Opinion

Jones v. "Fireball"-Class Action Suit

Court
District Court, E.D. New York
Filed
Aug 30, 2023
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 26.7%

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CLERK

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 4:58 pm, Aug 30, 2023

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U.S. DISTRICT COURT

RICHARD JONES, #427958,

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

LONG ISLAND OFFICE

Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

-against- 23-CV-1564(GRB)(ST)

FIREBALL CLASS ACTION SUIT,

Defendant.

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GARY R. BROWN, United States District Judge:

Before the Court is the application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) filed by pro se

plaintiff Richard Jones (“Plaintiff”) while incarcerated at the Suffolk County Correctional

Facility (“Jail”) in relation to his complaint brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section

1983”) against the “Fireball Class Action Suit” (“Defendant”).1 Docket Entry “DE” 1, 5.

However, Plaintiff did not file the required Prisoner Litigation Authorization form (“PLA”) with

his IFP application. Accordingly, by Notice of Deficiency dated April 24, 2023, Plaintiff was

instructed to file the PLA as well as a complete copy of his complaint. (DE 5.) The Court’s

Notice and the Court’s case opening letter were both returned to the Court as undeliverable on

May 3, 2023. (DE 6-7.) By Electronic Order dated May 18, 2023, the Court ordered Plaintiff to,

by no later than June 2, 2023, to provide a current mailing address and the PLA. (Elec. Order,

dated May 18, 2023.) By letter dated June 5, 2023, Plaintiff apprised the Court that he was out

on bail but has now returned to the Jail. (DE 8.) Albeit untimely filed, the Court accepted

Plaintiff response and afforded him a final opportunity to cure the deficiencies noted earlier.

The Electronic Order provided:

By Notice of Deficiency dated April 24, 2023, the Court notified plaintiff that

1 Plaintiff used the Court’s form for complaints brought pursuant to Section 1983 but his submission was missing

pages 2 and 4.

his complaint is missing pages 2 and 4. Because the Courts Notice and May

18, 2023 order were returned to the Court as undeliverable during the time

he was discharged, the Court affords plaintiff a FINAL opportunity to cure

these deficiencies.

To be clear, Plaintiff is ORDERED to, by no later than June 29, 2023: (1)

apprise the Court in writing that the complaint filed on April 10, 2023 is

complete or provide the Court with a complete complaint; and (2) file the

Prisoner Litigation Authorization form.

PLAINTIFF IS ON NOTICE: Failure to timely respond to this Electronic

Order will result in this case being DISMISSED without prejudice and

without further notice.

(See Elec. Order, dated June 12, 2023.) In response, Plaintiff filed a letter dated May 26, 2023

and received on June 30, 2023, wherein he reported that he did not have a PLA form to file.

(DE 9.) Accordingly, the Court ordered the Clerk of the Court to mail the PLA form to Plaintiff

and ordered that Plaintiff “by no later than August 1, 2023: (1) apprise the Court in writing

that the complaint filed on April 10, 2023 is complete or provide the Court with a complete

complaint; and (2) file the Prisoner Litigation Authorization form enclosed with this

Electronic Order.” (Elec. Order dated July 11, 2023.) On July 31, 2023, Plaintiff filed the

PLA but did not file a complete complaint nor did he apprise the Court that the original

complaint filed is complete. (DE 10.) Accordingly, the Court accepts the original complaint,

filed on April 10, 2023 as Plaintiff’s pleading and screens it in accordance with the requirements

on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915, 1915A. For the reasons that follow, the Court grants Plaintiff’s

application to proceed IFP and finds that Plaintiff has not alleged a plausible claim. Thus, the

complaint is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b).

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BACKGROUND

1. Summary of the Complaint2

Plaintiff’s complaint is submitted on the Court’s form for civil rights actions brought

pursuant to Section 1983 and is missing pages 2 and 4.3 See DE 1. In its entirety, Plaintiff

alleges that, at various Bellport, New York locations including Sunoco gas stations and 7/11 stores,

during the period June 2022 to January 2023, he presumably purchased “Fireball” products and:

I’m seeking compensation for false advertisement of said “Fireball” alcohol being

not the real alcohol being sold at gas stations and 7-11 stores. Would like to be

added to class action suit and compensation.

DE 1 at ¶ V.

LEGAL STANDARDS

The Second Circuit has established a two-step procedure wherein the district court first

considers whether plaintiff qualifies for in forma pauperis status, and then considers the merits of

the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Potnick v. E. State Hosp., 701 F.2d 243, 244 (2d

Cir. 1983).

I. In Forma Pauperis

Upon review of the IFP application, the Court finds that plaintiff is qualified by his

financial status to commence this action without the prepayment of the filing fee. Therefore, the

application to proceed IFP (DE 2) is granted.

2 Excerpts from the complaint are reproduced here exactly as they appear in the original. Errors in spelling,

punctuation, and grammar have not been corrected or noted.

3 Notably, page 4 of the form asks for a description of the facts giving rise to the claim(s) and any injuries suffered

as a result of those events. See Section 1983 Compl. Form, annexed to this Order.

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II. Sufficiency of the Pleadings

As Judge Bianco summarized,

A district court is required to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint if the action

is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or

seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28

U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). The Court is required to dismiss the action as

soon as it makes such a determination. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii).

It is axiomatic that district courts are required to read pro se complaints liberally,

see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429

U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); Chavis v. Chappius, 618 F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir. 2010), and to

construe them “‘to raise the strongest arguments that [they] suggest [ ].’” Chavis,

618 F.3d at 170 (quoting Harris v. City of New York, 607 F.3d 18, 24 (2d Cir.

2010)). Moreover, at the pleadings stage of the proceeding, the Court must assume

the truth of “all well-pleaded, nonconclusory factual allegations” in the complaint.

Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir. 2010), aff’d, ---

U.S. ----, 133 S. Ct. 1659, 185 L. Ed. 2d 671 (2013) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662 (2009)). However, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of

action, supported by mere conclusory statements . . . are not entitled to the

assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted).

Notwithstanding a plaintiff’s pro se status, a complaint must plead sufficient facts

to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that

the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The

plausibility standard requires “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has

acted unlawfully.” Id.; accord Wilson v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 671 F.3d 120, 128

(2d Cir. 2011). While “detailed factual allegations” are not required, “[a] pleading

that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a

cause of action will not do.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at

555). Plaintiff’s factual allegations must also be sufficient to give the defendant

“fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,” Twombly,

550 U.S. at 555 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Patrick v. Bronx Care, No. 14-CV-7392 (JFB)(AKT), 2014 WL 7476972, at *1-2 (E.D.N.Y. Dec.

31, 2014).

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DISCUSSION

Section 1983 provides that:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or

usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to

be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction

thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in

equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 “creates no substantive rights; it provides only a procedure for

redress for the deprivation of rights established elsewhere.” Sykes v. James, 13 F.3d 515, 519 (2d

Cir. 1993). To maintain a Section 1983 action, a plaintiff must show that the defendant (1) acted

under color of state law (2) to deprive the plaintiff of a right arising under the Constitution or

federal law. See id. The Court analyzes plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim below.

I. Lack of State Action or a Constitutional Deprivation

Plaintiff names the “Fireball Class Action” as the sole Defendant. Further, although he

used the Section 1983 complaint form, he does not allege the deprivation of any constitutional

right. Indeed, the complaint lacks any facts and, critically, does not allege that a state actor

deprived him of some constitutional right. Thus, his Section 1983 claim is not plausible and is

dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b)(i)-(ii); 1915A(b)(1).

II. Leave to Amend

A pro se plaintiff should ordinarily be given the opportunity “to amend at least once when

a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Shomo

v. City of New York, 579 F.3d 176, 183 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). However, leave to amend is not required where it would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione,

657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988).

5

To the extent that Plaintiff seeks to join the “Fireball Class Action”, Plaintiff is advised

that, although a complaint had been filed in the United Stated District Court for the Northern

District of New York, 23-CV-0097, Marquez, individually and on behalf of all others similarly

situated, v. Sazerac Company, Inc., it is now closed. A copy of docket sheet for that action is

attached.

However, given Plaintiff’s pro se status, in an abundance of caution, the Court grants leave

to amend the complaint to afford him an opportunity to allege as plausible claim against a proper

defendant. If Plaintiff chooses to amend his complaint, he shall do so within thirty (30) days from

the date of this Order. Any amended complaint shall be clearly labeled “Amended Complaint”

and shall bear the same docket number as this Order, 23-CV-1564(GRB)(ST). If Plaintiff does

not timely file an amended complaint, judgment shall enter without further notice and this case

will be closed. Alternatively, Plaintiff may pursue any valid claims he may have in state court.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s application to proceed IFP (DE 2) is granted.

However, complaint is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii) and 1915A(b)(1).

Plaintiff is afforded an opportunity to amend his complaint. If Plaintiff chooses to amend the

complaint against a proper defendant in accordance with this Order, he shall do so within thirty

(30) days from the date of this Order. Any amended complaint shall be clearly labeled “Amended

Complaint” and shall bear the same docket number as this Order, 23-CV-1564(GRB)(ST). If

Plaintiff does not timely file an amended complaint, judgment shall enter without further notice

and this case will be closed.

The Clerk of the Court shall mail a copy of this Order together with a complaint form and

the docket sheet for 23-CV-0097(N.D. Ill.) to the pro se Plaintiff at his address of record and note

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service on the docket.

The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this Order

would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose

of any appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Gary R. Brown

_______________________

Hon. Gary R. Brown

United States District Judge

Dated: August 30, 2023

Central Islip, New York

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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