Daniels v. United States of America

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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BRANDON DANIELS,

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Plaintiff, 22-cv-01011(KAM)(CLP)

-against-

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; JONATHAN

SIEGEL, AUSA; MICHAEL W. GIBALDI, AUSA;

FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS; WARDEN OF

INSTITUTION MDC,

Defendants.

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KIYO A. MATSUMOTO, United States District Judge:

Pro se plaintiff Brandon Daniels, currently incarcerated

at the Metropolitan Detention Center (“MDC”), filed this complaint

on February 22, 2022 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging

violations of his constitutional rights based on his arrest and

subsequent confinement at the MDC. Because Plaintiff alleges that

federal defendants violated his constitutional rights, the Court

liberally construes Plaintiff's complaint as asserting claims

under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of

Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (“Bivens”), rather than 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, which applies only to state, not federal, actors.

Although Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma

pauperis is granted, for the reasons stated below, the complaint

is dismissed as to the United States of America, Assistant United

States Attorney (“AUSA”) Jonathan Siegel, AUSA Michael W. Gibaldi,

the Warden of Institution MDC (“Warden”), and the Federal Bureau

of Prisons (“BOP”) for failure to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and (2).

Plaintiff is, however, granted thirty (30) days from the date of

this Memorandum and Order to submit an amended complaint to the

extent permitted herein, as detailed below.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff asserts several claims resulting from his

confinement at MDC. First, he alleges that in December 2020, he

was attacked by unnamed and undescribed “staff officers” at MDC,

though Plaintiff does not provide any information regarding the

incident. (ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”) at 1.) Next, Plaintiff alleges

that, while incarcerated, he developed a hernia and lost a

“substantial amount of weight.” (Id.) Further, Plaintiff asserts

that the conditions of confinement at MDC are poor, that the

facility is extremely hot, there is a lack of air circulation, the

food is poor, and safety and security are lacking. (Id. at 2.)

Plaintiff further asserts that he is at increased risk of

contracting the coronavirus while incarcerated because he has a

preexisting medical condition. (Id.) Finally, Plaintiff asserts

a claim for false arrest, false imprisonment and alleges misconduct

on the part of the prosecutors in his pending criminal action.

(Id. at 3.) Plaintiff seeks monetary damages.

LEGAL STANDARD

I. Standard of Review

A complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Matson v. Bd. of Educ., 631 F.3d 57, 63 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). Although all well-

pleaded allegations contained in the complaint are assumed to be

true, this tenet is “inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 678.

It is axiomatic that pro se complaints are held to less

stringent standards than pleadings drafted by attorneys, and that

a court is required to read a pro se plaintiff’s complaint

liberally and interpret it to raise the strongest arguments it

suggests. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Hughes

v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980); Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant

#1, 537 F.3d 185, 191-93 (2d Cir. 2008); see also Harris v. Mills,

572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting that even after Twombly,

the court “remain[s] obligated to construe a pro se complaint

liberally”). Nevertheless, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), a

district court shall dismiss an in forma pauperis action where it

is satisfied that the action “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii)

fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii)

seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such

relief.”

DISCUSSION

I. Plaintiff’s Constitutional Claims

It is well-established that the purpose of a Bivens claim

is to hold individual federal defendants accountable for their

personal conduct that violates a plaintiff's constitutional

rights. See Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 571 (2d Cir. 2009)

(“The purpose of the Bivens remedy ‘is to deter individual federal

officers from committing constitutional violations.’”) (quoting

Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 70 (2001)); accord

F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 485 (1994).

To state a claim for relief under Bivens, a plaintiff

must allege facts that plausibly show: (1) the challenged action

was attributable to an officer acting under color of federal law,

and (2) such conduct deprived him of a right, privilege, or

immunity secured by the Constitution. See Thomas v. Ashcroft, 470

F.3d 491, 496 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389).

Like actions brought against state officials pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, a plaintiff’s Bivens claims must be brought against the

individuals personally responsible for the alleged deprivation of

his constitutional rights, not against the federal government or

the agencies where they are employed. See Meyer, 510 U.S. at 486;

see also Irizarry v. Manhattan Correctional Ctr., No. 21-cv-5170

(LTS), 2021 WL 3668045, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2021).

“Because the doctrine of respondeat superior does not

apply in Bivens actions, a plaintiff must allege that the

individual defendant was personally involved in the constitutional

violation.” Thomas, 470 F.3d at 496 (citation omitted); Martin

v. Mihalik, No. 19-cv-7979 (PMH), 2021 WL 1738458, at *6 (S.D.N.Y.

May 3, 2021). A showing of personal involvement of a supervisory

defendant includes, but is not limited to, evidence that the

supervisory defendant: (1) directly participated in the

constitutional violation; (2) failed to remedy the violation after

learning of it through a report or appeal; (3) created a custom or

policy fostering the violation or allowed the custom or policy to

continue after learning of it; (4) was grossly negligent in

supervising subordinates who caused the violation; or (5) failed

to act on information indicating that unconstitutional acts were

occurring. Thomas, 470 F.3d at 496-96 (quotations omitted). The

fact that a defendant is a supervisor is not enough to impute

personal involvement onto that actor; rather, “supervisory

liability requires that the ‘defendant, through the official's own

individual actions, has violated the Constitution.’” Williams v.

Novoa, No. 19-cv-11545 (PMH), 2021 WL 431445, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.

5, 2021) (quoting Tangreti v. Bachmann, 983 F.3d 609, 618 (2d Cir.

2020) (citation omitted)).

A. Sovereign Immunity

The doctrine of sovereign immunity bars federal courts

from hearing all suits against the federal government, including

suits against federal agencies, unless sovereign immunity has been

waived. See United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980);

see also Robinson v. Overseas Military Sales Corp., 21 F.3d 502,

510 (2d Cir. 1994) (“Because an action against a federal agency .

. . is essentially a suit against the United States, such suits

are . . . barred under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, unless

such immunity is waived.”); see also Reynolds v. Fed. Bureau of

Prisons, No. 21-cv-4763 (LTS), 2021 WL 2338249, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.

June 7, 2021). Thus, the Court dismisses Plaintiff's Bivens

claims against the BOP under the doctrine of sovereign immunity,

and discusses possible claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act,

infra.

B. Prosecutorial Immunity

Plaintiff names AUSAs Jonathan Siegel and Michael W.

Gibaldi — who prosecuted Plaintiff’s underlying criminal action —

as defendants in this suit. See USA v. Stroia et al., No. 19-cr-

00221 (RJD) (E.D.N.Y., filed May 10, 2019). “The doctrine of

absolute immunity bars claims against government attorneys with

regard to their actions in carrying out their prosecutorial

functions.” Shapiro v. Goldman, No. 14 CIV. 10119 (NRB), 2016 WL

4371741, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2016) (citing Buckley v.

Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 272–73 (1993), aff'd, 696 F. App'x 532

(2d Cir. 2017) (summary order)). The doctrine applies to Bivens

claims as well as Section 1983 claims. See Zahrey v. Coffey, 221

F.3d 342, 346 (2d Cir. 2000). Provided that “a prosecutor acts

with colorable authority, absolute immunity shields his

performance of advocative functions regardless of motivation.”

Bernard v. Cty. of Suffolk, 356 F.3d 495, 498 (2d Cir. 2004).

To determine whether a prosecutor's activity is subject

to absolute (or qualified) immunity requires “[a]n examination of

the functional nature of the prosecutorial behavior, rather than

the status of the person performing the act.” Taylor v. Kavanagh,

640 F.2d 450, 452 (2d Cir. 1981) (citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424

U.S. 409, 431 (1976)). Here, Plaintiff fails to plead any facts

to support his allegation of “prosecutorial misconduct,” let alone

any facts suggesting that absolute immunity would not apply to

Defendants for performing their duties in prosecuting Plaintiff.

Thus, the Court dismisses Plaintiff's claims against Jonathan

Siegel and Michael W. Gibaldi as barred by absolute immunity.

C. False Arrest, False Imprisonment Claims

Fourth Amendment claims for false arrest, “whether

brought under § 1983, pursuant to Bivens, or under state law, are

analyzed pursuant to the same standards as the applicable state

law's false arrest tort.” Nzegwu v. Friedman, 605 F. App’x 27,

29 (2d Cir. 2015) (citation omitted) (summary order). “Under New

York law, false arrest is considered to be a species of false

imprisonment, and the two claims have identical elements.” Mejia

v. City of N.Y., 119 F. Supp. 2d 232, 252 (E.D.N.Y. 2000). A

plaintiff alleging false arrest must therefore establish that “(1)

the defendant intended to confine him, (2) the plaintiff was

conscious of the confinement, (3) the plaintiff did not consent to

the confinement and (4) the confinement was not otherwise

privileged.” Ackerson v. City of White Plains, 702 F.3d 15, 19

(2d Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (quoting Broughton v. State of New

York, 37 N.Y.2d 451, 456 (1975)).

To the extent that Plaintiff seeks to assert a Bivens

claim for false arrest and false imprisonment in violation of the

Fourth Amendment, he fails to allege any facts in support of his

claim and fails to name any defendants who are alleged to have

been personally involved in Plaintiff's arrest. See Barrow v.

Wethersfield Police Dep't, 66 F.3d 466, 470 (2d Cir. 1995),

modified, 74 F.3d 1366 (2d Cir. 1996). In the absence of such

allegations, Plaintiff's Bivens false arrest claims are dismissed.

D. Denial of Medical Care and Conditions of Confinement at

MDC

Liberally construed, Plaintiff’s Complaint seeks to

assert a Bivens claim based on violations of his Fifth or Eighth

Amendment rights due to his conditions of confinement and the

allegedly inadequate medical care at MDC. Prison officials have

a duty under either (1) the Eighth Amendment with respect to

convicted prisoners or (2) the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth

and Fourteenth Amendments with respect to pretrial detainees in

federal custody and state custody, respectively, to “ensure that

inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical

care, and ‘[to] take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety

of the inmates.’” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832-33 (1994)

(citations omitted); see Darnell v. Piniero, 849 F.3d 17, 29 (2d

Cir. 2017) (finding that rights of pretrial detainees are

considered under the Fourteenth Amendment while rights of

sentenced prisoners are considered under the Eighth Amendment).

Here, Plaintiff simply names the MDC Warden in the

caption but fails to make any factual allegations against the

Warden. Plaintiff does not plead any facts to demonstrate that

the Warden was personally involved with or had any knowledge of

any alleged constitutional deprivation. See Thomas v. Dubois, No.

19-cv-7533 (KMK), 2020 WL 2092426, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2020)

(dismissing complaint of a pro se incarcerated plaintiff because

the plaintiff did “not even mention [the defendant] in the body of

the Complaint” (collecting cases)); see also Moore v. Westchester

Cnty., No. 18-cv-7782 (KMK), 2019 WL 3889859, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.

19, 2019) (explaining that “personal involvement is not

established where the defendant's name appears only in the caption

of the complaint” (citation omitted)); Mercedes v. Westchester

Cnty., No. 18-cv-4087 (KMK), 2019 WL 1429566, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.

29, 2019) (dismissing defendants who were not alleged to have

participated in, inter alia, any alleged constitutional violations

regarding medical care (collecting cases)); Lovick v. Schriro, No.

12-cv-7419 (ALC), 2014 WL 3778184, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2014)

(dismissing the plaintiff's § 1983 claims against certain

defendants whose names appeared only in the caption of the

complaint and on the list of all defendants).

II. Federal Tort Claims Act

In light of Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court has

considered whether his claims could be brought under the Federal

Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2671 et seq. The FTCA

“constitutes a limited waiver of sovereign immunity by the United

States and allows for a tort suit against the United States under

specified circumstances.” Liranzo v. United States, 690 F.3d 78,

85 (2d Cir. 2012). The only proper defendant for an FTCA claim

is the United States of America. See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1)

(“[where] the defendant employee was acting within the scope of

his office or employment at the time of the incident out of which

the claim arose, any civil action or proceeding commenced upon

such claim in a United States district court shall be deemed an

action against the United States . . . and the United States shall

be substituted as the party defendant”); see also Irizarry, 2021

WL 3668045, at *2.

An FTCA claimant must exhaust his administrative

remedies before filing suit in federal court by: (1) filing an

administrative claim for money damages with the appropriate

federal government entity and (2) receiving a final written

determination from that agency. See 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a); see also

Phillips v. Generations Family Health Ctr., 723 F.3d 144, 147 (2d

Cir. 2013). FTCA claims must be “presented in writing to the

appropriate Federal agency within two years after such claim

accrues,” and an FTCA action must be commenced within six months

of when the agency issues its final denial of administrative

remedy. Roberson v. Greater Hudson Valley Family Health Ctr.,

Inc., No. 17-cv-7325 (NSR), 2018 WL 2976024, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June

12, 2018); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b).

Nothing in the Complaint suggests that Plaintiff has

either filed an administrative tort claim for money damages with

the BOP or received a final written determination from the BOP.

Therefore, to the extent that a liberal reading of the Complaint

suggests a tort claim, the Court dismisses any potential FTCA claim

without prejudice to Plaintiff filing an amended complaint

demonstrating that he has appropriately timely and exhausted his

administrative remedies, or to file a new timely action asserting

an FTCA claim against the United States after he has timely

exhausted his administrative remedies.

CONCLUSION

In light of Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court grants

Plaintiff 30 days from the date of this Memorandum and Order to

file an amended complaint alleging additional facts in support of

his claims. See Cruz v. Gomez, 202 F.3d 593, 597-98 (2d Cir.

2000). Should Plaintiff elect to file an amended complaint, he

is informed that the amended complaint must comply with Rule 8(a)

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and must plead “enough

facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

If Plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint

alleging Bivens claims, he must clearly name as defendant(s) those

individuals who were allegedly involved in the deprivation of his

federal rights in the caption of the complaint and in the statement

of claims. See, e.g., Flemming v. Velardi, No. 02 CIV.4113 (AKH),

2003 WL 21756108, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2003). If Plaintiff

does not know the name of an individual defendant, he may refer to

that individual as “John Doe” or “Jane Doe” in both the caption

and the body of the amended complaint, and must describe the

physical characteristics of the individuals. See Boyd v.

LaGuardia Airport, No. 21-cv-5000 (KAM), 2022 WL 4357466, at *4

(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2022).

Further, Plaintiff must provide a short and plain

statement of the relevant facts, in accordance with FRCP Rule 8(a),

that support each claim against each defendant. That information

must include: a) the names and titles of all relevant people; b)

a description of all relevant events, including what each defendant

did or failed to do, the approximate date and time of each event,

and the general location where each event occurred; c) a

description of the injuries Plaintiff suffered; and d) the relief

Plaintiff seeks, such as money damages, injunctive relief, or

declaratory relief. Any claims pursuant to the Federal Tort

Claims Act must allege facts showing timely compliance with

administrative prerequisites.

Finally, Plaintiff is informed that an amended complaint

does not simply add to the first complaint but instead completely

replaces the original complaint. Therefore, Plaintiff must

include in the amended complaint all the necessary and relevant

information contained in the original complaint, plus the

additional facts that are lacking, as discussed in this Order.

The amended complaint shall be captioned “Amended Complaint” and

bear the same docket number as the original complaint and this

Order, No. 22-cv-01011-KAM-CLP. If Plaintiff fails to file an

amended complaint within the time allowed (30 days from the date

of this Order) or to show good cause why he cannot comply, judgment

shall enter dismissing the action with prejudice, and the case

will be closed.

The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (3)

that any appeal from this Order would not be taken in good faith,

and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose

of an appeal. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45

(1962). The Court respectfully requests the Clerk of Court to

service Plaintiff with a copy of this Order and the docket, and

to note service by end of day, Tuesday, July 11, 2023.

SO ORDERED. bop

“Vy ee

KIYO A. MATSUMOTO”

United States District Judge

Eastern District of New York

Dated: July 10, 2023

Brooklyn, New York

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