McKenzie v. Brown

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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KELLYANN McKENZIE,

Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM & ORDER

-against- 23-CV-4556 (NRM) (LB)

CRAIG BROWN,

Defendant.

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NINA R. MORRISON, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Kellyann McKenzie (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, commenced this

civil action on June 14, 2023. ECF No. 1. She filed an Amended Complaint on June

26, 2023. ECF No. 4. Her request to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915, ECF No. 2, is granted for the limited purpose of this Order.

However, for the reasons set forth below, the Amended Complaint is dismissed for

lack of jurisdiction.

I. Background

The Amended Complaint is filed on a form complaint for civil actions. ECF

No. 4. In the space to provide a basis for the federal courts’ jurisdiction, Plaintiff

checks the box for Federal Question and describes her claim as “intentional

infliction of emotional distress.” Id. at 4. Plaintiff provides addresses for herself

and Defendant in New York. Id. at 2; see also id. at 7 (“Defendant . . . resides in

New York.”). Plaintiff asserts that Craig Brown (“Defendant”) is the father of her

daughter. Id. at 7. She states that, while she was pregnant, she informed Brown

that she was pregnant and asked him for food expenses. Id. Plaintiff alleges that

“Defendant refused to assist Plaintiff and told Plaintiff not to return to his home.

provide the dates on which she asserts that these events took place, the Amended

Complaint does state that she gave birth to K.M.M. in 2013. Id. No father was

listed on the birth certificate. Id.

Plaintiff asserts that “Defendant began to show up to Plaintiff’s home with

items needed for his daughter,” but then abandoned his child “after he saw Plaintiff

was not interested in him.” Id. at 8. Plaintiff sought child support from Defendant

in Queens County Family Court. Id. at 8-9. A DNA test “showed Defendant as the

father and Defendant began to pay child support.” Id. at 9. Plaintiff claims that

Defendant began a relationship with Plaintiff’s mother “and the two brought

Plaintiff to court to have daughter removed out of Plaintiff’s sole custody.” Id. at 9-

10. Plaintiff claims that her mother and Defendant plotted to bring Plaintiff and

Defendant back together. Id. at 9-10. She claims that Defendant and her mother

tried to control her life and interfered with her relationship with other family

members. Id. at 10-11.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s actions caused “intense emotional trauma

and psych trauma” that aggravated her existing condition of bi-polar disorder. Id.

at 11. She seeks $500,000 in damages. Id. at 5-6.

II. Standard of Review

To avoid dismissal, a complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570

(2007). A claim will be considered plausible on its face “when the plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

(2009). Although “detailed factual allegations” are not required, a complaint is

insufficient to state a claim “if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further

factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). At the same time,

federal courts give special consideration to pro se plaintiffs. In re Sims, 534 F.3d

117, 133 (2d Cir. 2008). When determining the sufficiency of a pro se complaint, the

Court must look for the strongest arguments that the complaint suggests. Erickson

v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d

185, 191-93 (2d Cir. 2008). If a liberal reading of the complaint “gives any

indication that a valid claim might be stated,” the court must give the plaintiff an

opportunity to amend the complaint. Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir.

2000).

A district court has the inherent power to dismiss a case, sua sponte, if it

determines that the court lacks jurisdiction over the action. Fitzgerald v. First E.

Seventh St. Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 363-364 (2d Cir. 2000); Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(h)(3). “[F]ailure of subject matter jurisdiction is not waivable and may be raised

at any time by a party or by the court sua sponte. If subject matter jurisdiction is

lacking, the action must be dismissed.” Lyndonville Sav. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Lussier,

211 F.3d 697, 700-01 (2d Cir. 2000). Federal subject matter jurisdiction is available

only when a “federal question” is presented, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, or when plaintiff and

defendant are of diverse citizenship and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000,

28 U.S.C. § 1332.

In this case, Plaintiff’s complaint does not assert any valid legal basis for this

Court to exercise jurisdiction over her claims, as she has neither presented a federal

question nor asserted a basis for diversity jurisdiction. Plaintiff states that her

claim is for intentional infliction of emotional distress and describes a cause of

action arising from personal conflicts between her and other private individuals.

Although intentional infliction of emotional distress may form the basis for a cause

of action under New York State law, it does not implicate any federal law or right.

Bender v. City of New York, 78 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1996) (describing intentional

infliction of emotional distress as a “state law tort”). Furthermore, since both

Plaintiff and Defendant are residents of New York State, Plaintiff may not rely on

diversity of citizenship to assert federal jurisdiction over this potential state law

claim.

Generally, a court should grant leave to amend at least once. Terry v. Inc.

Vill. of Patchogue, 826 F.3d 631, 633 (2d Cir. 2016). However, “leave to amend need

not be granted when amendment would be futile.” Id. In this case, because

Plaintiff has not suggested any factual allegations, parties to the lawsuit, or legal

claims that would bring her disputes with the putative father of her child and her

mother under the jurisdiction of the federal courts, amendment would be futile.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the action is dismissed for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). Any potential state law

claims are dismissed without prejudice to filing in state court.

this order would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is

denied for purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-

45 (1962).

The Clerk of Court shall close this case and enter judgment and mail a copy

of this Order to Plaintiff at the address provided and note the mailing on the docket.

SO ORDERED.

_/s/ NRM______________________

NINA R. MORRISON

United States District Judge

Dated: July 20, 2023

Brooklyn, New York