Squire v. Brooks

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

------------------------------------X

KASHON K. SQUIRE,

Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

-against- 23-CV-2401(JS)(ST)

(“Squire I”)

SUFFOLK 1ST PRESENT [SIC] POLICE,

DULE LATIFE,

Defendants.

------------------------------------X

KASHON K. SQUIRE,

Plaintiff,

-against- 23-CV-2402(JS)(ST)

(“Squire II”)

RAYMOND NEW, MATHEW CORR,

Defendants.

------------------------------------X

KASHON K. SQUIRE,

Plaintiff,

-against- 23-CV-2491(JS)(ST)

(“Squire III”)

SHAQUAISUR BROOKS, SUFFOLK POLICE 1ST

PRESENT [SIC], PATHWAYS TO REABILATIONS

[SIC], SUFFOLK COUNTY, NEW YORK STATE,

Defendants.

------------------------------------X

APPEARANCES

For Plaintiff: Kashon K. Squire, pro se

23-B-0588

Mid-State Correctional Facility

P.O. Box 2500

Marcy, New York 13403

For Defendants: No appearances.

SEYBERT, District Judge:

Presently before the Court are the applications to

proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) filed by incarcerated pro se

plaintiff Kashon K. Squire (“Plaintiff”) in the above-captioned

cases. (IFP Apps., ECF No. 2, in each case.) For the reasons

that follow, Plaintiff’s IFP applications are GRANTED; however,

each Complaint is DISMISSED for failure to allege a plausible claim

for relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b).

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is no stranger to this Court. Prior to filing

the present three Complaints, Plaintiff had six previous in forma

pauperis complaints dismissed by this Court for failure to

prosecute.1 Each of the present Complaints is sparse and is

1 See:

(a) Squire v. Brooks, et al., No. 20-CV-3641(JS)(ST), Order

(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 2020) (dismissed case without prejudice

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b));

(b) Squire v. Brooks, et al., No. 20-CV-4122(JS)(ST), Order

(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2020) (dismissed case without prejudice

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b));

(c) Squire v. 1st Present [sic] Police, et al., No. 20-CV-

4300(JS)(ST), Order (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2020) (dismissed

case without prejudice pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b));

(d) Squire v. Suffolk County, et al., No. 20-CV-4659(JS)(ST),

Memo & Order (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 2020) (dismissed case

without prejudice pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b));

(e) Squire v. State of NY, et al., No. 22-CV-5756(JS)(ST),

Elec. Order (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2022) (dismissed case

without prejudice pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b)); and

(f) Squire v. Suffolk County, et al., No. 22-CV-7299(JS)(ST),

Elec. Order (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2023) (dismissed case without

prejudice pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b)), appeal

dismissed, No. 23-0198 (2d Cir. Mar. 23, 2023) (see ECF

submitted on the Court’s form complaint for civil rights actions

under Section 1983.2

I. Complaint under Docket No. 23-CV-2401 (“Squire I”)

This Complaint names the “Suffolk 1st Present Police”,

which the Court understands to be the Suffolk County Police

Department’s First Precinct (“First Precinct”), and Dule Latife

(“Latife”). In its entirety, Plaintiff alleges that, in 2013, his

home was shot 18 time then about a week later

I was shot and told to die by the responding

officers as well they told that they would not

call medic and interfered with medical care

for my injuries. I went to police in 2018

because I neve new the person name who shot me

found out his name and they said they are not

going to arrest him.

(Squire I Compl., ECF No. 1, at ¶ II.) In the space that calls

for any injuries suffered, Plaintiff wrote: “shot and the bullets

hit my lungs and it almost collapse and I have a bullet in my leg

and a cut down my chest.” (Id., ¶ II.A.) For relief, Plaintiff

“would like the police that responded fired and my medical bills

paid and $150,000 for damages to my body and pain and suffering.

I’m trying to sue for failr to protect and failr to prosecute.”

(Id., ¶ III.)

No. 14 in E.D.N.Y. Case Docket).

2 Excerpts from the Complaints are reproduced here exactly as they

appear in the original. Errors in spelling, punctuation, and

grammar have not been corrected or noted.

II. Complaint under Docket No. 23-CV-2402 (“Squire II”)

This Complaint names as defendants Raymond New (“New”),

who is identified as a staff member of the shelter located at 129

Clinton Avenue in Bay Shore, New York, and Police Officer Mathew

Corr (“Officer Corr”); in said Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that,

on August 18, 2022, he:

was sleep in my bed on 8-18-22 at 8:39 AM when

Raymond New came into my room wakeing me up to

talk to me about calling police. He harassed

me out of my sleep and I got up and closed my

door and he clamed his hand got closed in the

door but it didn’t he called police and they

tried to look me up but I felt I did nothing

wrong due to the fact that he unlocked my door

without knocking it was early and I was

statled out of my sleep. Im being held and

keep getting set up on charges. I’m being

harassed there violating my 8th Amendment.

When I get free ther starting something else

to lock me up.

(Squire II Compl., ECF No. 1, at ¶ II.) Where prompted for

a description of any injuries suffered, or medical treatment

required, Plaintiff left the space blank. (Id., ¶ II.A.)

The relief sought by Plaintiff via this Complaint is his

release from custody and to “have charges droped.” (Id., ¶

III.)

III. Complaint under Docket No. 23-CV-2491

(“Squire III”)

Like Plaintiff’s Squire I Complaint, this Complaint

names the First Precinct, as well as adds Shaquaisur Brooks

(“Brooks”), “Pathways to Reabilitations” (“Pathways”), Suffolk

County, and New York State as defendants. In its entirety,

Plaintiff alleges that, “sometime in 2018” at 96 Ohio in Medford,

New York:

I Kashon Squire was living at 96 Ohio Medford

Root 112 the people there had problems with my

spouse then there where people cross the

street taking pitchers of our home. My truck

happened to get tampered with and takein by

the state police. My spouse comes to me and

tell me the people at the shelter tell her to

set me up on charges they start a fight and I

felt the mother was in on it me and the mother

have been waring for coustody of my kids dss

shelter starts a fight to justify the other on

coustody then when that don’t work they move

in my home and start a fight. I also feel

that they tried to start a fight with Linda

hope then justify a order of protect then my

spouse leaving me to believe she has something

to do with me getting shot.

(Squire III Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶ II.) Although Plaintiff does not

allege any injuries (id. ¶ II.A), for relief, he requests that

someone “pay for my truck being tampered with, full coustody of my

kids and payed for time in jail and payed for and pay for negligence

from dss A hate crime pay for me being shot.” (Id. ¶ III.)

DISCUSSION

I. Plaintiff’s In Forma Pauperis Applications are Granted

The Court finds that Plaintiff is qualified by his

financial status to commence these three actions without

prepayment of the filing fees. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1).

Therefore, Plaintiff’s IFP applications in Squire I, Squire II,

and Squire III are GRANTED.

II. Legal Standards

A. Consideration of the Complaint

Under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915, 1915A

Section 1915 requires a district court to dismiss an in

forma pauperis complaint if the action is frivolous or malicious,

fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks

monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.

See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii), 1915A(b). An action is

frivolous as a matter of law when, inter alia, it is based on an

“indisputably meritless legal theory” or when it “lacks an arguable

basis in law . . . or [when] a dispositive defense clearly exists

on the face of the complaint.” Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage

Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court is required to

dismiss the action as soon as it makes such a determination. See

28 U.S.C. § 1915A; Avant v. Miranda, No. 21-CV-0974, 2021 WL

1979077, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. May 18, 2021).

Courts are obliged to construe the pleadings of a pro se

plaintiff liberally and to interpret them to raise the “strongest

[claims] that they suggest.” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons,

470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (cleaned up); Harris v. Mills,

572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009). However, the complaint must plead

sufficient facts to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on

its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citations omitted). The

plausibility standard requires “more than a sheer possibility that

a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. While “detailed factual

allegations” are not required, “[a] pleading that offers ‘labels

and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a

cause of action will not do.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at

557). Further, a pleading that only “tenders naked assertion[s]

devoid of further factual enhancement” will not suffice. Id. at

678 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Consequently, a court may dismiss a complaint that is “so confused,

ambiguous, vague or otherwise unintelligible that its true

substance, if any, is well disguised.” Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861

F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988); Tawfik v. Georgatos, No. 20-CV-5832,

2021 WL 2953227, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. July 14, 2021) (Seybert, J.).

B. Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) provides that a

pleading must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P.

8(a)(2); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002).

“Each allegation must be simple, concise, and direct.” FED. R.

CIV. P. 8(d)(1). However, the short and plain statement must be

“sufficient to give the defendants fair notice of what the

plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Jones

v. Nat’l Commc’ns & Surveillance Networks, 266 F. App’x 31, 32 (2d

Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Indeed, pleadings must give “‘fair notice of what the

plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests’” in order

to enable the opposing party to answer and prepare for trial, and

to identify the nature of the case. Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo,

544 U.S. 336, 346 (2005) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 335 U.S. 41,

47 (1957)), overruled in part on other grounds by Twombly, 550

U.S. at 544, 557 (a pleading that offers “labels and conclusion”

or “naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement”

does not satisfy Rule 8).

C. Section 1983

Section 1983 provides that:

Every person who, under color of any statute,

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of

any State . . . subjects, or causes to be

subjected, any citizen of the United

States . . . to the deprivation of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the

party injured . . . .

42 U.S.C. § 1983.

To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must

“allege that (1) the challenged conduct was attributable at least

in part to a person who was acting under color of state law and

(2) the conduct deprived the plaintiff of a right guaranteed under

the Constitution of the United States.” Rodriguez v. Shoprite

Supermarket, No. 19-CV-6565, 2020 WL 1875291, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Apr.

15, 2020) (Seybert, J.) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). Pursuant to New York Law, Section 1983 claims are

governed by a three-year statute of limitations. See Wheeler v.

Slanovec, No. 16-CV-9065, 2019 WL 2994193, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 9,

2019) (instructing that federal claims pursuant to Section 1983

are governed by the applicable state’s statute of limitations for

personal injury torts and that “federal courts in New York apply

a three-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions to

[Section] 1983 claims” (citations omitted)).

III. Application of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915, 1915A

Applying these standards to Plaintiff’s Complaints, even

with the special solicitude afforded to pro se pleadings, it is

readily apparent that Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims are not

plausible for the reasons that follow.

A. State Action

As noted above, to state a plausible Section 1983 claim,

a plaintiff must allege that the challenged conduct was committed

by a person acting under color of state law. Thus, private parties

are generally not liable under Section 1983 because such liability

may only be imposed upon wrongdoers “who carry a badge of authority

of a State and represent it in some capacity, whether they act in

accordance with their authority or misuse it.” Nat’l Collegiate

Athletic Ass’n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191 (1988) (citation

omitted).

To the extent that Plaintiff seeks to impose Section

1983 liability upon Latife, New, Brooks, and Pathways, they are

not alleged to be state actors; even affording the pro se

Complaints a liberal construction, there are no facts upon which

the Court can rely to reasonably conclude that these defendants

are anything other than purely private parties. Accordingly,

Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against Latife, New, Brooks, and

Pathways fail3 and are, therefore, DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii), 1915A(b)(1).4

B. Claims Against the First Precinct

“‘[U]nder New York law, departments that are merely

administrative arms of a municipality do not have a legal identity

3 Although liability may be imposed under Section 1983 upon private

individuals who are not state actors pursuant to a conspiracy or

joint-actor theory, see Ciambriello v. County of Nassau, 292 F.3d

307, 324-25 (2d Cir. 2002) (“a private actor acts under color of

state law when the private actor is a willful participant in joint

activity with the State or its agents” (internal quotation marks

and citations omitted)), these exceptions are inapplicable given

the factual allegations set forth in the Complaints.

4 Further, it appears that Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims in

Squire I and Squire III are well outside the three-year statute of

limitations given that the challenged conduct is alleged to have

occurred in 2013 and 2018, respectively. Plaintiff’s Squire I

Complaint was filed on March 27, 2023, and his Squire III Complaint

was filed on March 30, 2023. However, the Court need not reach

this issue given the substantive defects in his claims warranting

dismissal.

separate and apart from the municipality and therefore, cannot sue

or be sued.’” DeSouza v. 1st Precinct, No. 12-CV-0821, 2012 WL

956186, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2012) (Seybert, J.) (quoting Davis

v. Lynbrook Police Dep’t, 224 F.Supp.2d 463, 477 (E.D.N.Y. 2002)

(dismissing claim against Lynbrook Police Department)); citing

Carthew v. County of Suffolk, 709 F. Supp. 2d 188, 194 (E.D.N.Y.

2010) (holding Suffolk County police department is an

administrative arm of the County and, thus, lacks the capacity to

be sued)); Barreto v. Suffolk County, No. 10–CV-0028, 2010 WL

301949, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2010) (Seybert, J.) (holding local

police departments, such as the Suffolk County police department,

are administrative arms of the County without the capacity to sue

or be sued).

Here, the 1st Precinct is an arm of the municipality,

Suffolk County, and thus lacks the capacity to be sued. Therefore,

Plaintiff’s claims against the 1st Precinct are not plausible and

are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§

1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii), 1915A(b)(1).

C. Claims Against Suffolk County

It is well-established that a municipality, like the

County, cannot be held liable under Section 1983 on a respondeat

superior theory. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y. City,

436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); Agosto v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 982

F.3d 86, 98 (2d Cir. 2020) (“Monell expressly prohibits respondeat

superior liability for municipalities” (citations omitted)).

Rather, to state a claim against a municipality under Section 1983,

“‘the plaintiff is required to show that the challenged acts were

performed pursuant to a municipal policy or custom.’” Tafolla v.

County of Suffolk, No. 17-CV-4897, 2021 WL 3675042, at *10

(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2021) (Seybert, J.) (quoting Littlejohn v. City

of N.Y., 795 F.3d 297, 314 (2d Cir. 2015)). To establish the

existence of a municipal policy or custom, the plaintiff must

allege:

(1) the existence of a formal policy which is

officially endorsed by the municipality; (2)

actions taken or decisions made by municipal

policymaking officials, i.e., officials with

final decisionmaking authority, which caused

the alleged violation of the plaintiff’s civil

rights; (3) a practice so persistent and

widespread as to practically have the force of

law or that was so manifest as to imply the

constructive acquiescence of senior policy-

making officials; or (4) that a policymaking

official exhibited deliberate indifference to

constitutional deprivations caused by

subordinates.

Avant v. Miranda, No. 21-CV-0974, 2021 WL 1979077, at *3 (E.D.N.Y.

May 18, 2021) (Seybert, J.) (cleaned up).

Here, when liberally construing the Squire III

Complaint, there are no factual allegations that a municipal policy

or custom existed which caused the alleged constitutional

deprivations of which Plaintiff complains. (See Squire III Compl.

in toto.) Similarly, there are no allegations from which the Court

can reasonably construe a plausible Section 1983 claim against

Suffolk County. Thus, Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against

Suffolk County are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to 28

U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b) and 1915A(b). Further, Plaintiff is

GRANTED leave to file an Amended Complaint to address the pleading

deficiencies identified herein regarding his claims against

Suffolk County.

D. Claims Against New York State

“Under the Eleventh Amendment, a state and its agencies

are generally immune from suit in federal court.” Williams v.

N.Y.S. Off. of Mental Health, No. 10-CV-1022, 2014 WL 1311405, at

*5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2014). Neither of the two exceptions to

this rule, i.e., “an explicit and unequivocal waiver of immunity

by a state or a similarly clear abrogation of the immunity by

Congress,” id., apply here. First, “Section 1983 does not abrogate

the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the States.” Id. Second, New

York has not waived its immunity from suit. See Harrison v. New

York, 95 F. Supp. 3d 293, 314 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (“It is well

established that New York State has not waived its sovereign

immunity from Section 1983 claims.” (internal quotation marks, and

citation omitted)). Therefore, the State is entitled to Eleventh

Amendment immunity from Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims. See,

e.g., KM Enters., Inc. v. McDonald, 518 F. App’x 12, 13 (2d Cir.

Apr. 30, 2013) (“As a general matter, states enjoy sovereign

immunity from suit in federal court, even if the claim arises under

federal law.” (citing U.S. Const. amend. XI)).

Moreover, New York State is not a “person” within in the

meaning of Section 1983. See Carter v. New York, 316 F. Supp. 3d

660, 667 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (“[U]nder Section 1983, states are not

even considered “persons” subject to liability.” (citing Will v.

Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70 (1989) (“We hold

that neither a State nor its officials acting in their official

capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.”)). Accordingly,

Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against New York State are not

plausible and are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b).

E. Claims Against Officer Corr

To state a claim for relief under Section 1983 against

an individual defendant, a plaintiff must allege the personal

involvement of the defendant in the alleged constitutional

deprivation. See Farid v. Elle, 593 F.3d 233, 249 (2d Cir. 2010).

In Iqbal, the Supreme Court held that “[b]ecause vicarious

liability is inapplicable to . . . [Section] 1983 suits, a

plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant,

through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the

Constitution.” 556 U.S. at 676. A complaint based upon a

violation under Section 1983 that does not allege the personal

involvement of a defendant fails as a matter of law and should be

dismissed. See Johnson v. Barney, 360 F. App’x 199, 201 (2d Cir.

2010).

Here, although Plaintiff names Officer Corr in the

caption and in the “Defendants” section of the Squire II Complaint,

there are no factual allegations against him. Indeed, even upon

a liberal construction, there are no facts from which the Court

can reasonably construe conduct or inaction attributable to

Officer Corr. (See Squire II Compl., in toto.) Further, given

that the relief sought by Plaintiff, i.e., his release from custody

and having the charges against him dropped, is relief which Officer

Corr cannot provide, Plaintiff’s claims against Officer Corr must

be dismissed.5 See, e.g., Moultrie v. Wright, No. 21-CV-3925, 2021

WL 3372031, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2021) (dismissing Section 1983

claims against police officers “because Plaintiff does not allege

any facts showing that anything that [they] personally did or

failed to do violated Plaintiff’s rights”). Accordingly,

Plaintiff’s claims against Officer Corr are DISMISSED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) (b)(ii); 1915A(b).

Further, Plaintiff is GRANTED leave to file an Amended Complaint

to address the pleading deficiencies identified herein regarding

5 To the extent Plaintiff seeks to be released from custody and

have the charges against him dropped, the Court is without

authority to grant such relief in a Section 1983 civil action.

The exclusive avenue to challenge the fact or duration of

Plaintiff’s custody is via a properly exhausted petition seeking

a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

his claims against Officer Corr.

IV. State Law Claims

Given the dismissal of Plaintiff’s federal claims, the

Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any

state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (“The district courts

may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a

claim . . . if . . . the district court has dismissed all claims

over which it has original jurisdiction . . . .”); Carnegie-Mellon

Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988) (“[I]n the usual

case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial,

the balance of factors to be considered under the pendent

jurisdiction doctrine -- judicial economy, convenience, fairness,

and comity -- will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction

over the remaining state-law claims.”). Plaintiff may pursue any

valid state law claims that may be construed from these Complaints

in state court.

V. Leave to Amend

Given the Second Circuit’s guidance that a pro se

complaint should not be dismissed without leave to amend unless

amendment would be futile, see Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99,

112 (2d Cir. 2000), the Court has carefully considered whether

leave to amend is warranted. Given that the defects in Plaintiff’s

claims against Latife, New, Brooks, Pathways, the First Precinct,

and New York State are substantive and could not be cured with

better pleading, leave to amend these claims is DENIED. Further,

to the extent that Plaintiff seeks to be released from custody and

to have the charges against him dropped, the Court is without

authority to grant such relief in a civil action brought pursuant

to Section 1983. As noted, the exclusive avenue to challenge the

fact or duration of Plaintiff’s custody is via a properly exhausted

petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2254. Thus, leave to amend the Complaints to seek such relief is

DENIED.

However, regarding his claims against Officer Corr and

against Suffolk County, Plaintiff is GRANTED leave to file Amended

Complaints in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

and the guidance set forth herein within 30 days from the date of

this order. Any Amended Complaint shall be clearly labeled

“Amended Complaint” and shall bear the same Docket Number as the

originally filed Complaint. Further, because an Amended Complaint

will completely replace the originally filed Complaint, it must

include all factual allegations and claims that Plaintiff seeks to

pursue in that case. For clarity: If Plaintiff seeks to amend

his claims against Officer Corr, he must file an Amended Complaint

in Squire II, Case No. 22-CV-2402, which will completely replace

his original Squire II Complaint; and, if Plaintiff seeks to amend

his claims against Suffolk County, he must file an Amended

Complaint in Squire III, Case No. 22-CV-2491, which will completely

replace his original Squire III Complaint.

PLAINTIFF IS WARNED that if he does not file any Amended

Complaints within 30 days from the date of this Order, judgment

will enter and those cases will be closed without further notice.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that

Plaintiff’s IFP applications in Squire I, Squire II, and Squire

III (ECF No. 2 in each case) are GRANTED; and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Section 1983

claims against Latife, New, Brooks, Pathways, the First Precinct,

and New York State are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to 28

U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A for failure to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted and as frivolous;6 and Plaintiff’s

Section 1983 claims against Officer Corr and Suffolk County are

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A for failure to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted and as frivolous; and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, as a result, the Squire I Case,

No. 22-CV-2401, is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, and Judgment shall

enter accordingly; and

6 An action is deemed frivolous as a matter of law when, inter

alia, it “lacks an arguable basis in law. . . .” Livingston, 141

F.3d at 437. Here, for the reasons set forth above, the Squire I,

Squire II, and Squire III Complaints lack an arguable basis in

law; thus, they are frivolous.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff is GRANTED LEAVE TO

FILE AMENDED COMPLAINTS in Squire II and Squire III only and in

accordance with the guidance set forth above, within 30 days from

the date of this Order. Any Amended Complaint shall be clearly

labeled “Amended Complaint” and shall bear the same case number as

the originally filed Complaint, i.e., Squire II, No. 23-CV-

2402(JS)(ST), and/or Squire III, No. 23-CV-2491(JS)(ST).

Plaintiff is WARNED: If an Amended Complaint is not filed within

30 days from the date of this Order, judgment will enter and the

Squire II and/or Squire III cases will be closed; and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a)(3), any appeal from this Order would not be taken in

good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is DENIED for

the purpose of any appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369

U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962); and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall

mail a copy of this Memorandum & Order to the pro se Plaintiff and

include the notation “Legal Mail” on the envelope.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ JOANNA SEYBERT

Joanna Seybert, U.S.D.J.

Dated: July 5, 2023

Central Islip, New York