Langston v. Commissioner of Social Security

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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DEVONNE LANGSTON,

Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

v. 21-CV-00723 (KAM)

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant.

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KIYO A. MATSUMOTO, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Devonne Langston, proceeding pro se, appeals a

final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“the

Commissioner”) which found that Plaintiff was not disabled within

the meaning of the Social Security Act (the “Act”) and therefore

not eligible for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). Presently

before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the

Pleadings (ECF No. 27, Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the

Pleadings (“Def. Mem.”).) For the reason stated below, Defendant’s

motion is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was born on July 30, 1987, and graduated from high

school on May 27, 2006. (ECF No. 26, Administrative Transcript

(“Tr.”), at 260, 266.) Following high school, Plaintiff attended

Central Carolina Technical College for three years and attended

vocational rehabilitation. (Id. at 83, 272, 466.) Plaintiff

reported working in food preparation from June to August 2010, and

as a bell ringer for the Salvation Army in November 2014. (Id. at

272-73.) On October 19, 2017, Plaintiff filed an application for

supplemental security income, alleging a disability beginning on

April 8, 2016, due to “asperger’s disorder, anxiety, autism

spectrum disorder, depression, low self-esteem, and passive

behavior.” (Id. at 9, 271.) Plaintiff’s claim was denied

initially on March 27, 2018. (Id. at 129.)

On April 13, 2018, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an

Administrative Law Judge. (Id. at 135.) Plaintiff initially

appeared for a hearing and requested a postponement on October 7,

2019, in order to obtain counsel. (Id. at 81, 189.) Plaintiff

subsequently stated that he was willing to proceed unrepresented,

and Administrative Law Judge Robert R. Schriver (the “ALJ”) held

a hearing on January 24, 2020, during which Plaintiff testified.

(Id. at 79-81.) Mary Vasishth, a vocational expert, also appeared

at the hearing and testified. (Id. at 87.)

In a decision dated March 4, 2020, the ALJ determined that

Plaintiff was not disabled under the Act because he retained the

residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform a limited range of

sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(a), and, considering

“claimant’s age, education, work experience, and [RFC], there are

jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy

that the claimant can perform.” (Id. at 14, 20-21.) In making

his RFC determination, the ALJ weighed the medical opinions of

Drs. Shapiro, Trimba, Papapetrou, Georgiou, Feldman, and Harris.

(Id. at 19.) The ALJ found the opinion of Dr. Shapiro

“persuasive,” noting that it was “supported by a review of the

record as it stood at the time, as well as a detailed rationale,

and is consistent with the record as a whole, and in particular

the claimant’s activities of daily living.” (Id.) The ALJ found

the opinions of both Drs. Trimba and Papapetrou slightly less

persuasive due to issues with consistency and supportability.

(Id.) Finally, the ALJ did not find the opinions of Drs. Georgiou

or Harris persuasive, noting that each was “vague,” and similarly

found the opinion of Dr. Feldman unpersuasive as it was

“inconsistent with the record as a whole, including the opinion of

Dr. Trimba.” (Id.)

On August 10, 2020, Plaintiff requested reconsideration of

his case. (Id. at 211.) On December 7, 2020, the Appeals Council

denied review of the ALJ’s decision, rendering it the final

decision of the Commissioner. (Id. at 1.) On February 9, 2021,

Plaintiff filed the instant action seeking judicial review of the

Commissioner’s decision. (ECF No. 1, Complaint (“Compl.”).) On

January 21, 2022, the Commissioner filed a notice of motion and

memorandum of law in support of a motion for judgment on the

pleadings. (ECF No. 27.) Plaintiff failed to respond to the

Commissioner’s motion or provide his consent to the Commissioner’s

proposed joint stipulation of relevant facts, despite being

granted an extension by the Court to do so. (See Docket Order

dated December 30, 2021.) Though the Commissioner’s motion is

unopposed, the Court will review the record to determine if

substantial evidence in the record supports the decision that

Plaintiff is not disabled, and whether the Commissioner is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law.

LEGAL STANDARD

To receive disability benefits, a claimant must be “disabled”

within the meaning of the Act. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(a), (d). A

claimant qualifies as disabled when he is unable to “engage in

any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically

determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected

to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last

for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” Id. §

423(d)(1)(A). The impairment must be of “such severity” that the

claimant is unable to do his previous work or engage in any other

kind of substantial gainful work. Id. § 423(d)(2)(A). “The

Commissioner must consider the following in determining a

claimant’s entitlement to benefits: ‘(1) the objective medical

facts [and clinical findings]; (2) diagnoses or medical opinions

based on such facts; (3) subjective evidence of pain or disability

. . . ; and (4) the claimant’s educational background, age, and

work experience.’” Balodis v. Leavitt, 704 F. Supp. 2d 255, 262

(E.D.N.Y. 2010) (quoting Brown v. Apfel, 174 F.3d 59, 62 (2d Cir.

1999)) (alterations in original).

An unsuccessful claimant for disability benefits under the

Act may bring an action in federal court seeking judicial review

of the Commissioner’s denial of his or her benefits. 42 U.S.C. §§

405(g), 1383(c)(3). “A district court may set aside the

Commissioner’s determination that a claimant is not disabled only

if the factual findings are not supported by substantial evidence

or if the decision is based on legal error.” Burgess v. Astrue,

537 F.3d 117, 127 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). “Substantial

evidence is more than a mere scintilla,” and must be relevant

evidence that a “reasonable mind might accept as adequate to

support a conclusion.” Halloran v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 28, 31 (2d

Cir. 2004) (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971))

(internal quotation marks omitted).

If there is substantial evidence in the record to support the

Commissioner’s factual findings, those findings must be

upheld. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Inquiry into legal error requires

the court to ask whether “the claimant has had a full hearing under

the [Commissioner’s] regulations and in accordance with the

beneficent purposes of the Social Security Act.” Moran v. Astrue,

569 F.3d 108, 112 (2d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). The reviewing

court does not have the authority to conduct a de novo review and

may not substitute its own judgment for that of the ALJ, even when

it might have justifiably reached a different result. Cage v.

Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 692 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2012).

Pursuant to regulations promulgated by the Commissioner, a

five-step sequential evaluation process is used to determine

whether the claimant’s condition meets the Act’s definition of

disability. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. This process can be

summarized as follows:

[I]f the Commissioner determines (1) that the claimant

is not working, (2) that he has a ‘severe impairment,’

(3) that the impairment is not one [listed in Appendix

1 of the regulations] that conclusively requires a

determination of disability, and (4) that the claimant

is not capable of continuing in his prior type of work,

the Commissioner must find him disabled if (5) there is

not another type of work the claimant can do.

Burgess, 537 F.3d at 120 (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4).

During this five-step process, the Commissioner must consider

whether the combined effect of any such impairment would be of

sufficient severity to establish eligibility for Social Security

benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1523(c). Further, if the Commissioner

does find a combination of impairments, the combined impact of the

impairments, including those that are not severe (as defined by

the regulations), will be considered in the determination

process. 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(2). At steps one through four of

the sequential five-step framework, the claimant bears the

“general burden of proving . . . disability.” Burgess, 537 F.3d

at 128. At step five, the burden shifts from the claimant to the

Commissioner, requiring that the Commissioner show that, in light

of the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience, the

claimant is “able to engage in gainful employment within the

national economy.” Sobolewski v. Apfel, 985 F. Supp. 300, 310

(E.D.N.Y. 1997).

Federal regulations explicitly authorize a court, upon

reviewing decisions of the Commissioner, to remand for further

proceedings when appropriate. “The court shall have power to

enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment

affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the

Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the

cause for a rehearing.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Remand is warranted

where “there are gaps in the administrative record or the ALJ has

applied an improper legal standard.” Rosa v. Callahan, 168 F.3d

72, 82-83 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Pratts v. Chater, 94 F.3d 34, 39

(2d Cir. 1996)). Remand is particularly appropriate where further

findings or explanation will clarify the rationale for the ALJ’s

decision. Pratts, 94 F.3d at 39. If the record before the court

provides “persuasive proof of disability and a remand for further

evidentiary proceedings would serve no purpose,” however, the

court may reverse and remand solely for the calculation and payment

of benefits. Parker v. Harris, 626 F.2d 225, 235 (2d Cir. 1980);

see also Kane v. Astrue, 942 F. Supp. 2d 301, 314 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).

Where, as here, a motion for judgment on the pleadings is

unopposed, the Court cannot grant the unopposed motion based solely

upon the opposing party’s failure to respond. Acheampong v. Comm’r

of Soc. Sec., 564 F. Supp. 3d 261, 265 (E.D.N.Y. 2021). Instead,

the Court “must review the record and determine whether the moving

party has established that the undisputed facts entitle it to

judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (internal citations omitted).

DISCUSSION

I. The ALJ’s Disability Determination

Using the five-step sequential process described above, the

ALJ determined at step one that Plaintiff had not engaged in

substantial gainful activity since October 19, 2017, the

application date. (Tr. at 11.) At step two, the ALJ found that

Plaintiff suffered from the following severe impairments:

intellectual disorder, unspecified anxiety disorder, autism

spectrum disorder, ankle/foot deformity, asthma, a history of

gout, and obesity. (Id.) The ALJ found that the Plaintiff’s

impairments, “significantly limit [his] ability to perform basic

work activities.” (Id.)

a. The ALJ’s Findings Regarding Plaintiff’s Impairment

At step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff did not have

an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically

equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R.

Part 404 Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(d), 416.925,

416.926). (Tr. at 11.) First, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff

did not meet Listing 1.02 (Musculoskeletal Disorders) because

there was no evidence of Plaintiff’s inability to ambulate. (Id.

at 12.) Second, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff did not meet

Listing 3.03 (Asthma) because the record did not contain evidence

of FEV1 values or the required hospitalizations set forth in the

listing. (Id.) Third, the ALJ, although having considered obesity

under SSR 19-2p, determined that there was no evidence that

Plaintiff’s obesity met or medically equaled a listing. (Id.)

Next, the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s mental impairments and

determined that the impairments, singly and in combination, did

not meet or medically equal the criteria of listings 12.05

(Intellectual Disorder), 12.06 (Anxiety and Obsessive-Compulsive

Disorders), and 12.10 (Autism Spectrum Disorder). (Id. at 12.) In

making that finding, the ALJ considered whether Plaintiff met the

“paragraph B” criteria as required by listing 12.05. (Id.) To

satisfy paragraph B criteria, a claimant’s mental impairments must

result in at least one extreme or two marked limitations in the

following areas of mental functioning: (1) understanding,

remembering, or applying information; (2) interacting with others;

(3) concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace; (4) adapting

or managing oneself. See 20 C.F.R. § Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1.

The ALJ determined that Plaintiff had a mild limitation in

understanding, remembering, or applying information as Plaintiff

did not report any difficulties with self-care activities, but a

mild impairment in memory was noted upon consultative examination.

(Tr. at 12.) The ALJ determined that Plaintiff had a moderate

limitation in interacting with others, citing Plaintiff’s

socialization with family members and ability to take public

transportation independently while noting Plaintiff’s reported

lack of friends, as well. (Id.) The ALJ considered Plaintiff to

have a mild limitation in concentrating, persisting, or

maintaining pace based on Plaintiff’s statement that “he is able

to finish what he starts, [though he] noted some issues with focus

and memory.” (Id.) Lastly, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had

a moderate limitation for adapting or managing oneself, based on

his testimony that he gets overwhelmed easily. (Id.) Accordingly,

the ALJ determined that the “paragraph B” criteria were not

satisfied because Plaintiff’s mental impairments did not cause at

least two “marked limitations” or one “extreme” limitation. (Id.)

The ALJ also determined that the “paragraph C” criteria of listing

12.06 (Anxiety and Obsessive-Compulsive Disorders) was not

satisfied. (Id.) To satisfy the “paragraph C” criteria, a

claimant’s mental disorder must be “serious and persistent” with

a medically documented history of the existence of the disorder

over a period of at least two years. 20 C.F.R. § Pt. 404, Subpt.

P, App. 1

Continuing with his analysis of whether Plaintiff met the

requirements of listing 12.05, the ALJ then considered the three

elements that characterize intellectual disorder under the

listing’s “paragraph A criteria”: significantly subaverage general

intellectual function; significant deficits in current adaptive

functioning; and that the disorder manifested before age 22. (Tr.

at 13.) The ALJ determined that Plaintiff did not meet the

requirements because Plaintiff was “independent in his personal

needs.” (Id.) Next, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff did not

meet the “paragraph B” criteria under Listing 12.05. The ALJ found

that the intelligence testing did not reflect the requisite scores

and Plaintiff did not meet the “paragraph B” criteria, as discussed

earlier in the ALJ’s report. (Id. at 14.) As a result, the ALJ

concluded that Plaintiff failed to meet Listing 12.05’s “paragraph

A” or “paragraph B” criteria. (Id. at 13-14.)

b. Plaintiff’s Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”)

Next, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform

sedentary work with the following limitations: Plaintiff “can

perform simple tasks only, make only simple work-related

decisions, and have only occasional interaction with supervisors,

coworkers, and the general public.” (Id. at 14.)

In determining that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform sedentary

work with the aforementioned conditions, the ALJ relied on

Plaintiff’s hearing testimony and medical records that included,

among others, hospital records and treatment records from a variety

of healthcare providers. (Id. at 14-18.) The ALJ found that

although Plaintiff’s “medically determinable impairments could

reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms,” Plaintiff’s

“statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting

effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent with the

medical evidence and other evidence in the record.” (Id. at 15.)

With regards to Plaintiff’s physical impairments, the ALJ

determined that Plaintiff’s physical impairments did not preclude

him from performing all work activity. (Id. at 18.) The ALJ

noted, “[a]lthough the record contains a history of foot

complaints, progress notes do not indicate more than moderate

limitations.” (Id.) The ALJ also determined that Plaintiff’s

claims of “disabling symptoms” were “inconsistent with the

record,” noting that Plaintiff had attended college and vocational

training programs, has no problem with self-care or the activities

of daily living, spends time with others, and “goes to shopping

places, bowling alleys, and church commonly.” (Id.) Furthermore,

the ALJ found that Plaintiff, despite indicating that he has

problems paying attention, was “able to finish what he starts.”

(Id.) Overall, the ALJ concluded that “[Plaintiff’s] conditions

are generally managed, with no indication of more than moderate

limitations” and “the record does not contain support in objective

or clinical findings for an inability to perform all work.” (Id.)

The ALJ gave the most weight in his analysis to S. Shapiro,

Ph.D. (Id. at 19.) The ALJ noted that Dr. Shapiro’s opinion was

supported by the record and a detailed rationale and was also

consistent with the record. (Id.) The ALJ found the opinion of

Lyudmila Trimba, MD, a consultative examiner, mostly persuasive.

(Id. at 19). The ALJ noted that Dr. Trimba’s opinion was supported

by a detailed report regarding a physical examination and was

mostly consistent with the record. (Id.) The ALJ noted that a

sedentary residual functional capacity would be most appropriate

for the Plaintiff given his foot and ankle ailments. (Id.) The

ALJ found the opinion of Gus Papapetrou, Ph.D., somewhat

persuasive, as it was vague, but was nonetheless supported by an

in-person examination and was consistent with the record. (Id.)

Dr. Papapetrou’s opinion supported the conclusion that Plaintiff

was “best suited for indoor, sedentary work with limited social

interaction.” (Id.)

The ALJ afforded little weight to Toula Georgiou, Psy.D. (Id.)

The ALJ noted that Dr. Georgiou’s opinion was too vague and

therefore could not be used to determine Plaintiff’s mental

limitations. (Id.) The ALJ also afforded little weight to the

opinion of Dr. Feldman, which did not include a detailed report

and was inconsistent with the record as a whole, including Dr.

Trimba’s opinion. (Id.) The ALJ also afforded little weight to

the opinion of Dr. Jean Louise Harris, which he found vague,

unsupported, and inconsistent with the overall record. (Id.)

c. The ALJ’s Disability Conclusion

At step four, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had no past

relevant work, and that transferability of job skills was

accordingly not an issue. (Id. at 20.)

At step five of the evaluation process, the ALJ found that,

based on Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity, age, education,

and work experience, and from the vocational expert’s testimony,

that jobs existed in the national economy that Plaintiff could

perform. (Id.) At the January 24, 2020, hearing, the vocational

expert testified that Plaintiff would be able to perform the

requirements of representative occupations such as Addressing

Clerk, Document Preparer, and Final Assembler. (Id. at 20-21.)

The ALJ subsequently asked Plaintiff: “the sorts of jobs that [the

vocational expert] was describing where you kind of sit in the

desk and either work with paper or work with objects . . . [d]o

you think you would be able to do that kind of job?” (Id. at 91.)

The Plaintiff replied “Yes.” (Id.) Upon further questioning from

the ALJ regarding “anything that would keep you from doing that

kind of job,” the Plaintiff explained that he “get[s] overwhelmed

easily.” Ultimately, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not

disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act because

there existed jobs in the national economy that Plaintiff could

perform even given his limited RFC. (Id. at 21.)

II. The ALJ Sufficiently Developed the Record

“Whether the ALJ has met his duty to develop the record is a

threshold question that must be determined before the Court reviews

whether the ALJ's final decision is supported by substantial

evidence.” Miranda v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 22-cv-4226 (PKC),

2023 WL 6385727, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2023) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). Even when not raised by

the claimant, the Court “must independently consider the question

of whether the ALJ failed to satisfy his duty to develop the

Record.” Sanchez v. Saul, No. 18-cv-12102 (PGG) (DF), 2020 WL

2951884, at *23 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2020), report and recommendation

adopted, 2020 WL 1330215 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2020). “[B]ecause a

hearing on disability benefits is a nonadversarial proceeding, the

ALJ generally has an affirmative obligation to develop the

administrative record.” Burgess v. Astrue, 537 F.3d 117, 128 (2d

Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). “Legal errors regarding the duty

to develop the record warrant remand.” Wilson v. Colvin, 107 F.

Supp. 3d 387, 407 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (collecting cases).

Plaintiff argues in his complaint that the ALJ “failed to

develop the [administrative] record” without further elaboration.

(Compl. at 3.) Courts have concluded, in other circumstances,

that an ALJ should have sought additional information to fill a

record consisting of “sparse” and “wholly conclusory” notes of a

single treating physician. Rosa v. Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 79–80

(2d Cir. 1999). However, where an ALJ has a “complete record

before [him] consisting of medical opinions, treatment notes, and

test results . . . the ALJ did not err in failing to supplement

the administrative record.” Schillo v. Kijakazi, 31 F.4th 64, 76

(2d Cir. 2022).

As discussed supra, the ALJ considered numerous psychiatric

evaluations, medical records, and other evidence in making his

conclusions. (Tr. at 14-19.) The ALJ specifically reviewed and

relied on the opinions of several medical professionals in crafting

an RFC, including Dr. Trimba regarding Plaintiff’s “foot/ankle

ailments” and Dr. Papapetrou regarding Plaintiff’s suitability for

“sedentary work with limited social interaction.” (Id. at 19.)

As a result, in making his determination, the ALJ did not issue a

“patchwork” RFC that “lack[ed] a clear basis in the record’s

medical evidence.” Lao v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 18-cv-07462

(FB), 2020 WL 4194210, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. July 21, 2020).

Plaintiff has pointed to no gaps in the administrative record.

“Where there are no obvious gaps in the administrative record, and

where the ALJ already possesses a complete medical history, the

ALJ is under no obligation to seek additional information in

advance of rejecting a benefits claim.” Rosa v. Callahan, 168

F.3d 72, 79 n.5 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). Accordingly, the Court finds that the ALJ

sufficiently developed the record in the instant case.

III. The ALJ’s Weighing of the Medical Source Opinions

a. New Regulations Governing Medical Opinion Evidence

In 2017, new regulations were issued that changed the standard

for evaluating medical opinion evidence regarding claims filed on

or after March 27, 2017. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c. Because

Plaintiff filed his claim on October 19, 2017, the new regulations

apply.

Under the new regulations, the Commissioner no longer

“defer[s]” or gives “controlling weight” to a claimant’s treating

medical sources. Id. § 416.920c(a). Instead, when evaluating the

persuasiveness of medical opinions, the Commissioner considers the

following five factors: (1) supportability; (2) consistency; (3)

the relationship of the medical source with the claimant (taking

into account the length of the treatment relationship, the

frequency of examinations, the purpose of the treatment

relationship, the extent of the treatment relationship, and

whether the relationship is an examining relationship); (4) the

medical source’s specialization; and (5) other factors, including,

but not limited to, “evidence showing [the] medical source has

familiarity with the other evidence in the claim or an

understanding of [the SSA] disability program’s policies and

evidentiary requirements.” Id. § 416.920c(c). In each case, the

ALJ must explain how he or she considered the factors of

supportability and consistency, the two most important factors for

determining persuasiveness. Id. §§ 416.920c(a), (b)(2).

b. The ALJ’s Assessment of Medical Opinion Evidence

Plaintiff contends that “the ALJ’s decision was not supported

by substantial evidence.” (Compl. at 3.) Although Plaintiff does

not elaborate further, this Court, in light of his pro se status,

will liberally construe his argument to claim that the ALJ

improperly weighed the medical opinion evidence. See Rose v.

Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 202 F. Supp. 3d 231, 239 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (“The

court will liberally construe [pro se] Plaintiff's pleadings to

raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.”)

Supportability and consistency are the most important factors

in evaluating the persuasiveness of a medical opinion. 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1520c(a). With respect to the supportability factor, the

regulations provide that “[t]he more relevant the objective

medical evidence and supporting explanations presented by a

medical source are to support his or her medical opinion(s) or

prior administrative medical finding(s), the more persuasive the

medical opinions or prior administrative medical finding(s) will

be.” Id. § 404.1520c(c)(1). As to the consistency factor, the

regulations provide that “[t]he more consistent a medical

opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s) is with the

evidence from other medical sources and nonmedical sources in the

claim, the more persuasive the medical opinion(s) or prior

administrative medical finding(s) will be.” Id. §

404.1520c(c)(2). The ALJ must explain how he or she considered

the “supportability” and “consistency” factors for a medical

source’s opinion. Id. § 404.1520c(b)(2). The ALJ may, but is not

required to, explain how he or she considered the remaining

factors. Id.

Here, after reviewing the ALJ’s decision and the medical

evidence in the record, the Court concludes that the ALJ properly

weighed the medical opinions and that, as a result, his RFC

assessment was based on substantial evidence. As set forth below,

the ALJ evaluated the persuasiveness of each medical source and

explained how he determined the supportability and consistency of

each opinion, as required by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c, even if he did

not use the words “supportability” and “consistency.” See Raymond

M. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 19-CV-1313 (ATB), 2021 WL 706645,

at *8 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2021) (citation omitted) (“At their most

basic, the amended regulations require that the ALJ explain h[is]

findings regarding the supportability and consistency for each of

the medical opinions, ‘pointing to specific evidence in the record

supporting those findings.’”).

First, the ALJ properly weighed the March 2018 opinion of Dr.

Shapiro, finding it “persuasive.” (Tr. at 19.) Dr. Shapiro

conducted a review of Plaintiff’s medical records as they stood at

March 2018, including several previous psychological evaluations,

and opined that Plaintiff “appears capable of performing simple

tasks on a sustained basis.” (Id. at 122.) Dr. Shapiro noted

that the January 22, 2018, evaluation of Plaintiff by Dr. Toula

Georgiou was more restrictive than his findings, but explained

that Dr. Georgiou’s opinion “appears to rely on the assessment of

limitations resulting from an impairment for which the source has

not treated or examined the individual.” (Id. at 126.) Regarding

supportability, the ALJ found that Dr. Shapiro’s opinion was

supported by “the record as it stood at the time, as well as a

detailed rationale.” (Id. at 19.) Regarding consistency, the ALJ

found Dr. Shapiro’s opinion to be “consistent with the record as

a whole, and in particular [Plaintiff’s] activities of daily

living.” (Id.)

Second, the ALJ properly weighed the January 2018 opinion of

Dr. Lyudmila Trimble, the consultative examiner, deeming it

“mostly persuasive.” (Id. at 19.) Dr. Trimble opined that

Plaintiff's history of gout and ankle/foot pain resulted in a “mild

limitation” to Plaintiff’s ability to “stand and walk for a

prolonged time” and “push, pull, or carry heavy objects.” (Id. at

431.) Dr. Trimble assessed “no limitation” in Plaintiff’s “ability

to sit for a prolonged time.” (Id.) Regarding supportability,

the ALJ explained that Dr. Trimble’s opinion was supported by “a

detailed report containing her clinical findings on physical

examination.” (Id. at 19.) As to consistency, the ALJ found the

opinion to be “mostly consistent with the record as a whole,

although [the ALJ found] that a sedentary residual functional

capacity would be most appropriate for [Plaintiff], given his

foot/ankle ailments.” (Id.) Accordingly, given the ALJ found the

medical opinion “mostly consistent” with the record, he found it

“mostly persuasive.” (Id.)

Third, the ALJ properly weighed the February 2018 opinion of

psychologist Dr. Gus Papapetrou, finding it “somewhat persuasive.”

(Id.) Dr. Papapetrou conducted an examination to assess

Plaintiff’s “current intellectual, emotional, academic, and

vocational functioning and skills” utilizing a behavioral

observation and tests of intellectual functioning. (Id. at 433.)

Dr. Papapetrou opined that Plaintiff “is able to work in an office

setting doing ‘bookkeeping’ or ‘accounting’ work or some computer-

related work.” (Id. at 435.) Dr. Papapetrou also stated that

Plaintiff needed “more socialization experiences with others in

general” which should be “addressed by his vocational counselor.”

(Id.) The ALJ found Dr. Papapetrou’s opinion to be “supported by

an in-person examination and a detailed rationale” despite being

“somewhat vague.” (Id. at 19.) Regarding consistency, the ALJ

found that Dr. Papepetrou’s opinion was “consistent with the record

as a whole, which supports that the [Plaintiff] is best suited for

indoor, sedentary work with limited social interaction.” (Id.)

Fourth, the ALJ did not find the January 2018 opinion of

psychologist Dr. Toula Georgiou to be persuasive. (Id.) Dr.

Georgiou conducted a consultative examination and opined that

Plaintiff “may have difficulties maintaining a regular work

schedule, working at a consistent pace, regulating his emotions,

and interacting with others.” (Id. at 426.) Regarding both

supportability and consistency, the ALJ found that Dr. Georgiou’s

opinion was “too vague to be of any use in determining the extent

of the claimant's mental limitations.” (Id. at 19.)

The Court finds that the ALJ’s explanation reflects a proper

consideration of the evidence. Despite performing an interview of

Plaintiff and a “mental status examination,” Dr. Georgiou did not

offer any clarity or specifics regarding what she meant when she

opined generally that Plaintiff “may have difficulties” in some

work settings. (Id. at 426.) As compared to the opinion of Dr.

Shapiro, which offered specific details on Plaintiff’s ability to

understand, concentrate, interact with others, and adapt to

change, (Id. at 124-26), Dr. Georgiou’s generalized statement

would be of little use to an ALJ in determining “what [Plaintiff]

can still do despite [his] impairment(s),” 20 C.F.R. §

404.1513(a)(2). As such, and given the ALJ relied upon three other

more persuasive, reliable, and consistent medical opinions in

crafting Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ did not commit reversible error

by failing to credit Dr. Georgiou’s opinion.

Fifth, the ALJ did not find the March 2018 opinion of

consultative examiner Dr. Feldman persuasive. (Tr. at 19.) Dr.

Feldman conducted an extremely limited review of the record and

concluded simply that “[Plaintiff’s] physical conditions are non-

severe.” (Id. at 121.) While Dr. Feldman summarized the medical

evidence in the record as of the time of his review, he does not

appear to have offered any rationale or explanation as to how the

evidence supported his conclusion. (Id.) Regarding

supportability, the ALJ found that “Dr. Feldman’s opinion is based

on a review of the record as it stood at the time, but not a

detailed report or rationale.” (Id. at 19.) Regarding

consistency, the ALJ found that Dr. Feldman’s opinion was

“inconsistent with the record as a whole, including the opinion of

Dr. Trimba.” (Id.) Accordingly, because the ALJ found that Dr.

Feldman’s both unsupported and inconsistent with other evidence,

including Dr. Trimba’s opinion which suggested Plaintiff had

certain physical limitations for work, the ALJ properly found Dr.

Feldman’s opinion not persuasive. (Id.)

Sixth, the ALJ found the November 2018 opinion of Dr. Jean

Louise Harris not to be persuasive. (Id.) Dr. Harris, following

an examination of Plaintiff and a record review, opined that

Plaintiff was temporarily unable to work for “60 days” due to his

“[a]nxiety state, unspecified [p]ervasive developmental disorder[,

and] [d]epressive disorder.” (Id. at 508.) Dr. Harris continued

by recommending that Plaintiff “[e]stablish routine mental health

care” and “[e]ngage in psychotherapy.” (Id.) Dr. Harris concluded

by noting that “[b]ased on my interview, examination, and review

of available documentation, [Plaintiff] may potentially be

employed in some capacity afterwards.” (Id. at 509.) Regarding

supportability, the ALJ found that Dr. Harris’s opinion was “vague

[and] unsupported.” (Id. at 19.) Dr. Harris did not offer any

rationale or explanation for her 60-day recommendation based on

her examination or her review of the record, and also did not offer

any opinion regarding what Plaintiff could still do despite his

impairments after the 60-day period had elapsed. (Id. at 506-09.)

Regarding consistency, the ALJ found that Dr. Harris’s opinion was

“inconsistent with the overall record.” (Id. at 19.) Although

other medical opinions offered varying views on the type of work

to which Plaintiff was suited, no opinion or medical evidence

outside of Dr. Harris’s opinion stated that Plaintiff was unable

to conduct any type of work for a specific period of time. (See

Id. at 18 (“the record does not contain support in objective or

clinical findings for an inability to perform all work”).)

Accordingly, because the ALJ found that Dr. Harris’s opinion both

unsupported and inconsistent with other evidence, he deemed it not

persuasive for purposes of his analysis. (Id. at 19.)

In conclusion, the Court finds that the ALJ properly

considered each of the medical opinions before him, and to the

extent a conflict existed between any of the medical opinions, the

Court must “defer to the Commissioner's resolution of conflicting

evidence” and reject the ALJ's findings “only if a reasonable

factfinder would have to conclude otherwise.” Morris v. Berryhill,

721 F. App'x 25, 29 (2d Cir. 2018) (internal citations and

quotations omitted); see also Krull v. Colvin, 669 F. App'x 31, 32

(2d Cir. 2016) (the deferential standard of review prevents a court

from reweighing evidence). Plaintiff has not sufficiently shown

that the ALJ improperly weighed the medical opinions, or that his

resolution of any potential conflict in the evidence was

unreasonable or unsupported by the evidence in the record.

Accordingly, the ALJ did not commit reversible error by relying on

the medical opinion of Drs. Shapiro, Trimba, and Papapetrou in

crafting his RFC.

IV. Substantial Evidence Supports the ALJ’s Findings

The Court finds that the ALJ’s RFC determination was supported

by substantial evidence. “Substantial evidence” is relevant

evidence which a “reasonable mind might accept as adequate to

support a conclusion.” Halloran v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 28, 31 (2d

Cir. 2004). “The substantial evidence standard is ‘not high.’”

Rucker v. Kijakazi, 48 F.4th 86, 91 (2d Cir. 2022) (citation

omitted). “Substantial” evidence means only “more than a mere

scintilla.” Sczepanski v. Saul, 946 F.3d 152, 157 (2d Cir. 2020)

(citation omitted).

A reasonable factfinder could have arrived at the same RFC

conclusion as did the ALJ here. As discussed further supra, the

ALJ properly weighed and relied upon three medical opinions in

crafting his RFC, and discussed the reasons why he did not find

the remaining three medical opinions to be persuasive. (Tr. at

19.) The ALJ also noted that he “carefully considered

[Plaintiff’s] statements and hearing testimony concerning his

symptoms” but explained that his “review of the record, considering

treatment notes and the longitudinal record, does not establish

that the claimant’s impairments preclude him from performing all

work activity.” (Id. at 18.)

Regarding Plaintiff’s physical limitations, the ALJ noted

that though “the record confirms a history of foot complaints,

progress notes do not indicate more than moderate limitations.”

(Id.) Regarding Plaintiff’s mental impairments, the ALJ noted

that “the record does not indicate conditions so severe as to

preclude all work activity.” (Id.) Specifically, the ALJ noted

that the Plaintiff had “reported holding several jobs for short

periods of time” and remained “able to carry out his activities of

daily living, [testifying] that he is able to walk about, and

travel independently by public transportation.” (Id.)

Continuing, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff’s “reports of totally

disabling subjective symptoms are not supported by the overall

record.” (Id.) The ALJ noted that Plaintiff had “attended

college,” had “participated in a vocational training program,” was

“independent in self-care activities and activities of daily

living,” performed “household chores,” was able to go “out often

on foot[] and shop[] in stores,” was able to “spend[] time with

others,” and was able to “finish what he starts.” (Id.) An ALJ

may properly consider such evidence in finding a Plaintiff not

disabled. See Barrere v. Saul, 857 F. App’x 22, 24 (2d Cir. 2021)

(citing the ability to travel alone and get to appointments on

time, as well as “only mild difficulties completing ‘activities in

daily living,’” as part of the record’s “robust” support of the

finding that the claimant was not disabled).

After reviewing the evidence, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s

“conditions are generally managed, with no indication of more than

moderate limitations.” (Tr. at 18.) The ALJ’s conclusions

regarding moderate limitations were consistent with Dr. Shapiro’s

medical opinion, which found no more than “moderate” limitations

to any category in his Mental Residual Functional Capacity

Assessment. (Id. at 124-26.) In light of the limitations noted,

the ALJ noted in his RFC that Plaintiff could “perform simple tasks

only, make only simple work-related decisions, and have only

occasional interaction with supervisors, coworkers, and the

general public.” (Id. at 14.)

Even if there were evidence in the record supporting a more

restrictive RFC, the “relevant question” is whether “substantial

evidence supports the ALJ’s decision.” See Wider v. Colvin, 245

F. Supp. 3d 381, 386 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) (quoting Bonet ex rel. T.B.

v. Colvin, 523 F. App’x 58, 59 (2d Cir. 2013)). Given the record

before the ALJ, including treatment notes, medical opinions, and

Plaintiff’s own testimony, the Court concludes that substantial

evidence supported the ALJ’s finding regarding Plaintiff’s RFC.

Finally, after finding that Plaintiff had no relevant work

experience at step four of his analysis, the ALJ relied on a

vocational expert to find that Plaintiff was capable of work

existing in significant numbers in the national economy. (Tr. at

20-21.) During the hearing, in response to the ALJ’s questioning

setting out Plaintiff’s vocational profile and RFC, the vocational

expert identified that the hypothetical individual could perform

the occupations of addressing clerk, document specialist or

preparer, and final assembler of optical goods. (Tr. 90-91). As

the Court has concluded that the ALJ’s RFC determination was based

on substantial evidence, the ALJ did not err relying on the

testimony of a vocational expert to find that Plaintiff was capable

work existing in significant numbers in the national economy, and

therefore not disabled under the Social Security regulations. See

McIntyre v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 146, 151 (2d Cir. 2014) (“An ALJ may

rely on a vocational expert's testimony regarding a hypothetical

as long as there is substantial record evidence to support the

assumption[s] upon which the vocational expert based his opinion

and accurately reflect the limitations and capabilities of the

claimant involved.”).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion for judgment on the

pleadings is GRANTED. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed

to enter judgment in favor of the Commissioner, send a copy of

this Memorandum and Order and the judgment to Plaintiff, note

service on the docket, and close this case.

SO ORDERED

Dated: January 11, 2024

Brooklyn, New York b “2 YY, tng,

eee te

HON. KIYO A. MATSUMOTO

United States District Judge

Eastern District of New York

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