate Judge Dunst stayed discovery in this matter pending the undersigned’s review
of the R&R. See Electronic Order dated December 21, 2023. For all the reasons stated, that stay
is hereby lifted, and discovery should proceed forthwith.
And it will proceed quickly. Given the unthinkable amount of time (and money) already
spent on this case and related litigation, along with the vast record already available to the parties,
this matter will be returned to Judge Dunst to supervise discovery. The parties are directed to meet
and confer to establish a discovery schedule that will conclude in no longer than nine months from
the date of this Opinion. At that juncture, unless the matter is settled, the parties should be prepared
to proceed with summary judgment or trial, as appropriate.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: Central Islip, New York
February 16, 2024
/s/ Gary R. Brown
GARY R. BROWN
United States District Judge
APPENDIX A
Claim Description Recommended Objection Court’s Ruling on the Motion
Disposition of Motion P D20
to Dismiss
1 §1983 Free Exercise Denied X Denied
2 §1983 Free Denied X Denied
Speech/Association
3 §1983 Freedom of Denied in part; granted X X Denied in part; Granted as to
Association as to “intimate “intimate association claim”
association claim”
4 §1983 Equal Protection Granted as to dismissal X Granted: lack of comparator
of selective enforcement institutions
claim for lack of
comparators, but
survives as a Pyke claim.
5 §1983 Due Process Denied X Denied
6 RLUIPA Substantial Burden Denied X Denied
7 RLUIPA Discrimination Denied X Denied
8 RLUIPA Land Use/Equal Granted: lack of Granted: lack of comparator
Terms comparator institutions institutions
9 Retaliation/Constitutional Granted in part; denied X Granted in part; Denied as to
Rights as to retaliation for retaliation for pursuing right to
pursuing right to use use for religious purposes21
property for religious
purposes
10 Fourth Amendment Search Granted: failure to Granted: failure to satisfy Monell
11 (various incidents) satisfy Monell pleading pleading requisites
12 requisites.
13 “Commingled Claim”22 Granted: Claim Granted: claim abandoned
abandoned
14 §1985 Civil Conspiracy Granted (with X Granted (with prejudice): single
15 §1986 Failure to Prevent prejudice): single X defendant/absence of conspiracy.
Interference defendant/absence of
conspiracy.
16 NYS Constitutional Claims Granted: Claims X Granted: Claims withdrawn
17 Discrimination/NY Civil withdrawn
Rights law
20 Defendant filed certain specific objections, each of which is designated with an X. In addition, defendant filed
generalized “theory based” objects (including objections based on the R&R’s analysis of law of the case, ripeness,
etc.) which—to the extent their applicability are expressed—are designated by a grayed X on the chart. These
generalized objections fail to satisfy the requisites of the statute and, somewhat outrageously, encompass objections
to counts as to which defendant prevailed before the Magistrate Judge, including Claims 14 and 15.
21 To be clear, this appears to include retaliation regarding to the development and use of the Mikvah. To the extent
defendant claims that denial of such development and use was the result of actions by the Fire Marshal, such arguments
will be considered at summary judgment or trial.
22 DE 188 at 31.