Doe v. New York City Department of Education

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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JANE DOE,

Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Case No. 1:21-cv-04332 (FB) (RML)

-against-

NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF

EDUCATION and MARK WALTZER,

Defendants.

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Appearances:

For the Plaintiff: For the Defendant the New York City

KARL J. ASHANTI Department of Education:

Musa-Obregon Law, P.C. JACQUELYN DAINOW

55-21 69th St., 2nd Fl. JOHN DOODY

Maspeth, NY 11378 Assistant Corporation Counsels for

the City of New York

100 Church St.

New York, NY 10007

BLOCK, Senior District Judge:

Plaintiff Jane Doe (“Plaintiff”) brought this federal question action for alleged

sexual abuse and harassment that she suffered as a minor at the hands of employees

of Defendant New York City Department of Education (“NYC DOE”). On March

20, 2023, the Court granted NYC DOE, Defendant Mark Waltzer, and the now-

dismissed non-party Defendants’ motion to dismiss in part. See Doe v. New York

City Dep’t of Educ., No. 21-CV-4332, 2023 WL 2574741, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 20,

2023) (“Motion to Dismiss Order”), appeal dismissed (Sept. 20, 2023). On October

6, 2023, Plaintiff filed her Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”) — the now-operative

complaint — raising claims for: (i) sexual assault for rape in the first and third degree

against Waltzer, and against NYC DOE for their negligent acts and omissions; (ii)

intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) against Waltzer; (iii) violation

of New York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”) against NYC DOE and

Waltzer; and (iv) violation of New York City Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”)

against NYC DOE and Waltzer. NYC DOE now moves for summary judgment on

the claims against it.

For the following reasons, NYC DOE’s motion for summary judgment is

GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

I. ISSUES

The predominant issue for the Court is whether Plaintiff’s HRL claims are

revived by the Child Victim’s Act, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214-g, and whether those

claims survive summary judgment. Based on the Court’s analysis, HRL claims are

revived by the Child Victim’s Act, but Plaintiff’s NYSHRL claim does not survive

because no claim was available under the then-applicable statute. Plaintiff’s

NYCHRL claim survives summary judgment and will proceed to trial.

The remaining Defendant, Waltzer, has not moved for summary judgment

on Plaintiff’s claims against him — i.e., Plaintiff’s sexual assault and IIED claims,

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and Plaintiff’s HRL claims alleged against Waltzer. As such, the Court need not

address the undisputed question that the CVA revives Plaintiff’s sexual assault and

IIED claims,1 which are both premised on Waltzer’s alleged forcible and statutory

rape of Plaintiff.

II. BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from the pleadings, the parties’ Rule 56.1

statements, and the supporting documentation. The facts are undisputed unless

otherwise noted. The Court construes all evidence in the light most favorable to

the nonmoving party, drawing all inferences and resolving all ambiguities in that

party’s favor. See LaSalle Bank Nat. Ass’n v. Nomura Asset Cap. Corp., 424 F.3d

195, 205 (2d Cir. 2005). Summary judgement is appropriate only if “there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

1 Nor is there any merit to doing so, as there is no question that the CVA revives

sexual assault and statutory rape claims, e.g., Doe, No. 21-CV-4332, 2023 WL

2574741, at *4 (“The CVA revives claims based on [] conduct committed against a

minor which would constitute an offense under Article 130 of the New York State

Penal Law, which includes rape, [and] statutory rape.”), or IIED claims premised

on that conduct as discussed infra. See Shapiro v. Syracuse Univ., 173 N.Y.S.3d

769, 773-74 (4th Dep’t 2022) (CVA revives negligence claims that “arise from

sexual abuse”).

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Plaintiff alleges that she was repeatedly sexually abused and harassed by

multiple NYC DOE employees while she attended middle school and high school,

culminating in her dropping out of high school after the 2001-2002 school year.

First, Plaintiff alleges that, when she was in middle school, a custodial

janitor — John Doe #1 — offered to give her a ride while she was walking to

school. Instead of taking her to school, the janitor took Plaintiff to a motel. At the

motel, he took Plaintiff into a room and made verbal sexual advances towards her.

After she refused his advances, the janitor took her back to her school.

Next, while Plaintiff was a student at Francis Lewis High School (“FLHS”)

in Queens, New York, between 1998 and 2001, she alleges that she was sexually

abused by Defendant Waltzer, who was a social studies teacher and hall dean at the

time. Plaintiff claims that Waltzer forcibly raped her at his home when she was

fifteen or sixteen years old. Plaintiff and Waltzer continued to have sexual

intercourse for a year or more thereafter — during which time, Plaintiff maintains

she was under the age of consent and hence statutorily raped — until Plaintiff

became pregnant and had an abortion.

Plaintiff alleges that she informed her physical education teacher, Douglas

Meiners, that she and Waltzer were having sexual intercourse. Meiners did not

report the relationship, but instead tried to kiss her after class. In describing the

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incident in her deposition, Plaintiff alleged that Meiners “pinned” her against the

wall in his office, and tried to kiss her, but she avoided it by ducking under his

arms and ran out of the room. Ashanti Decl., Ex. D, at 356:2-5.

Plaintiff alleges that when she went back to Meiners’ office afterwards to

talk about the incident, she instead found Michael Eisenberg, another physical

education teacher who shared Meiners’ office. Eisenberg told Plaintiff that

Meiners had told him about trying to kiss Plaintiff, and that Meiners was in love

with her but could not do anything about it because he was married. Eisenberg

went on to say that he (Eisenberg) was not married and would “marry [her] on the

spot.” Id. at 399:18.

Lastly, Plaintiff alleges that she was “stalked” by her high-school Spanish

teacher, John Doe #2 (aka “Aaron”). Plaintiff alleges that “Aaron” would follow

her at school, take the same bus as her, and frequently call her house. He told

Plaintiff that he wanted to be her “boyfriend.”

Plaintiff alleges that the abuse and harassment she suffered from the teachers

at FLHS caused her grades to deteriorate and inflicted long-term emotional and

psychological trauma. She dropped out of high school at the end of the 2001-2002

school year because, according to her deposition, it was not a “safe” environment

for her. Id. at 292:4.

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III. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff’s Sexual Assault Claim Against NYC DOE

As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that the TAC raises a claim against

NYC DOE for negligence regarding Waltzer’s alleged sexual assault, despite the

Court’s dismissal of the sexual assault claim against NYC DOE in the Court’s

Motion to Dismiss Order. Although the parties did not discuss this issue in their

memoranda, Defendant’s Rule 56 motion to dismiss the Complaint against NYC

DOE in its entirety, and the dispute between the parties in their Rule 56.1

statements over the significance of the Court’s prior decision, puts this issue before

the Court for resolution.

The law of the case doctrine makes the Court’s disposition of Plaintiff’s

sexual assault claim against NYC DOE binding on future proceedings in this case.

United States v. Quintieri, 306 F.3d 1217, 1225 (2d Cir. 2002) (“[W]hen a court

has ruled on an issue, that decision should generally be adhered to by that court in

subsequent stages in the same case.”). The mere “filing of an Amended Complaint

does not entitle Plaintiff” to relitigate her claims “absent new factual allegations.”

Weslowski v. Zugibe, 96 F. Supp. 3d 308, 316 (S.D.N.Y.) (applying law of the case

doctrine), aff’d, 626 F. App’x 20 (2d Cir. 2015). As the factual allegations

concerning Plaintiff’s claim against NYC DOE for Waltzer’s sexual assault are

unchanged, so too is the Court’s disposition. See Motion to Dismiss Order at 14-

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15.

B. The Child Victims Act (“CVA”)

NYC DOE first argues that the CVA does not revive Plaintiff’s claims under

the NYCHRL and NYSHRL.2 It is incorrect.

Enacted in 2019 as “an extreme exercise of legislative power” that “seeks to

remedy an injustice,” see In re Child Victims Act Cases Removed From State Ct.,

No. CV 23-5029(GRB), 2023 WL 5123396, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2023)

(cleaned up), the CVA provides, in relevant part:

Notwithstanding any provision of law which imposes a period of

limitation to the contrary and the provisions of any other law

pertaining to the filing of a notice of claim or a notice of intention to

file a claim as a condition precedent to commencement of an action or

special proceeding, every civil claim or cause of action brought

against any party alleging intentional or negligent acts or omissions by

a person for physical, psychological, or other injury or condition

suffered as a result of conduct which would constitute a sexual

offense as defined in article one hundred thirty of the penal law

committed against a child less than eighteen years of age . . . which is

barred as of the effective date of this section because the applicable

period of limitation has expired, and/or the plaintiff previously failed

2 Plaintiffs spill — and waste — much ink arguing that another provision of the

CVA, C.L.P.R. § 208(b), revives past claims. It does not; this provision only

extends the statute of limitations prospectively. Plaintiff’s claims are instead

brought properly pursuant to the revival provision of the CVA, § 214-g. See Jones

v. Cattaraugus-Little Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 19-CV-707S, 2022 WL 2124608,

at *3 (W.D.N.Y. June 13, 2022) (noting that N.Y. C.P.L.R. 214-g “reopened the

state’s statute of limitations,” while “newly created C.P.L.R. 208 (b), extended the

infancy tolling of the statute of limitations for certain child sex abuse crimes from

age 18 to age 55”).

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to file a notice of claim or a notice of intention to file a claim, is

hereby revived. . .”

N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214-g.

While neither the Second Circuit nor the New York Court of Appeals has yet

spoken on whether the CVA revives NYSHRL and NYCHRL claims, see Coe v.

Regan, No. 19-CV-05327 (ENV) (VMS), 2022 WL 467053, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Feb.

3, 2022) (“assuming without deciding that CVA even applies to gender

discrimination claims”), aff’d sub nom. Kane v. Mount Pleasant Cent. Sch. Dist.,

80 F.4th 101 (2d Cir. 2023), the Court believes that the plain language of the CVA

embraces these civil claims. The CVA revives “every civil claim or cause of

action,” language that definitively encompasses the NYSHRL and NYCHRL. See

Segal v. New York Mil. Acad., No. 21-CV-6872 (VB), 2023 WL 5211220, at *6

(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2023) (the CVA revives NYSHRL claims); Crawford v.

Ratner, No. 952052/2023, slip op. at 6-9 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., N.Y. Cnty. Dec. 20, 2023)

(the nearly identical language in the Adult Survivors Act (“ASA”) revives

NYCHRL claims).

Moreover, the text makes clear that the CVA revives not only tort claims

based on sexual assault but also all civil claims that “arise out of conduct that

constitutes a sexual offense under the penal law.” See Wilkie v. Vill. of Hempstead,

No. 22-CV-00920 (JMA) (JMW), 2023 WL 5952056, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. June 20,

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2023) (Wicks, M.J.) (the ASA revives false arrest and imprisonment claims that

arise from conduct that constitutes a sexual offense under N.Y. Penal L. § 130),

report and recommendation adopted, 2:22-CV-00920-NJC-JMW (E.D.N.Y. July

10, 2023); Shapiro, 173 N.Y.S.3d at 773-74 (CVA revives negligence claims

because the claims “arise from sexual abuse”). But see Rapp v. Fowler, No. 20-

CV-9586 (LAK), 2022 WL 1997176, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 6, 2022) (“As common

law assault is not a sexual offense, incest or the use of a child in a sexual

performance, all as defined in the Penal Law, the Child Victims Act did not revive

such claims.”). The CVA revives civil claims brought against a party alleging an

“injury or condition suffered as a result of conduct which would constitute” a Penal

Code § 130 offense. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214-g. And the CVA revives claims against

a party for “omissions,” which are not “explicitly criminalized in Section 130 of

the penal law.” Crawford, No. 952052/2023, slip op. at 8. Therefore, while

conduct that gives rise to injury must be a sexual offense, the civil claim itself need

not be synonymous with § 130.

NYC DOE contends that the CVA does not revive NYSHRL and NYCHRL

claims because they are “anti-discrimination/anti-harassment legislation as

opposed to legislation defining criminal sexual offenses.” Def’s Mem. L. in. Supp.

Summ. J. 10. But NYC DOE’s proffered construction cannot be correct because,

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in New York, civil tort claims based on rape have distinct elements from the crime

of rape. Even a civil claim for assault or battery based on rape is not, strictly

speaking, a sexual offense defined in the Penal Law. See Nicholson v. Luce, 866

N.Y.S.2d 52, 53 (1st Dep’t 2008) (civil claims for “sexual assault may be framed

as a claim for either assault or battery”). As these torts “cover all types of

‘qualitatively different’ situations” and do not necessarily involve sexual

misconduct, “the crime of rape, as compared with assault and battery, entails other

or additional elements.” United Nat. Ins. Co. v. Waterfront New York Realty

Corp., 994 F.2d 105, 108 (2d Cir. 1993). Thus, a narrow reading of the CVA

requiring the civil claim to be synonymous with the Penal Code would produce an

absurd result by excluding claims at the very heart of the statute. That the New

York State Legislature specifically chose the words “every civil claim” only

buttresses this broad reading.

In sum, the appropriate CVA revival test is whether the civil claim arises

from sexual misconduct criminalized under Penal Code § 130 against a child under

eighteen. Just as the civil claim of battery is not necessarily the crime of rape,

gender discrimination itself is not a violation of the penal law and does not

necessarily involve sexual abuse; here, however the NYSHRL and NYCHRL

discrimination claims do arise from “conduct which would constitute a sexual

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offense” and are thus revived by the CVA. Segal, 2023 WL 5211220, at *6

(quoting N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214-g).

While the Second Circuit — as well as this Court — has held the CVA does

not revive federal claims under § 1983 and Title IX, this analysis is easily

distinguishable from that of state and City claims. See Kane v. Mount Pleasant

Cent. Sch. Dist., 80 F.4th 101, 108 (2d Cir. 2023) (CVA did not revive § 1983 or

Title IX claims); Doe, No. 21-CV-4332, 2023 WL 2574741, at *3. As the Kane

court itself acknowledged, “our holding does not impact a plaintiff’s ability to

utilize Section 214-g to attempt to revive his or her state law claims,” including the

NYSHRL, which could proceed in state court. Kane, 80 F.4th at 111, n.3

(emphasis in original).

The reasoning behind this distinction is instructive. For § 1983 and Title IX

claims — neither of which supplies its own statute of limitations — federal courts

are duty-bound to follow Supreme Court precedent. Previously, federal courts

determined the statute of limitations by analogizing § 1983 claims to various

common-law actions, which often created divergent statute of limitations for the

wide swath of § 1983 claims. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 272-73 (1985).

Concerned by the lack of uniformity and predictability, the Supreme Court

jettisoned a claim-by-claim approach and held that the state personal injury statute

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of limitations applies, which in New York is the three-year residual personal injury

statute of limitations. Id. at 274-75; Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1989)

(courts should borrow from the residual statute for personal injury actions where

state law provides multiple statutes of limitations for personal injury actions). In

so holding, the Court proscribed federal courts from analyzing the particular facts

or legal theory of each claim to determine the relevant statute of limitations. Kane,

80 F.4th at 109.

As the Second Circuit explained in Kane, were the CVA to revive some, but

not all, § 1983 or Title IX claims — only those arising from sexual misconduct —

courts would have to engage in precisely the fact- and-theory-specific statute-of-

limitations analysis the Supreme Court forbade. Id. at 109. By contrast, for the

state and City claims, the Court must undertake a different analysis, following state

decisional law and the statutory language, among other resources. See, e.g.,

Pentech Int’l, Inc. v. Wall St. Clearing Co., 983 F.2d 441, 445-46 (2d Cir. 1993).

Because the CVA’s language covers “all claims,” and the few state courts that

have considered the matter have held that the CVA and its near-identical twin, the

ASA, revive both state and City claims, see Crawford, No. 952052/2023, slip op.

at 6-9 (ASA revives NYCHRL claims), this Court holds that the CVA revives

NYSHRL and NYCHRL claims arising from sexual misconduct under § 130 of the

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Penal Code.

C. Plaintiff Cannot Bring an NYSHRL Claim.

Turning to Plaintiff’s specific claims, however, her NYSHRL claims fails

because the CVA only revives previously lapsed claims, see Holloway v. Holy See,

537 F. Supp. 3d 502, 505 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (“the CVA itself does not create a cause

of action, nor does it regulate conduct”), and the relevant provisions of the

NYSHRL did not include sex or gender as a protected class at the time when the

underlying conduct occurred. See N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(4) (effective Nov. 16,

2002, to Jan. 15, 2003) (“It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for an

education corporation . . . to deny the use of its facilities to any person . . . by

reason of his race, color, religion, disability, national origin, age or marital

status.”). As contemporary caselaw explains, the statute “d[id] not prohibit

discrimination based on sex.” Hayut v. State Univ. of New York, 217 F. Supp. 2d

280, 291 (N.D.N.Y. 2002) (discussing § 296(4)), aff’d in part, vacated in part on

other grounds, remanded, 352 F.3d 733 (2d Cir. 2003).

In fact, it was only in amendments effective on January 16, 2003, and July 1,

2003, that the New York State Legislature added “sexual orientation” and “sex,”

respectively, as protected categories. See 2002 Sess. Law News of N.Y. Ch. 2 (A.

1971) (McKinney’s); 2003 Sess. Law News of N.Y. Ch. 106 (S. 5679)

(McKinney’s). These amendments do not evince legislative intent to apply

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retroactively and thus do not overcome the presumption against retroactive

legislation.3 See Tesoriero v. Syosset Cent. Sch. Dist., 382 F. Supp. 2d 387, 400

(E.D.N.Y. 2005) (2003 amendments to NYSHRL do not apply retroactively);

CFCU Cmty. Credit Union v. Hayward, 552 F.3d 253, 262 (2d Cir. 2009)

(“[R]etroactive operation is not favored by [New York] courts and statutes will not

be given such construction unless the language expressly or by necessary

implication requires it.” (citing Majewski v. Broadalbin-Perth Cent. Sch. Dist., 91

N.Y.2d 577, 584 (N.Y. 1998))). Accordingly, because the NYSHRL provision in

force at the time of the underlying conduct did not prohibit that conduct, Plaintiff’s

NYSHRL claim against NYCDOE is dismissed.4

D. Plaintiff Can Bring an NYCHRL Claim.

However, Plaintiff has created an issue of material fact for her NYCHRL

claim. That claim does not face the same retroactivity problem as her NYSHRL

claim because City law prohibited gender discrimination in public

3 Plaintiff argues that the Court should apply the current NYSHRL standard

because, under Bradley v. Richmond School Board, “a court is to apply the law in

effect at the time it renders its decision.” 416 U.S. 696, 711 (1974). But as the

Supreme Court explained in Landgraf v. USI Film Products, the language cited in

Bradley applied to “a statute authorizing the award of attorney’s fees to successful

civil rights plaintiffs . . . in a case that was pending on appeal at the time the statute

was enacted.” 511 U.S. 244, 264 (1994).

4 As it fails for the same reasons, Plaintiff’s NYSHRL claim against Waltzer is also

dismissed.

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accommodations such as schools at the time. See Administrative Code of the City

of New York, § 8-107(4) (1998) (it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any

person, being the . . . agent or employee of any place or provider of public

accommodation because of . . . gender . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold

from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or

privileges thereof…”).

NYC DOE argues that the NYCHRL does not apply because the law’s

public accommodations provisions do not encompass “victims of sex offenses or

stalking” as a protected category. Def’s Mem. L. in. Supp. Summ. J. 12. This

argument proves too clever by half: as was clearly established at the time of the

alleged sexual abuse,5 gender discrimination6 in the educational context

5 At the time, New York courts generally applied similar standards for claims

under Title IX and the NYCHRL. See Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33,

42, n.1 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[I]dentical standards apply to employment discrimination

claims brought under Title VII, Title IX, New York Executive Law § 296, and the

Administrative Code of the City of New York.”).

6 It is of no moment that the NYCHRL speaks of “gender,” rather than “sex,”

discrimination. Courts at the time of the alleged misconduct against Plaintiff

understood gender discrimination to encompass sexual harassment and abuse. See,

e.g., Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 930 F. Supp. 134, 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“It is

established law that sexual harassment is a form of gender discrimination.”).

Moreover, when the New York City Council amended the Human Rights Law’s

protected categories from “sex” to “gender” in 1991, it did so to broaden, rather

than narrow, the law’s protections. See New York City, Committee on General

Welfare, The Council Report of the Governmental Affairs Division, Proposed Int.

No. 24 (Apr. 24, 2002) (“Central to the 1991 changes to the law was the expansion

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encompasses situations in which “a teacher sexually harasses and abuses a

student.” Franklin v. Gwinnett Cnty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 75 (1992) (Title IX

context) (citing Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986)); see

also Davis Next Friend LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629,

650 (1999) (“‘sexual harassment’ is ‘discrimination’ in the school context under

Title IX”). A teacher’s sexual assault of a student easily clears this bar. Thus, the

alleged misconduct against Plaintiff is “gender discrimination” under the

NYCHRL, which the CVA has revived.

Moreover, Plaintiff has proffered evidence that she was denied access to a

public accommodation. Plaintiff’s schools were public accommodations as

described in § 8-107(4), and Plaintiff has set forth facts showing that she suffered

sexual abuse from their “agents or employees.” See Novio v. New York Acad. of

Art, 286 F. Supp. 3d 566, 583 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (applying NYCHRL in the

educational setting). Under current NYCHRL caselaw, Plaintiff need only show

that she was treated “less well” than other students on account of her gender to

show that she was deprived of a public accommodation. See id. at 583 (“Under

[§ 8–107(4)(a)], a plaintiff need not demonstrate that the treatment was ‘severe or

of the breadth of unlawful discriminatory practices as well as the scope of

protected classes of individuals.”).

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pervasive’ ... [but] need only show that she has been treated ‘less well’ than other

[students] because of a protected characteristic.”). Arguably, the standard in place

at the time could have relied on the more restrictive “severe or pervasive” test from

federal caselaw. See Williams v. New York City Hous. Auth., 872 N.Y.S.2d 27, 36-

39 (1st Dep’t 2009) (discussing the prior “view of the City HRL as simply

mimicking its federal and State counterparts” in application of the federal “severe

or pervasive” test for actionable sexual harassment; and adopting the “less well”

test for HRL liability). But this question is academic for the purposes of this

motion; sexual assault by a teacher of a student certainly constitutes “severe or

pervasive” treatment on account of gender. Accordingly, there are disputed

material facts that preclude summary judgment.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, NYC DOE’s motion for summary judgment is

GRANTED on Plaintiff’s claims under NYSHRL; accordingly, those claims are

DISMISSED. Plaintiff’s claim against NYC DOE for negligence for Defendant

Waltzer’s alleged sexual assault of Plaintiff is DISMISSED based on the Court’s

prior judgment. NYC DOE’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims

under NYC HRL is DENIED.

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Trial will be held on Plaintiff’s sexual assault and IIED claims against

Waltzer, and on Plaintiff’s NYCHRL claim against Waltzer and NYC DOE.

SO ORDERED.

_/S/ Frederic Block___________

FREDERIC BLOCK

Senior United States District Judge

Brooklyn, New York

January 12, 2023

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