Dickerson v. Dickerson

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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ROBERT L. DICKERSON,

Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM & ORDER

23-CV-3859(EK)(LB)

-against-

BERNICE D. SIEGAL and ABRAHAM

MAZLOUMI,

Defendants.

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ERIC KOMITEE, United States District Judge:

On May 24, 2023, pro se plaintiff Robert Dickerson

filed a fee-paid complaint, together with a motion for a

preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. He

alleged constitutional claims arising from an ongoing New York

State guardianship proceeding involving his adult son Brandon

Dickerson, and requested that this Court intervene to enjoin

that proceeding. By Memorandum and Order dated June 9, 2023, I

dismissed without prejudice any claims asserted on behalf of

Brandon Dickerson; denied Plaintiff’s request for preliminary

injunctive relief; and directed him to show cause why this

action should not be dismissed for, among other reasons, lack of

jurisdiction on abstention grounds. See Dickerson v. Dickerson,

No. 23-CV-3859, 2023 WL 3931696 (E.D.N.Y. June 9, 2023). On

June 16, 2023, Plaintiff filed a response to the Court’s Order.

Pl. Response, ECF No. 13.1 For the reasons set forth below, the

action is dismissed.2

Discussion

The Court assumes the parties’ familiarity with this

action’s factual and procedural background and elaborates only

those details necessary for this Order. In March 2022,

Dickerson’s son Brandon, then residing in Louisiana, suffered a

brain aneurysm that resulted in a brain injury. On October 25,

2022, Plaintiff asserts, a Louisiana state court appointed

Dickerson as Brandon’s guardian. Brandon’s sister, Geneva

Dickerson, however, initiated a separate guardianship proceeding

in New York state court, pursuant to Article 81 of the New York

Health Law. On February 9, 2023, Justice Bernice Siegal, the

judge overseeing that case, appointed Abraham Mazloumi as the

temporary guardian for Brandon. Asserting constitutional due

process claims, Plaintiff alleges that his Louisiana state court

1 Plaintiff’s initial complaint named Justice Siegal, Geneva Dickerson,

Judah Schwartz, and Abraham Mazloumi as defendants. Plaintiff’s response to

the order to show cause is also labeled as an amended complaint and is

brought against only defendants Siegal and Mazloumi. That response also

explicitly notes, as “Petition Amendments,” the “remov[al]” of Brandon

Dickerson as a plaintiff and of Geneva Dickerson and Schwartz as defendants.

Id. at 9. The Clerk of Court is therefore respectfully directed to terminate

Geneva Dickerson and Judah Schwartz as parties to the action.

2 On August 30 and September 3, 2023, Dickerson filed additional orders

to show cause for a temporary restraining order, again requesting that the

Court intervene to halt the New York state court proceedings. ECF Nos. 24,

25. Because the Court dismisses the action, these requests for injunctive

relief are denied as moot.

appointment is valid and must take precedence over Mazloumi’s

appointment.

In his response to the order to show cause, Dickerson

asserts that: (1) his request for injunctive relief is not

barred by the Younger abstention doctrine; and (2) Defendants

Siegal and Mazloumi are not immune to suit. ECF No. 13.

Neither argument is correct, however, and the action is

dismissed.

A. Plaintiff’s Requests for Injunctive Relief Are Barred Under

the Younger Abstention Doctrine

Dickerson requests, as injunctive relief, the

termination of the New York-state court temporary guardianship

and an order directing Justice Siegal to recognize his alleged

prior appointment as guardian. While the Court is sympathetic

to Dickerson’s situation, it must abstain from intervening in an

ongoing state court proceeding under the doctrine set out in

Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).

Under Younger, “federal courts should generally

refrain from enjoining or otherwise interfering in ongoing state

proceedings.” Spargo v. N.Y. State Comm’n on Jud. Conduct, 351

F.3d 65, 74 (2d Cir. 2003). Younger abstention is “mandatory

when: (1) there is a pending state proceeding, (2) that

implicates an important state interest, and (3) the state

proceeding affords the federal plaintiff an adequate opportunity

for judicial review of his or her federal constitutional

claims.” Id. at 75.

As the Court previously ruled, all Younger

requirements are met here. First, Dickerson’s response and

amended complaint indicate that state guardianship proceedings

remain ongoing in both New York and Louisiana. ECF No. 13. at

11–44. Such proceedings, moreover, implicate important state

interests — namely, in adjudicating questions of guardianship.

See Disability Rts. N.Y. v. New York, 916 F.3d 129, 136 (2d Cir.

2019) (observing that “states have an especially strong

interest” in “state court procedure in guardianship proceedings”

and affirming district court’s abstention under Younger);

Toriola v. N. Shore LIJ, No. 9-CV-3251, 2009 WL 2338037, at *2

(E.D.N.Y. July 29, 2009) (“As plaintiff seeks to have this court

intervene in a pending state court proceeding in an effort to

challenge the guardianship of her mother, this court must

abstain.”). Finally, the state courts provide Dickerson with an

adequate opportunity to raise his federal constitutional claims.

Indeed, the “[Second] Circuit has often recognized the

obligation and competence of state courts to decide federal

constitutional questions.” Donkor v. City of New York Hum. Res.

Admin. Special Servs. for Child., 673 F. Supp. 1221, 1226

(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (citing cases). In addition, Dickerson has not

identified any barrier that “precludes [him] from raising these

claims in a state appellate court” at the appropriate time.

McKnight v. Middleton, 699 F. Supp. 2d 507, 521 (E.D.N.Y. 2010),

aff’d, 434 F. App’x 32 (2d Cir. 2011).

Because the requested injunctive relief would require

a federal court to interfere with ongoing state court

guardianship proceedings, this Court must abstain from

exercising jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims.

B. Plaintiff’s Claims Against Defendants Siegal and Mazloumi

Dickerson’s Section 1983 claims and request for

monetary damages against Justice Siegal and Mazloumi likewise

fail, as discussed in this Court’s prior Order. See Dickerson,

2023 WL 3931696, at *3-5.

1. Claims Against Justice Siegal

Judges are absolutely immune from suit for damages for

any actions taken in their judicial capacity. Mireles v. Waco,

502 U.S. 9, 9-11 (1991). “[A]cts arising out of, or related to,

individual cases before the judge are considered judicial in

nature.” Bliven v. Hunt, 579 F.3d 204, 210 (2d Cir. 2009).

Moreover, “[a] judge will not be deprived of immunity because

the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in

excess of his authority.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356

(1978). Here, the claims against Justice Siegal arise from

decisions made during the New York guardianship proceeding,

including her appointment of a temporary guardian. These

actions plainly fall within the scope of her judicial capacity.

Dickerson now seeks to invoke an exception to judicial

immunity, arguing that Justice Siegal’s actions were taken “in

the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” See Mireles, 502

U.S. at 12. Specifically, he asserts that the Louisiana state

court maintains “exclusive and continuing jurisdiction” over all

matters regarding Dickerson’s guardianship. Pl. Response 3.

“[T]he scope of the judge’s jurisdiction must be construed

broadly,” Stump, 435 U.S. at 356, such that a court acts “in the

absence of all jurisdiction” only “when it does not have any

“statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case.”

Gross v. Rell, 585 F.3d 72, 84 (2d Cir. 2009). “[A] judge will

be denied immunity only where it appears, first, that the judge

acted in the clear absence of jurisdiction, and second, that the

judge must have known that he or she was acting in the clear

absence of jurisdiction.” Maestri v. Jutkofsky, 860 F.2d 50, 53

(2d Cir. 1988).

The Supreme Court has distinguished between actions

taken “in excess of authority,” to which judicial immunity

applies, and those taken “in clear absence of all jurisdiction,”

to which it does not.

Where there is clearly no jurisdiction over the subject-

matter any authority exercised is a usurped authority, and

for the exercise of such authority, when the want of

jurisdiction is known to the judge, no excuse is

permissible. But where jurisdiction over the subject-

matter is invested by law in the judge, or in the court

which he holds, the manner and extent in which the

jurisdiction shall be exercised are generally as much

questions for his determination as any other questions

involved in the case, although upon the correctness of his

determination in these particulars the validity of his

judgments may depend.

Stump, 435 U.S. at 356 n.6 (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall.

335, 351-52 (1872)). The Bradley Court further illustrated this

distinction with the following example:

If a probate court, the jurisdiction of which is limited to

wills and estate settlement, should conduct a criminal

trial, jurisdiction over the subject matter would be

entirely wanting, and, as this lack would necessarily be

known to the court, the judge would not be entitled to

judicial immunity. If, on the other hand, a judge of a

criminal court were to try a party for a nonexistent

offense or sentence a convict to a term longer than that

permitted by law, that judge would be entitled to the

protection of the judicial immunity doctrine.

Maestri, 860 F.2d at 53 (citing Bradley, 13 Wall. at 351).

Dickerson has not alleged sufficient facts suggesting

that Justice Siegal has acted in the clear absence of all

jurisdiction. He does not dispute that Justice Siegal, as a New

York State Supreme Court justice, has subject matter

jurisdiction to adjudicate an Article 81 proceeding. See N.Y.

Const. art. VI, § 7(a) (“The supreme court shall have general

original jurisdiction in law and equity.”). “[A] judge who

possesses subject matter jurisdiction is not within the ‘clear

absence of all jurisdiction’ posture which would deprive [the

judge] of the use of the defense of judicial immunity.” Green

v. Maraio, 722 F.2d 1013, 1017 (2d Cir. 1983); cf. Maestri, 860

F.2d at 53 (judicial immunity did not apply to town justice who

issued arrest warrants in neighboring towns over which he knew

he lacked jurisdiction). As a result, whether and to what

extent the Louisiana state court proceedings might bear on the

New York state proceedings does not suggest that Justice Siegal

clearly has no jurisdiction to adjudicate the latter. Instead,

she is entitled to immunity because she “clearly ha[s]

jurisdiction over cases like” Brandon’s, even if she ultimately

does “not have jurisdiction over [Brandon’s] case itself.” See

Gross, 585 F.3d at 85 (granting judicial immunity to judge who

improperly ordered involuntary conservatorship).

Justice Siegal is therefore entitled to absolute

immunity from this suit.

2. Claims Against Mazloumi

Defendant Mazloumi, who was appointed as Brandon

Dickerson’s temporary guardian, is likewise absolutely immune

from suit, under the doctrine of “quasi-judicial immunity.”

Dickerson, 2023 WL 3931696, at *4; see Mitchell v. Fishbein, 377

F.3d 157, 172 (2d Cir. 2004) (affording immunity to private

actors whose acts “are integrally related to an ongoing judicial

proceeding.”). Dickerson brings claims against Mazloumi for

acting as Brandon’s court-appointed guardian — in other words,

for acting “as an adjunct of the New York state judicial

system.” See Galanova v. Portnoy, 432 F. Supp. 3d 433, 446 n.12

(S.D.N.Y. 2020); see, e.g., Wilson v. Wilson-Polson, No. 9-CV-

9810, 2010 WL 3733935, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2010)

(guardians ad litem and “law guardians” protected by quasi-

judicial immunity); Faraldo v. Kessler, No. 08-CV-0261, 2008 WL

216608, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2008) (court evaluator

appointed pursuant to Article 81 enjoyed judicial immunity).

Moreover, even if Mazloumi were not entitled to quasi-

judicial immunity, he is a private party — not a state actor —

beyond the scope of Section 1983. Cf. Milan v. Wertheimer, 808

F.3d 961, 964 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding that court-appointed law

guardians are not state actors); Shabtai v. Shabtai, No. 20-CV-

10868, 2021 WL 1518382, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2021)

(defendant’s appointment by the state court judge “to act as the

temporary guardian. . . is insufficient to show that [he] acted

under color of state law”).3

3 Dickerson’s August 30, 2023 order to show cause seeks to add, as a

defendant, counsel for Brandon appointed by Justice Siegal. ECF No. 24 at 4–

5. “[I]t is well-established,” however, “that court-appointed attorneys

performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel . . . do not act

‘under color of state law’ and therefore are not subject to suit under 42

U.S.C. § 1983.” Rodriguez v. Weprin, 116 F.3d 62, 65–66 (2d Cir. 1997); see,

e.g., Fisk v. Letterman, 401 F. Supp. 2d 362, 378 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (attorney

from state-funded Mental Hygiene Legal Services, appointed by the court to

represent the plaintiff in an involuntary commitment proceeding, not acting

under color of state law). That request is therefore denied.

Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s claims are

barred by the Younger abstention doctrine and the doctrines of

judicial and quasi-judicial immunity. The Clerk of Court is

respectfully directed to enter judgment dismissing this action.

All pending motions are disposed of via this Order.

Although Plaintiff paid the filing fee to bring this

action, the Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3)

that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith

and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose

of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-

45 (1962).

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Eric Komitee__________

ERIC KOMITEE

United States District Judge

Dated: September 21, 2023

Brooklyn, New York