Opinion

Brown v. Commissioner of Social Security

Court
District Court, E.D. New York
Filed
Dec 21, 2023
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 26.8%

remanding “for the ALJ to provide more detailed reasons for her credibility determination, taking into consideration the factors set forth in 20 C.F.R. 404.1529(c)(3

How later courts described this case

  • remanding “for the ALJ to provide more detailed reasons for her credibility determination, taking into consideration the factors set forth in 20 C.F.R. 404.1529(c)(3
  • “ALJs are specifically instructed that credibility determinations should take account of ‘prior work record’” because a Plaintiff’s “good work history may be deemed probative of credibility”
  • finding that “any evidence of a desire by [Plaintiff] to work would merely emphasize the positive value of his 32-year employment history. A claimant with a good work record is entitled to substantial credibility when claiming an inability to work because of a disability.”
  • “The crucial factors in [the ALJ’s] determination must be set forth with sufficient specificity to enable [the reviewing court] to decide whether the determination is supported by substantial evidence.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

--------------------------------------X

YVONNE BROWN,

Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

-against-

20-CV-5959(KAM)

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant.

--------------------------------------X

KIYO A. MATSUMOTO, United States District Judge:

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Plaintiff Yvonne Brown

(“Plaintiff”) appeals the final decision of the Commissioner of

the Social Security Administration (“Defendant” or the

“Commissioner”) finding that Plaintiff is not disabled within

the meaning of the Social Security Act (the “Act”) and thus not

entitled to disability insurance benefits (“benefits”) under

Title II of the Act. Presently before the Court is Plaintiff’s

motion for judgment on the pleadings (ECF No. 12, “Ptf. Mem.”),

the Commissioner’s response to Plaintiff’s motion for judgment

on the pleadings and cross-motion for judgment on the pleadings

(ECF No. 13, “Def. Mem.”) and Plaintiff’s reply memorandum of

law in support thereof. (ECF No. 14, “Ptf. Reply”.)

For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s motion for

judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED, the Commissioner’s cross-

motion is respectfully DENIED, and the case is REMANDED for

further proceedings consistent with this Memorandum and Order.

Background

The parties have filed a joint stipulation of relevant

facts detailing Plaintiff’s medical history, the ALJ’s review,

and the administrative hearing testimony, which the Court has

reviewed and hereby incorporates by reference. (See generally

ECF No. 15, Joint Stipulation of Facts (“Stip.”).) Here, the

Court briefly recounts the facts relevant to the instant

motions.

Plaintiff was born in 1958 (Stip. at 2) and worked for 38

years prior to the onset of the alleged disability, including as

an “application reviewer.” (ECF No. 16, Administrative

Transcript, “Tr.” at 215-16.) Plaintiff filed an application

for disability insurance benefits on October 20, 2017 wherein

she alleged that the onset date of her disability was January

16, 2017. (Stip. at 2.) Plaintiff’s claim was denied. (Id.)

On April 13, 2018, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). (Id.) ALJ Paul W. Goodale

held a hearing on September 16, 2019. (Id.) Although

Plaintiff’s original benefits application and supporting medical

documentation focused on respiratory and spinal impairments,

Plaintiff alleged at this hearing that she was disabled by hand

and wrist impairments, including bilateral carpal tunnel

syndrome. (Tr. at 14.) On January 2, 2020, the ALJ issued a

decision denying Plaintiff’s application for disability

insurance benefits. (Stip. at 2.) Using a five-step sequential

analysis, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled

within the meaning of the Act. (Tr. at 10.)

At the first step of the five-step sequential analysis, the

ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful

activity since January 16, 2017, the alleged disability onset

date, and that Plaintiff met the insured status requirements of

the Act through December 31, 2021. (Tr. at 12.)

At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff suffered from a

number of severe impairments, including bilateral carpal tunnel

syndrome, hand-wrist neuropathy in the bilateral upper

extremities, and status post wrist compression procedures

related to both of Plaintiff’s wrists (the “hand and wrist

impairments”). (Tr. at 12.) The ALJ also found that Plaintiff

had non-severe impairments that were either under control or

that had improved with the assistance of medication including

hypertension, status post right knee arthroscopy, asthma, and

spinal disorder. (Tr. at 13.)

At the third step, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s

impairments, both individually and in combination, did not

“reach the level of severity contemplated in the Listings.”

(Tr. at 13.) Specifically, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s

impairments did not meet the requirement of Listing 1.04 as it

relates to Plaintiff’s spinal impairments. (Tr. at 13.) The

ALJ did not identify any listings that were applicable to those

of Plaintiff’s impairments that the ALJ described as medically

severe at step two, including Plaintiff’s bilateral carpal

tunnel syndrome, hand-wrist neuropathy in the bilateral upper

extremities, and status post wrist compression procedures

related to both of Plaintiff’s wrists. Nevertheless, much of

the ALJ’s discussion of Plaintiff’s impairments in the context

of his residual functional capacity (“RFC”) determination

focused on Plaintiff’s hand and wrist impairments. (Tr. at 14-

17.)

Ultimately, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had the RFC to

perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b) with

certain limitations.1 (Tr. at 14.) The ALJ stated that his RFC

“assessment [was] supported by the medical record” and concluded

that “[v]iewing the record as a whole, there is a substantial

1 The ALJ found that while Plaintiff was capable of engaging in work that

involved “handling and fingering bilaterally, and frequent overhead reaching

bilaterally[,]” Plaintiff “must avoid concentrated exposure to fumes, odors,

dust, gases, poorly ventilated areas and pulmonary irritants” and that

Plaintiff “could not do assembly-line type work (i.e., outwardly paced,

working in close tandem with co-workers),” with the exception of “individual

table/bench work[,]” which Plaintiff could still perform. (Tr. at 14.)

disparity between the claimant’s documentary complaints and the

objective medical findings contained in the record” and that

Plaintiff’s testimony regarding her condition was “neither

reasonably consistent with [the] medical findings [in the

record], nor sufficiently credible as additive evidence[.]”

(Tr. at 17.) In describing the medical findings in the record,

the ALJ referred primarily to treatment notes from Plaintiff’s

treating physician, Dr. Michael Rettig, M.D. as well as

Plaintiff’s own self-reported symptoms. The ALJ explicitly

disavowed “any prior administrative medical findings or medial

opinions,” stating that the record contained “no assessments or

Medical Source Statements by any treating provider.” (Tr. at

17.)

Although the ALJ stated Plaintiff’s testimony regarding

“the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of [her]

symptoms” and Plaintiff’s daily activities were inconsistent

with the “medical opinions” in the record, the ALJ did not

appear to consider any medical opinions. (Tr. at 16.) In fact,

the ALJ stated that there were no medical opinions in the record

relating to the set of impairments that the ALJ determined were

severe. (Tr. at 17) (“There were no assessments or Medical

Source Statements by any treating provider[]” regarding

Plaintiff’s hand and wrist impairments or otherwise.) With

respect to the medical opinion of Dr. D. Chen, the ALJ declined

to consider Dr. Chen’s opinion because Dr. Chen’s opinion did

not include an assessment of Plaintiff’s residual functional

capacity, because Dr. Chen’s medical opinion purported to

evaluate Plaintiff’s spinal impairments, as opposed to

Plaintiff’s hand and wrist impairments, and because Plaintiff

failed to attend a February 28, 2018 consultative examination

with Dr. Chen. (Tr. at 13, 17.) The ALJ further concluded that

“[a]s for medical opinions and prior administrative medical

findings, [he would] not defer or give any specific evidentiary

weight, including controlling weight, to any prior

administrative medical findings or medial opinions.” (Tr. at

17.)

Having ruled out “any prior administrative medical findings

or medical opinions” (Tr. at 17), the ALJ summarized Plaintiff’s

medical history with respect to her bilateral carpal tunnel

syndrome and other hand and wrist related restrictions.

Specifically, the ALJ referenced Plaintiff’s “January 13, 2017 .

. . evaluation of bilateral hand pain/numbness[,]” Plaintiff’s

“January 17, 2017 . . . right carpal tunnel release surgery

[and] . . . right wrist median nerve compression” following her

diagnosis with right carpal tunnel syndrome, Plaintiff’s “April

25, 2017 . . . left wrist median nerve decompression surgery”

and treatment notes from Dr. Rettig stating that Plaintiff’s

“left wrist incision was healed,” that, following Plaintiff’s

“November 6, 2018 . . . left thumb decompression of flexor

tendon,” Plaintiff’s “left thumb incision [had] healed,” and

that Plaintiff’s “left thumb locking [had] resolved” as of June

3, 2019. (Tr. at 16-17.) The ALJ also referred to “X-rays

reveal[ing] . . . joint osteoarthritis[.]” (Tr. at 17.) Based

on these observations, the ALJ concluded that although

Plaintiff’s “medically determinable impairments could reasonably

be expected to” cause the symptoms alleged by Plaintiff,

Plaintiff’s “statements concerning the intensity, persistence,

and limiting effects of [her] symptoms [were] not entirely

consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the

record[.]” (Tr. at 16.)

At the fourth step, the ALJ determined that based on her

RFC, Plaintiff “is capable of performing her past relevant work

as a final application reviewer.” (Tr. at 17.)

Finally, at step five, the ALJ noted that, according to the

vocational expert’s testimony, Plaintiff could also perform

“other jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national

economy,” given Plaintiff’s “[RFC], age, education, and work

experience[.]” (Tr. at 18.) Specifically, the ALJ referenced

testimony from vocational expert, Zachary Fosberg, stating that

Plaintiff can work as an “office clerk[.]” (Tr. at 18.)

Accordingly, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was “not disabled

under sections 216(i) and 223(d) of the [Act]” and was not

therefore entitled to disability insurance benefits. (Tr. at

19.)

Plaintiff requested review of the ALJ’s decision on January

7, 2020 and, on October 9, 2020, the Appeals Council denied

review of the ALJ’s decision, rendering the ALJ’s decision the

final decision of the Commissioner. (Stip. at 2.) On December

7, 2020, Plaintiff filed the instant action seeking judicial

review of the Commissioner’s final decision. (See generally ECF

No. 1, Complaint (“Compl.”).)

Legal Standard

I. The Commissioner’s Disability Determination

To receive disability benefits, a claimant must be disabled

within the meaning of the Act. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(a), (d). A

claimant is considered disabled within the meaning of the Act if

she demonstrates her “inability to engage in any substantial

gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable

physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in

death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a

continuous period of not less than 12 months[.]” 42 U.S.C. §

423(d)(1)(A). “The impairment must be of such severity that

[the claimant] is not only unable to do [her] previous work but

cannot . . . engage in any other kind of substantial gainful

work which exists in the national economy.” Shaw v. Chater, 221

F.3d 126, 131-32 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting 42 U.S.C. §

423(d)(2)(A)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

In evaluating whether a claimant’s condition constitutes a

disability within the meaning of the Act and whether the

claimant is, therefore, entitled to benefits, the Commissioner

conducts a five-step sequential evaluation process. See 20

C.F.R. § 404.1520. Throughout that analysis, the Commissioner

must consider “(1) the objective medical facts [and clinical

findings]; (2) diagnoses or medical opinions based on such

facts; (3) subjective evidence of pain or disability . . .; and

(4) the claimant’s educational background, age, and work

experience.” Balodis v. Leavitt, 704 F. Supp. 2d 255, 262

(E.D.N.Y. 2010) (quoting Brown v. Apfel, 174 F.3d 59, 62 (2d

Cir. 1999) (alterations in original).

At the first step of the Commissioner’s five-step

sequential analysis, the Commissioner must determine whether the

claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity.

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If not, the Commissioner

must next determine whether the claimant has a severe

impairment. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). The

Commissioner’s assessment of severity at the second step is

based on the combined effect of all the claimant’s impairments,

including those that are not considered medically severe. See

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1523, 404.1545(a)(2). At step three, the

Commissioner must determine whether the claimant’s impairment or

combination of impairments is, or medically equals, one of the

listings of impairments included in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P,

Appendix 1. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). The

Commissioner then evaluates the claimant’s capacity for physical

and mental work activities on a sustained basis considering the

claimant’s impairments. This is referred to as the claimant’s

RFC and is defined as “the most [that a claimant] can still do

despite [her] limitations.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a). At the

fourth step, the Commissioner considers whether the claimant can

engage in past relevant work in light of the claimant’s RFC.

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). Finally, at step five, the

Commissioner must determine whether the claimant can perform

other work that is available in the national economy, taking

into account the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and past work

experience. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v).

At steps one through four of the sequential five-step

analysis, the claimant bears the ”general burden of proving that

[] she has a disability.” Burgess v. Astrue, 537 F.3d 117, 128

(2d Cir. 2008). Once the claimant has met her burden at steps

one through four, the Commissioner bears the burden, at step

five, of demonstrating that, notwithstanding the claimant’s RFC,

age, education, and work experience, she is “able to engage in

gainful employment within the national economy.” Sobolewski v.

Apfel, 985 F. Supp. 300, 310 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).

II. Judicial Review of the Commissioner’s Final Decision

Following a final decision of the Commissioner, denying a

claimant’s application for disability benefits, a claimant may

bring an action in federal district court seeking judicial

review of the Commissioner’s denial of benefits “within sixty

days after the mailing . . . of notice of such decision or

within such further time as the Commissioner of Social Security

may allow.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). A reviewing court may not

conduct a de novo review of the claimant’s application. See

Cage v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 692 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2012).

Nor can the district court “substitute its own judgment for that

of the [ALJ],” even if it would have justifiably reached a

different conclusion. Jones v. Sullivan, 949 F.2d 57, 59 (2d

Cir. 1991) (internal citation omitted).

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), a reviewing district court

may affirm, reverse, or modify the decision of the Commissioner

with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing. Butts v.

Barnhart, 388 F.3d 377, 384 (2d Cir. 2004). However, the

district court may only set aside the Commissioner’s

determination that a claimant is not disabled within the meaning

of the Act if the district court finds either that the factual

findings of the Commissioner are not supported by substantial

evidence or that the final decision of the Commissioner is based

on legal error. Burgess, 537 F.3d at 127 (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

“Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla,” and

must be relevant evidence that a “reasonable mind might accept

as adequate to support a conclusion.” Halloran v. Barnhart, 362

F.3d 28, 31 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing Richardson v. Perales, 420

U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The

Commissioner’s final decision is based on legal error if the ALJ

“fail[ed] to apply the correct legal standard . . . [or]

fail[ed] to adhere to the applicable regulations.” Kohler v.

Astrue, 546 F.3d 260, 262 (2d Cir. 2008).

Finally, federal regulations explicitly authorize a

reviewing district court to remand for further proceedings when

appropriate. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“The court shall have

power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record,

a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of

the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding

the cause for a rehearing.”). Remand is warranted where “there

are gaps in the administrative record or the ALJ has applied an

improper legal standard[.]” Rosa v. Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 82-

83 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Pratts v. Chater, 94 F.3d 34, 39 (2d

Cir. 1996). Remand is particularly appropriate where further

findings or explanation will clarify the rationale for the ALJ’s

decision. Pratts, 94 F.3d at 39. If the record before the

reviewing court provides “persuasive proof of disability and a

remand for further evidentiary proceedings would serve no

purpose,” however, the reviewing court may reverse and remand

solely for the calculation and payment of benefits. Parker v.

Harris, 626 F.2d 225, 235 (2d Cir. 1980).

Discussion

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s decision was not based on

substantial evidence and that remand is warranted because (1)

the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the medical evidence in the

record, particularly as it relates to statements made by Dr.

Rettig, (2) the ALJ failed to adequately develop the medical

record with respect to the ALJ’s determination of Plaintiff’s

RFC, and (3) the ALJ failed to properly evaluate Plaintiff’s

subjective statements. In response, defendants argue that (1)

Dr. Rettig’s statements were properly considered by the ALJ as

treatment notes, rather than medical opinions, (2) that the

medical record contained sufficient evidence to support the

ALJ’s RFC determination and did not require further development,

and (3) that the ALJ exercised the proper discretion to consider

and ultimately discount Plaintiff’s credibility.

For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that Dr.

Rettig’s statements do not constitute medical opinions within

the meaning of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(1), that the ALJ failed

to adequately develop the record with respect to his RFC

determination, and that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate

Plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony. The ALJ also failed

to specify and discuss the relevant listings of impairments, as

required by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). The ALJ's

decision, particularly as it relates to his RFC determination,

was not supported by substantial evidence and the ALJ’s

credibility assessment of Plaintiff’s subjective symptom

testimony was rooted in legal error. Accordingly, the Court

reverses and remands the final decision of the Commissioner.

I. Dr. Rettig’s Treatment Notes

Plaintiff first contends that Dr. Rettig’s treatment notes

are medical opinions which the ALJ failed to properly consider

in his determination. (Ptf. Mem. at 2.) In response, the

Commissioner notes that “Dr. Rettig’s statements were not

‘medical opinions’ . . . under the regulations.” (Def. Mem. at

7.) Dr. Rettig’s treatment notes do not constitute medical

opinions as defined by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(1) and, even if

they did, the Commissioner would not be beholden to conclusory

statements regarding Plaintiff’s disability status, pursuant to

20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1).

“Medical opinions are statements from acceptable medical

sources that reflect judgments about the nature and severity of

[a claimant’s] impairment(s), including [her] symptoms,

diagnosis and prognosis, what [she] can still do despite [her]

impairment(s), and [her] physical or mental restrictions.” 20

C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(1). Medical opinions are more than mere

treatment notes. See Fontanez v. Colvin, No. 16-cv-01300 (PKC),

2017 WL 4334127, at *25 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 28, 2017) (noting that

“based on the ALJ's decision, it is unclear how [Plaintiff’s

physical therapy and treatment notes] alone supported the ALJ’s

finding that Plaintiff is capable of sitting, standing, and

walking . . . [particularly] when Plaintiff also consistently

reported to her physicians that her . . . pain was exacerbated

by sitting or standing.”) In order to constitute a medical

opinion under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(1), a medical

practitioner’s statements must “explicitly assess [the]

claimant’s limitations and RFC.” Reginald R. v. Comm’r of Soc

Sec., No. 21-cv-6326 (CJS), 2023 WL 5608869, at *10 (W.D.N.Y.

Aug. 30, 2023).

Dr. Rettig’s statements do not provide sufficient insight

into Plaintiff’s abilities or restrictions regarding her

functional limitations or capacity to work. Nor do Dr. Rettig’s

notes shed light on the nature and severity of Plaintiff’s

impairments for the purpose of an RFC determination.2 On March

2 In reviewing the record, it is apparent that Plaintiff’s first appointment

with Dr. Rettig resulted in the most descriptive of Dr. Rettig’s treatment

notes in terms of describing the manner in which Plaintiff’s symptoms

physically limit her work activities. On September 19, 2016, Dr. Rettig

noted in his treatment notes that Plaintiff “ha[d] been working” and that

9, 2017, Dr. Rettig states that Plaintiff’s “pre-operative

symptoms are resolving,” “follow[ing] [Plaintiff’s] . . . right

carpal tunnel” procedure, but that Plaintiff is “unable to work”

and is “[l]ikely [to] return to work [by] June 26, 2017.” (Tr.

at 487). On April 27, 2017, approximately two days after

Plaintiff’s left wrist median nerve compression procedure, Dr.

Rettig states that Plaintiff is “not working” and instructs her

to “limit use of [her] hand.” (Tr. at 491.) On May 4, 2017,

Dr. Rettig again states that Plaintiff is “not working,” noting

that she is “completely disabled from work” notwithstanding

Plaintiff’s “[f]ull digital active range of motion.” (Tr. at

492.) Plaintiff was instructed to “RTO” in “6 weeks” for

consideration of whether Plaintiff may “return to work at that

time.” (Id.) There are no further treatment notes in the

record for nearly 18 months. On November 12, 2018 and again on

February 25, 2019, Dr. Rettig notes that Plaintiff is “not

working,” although he remarks that Plaintiff is “[d]oing well,”

has “[g]ood thumb flexion,” “[h]as been using [her thumb] with

Plaintiff was “complaining of pain over volar aspect of wrist with radiation

proximally and distally.” (Tr. at 477.) Dr. Rettig further elaborates that

Plaintiff experienced “associated numbness/tingling to Right index and long

finger, [and] Left index/long/ring fingers” that is “[w]orse with typing” and

that Plaintiff’s “[p]ain/numbness wakes [her up] at night.” (Id.) There is

no further or even similar description of how Plaintiff’s impairments might

impact her functioning in any of the subsequent treatment notes. In fact, it

is unclear whether the treatment notes regarding Plaintiff’s complaints of

pain for the follow up visits with Dr. Rettig after each of Plaintiff’s

surgical procedures apply to both of Plaintiff’s hands/wrists or just the

hand/wrist that was the subject of the most recent surgical procedure and the

focus of the follow up visit.

daily activities,” and has “no complaints of pain.” (Tr. at

494.)

The statements in Dr. Rettig’s treatment notes do not

constitute an explicit assessment of Plaintiff’s mental or

physical limitations in connection with Plaintiff’s capacity to

work. As a result, these statements cannot, alone, support an

RFC determination in these circumstances. See Buonsignore v.

Commissioner of Social Security, No. 20-cv-4582 (MKB), 2022 WL

4121378, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 9, 2022) (“As a general rule,

where the transcript contains only diagnostic evidence and no

opinion from a medical source about functional limitations . .

., to fulfill the responsibility to develop a complete record,

the ALJ must recontact the treating source, order a consultative

examination, or have a medical expert testify at the hearing[]”)

(internal citations omitted) (alterations in original).

Plaintiff alleges that “Dr. Rettig twice opined that Ms.

Brown was not cleared to return to work in any capacity” and

that “the ALJ failed to even mention these opinions . . . let

alone indicate how persuasive he found [them].” (Ptf. Mem. at

2.) It is not clear that Dr. Rettig’s statements that Plaintiff

was “unable to work” on March 9, 2017 (Tr. at 487), or that

Plaintiff was “completely disabled from work” on May 4, 2017

(Tr. at 492), particularly in the context of subsequent notes

remarking on Plaintiff’s progress, represent a conclusion that

Plaintiff is “not cleared to return to work in any capacity,” as

Plaintiff suggests. (Ptf. Mem. at 2.) In any case, 20 C.F.R. §

404.1527(d)(1) explicitly rejects conclusory statements made by

medical practitioners that a Plaintiff is “disabled” or “unable

to work” because such conclusions lie squarely within the realm

of the Commissioner’s judgment. Accordingly, Dr. Rettig’s

treatment notes neither constitute medical opinions within the

meaning of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(1), nor do Dr. Rettig’s

statements on March 9, 2017 and May 4, 2017 require adoption by

the Commissioner in light of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1).

II. The ALJ’s Duty to Develop the Record

Next, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ did not properly

develop the medical record because the ALJ failed to request an

updated and more detailed medical opinion from the treating

specialist or from an examining or non-examining consultant.

(Ptf. Mem. at 5.) Defendant raises two points in response: (1)

that the ALJ was under no obligation to obtain an updated and

more detailed medical opinion from Dr. Rettig because the record

was adequate to make a disability determination and that (2)

Plaintiff rejected contemporaneous opportunities to supplement

the record by declining to attend the consultative examination

scheduled for her by the ALJ. (Def. Mem. at 9-10.) Both of the

Commissioner’s responses are misguided in light of the notably

limited medical record, which the ALJ acknowledged and failed to

supplement, and because Plaintiff’s responsibility to proffer

supporting medical evidence “do[es] not derogate from the ALJ’s

responsibility to investigate[]” Plaintiff’s claims. Tankisi v.

Commissioner of Social Sec., 521 F. App’x 29, 33 n.1 (2d Cir.

2013) (citing Perez v. Chater, 77 F.3d 41, 47 (2d Cir. 1996)).

A. The Medical Record was Notably Limited

“Social Security adjudications represent a unique variant

from the traditional model of adversarial litigation[]” because

“Social Security disability determinations are investigatory, or

inquisitorial, rather than adversarial.” Vincent v.

Commissioner of Social Sec., 651 F.3d 299, 304-05 (2d Cir. 2011)

(citing Morgan v. Astrue, 569 F.3d 108, 112 (2d Cir.

2009) (internal quotation marks omitted)). In light of the

investigatory nature of Social Security proceedings, the ALJ,

unlike a judge at trial, has a duty “to investigate and develop

the facts and develop the arguments both for and against the

granting of” social security benefits. Butts, 388 F.3d at 386

(internal citation omitted). An ALJ is not relieved of this

duty by virtue of a claimant’s failure to fulfill their own

responsibility “to bring all favorable evidence to the ALJ's

attention[.]” Tankisi, 521 F. App’x at 33 n.1.

In the context of the RFC determination, the ALJ typically

has a duty to request medical source opinions where no such

opinions or comparable information are otherwise available

within the record. See Arias v. Saul, No. l8-cv-1296 (KAM),

2020 WL 1989277, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2020) (“The ALJ should

have obtained a medical opinion from a qualified source, as her

RFC could not stand if unsupported by at least one medical

opinion.”). This is “[b]ecause an RFC determination is a

medical determination, [and] an ALJ who makes an RFC

determination in the absence of supporting expert medical

opinion has improperly substituted his own opinion for that of a

physician[.]” Fontanez, 2017 WL 4334127, at *19 (internal

citations omitted); see also Blowe v. Commissioner of Social

Security, No. 19-cv-2658 (JS), 2020 WL 3129062, at *5 (E.D.N.Y.

June 12, 2020) (an “ALJ is not qualified to assess a claimant's

RFC on the basis of bare medical findings, and as a result an

ALJ’s determination of [a claimant’s] RFC without a medical

advisor’s assessment is not supported by substantial evidence”)

(internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless,

"remand is not always required when an ALJ fails to request

[medical] opinions” Tankisi, 521 F. App’x at 34, and in

particular, “where there are no obvious gaps in the

administrative record, and where the ALJ already possesses a

complete medical history, the ALJ is under no obligation to seek

additional information.” Lowry v. Astrue, 474 F. App'x 801, 804

(2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Here, it cannot be concluded that the ALJ “already

possess[ed] a complete medical history” nor can it be decided

that there are “no obvious gaps in the administrative record.”

Lowry, 474 F. App'x at 804. First, there is no indication from

the record that the ALJ requested medical opinion evidence from

Dr. Rettig. As previously noted, Dr. Rettig’s treatment notes

are not medical opinions, nor does the content of Dr. Rettig’s

treatment notes constitute a substantive equivalent or

replacement of a medical opinion because Dr. Rettig did not

include any explicit functional assessment of Plaintiff’s

limitations. See Fontanez, 2017 WL 4334127, at *26 (where

there is a “lack of explicit functional assessments by

Plaintiff’s treating physicians, the ALJ should have requested

an RFC assessment from one of Plaintiff’s many treating

physicians who examined her on an ongoing basis.”). Nor were

there other medical opinions or assessments within the record

that obviated the need for the ALJ to solicit additional medical

opinions. Indeed, the ALJ explicitly acknowledged the limited

nature of the medical record, stating that there were “no

assessments or Medical Source Statements by any treating

provider” within the record and that he we would “not defer or

give any specific evidentiary weight, including controlling

weight, to any prior administrative medical findings or medical

opinions.” (Tr. at 17.) In the absence of “any . . . medical

findings or medical opinions,” the ALJ should have obtained a

medical opinion from a qualified source. (Id.)

Furthermore, there is no indication from the record that

the ALJ made a reasonable attempt to request or obtain medical

records from any other medical source, including Plaintiff’s

occupational therapy treatment records. The first treatment

notes with Dr. Rettig from September 19, 2016, indicate that

Plaintiff “ha[d] been in occupational therapy for two years.”

(Tr. at 477.) After Plaintiff’s right carpal tunnel surgery,

Dr. Rettig said that Plaintiff was going to occupational therapy

and should continue to do so. (Tr. at 487.) On May 4, 2017,

during a follow up appointment after Plaintiff’s carpal tunnel

surgery on her left wrist, Dr. Rettig again stated in his

treatment notes that Plaintiff had “start[ed] occupational

therapy.” (Tr. at 492.) The ALJ made no reference to

Plaintiff’s history of occupational therapy treatment and does

not appear to have either solicited Plaintiff’s treatment

records or sought to explain why such records were unnecessary.

Particularly given the gap in Plaintiff’s treatment records with

respect to Dr. Rettig, the ALJ should have sought to obtain

Plaintiff’s occupational therapy treatment records to further

develop the record and support his RFC determination. See

Daniela B. v. Kijakazi, No. 22-cv-03495 (NRM), 2023 WL 3719634,

at *7 (E.D.N.Y. May 30, 2023) (finding that the ALJ failed to

develop the record because “[the ALJ] [did] not include any

treatment notes from the mental health counselor who treated

Plaintiff regularly for three years,” which was “a clear and

obvious gap in the record.”).

Second, as the Commissioner acknowledges, the record

reflects a significant gap in Plaintiff’s treatment by the sole

treating physician referenced in the record, Dr. Rettig. (Def.

Mem. at 13.) Following Plaintiff’s carpal tunnel surgery in

early 2017, Plaintiff does not appear to have met with Dr.

Rettig “for approximately 18 months between May 2017 and

November 2018.” (Id.) In light of the absence of any other

treatment records from this time period, including occupational

therapy treatment records that may have helped fill the gap in

the ALJ’s understanding of Plaintiff’s functional limitations,

this approximately 18-month gap placed an affirmative duty on

the ALJ to either solicit further medical evidence or to

articulate in his decision why any such effort would be in vain.

See Blash v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 813 F. App'x 642, 645

(2d Cir. 2020) (“When there is an obvious or ‘clear gap[]’ in

the record, the ALJ is required to seek out missing medical

records, even when a party is represented by counsel[]”) (citing

Rosa, 168 F.3d at 79); see also Powell v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.,

No. 17-cv-05360 (AMD), 2019 WL 254036, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 17,

2019).

The Commissioner asks this Court to find that the ALJ was

not required to solicit or rely on medical opinion evidence to

support the ALJ’s RFC determination. The Court denies the

Commissioner’s request because the record was notably sparse and

contains clear and obvious gaps that warranted further

development by the ALJ. Under these circumstances, the ALJ had

an obligation to solicit additional medical evidence and failed

to do so.

B. Plaintiff’s Failure to Attend the February 2018

Consultative Examination Does Not Excuse the ALJ’s

Failure to Develop the Record

With respect to Plaintiff’s failure to attend the February

28, 2018 consultative examination by Dr. D. Chen, the

Commissioner’s assertion that this failure constitutes a waiver

of Plaintiff’s disability insurance claim is not supported by

applicable regulations or relevant case law. To the extent the

ALJ finds that a record is insufficient to make a disability

determination and that the claimant is noncompliant such that

the record cannot be further developed, the ALJ may find a

claimant is not disabled based on her failure to cooperate. See

20 C.F.R. § 404.1518. However, in such a circumstance, “the ALJ

must include in his decision[] ‘a statement about the effect (if

any) of the claimant’s failure or refusal [to attend the

consultative examination] on the [ALJ’s] decision.’” McClean v.

Astrue, 650 F. Supp. 2d 223, 228 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (internal

citations omitted).

The ALJ did not make a finding that Plaintiff was not

disabled within the meaning of the Act because of her failure to

cooperate and attend a medical examination pursuant to 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1518. Nor did the ALJ specify what effect, if any,

Plaintiff’s failure to attend the February 28, 2018 consultative

examination had on his ultimate decision. The ALJ notes that

Plaintiff “indicated she was unwilling to attend a consultative

examination and would not be pursuing her claim” in the context

of Dr. D. Chen’s “initial[] [assessment of] spinal impairments.”

(Tr. at 13.) The ALJ further notes that “in view of these

circumstances, [he] does not evaluate the opinion of Dr. Chen.”

(Tr. at 17.) However, the consultative examination and Dr. D.

Chen’s medical opinion relate only to Plaintiff’s spinal

impairments. There is nothing in the record to suggest that

Plaintiff was uncooperative with efforts by the ALJ to seek a

consultative examination or further medical evidence regarding

Plaintiff’s hand and wrist impairments, which are the only

impairments the ALJ found to be medically severe.

Moreover, the ALJ’s decision strongly suggests that

Plaintiff’s failure to attend the February 28, 2018 consultative

examination had no bearing whatsoever on his conclusion

regarding Plaintiff’s hand and wrist impairments. First, the

consultative examination was scheduled more than a year before

Plaintiff’s hearing with the ALJ wherein she alleged hand and

wrist impairments as the basis for her disability claim, rather

than the spinal impairments that Dr. D. Chen was supposed to

assess. Second, Dr. D. Chen explicitly stated that the purpose

of his examination was to assess Plaintiff’s assertion of “pain

of B/L shoulders, arms, right knee, left foot and HTN.” (Tr. at

473.)

More than a year after the February 28, 2018 consultative

examination was cancelled, Plaintiff appeared before the ALJ for

a hearing on September 16, 2019. (Tr. at 15-16.) At the

hearing, Plaintiff alleged a new basis for her disability claim,

her bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome. (Tr. at 13.) Plaintiff’s

failure to attend the initial consultative examination regarding

her apparently abandoned claim of spinal impairments, does not

absolve the ALJ of his duty to develop the record with respect

to Plaintiff’s assertion of hand and wrist impairments and it

does not empower the ALJ to undergo a five-step sequential

analysis of Plaintiff’s hand and wrist impairments without the

assistance of any medical assessment or sufficient medical

evidence. Ordering a new consultative examination to assess

Plaintiff’s bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome was one of many

avenues that the ALJ could have taken to develop the record

after the hearing. See Conyers v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 17-

cv-5126 (BCM), 2019 WL 1122952, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2019)

(noting that the ALJ adjourned plaintiff’s hearing in order to

obtain additional medical records and for plaintiff undergo a

consultative examination). In light of the limited nature of

the medical record regarding Plaintiff’s hand and wrist

impairments, Plaintiff’s failure to attend a consultative

examination about a separate, apparently abandoned claim is

simply not an excuse for the ALJ to assess Plaintiff’s hand and

wrist impairments and make a conclusive RFC determination

without sufficient medical evidence.

III. The ALJ’s Analysis of Plaintiff’s Credibility

The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s “medically determinable

impairments could reasonably be expected to produce the above

alleged symptoms,” but that Plaintiff’s “statements concerning

the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these

symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence

and other evidence in the record.” (Tr. at 16.) The ALJ

further noted that “[v]iewing the record as a whole, there is a

substantial disparity between the claimant’s documentary

complaints and the objective medical findings contained in the

record” and that “[t]he evidence generally does not support the

alleged loss of functioning[.]” (Tr. at 17.) Plaintiff

contends the ALJ’s statements regarding the credibility of her

subjective symptom testimony were “conclusory,” were not

supported by the required explanation of the ALJ’s reasoning,

and were “not supported by substantial evidence” in light of the

ALJ’s concession that the medical record was sparse. (Ptf. Mem.

at 9.) The Commissioner contends that the ALJ’s assessment of

Plaintiff’s credibility was well-reasoned and supported by

evidence in the record. (Def. Mem. at 12-14.) The Commissioner

further notes that contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, the ALJ

had no obligation to reference Plaintiff’s 38-year work history

in light of the “substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s

[credibility] determination. (Def. Mem. at 15) (citing Wavercak

v. Astrue, 420 F. App’x 91, 94 (2d Cir. 2011).

In evaluating a claimant’s subjective statements, the ALJ

follows a two-step process: (1) determining whether there is an

underlying medically determinable physical or mental impairment

“that could reasonably be expected to produce the claimant’s

pain or other symptoms,” and (2) once such an impairment has

been shown, “evaluat[ing] the intensity, persistence, and

limiting effects of the claimant’s symptoms to determine the

extent to which they limit the claimant’s functional

limitations.” See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529. The “subjective

element of pain,” as set forth in a claimant’s statements or

testimony, is “an important factor” in determining the

intensity, persistence and limiting effects of the claimant’s

symptoms and the ALJ has discretion on how to “evaluate the

credibility” of such statements “in light of medical findings

and other evidence.” Valet v. Astrue, No. 10-cv-3282 (KAM),

2012 WL 194970, at *21 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2012) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). Social Security Ruling

(“S.S.R.”) 96-7p guides the ALJ’s determination of the

credibility of a claimant’s statements. The seven factors that

an ALJ must consider in making this determination are:

(1) Daily activities; (2) The location, duration,

frequency, and intensity of pain or other symptoms; (3)

Factors that precipitate and aggravate the symptoms; (4)

The type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any

medication an individual takes or has taken to alleviate

pain or other symptoms; (5) Treatment, other than

medication, an individual receives or has received for

relief of pain or other symptoms; (6) Any measures other

than treatment an individual uses or has used to relieve

pain or other symptoms (e.g., lying flat on his or her

back, standing for 15 to 20 minutes every hour, or sleeping

on a board); and (7) Any other factors concerning an

individual's functional limitations and restrictions due to

pain or other symptoms.

S.S.R. 96-7p; see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c).

“[T]he ALJ must consider all of the evidence in the record

and give specific reasons for the weight accorded to the

claimant’s testimony.” Alcantara v. Astrue, 667 F. Supp. 2d

262, 277–78 (2d. Cir. 2009) (quoting Lugo v. Apfel, 20 F. Supp.

2d 662, 663 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).

First, the ALJ found that Plaintiff suffers from an

underlying medically determinable physical impairment that could

reasonably be expected to produce her pain or other symptoms,

but the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s statements concerning the

intensity, persistence and limiting effects of her hand and

wrist impairments “are not entirely consistent with the medical

evidence and other evidence in the record.” (Tr. at 16.) The

ALJ then proceeded to review Plaintiff’s subjective symptom

testimony (Tr. at 14-15) and summarize Dr. Rettig’s treatment

notes. (Tr. at 16-17).

Putting aside the insufficiency of the medical evidence to

which the ALJ compares Plaintiff’s subjective testimony, the

ALJ’s determination fails to articulate his reasons with

specificity and fails to identify what evidence he gives weight

to in his assessment. See Williams ex rel. Williams v. Bowen,

859 F.2d 255, 260-61 (2d Cir. 1988) (“a finding that the witness

is not credible must . . . be set forth with sufficient

specificity to permit intelligible plenary review of the

record[]”) (quoting Carroll v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs.,

705 F.2d 638, 643 (2d Cir. 1983). Specifically, the ALJ fails

to explain how Plaintiff’s testimony can properly be compared to

the record when he simultaneously asserts that the record

contains “no assessments or medical source statements.” (Tr. at

17.) This contradiction is highlighted by the ALJ’s conclusion

that Plaintiff’s “allegations are not consistent with, or fully

supported by, the documentary medical evidence, treating source

notes and medical opinions (DDS),” and the ALJ’s later statement

that he did not assess the opinion of the DDS whose opinion

Plaintiff’s statements are purportedly inconsistent with. (Tr.

at 16-17.)

With respect to Dr. Rettig’s treatment notes, although the

ALJ summarizes Plaintiff’s surgeries and diagnoses, and Dr.

Rettig’s treatment notes generally (Tr. at 16-17), the ALJ fails

to provide specific reasons for how Dr. Rettig’s treatment notes

were considered in his assessment of Plaintiff’s credibility or

conflicted with Plaintiff’s testimony regarding her exertional

limits or capacity to work. As noted earlier, Dr. Rettig’s

treatment notes do not purport to address Plaintiff’s exertional

limits and capacity to work.

Ultimately, the ALJ did not specify the reason for which he

accorded seemingly no weight to Plaintiff’s subjective symptom

testimony. See Alcantara, 667 F. Supp. 2d at 278 (remanding

“for the ALJ to provide more detailed reasons for her

credibility determination, taking into consideration the factors

set forth in 20 C.F.R. 404.1529(c)(3)” because the ALJ

“summarized her credibility finding in a single statement,

indicating that [Plaintiff’s] allegations . . . are not totally

credible for the reasons set forth in the body of the decision”

without detailing “the basis for her credibility assessment”)

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). As in

Alcantara, ALJ Goodale concluded that Plaintiff’s subjective

testimony was not consistent with the “record as a whole” and

the “evidence generally” for “the reasons explained in [his]

decision” without the required elaboration. (Tr. at 16-17.)

Finally, the Commissioner is correct that the absence of

any reference to Plaintiff’s work history in the ALJ’s decision

does not necessarily undermine the ALJ’s credibility assessment

and is not per se dispositive such that remand on this basis

alone would be warranted. (Def. Mem. at 15.) However, in light

of the sparseness of the overall record, Plaintiff’s 38 years of

dedicated work experience should have been particularly

probative of her credibility. See Schaal v. Apfel, 134 F.3d

496, 502 (2d Cir. 1998) (“ALJs are specifically instructed that

credibility determinations should take account of ‘prior work

record’” because a Plaintiff’s “good work history may be deemed

probative of credibility”) (internal citation omitted). On

remand, the Court encourages the ALJ to consider Plaintiff’s

work history in assessing her credibility, consistent with the

governing regulations. See Rivera v. Schweiker, 717 F.2d 719,

725 (2d Cir. 1983) (finding that “any evidence of a desire by

[Plaintiff] to work would merely emphasize the positive value of

his 32-year employment history. A claimant with a good work

record is entitled to substantial credibility when claiming an

inability to work because of a disability.”)

Ultimately, remand is warranted where, as here, the ALJ

fails to detail a basis for his conclusion regarding Plaintiff’s

credibility. See Valet, 2012 WL 194970, at *22 (“Where the ALJ

fails [to] sufficiently [] explain a finding that the claimant’s

testimony was not entirely credible, remand is appropriate[]”)

(quoting Tornatore v. Barnhart, No. 05-cv-6858 (GEL), 2006 WL

3714649, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2006)).

IV. The ALJ’s Discussion of Relevant Listings of Impairments

Although Plaintiff does not challenge the ALJ’s

determination of the relevant listings of impairments, this

Court finds that the ALJ failed to either specify the relevant

listing that applies to Plaintiff’s hand and wrist impairments

or articulate a finding that no relevant listing applied to

Plaintiff’s impairments. At step three of the five-step

sequential analysis, the ALJ considers whether the claimant

“[has] an impairment(s) that meets or equals one of the listings

in appendix 1 of this subpart[.]” 20 C.F.R. §

404.1520(a)(4)(iii). The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s hand and

wrist impairments were medically severe, but his analysis

stopped short of identifying any listing of impairments. (Stip.

at 6) (“ALJ Goodale found that [Plaintiff had] severe

impairments of bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, hand-wrist

neuropathy in the bilateral upper extremities, and status-post

wrist compression procedures.”) By contrast, the ALJ properly

specified a listing applicable to Plaintiff’s spinal impairment,

giving “specific consideration . . . to Section 1.04 of the

Listing of Impairments,” and explained that Plaintiff’s spinal

impairment did not meet the requirements of Listing 1.04

“because the record does not demonstrate compromise of a nerve

root . . . or the spinal cord with additional findings[.]” (Tr.

at 13.) No such analysis was articulated with respect to

Plaintiff’s hand and wrist impairments. The ALJ does not

specify any other listing that he gave any consideration to or

any listing that would apply to Plaintiff’s bilateral carpal

tunnel syndrome, hand-wrist neuropathy in bilateral upper

extremities, or status post wrist compression procedures on both

wrists. Nor does the ALJ conclude that no listing of impairment

applies to Plaintiff’s hand and wrist impairments. To the

contrary, the ALJ provided a thorough overview of Plaintiff’s

hearing testimony and a summary of Dr. Rettig’s treatment notes

in determining Plaintiff’s RFC with respect to her hand and

wrist impairments, but the ALJ failed to specify any applicable

listing that should have preceded his RFC determination. (Tr.

at 15-17.) Absent any reasoning from the ALJ regarding the

relevant listing or lack thereof, the Court is left with no

basis on which to review the ALJ’s determination. See Ferraris

v. Heckler, 728 F.2d 582, 587 (2d Cir. 1984) (“The crucial

factors in [the ALJ’s] determination must be set forth with

sufficient specificity to enable [the reviewing court] to decide

whether the determination is supported by substantial

evidence.”)}; see also Jones v. Barnhart, No. 04-cv-2772 (FB),

2004 WL 3158536, at *7 (E.D.N.Y Feb. 3, 2004) (“When the ALJ

does not adequately explain his rationale, [the] Court cannot

provide meaningful judicial review.”). Accordingly, on remand,

the ALJ is respectfully directed to assess whether there are any

listings of impairments that relate to Plaintiff’s hand and

wrist impairments and to conduct the relevant inquiry as to any

applicable listing at step three of the ALJ’s analysis.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on

the pleadings is GRANTED and Defendant’s cross-motion for judgment

on the pleadings is DENIED, and the case is REMANDED for further

proceedings consistent with this Memorandum and Order. The Clerk

of Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff and

to close the case.

SO ORDERED

Dated: December 21, 2023

Brooklyn, New York

Yn en

ye + iw

How. Ukrvo A. MATSUMOTO

United States District Judge

Eastern District of New York

35

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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