Belvin v. Electchester Management, LLC

U.S. District Court E.D.N.Y.

5/22/2023

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT BROOKLYN OFFICE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

MICHAEL BELVIN and MICHAEL MAYERS,

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

Plaintiffs, 17-CV-6303 (NGG) (MMH)

-against-

ELECTCHESTER MANAGEMENT, LLC,

Defendant(s).

NICHOLAS G. GARAUFIS, United States District Judge.

Pending before the court is Defendant Electchester Management,

LLC’s (“Electchester”) motion for judgment as a matter of law

and motion for a new trial (Mot. for New Trial (the “Mot.”) (Dkt.

116)). For the reasons that follow, Electchester’s motion for judg-

ment as a matter of law is DENIED and Electchester’s motion for

a new trial is GRANTED IN PART, unless Plaintiff Michael Belvin

agrees to a remittitur as described below.

BACKGROUND

Belvin and fellow Plaintiff Michael Mayers brought this suit on

October 29, 2017, alleging various violations of federal, state,

and city employment law. (See generally Compl. (Dkt. 1).) Fol-

lowing discovery, Electchester moved for summary judgment,

which was granted in part and denied in part. (See Dec. 10, 2020

M&O (Dkt. 52).) Specifically, the court held that the Plaintiffs

had adduced sufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror

could conclude that Electchester was liable on each of Belvin and

Mayers’s hostile work environment claims and racial discrimina-

tion claims premised on a hostile work environment. (Id. at 16,

19, 26, 30-31.) Similarly, sufficient evidence supported Belvin’s

claim for retaliation, (id. at 33), and Mayers’s claim for disability

discrimination. (Id. at 41, 43.) The Plaintiffs’ remaining claims

were dismissed. (Id. at 47.)

Jury selection commenced on November 2, 2022, and opening

statements were made on November 7, 2022. (Nov. 2, 2022 Mi-

nute Entry; Nov. 7, 2022 Minute Entry (Dkt. 106).) Over the

course of three days of testimony, the Plaintiffs called four wit-

nesses, including both Belvin and Mayers; Electchester called five

defense witnesses. (See Nov. 7, 2022 Minute Entry; Nov. 8, 2022

Minute Entry (Dkt. 108); Nov. 9, 2022 Minute Entry (Dkt. 109).)

Electchester moved for a directed verdict after the close of the

Plaintiffs’ case, and again after Electchester completed its defense

presentation of evidence. (Nov. 8, 2022 Minute Entry; Nov. 10,

2022 Minute Entry (Dkt. 110).) Both were denied. (Nov. 8, 2022

Minute Entry; Nov. 10, 2022 Minute Entry.)

After deliberating, the jury completed a “Final Jury Verdict

Form,” (Dkt. 112), and submitted a verdict in favor of the Plain-

tiffs. (Nov. 10, 2022 Minute Entry.) The jury found Electchester

liable on Belvin’s federal and state claims for a hostile work envi-

ronment, and awarded $0 in actual damages, $25,000 in

compensatory damages, and $500,000 in punitive damages; they

also found Electchester liable on Belvin’s New York City Human

Rights Law (“NYCHRL”) claim for hostile work environment, and

awarded an additional $25,000. (Final Jury Verdict Form at 3,

13.) The jury also found Electchester liable for retaliation against

Belvin, and awarded $50,000 in damages for the federal and

state claims, and $25,000 for the NYCHRL claim. (Id. at 15-16.)

The jury finally found Electchester liable for Mayers’s claim for

federal and state disability discrimination, and awarded

$100,000 for his termination and $1,000 for his denial of bonus,

as well as $25,000 for the NYCHRL claim for disability discrimi-

nation. (Id. at 17-19.) The jury found Electchester not liable on

the remaining claims—both Plaintiffs’ claims for racial discrimi-

nation, Mayers’s claims for hostile work environment, and

Mayer’s NYCHRL claim (Id. at 3-4, 6, 9, 13.)

This motion followed.

LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50, “[i]f a party has been

fully heard on an issue during a jury trial and the court finds that

a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary

basis to find for the party on that issue, the court may... grant a

motion for judgment as a matter of law against the party[.]” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1). Such a motion may be made at any time be-

fore the case is submitted to the jury, id. at 50(a)(2), and if not

granted, may be renewed within 28 days of the entry of judgment

or discharge of the jury. Id. at 50(b). Such a renewed motion

“may include an alternative or joint request for a new trial under

Rule 59,” and the court may allow all judgment on the jury ver-

dict, order a new trial, or direct the entry of judgment as a matter

of law. Id.

“A movant’s burden in securing Rule 50 relief is particularly

heavy after the jury has deliberated in the case and actually re-

turned its verdict.” Cross v. New York City Transit Auth., 417 F.3d

241, 248 (2d Cir. 2005).1 Such a motion may only be granted “if

there exists such a complete absence of evidence supporting the

verdict that the jury’s findings could only have been the result of

sheer surmise and conjecture, or the evidence in favor of the mo-

vant is so overwhelming that reasonable and fair minded persons

could not arrive at a verdict against it.” Kinneary v. City of New

York, 601 F.3d 151, 155 (2d Cir. 2010). “In reviewing a Rule 50

motion, a court may consider all the record evidence, but in do-

ing so it must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the

nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility determinations

or weigh the evidence.” Cross, 417 F.3d at 247. In other words,

the court “must give deference to all credibility determinations

1 When quoting cases, and unless otherwise noted, all citations and quota-

tion marks are omitted, and all alterations are adopted.

and reasonable inferences of the jury[.]” Caruolo v. John Crane,

Inc., 226 F.3d 46, 51 (2d Cir. 2000).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 allows for the court to “grant

a new trial on all or some of the issues.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1).

This decision is committed “to the sound discretion of the trial

judge.” Jennings v. Yurkiw, No. 14-CV-6377 (SMG), 2018 WL

5630454, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2018). The standard for grant-

ing a new trial is “less stringent than Rule 50,” as the court may

independently weigh the evidence “even if there is substantial

evidence supporting the jury’s verdict.” Finkel v. Zizza & Assocs.

Corp., No. 14-CV-4108 (JS) (ARL), 2022 WL 970670, at *4

(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2022). Nonetheless, “jury verdicts should be

disturbed with great infrequency,” ING Glob. v. United Parcel Serv.

Oasis Supply Corp., 757 F.3d 92, 99 (2d Cir. 2014), and “[a] mo-

tion for a new trial ordinarily should not be granted unless the

trial court is convinced that the jury has reached a seriously erro-

neous result or that the verdict is a miscarriage of justice.”

Medforms, Inc. v. Healthcare Mgmt. Sols., Inc., 290 F.3d 98, 106

(2d Cir. 2002).

DISCUSSION

A. Inconsistent Jury Verdict

Electchester argues that a new trial is warranted under Rule 59

because the jury’s conclusions were “fundamentally incon-

sistent.” (Mot. at 11.) Following summary judgment, Belvin’s

only remaining claim for race discrimination was premised on

the presence of a hostile work environment at Electchester. (See

Dec. 10, 2020 M&O.) The court thus instructed the jury that,

“[t]o prove . . . that they were subjected to a hostile work envi-

ronment, Mr. Belvin or Mr. Mayers must prove the elements that

also constitute their claims for hostile work environment.” (Final

Jury Charge (Dkt. 102) at 9.) After full deliberations, the jury

noted on the “Final Jury Verdict Form” that Belvin had proven

his hostile work environment claim, but failed to prove the hos-

tile work environment element for his race discrimination claim.

(Final Jury Verdict Form at 3-4.)

This motion implicates the difference between a special verdict

and a general verdict with written responses, addressed in Fed-

eral Rules of Civil Procedure 49(a) and (b) respectively. See Fed.

R. Civ. P. 49. A special verdict under Rule 49(a) asks “the jury

[to] answer[] primarily factual questions for the benefit of the

trial court which then applies the law to those answers;” that is,

the jury is not asked the question of ultimate liability. Lavoie v.

Pac. Press & Shear Co., a Div. of Canron Corp., 975 F.2d 48, 53

(2d Cir. 1992). By contrast, a general verdict with written re-

sponses issued pursuant to Rule 49(b) asks the jury to answer

interrogatories and address liability on each legal theory, and

leaves the trial court to enter judgment based on the jury’s re-

sponses. Id.

Rule 49(a) does not specify what occurs when the answers to a

special jury verdict are inconsistent, but the Second Circuit has

stated that “ineluctably inconsistent” answers warrant a new

trial, Tolbert v. Queens Coll., 242 F.3d 58, 74 (2d Cir. 2001) (cit-

ing Brooks v. Brattleboro Mem’l Hosp., 958 F.2d 525, 529 (2d Cir.

1992); Auwood v. Harry Brandt Booking Office, Inc., 850 F.2d

884, 891 (2d Cir. 1998)), unless “there is a view of the case that

makes the jury’s answers consistent.” Id. (citing Atl. & Gulf Steve-

dores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines, Ltd., 369 U.S. 355, 364 (1962)). By

contrast, Rule 49(b), in discussing general verdicts with written

responses, specifically states that “[w]hen the answers are incon-

sistent with each other and one or more is also inconsistent with

the general verdict, judgment must not be entered; instead, the

court must direct the jury to further consider its answers and ver-

dict, or must order a new trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 49(b)(4).2

This case involved a general verdict under Rule 49(b): the verdict

form asked the jury “yes” or “no” questions of fact which, if an-

swered pursuant to the directions on the form, would inform the

jury’s general verdict on liability and prompt the jury to provide

a recommended amount of damages. As the text of the rule

makes clear, “Rule 49(b) speaks to the procedure to be followed

when a general verdict is inconsistent with the special interroga-

tories; it does not expressly enact a procedure for reconciling

inconsistencies among verdicts.” U.S. Football League v. Nat’l

Football League, 644 F. Supp. 1040, 1046 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); see

also Jarvis v. Ford Motor Co., 283 F.3d 33, 56 (2d Cir. 2002)

(“Rule 49(b) is inapplicable here because the alleged incon-

sistency was not among responses to interrogatories regarding

‘issues of fact,’ but between two general verdicts based on differ-

ent legal theories.”). In regard to Belvin’s hostile work

environment claim, there is no inconsistency between the special

interrogatories and the general verdict: the jury found that Belvin

had proven each element of the claim, concluded that Electches-

ter was liable, and awarded damages. (Final Jury Verdict Form

at 1-3.) Separately, it also found that Belvin had failed to prove

the adverse employment action element of his race discrimina-

tion claim, and declined to find Electchester liable on that claim.

(Id. at 6.) What Electchester raises here is an inconsistency be-

tween one special interrogatory related to the hostile work

environment claim and another special interrogatory related to a

separate legal theory. This is not addressed by Rule 49(b).

2 Although not relevant for this motion, Rule 49(b)(3) adds that “[w]hen

the answers are consistent with each other but one or more is inconsistent

with the general verdict, the court may” approve the appropriate judgment

according to the answers, direct the jury to further consider its answers

and verdict, or order a new trial.

Even if such an inconsistency were sufficient to warrant relief un-

der Rule 49(b), though, the Second Circuit is clear that a party

waives such an objection if they fail to raise it before the jury is

discharged. Kosmynka v. Polaris Indus., Inc., 462 F.3d 74, 83 (2d

Cir. 2006) (“It is well established that a party waives its objection

to any inconsistency in a jury verdict if it fails to object to the

verdict prior to the excusing of the jury.”); see also Anderson Grp.,

LLC v. City of Saratoga Springs, 805 F.3d 34, 46 (2d Cir. 2015)

(finding waiver of right to contest inconsistencies in a jury verdict

where the moving party failed to object before the court excused

the jury); U.S. Football League, 644 F. Supp. at 1046 n.4

(“[P]laintiffs have waived their right to invoke that rule’s protec-

tion by failing to raise the question of inconsistency before the

jury was discharged.”). “The timely objection requirement is not

merely a technicality—it serves to give the court and the oppos-

ing party the opportunity to correct an error in the conduct of the

trial.” Anderson Grp., 805 F.3d at 46. The only exception to

waiver is where the inconsistency constitutes “fundamental er-

ror” that is “so serious and flagrant that it goes to the very

integrity of the trial.” Am. Tech. Ceramics Corp. v. Presidio Com-

ponents, Inc., 490 F. Supp. 3d 593, 624-25 (E.D.N.Y. 2020); see

also Anderson Grp., 805 F.3d at 49. But as discussed above, the

inconsistency was between findings of fact on two different legal

theories, rather than an issue between the factual findings and

the conclusion on liability, so there is no indication the conclu-

sions on liability were incorrect and therefore no “fundamental

error” occurred.3 As Electchester failed to raise the purported in-

consistency while the jury still could have fixed it, this argument

has been waived and this ground for relief is unsuccessful.

3 “[T]he fundamental error standard of review is stringent.” Hurdle v.

Board of Educ. for City of N.Y., No. 01-CV-4703 (HB), 2003 WL 22080721,

at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2003). For instance, in Armstrong ex rel. Armstrong

v. Brookdale Univ. Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 425 F.3d 126, 136 (2d Cir. 2005), the

B. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Electchester raises three separate claims that amount to contest-

ing the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial—that is,

arguments that the evidence was so deficient, no reasonable jury

could have concluded Electchester was liable, or at least that a

significant miscarriage of justice occurred warranting a new trial.

First, Electchester argues that the only evidence presented on Bel-

vin’s hostile work environment claim amounted to “petty slights

or minor annoyances” and therefore was legally insufficient.

(Mot. at 14 (quoting Tepperwien v. Entergy Nuclear Operations,

Inc., 663 F.3d 556, 568 (2d Cir. 2011).) Second, Electchester ar-

gues that no evidence supported the jury’s verdict on Belvin’s

claim for retaliation, because Belvin only provided evidence of

disciplinary actions taken against him for violation of workplace

rules and (after successfully contesting some of the discipline)

was not ultimately punished for any such violations. (Id. at 15-

16.) Further, Electchester argues that they successfully rebutted

the inference of discrimination by pointing to other employees—

who had not engaged in protected activity—who were punished

for some of the same violations as Belvin. (Id. at 16.) Third,

Electchester argues that the evidence could not support the ver-

dict on Mayers’s disability discrimination claim because it

showed no adverse effect from his termination (since he was re-

instated), that Mayers’s termination and denial of bonus were

motivated by non-discriminatory reasons (a clerical error and

neutrally applied workplace policy, respectively), and that no

verdict sheet included an error which treated a defense to recovery as an

element of recovery, such that when the jury answered “no” to the defense,

the verdict sheet instructed them to cease deliberating and return a verdict

of no liability. Because the error in the verdict sheet potentially reversed

the jury’s verdict, the Second Circuit held that “it misinformed the jurors

in a critical way and undermined the integrity of the trial,” found funda-

mental error, and remanded for a new trial. Id. The context before the

court in this case bears no resemblance to that egregious mistake.

employees were treated less well than non-disabled employees.

(Id. at 23-24.) None of these arguments have merit, and the court

declines to disturb the jury verdict.

The legal arguments that Electchester raises were, for the most

part, addressed in the court’s Memorandum and Order denying

Electchester’s motion for summary judgment in relevant part.4

(See generally Dec. 10, 2020 M&O.) For instance, Electchester

similarly argued at summary judgment that Belvin’s evidence of

hostile work environment amounted to trivial annoyances. (Id.

at 16-17.) The court concluded that that evidence—testimony

that he was “on the receiving end of racist language” and “found

toy monkeys or images of monkeys placed in his various work

areas on multiple occasions”—was enough to deny summary

judgment. (Id. at 16-17.) The law is clear that “several factors”

influence whether such evidence amounts to a hostile work en-

vironment, including not just “the frequency of the

discriminatory conduct” but also “its severity” and whether it is

humiliating. (Id. at 15-16 (citing Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128,

148 (2d Cir. 2003).) This same evidence was presented to the

jury, who was instructed on this law, and—according to their

4 In denying the relevant portions of Electchester’s motion for summary

judgment, the court was concluding that sufficient evidence existed to sup-

port a jury verdict in favor of the Plaintiffs. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (“The

court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judg-

ment as a matter of law.”). The same evidence that warranted that

conclusion at summary judgment was presented to the jury, which “ex-

pressly and impliedly resolved [the questions of fact]... contrary to the

defendant’s position.” D.A. Elia Constr. Corp. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., No.

95-CV-190E(H), 1996 WL 484200, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. July 31, 1996). Ac-

cordingly, there is no basis for the court to change its prior conclusions

regarding the legal sufficiency of the Plaintiffs’ evidence. Redmond v. St.

John’s Univ., No. 86-CV_2322, 1989 WL 16069, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 17,

1989) (“[A] motion for summary judgment should be regarded as the

equivalent of a trial motion for a directed verdict[.]”).

verdict—plainly concluded the epithets and incidents were suffi-

ciently severe to overcome the relative lack of frequency.

Accordingly, there is no legal basis for the court to conclude that

“the jury’s findings could only have been the result of sheer sur-

mise and conjecture,” Kinneary, 601 F.3d at 155, such that

judgment is a matter of law is warranted, nor that “the jury has

reached a seriously erroneous result or that the verdict is a mis-

carriage of justice” requiring a new trial. Medforms, 290 F.3d at

106.

Similarly, the court concluded at summary judgment that the se-

ries of disciplinary actions immediately preceding and after

Belvin filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (the “EEOC”) could constitute an adverse effect for

the purposes of retaliation. (See Dec. 10, 2020 M&O at 35.) Fre-

quent, consistent, and rigorous enforcement of minor rule

violations can constitute a change in working conditions, even if

none result in monetary penalties or suspensions, and can raise

an “inference of retaliation,” particularly where—as with Bel-

vin—many of the related punishments are ultimately vacated

after the employee is forced to contest them. (Id.) Further, alt-

hough Electchester presented evidence that other employees

(who had not engaged in protected activity) were sanctioned for

some similar behavior, it did not show any employee who was

punished or investigated as frequently as Belvin. Belvin also tes-

tified that Vito Mundo, Electchester’s general counsel, explicitly

told him that the various disciplinary actions would “go away” if

he dropped his EEOC complaint. (See Ex. 2 to Opp. (Dkt. 117-2)

at 164 (“[Mundo] made mention to me about the case in regards

to another matter... and said that – that all your write-ups could

go away if you just drop your EEOC case. It could make things

better for you”).) Mundo testified and denied this exchange oc-

curred, (Ex. 4 to Opp. (Dkt. 117—4) at 47), but the jury was

entitled to credit Belvin’s testimony and conclude that, despite

Electchester’s claims to the contrary, the aggregate punishments

and investigations were intended to retaliate against Belvin for

filing his EEOC complaint.

Finally, Electchester’s arguments regarding Mayers’s disability

discrimination claims were similarly already rejected by the

court. (See Dec. 10, 2020 M&O at 41-42, 43-44.) In that opinion,

the court noted that Electchester “admits that it terminated

[Mayers] in accordance with the CBA because of his absence,

which was a direct result of his cancer treatment,” and that the

only question in such a context is whether Mayers could have

performed the essential functions of his job “with reasonable ac-

commodations.” (Id. at 41-42.) The jury was instructed in

accordance with this law, as one required element was: “[May-

ers] was otherwise qualified for the position he held and was able

to perform the essential functions of that position, with reasona-

ble accommodations if he needs them[.]” (Final Jury Charge at

17.) At trial, the evidence showed that Mayers, upon learning of

the termination, asked to be (and was) medically cleared and

was able to immediately “return[] to work in the same posi-

tion[.]” (Mot. at 23-24.) Sufficient evidence was therefore

presented for the jury to conclude that, had Electchester simply

asked Mayers if he was able to return to work (certainly a “rea-

sonable” accommodation), he would have taken the necessary

steps to do so, and the termination—plainly an adverse effect

even though he was ultimately reinstated—could have been

avoided.

Finally, Mayers presented evidence that he was terminated and

denied his bonus because of his disability; indeed, Electchester

agreed that the motive for both was Mayers’s absence, which was

“a direct result” of his disability. (Dec. 10, 2020 M&O at 41-42.)

Electchester provided witness testimony regarding a non-dis-

criminatory justification for both actions—enforcement of

company policy regarding absences (in the case of the termina-

tion, a mistaken enforcement (Ex. 4 to Opp. at 59-60))—but the

jury was free to determine this was not credible, and the court

will not disturb that credibility finding.

Accordingly, the evidence presented at trial—accepting the jury’s

inherent credibility determinations—was sufficient for a reason-

able jury to conclude Electchester was liable on these claims.

C. Reasonableness of the Damages Awards

Next, Electchester argues that various damages awards—the

compensatory damages awarded to Belvin, the punitive damages

awarded to Belvin, and the compensatory damages awarded to

Mayers—were unreasonably excessive as a matter of law and

must be reduced or warrant a new trial. (Mot. at 20-26.) A court

has discretion to “overturn[] verdicts for excessiveness and or-

der[] a new trial without qualification, or conditioned on the

verdict winner’s refusal to agree to a reduction (remittitur).” Lore

v. City of Syracuse, 670 F.3d 127, 176-77 (2d Cir. 2012). In re-

viewing such a motion on federal claims, “a court’s review of a

compensatory damage award is ‘narrow,’ and a jury’s award may

be set aside as excessive only when the award is ‘so high as to

shock the judicial conscience.’” Graham v. City of New York, 128

F. Supp. 3d 681, 713 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (quoting Leo v. Long Island

R.R. Co., 307 F.R.D. 314, 321-22 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) and citing

Turley v. ISG Lackawanna, Inc., 774 F.3d 140, 162 (2d Cir.

2014)). For New York claims, “an award is excessive or inade-

quate if it deviates materially from what would be reasonable

compensation,” id. (citing Stampf v. Long Island R.R Co., 761 F.3d

192, 204 (2d Cir. 2014)), a “more exacting review” than the fed-

eral “shocks the conscious” standard. Patterson v. Balsamico, 440

F.3d 104, 119 (2d Cir. 2006). For any claim, courts review

awards in comparable cases. See, e.g., Stampf, 761 F.3d at 204

(citing examples). Where a damages award was not segregated

between state and federal claims, courts use the standard which

provides the most complete recovery. Graham, 128 F. Supp. 3d

at 714.

1. Belvin’s compensatory damages

Electchester first challenges the jury’s awards of compensatory

damages on Belvin’s various claims. These awards were $25,000

for Belvin’s federal and state hostile work environment claims,

which were reviewed together; $25,000 for Belvin’s NYCHRL

hostile work environment claim; $50,000 for Belvin’s federal and

state retaliation claims, which were reviewed together; and

$25,000 for Belvin’s NYCHRL retaliation claim. (See Final Jury

Verdict Form at 3, 13, 15-16.) Electchester argues that cumula-

tively, $125,000 far exceeds a reasonable award for garden

variety emotional distress, the only source of damages that Belvin

alleged. (Mot. at 17.)

There are a number of cases within this circuit finding compara-

ble or higher damages awards to be reasonable for garden variety

emotional distress, including some which remitted higher awards

to comparable amounts. See, e.g., Duarte v. St. Barnabas Hosp.,

341 F. Supp. 3d 306, 324-325 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (ordering remit-

titur of jury award for garden variety emotional distress to

$125,000); Vera v. Alstom Power, Inc., 189 F. Supp. 3d 360, 379

(D. Conn. 2016) (same); Bouveng v. NYG Cap. LLC, 175 F. Supp.

3d 280, 334 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (ordering remittitur of jury award

for garden variety emotional distress to $150,000). That courts

have ordered reductions of damages awards to amounts higher

than that awarded to Belvin in this case strongly indicates that

the jury award was reasonable and did not differ materially from

a reasonable award.

Further, the Second Circuit has repeatedly rejected Electchester’s

argument that the proper range for emotional distress damages

reaches a ceiling of approximately $35,000, (Mot. at 17-18), not-

ing that New York courts have awarded significantly higher

amounts even in garden variety emotional distress cases and

therefore such awards do not constitute a material deviation

from reasonable amounts. See Cross, 417 F.3d at 258 (“[W]e re-

iterate that while many cases... reduce awards to $30,000 or

below, others uphold awards of more than $100,000 without dis-

cussion of protracted suffering, truly egregious conduct, or

medical treatment.”); Patterson, 440 F.3d at 119-20 (upholding

award of $100,000 in compensatory damages for emotional dis-

tress). In Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory, a case

alleging age discrimination, the jury awarded damages for gar-

den variety emotional distress to various plaintiffs; on the

defendants’ motion for remittitur arguing that the appropriate

ceiling for such awards is $30,000, the district court capped these

awards at $125,000. 185 F. Supp. 2d 193, 219-21 (N.D.N.Y.

2002). On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s

conclusion, stating that “New York cases vary widely in the

amount of damages awarded for mental anguish” and added that

“the passage of time since the cited cases were decided could rea-

sonably support higher verdicts.” Meacham v. Knolls Atomic

Power Lab’y, 381 F.3d 56, 78 (2d Cir. 2004), vacated on other

grounds sub nom., KAPL, Inc. v. Meacham, 544 U.S. 957 (2005).

“When confronted with the range of mental anguish verdicts ap-

proved under New York law, [the Second Circuit did] not find

the verdicts in this case to deviate substantially from verdicts

awarded under similar circumstances.” Id.

As the Second Circuit determined more than fifteen years ago

that comparable verdicts were appropriate for garden variety

emotional distress, and district courts within the circuit have reg-

ularly upheld higher amounts, there is no basis to disturb the

jury’s verdict. This conclusion is further bolstered by the fact that

Electchester’s argument relies on aggregating Belvin’s damages

awards across different claims. The verdict is further unassailable

when properly understood as an award of $50,000 for hostile

work environment claims and $75,000 for retaliation, rather

than a single $125,000 verdict. (See Final Jury Verdict Form.)

Such amounts fall well within the range of permissible damages

awards upheld in New York, and the court therefore cannot con-

clude that the jury materially deviated from the reasonable

standard.

2. Belvin’s punitive damages

Next, Electchester challenges the award of punitive damages to

Belvin. The jury concluded that Belvin proved, to a preponder-

ance of the evidence, that Electchester acted with malice or

reckless indifference, and awarded $500,000 of punitive dam-

ages. (Final Jury Verdict Form at 3.) Electchester argues that this

award was without legal support and manifestly unjust, and that

the amount chosen was unconstitutionally excessive. (Mot. at 18-

23.) Specifically, Electchester argues that the evidence failed to

show malice of reckless indifference and therefore the jury had

no basis for an award of punitive damages, and that even if such

an award was warranted, the amount was excessive and the

court must grant remittitur. (Id.)

Under Title VII, the jury may award punitive damages where it

concludes that the employer acted in violation of the employee’s

federally protected rights with “malice” or “reckless indiffer-

ence.” Tepperwien v. Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., 663 F.3d

556, 572-73 (2d Cir. 2011). The jury was instructed that “malice”

means the employer was “motivated by ill will, a bad motive, or

spite,” and “[r]eckless indifference means that Electchester

knew, or should have known, that its actions would cause illegal

discrimination against employees.” (Final Jury Charge at 21.)

Courts have explained that malice or reckless indifference require

evidence that the employer acted with “conscious knowledge it

was violating the law” or that the conduct was “egregious” or

“outrageous.” Farias v. Instructional Sys., Inc., 259 F.3d 91, 102

(2d Cir. 2001). The actions of managerial employees can provide

a basis for punitive damages against the employer, unless those

actions contradict good faith efforts to comply with the law.

Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 543-46 (1999). An em-

ployer may also defeat punitive liability by demonstrating the

existence of an antidiscrimination policy and good faith efforts to

enforce it. Zimmermann v. Assocs. First Cap. Corp., 251 F.3d 376,

385 (2d Cir. 2001).

Electchester presented evidence of a corporate anti-discrimina-

tion policy, (Ex. 3 to Opp. (Dkt. 117-3) at 68-69), but it was only

adopted in 2015. (Id. at 92-93.) Thomas Prezioso, Electchester’s

general manager, testified that prior to that point, Electchester

utilized “scratched up policy” and never provided any written in-

structions to employees. (Id. at 93.) Prezioso also testified that

some rules in the post-2015 policy were “commonly violated,”

but did not recall any significant increase in disciplinary writeups

after distribution of the written policy. (Id. at 69.) The jury could

reasonably infer from this testimony that, for much of the rele-

vant time period, Electchester had no antidiscrimination policy

and, for the remaining time, failed to enforce the policy in good

faith. In light of these failures, it was similarly reasonable for the

jury to conclude that Electchester knew—or should have

known—that its failure to maintain a proper policy at all times,

remedy discriminatory incidents, and discipline employees for

discriminatory actions would violate federal law.

Further, Belvin presented evidence that Prezioso ignored dis-

criminatory incidents of which Belvin complained, and as a

manager, Prezioso’s actions can warrant an award of punitive

damages against Electchester. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 545-46. The

most egregious such incident involved a stuffed monkey which

was hung from Belvin’s locker; Belvin testified that Prezioso’s re-

sponse was “I don’t want to hear nothing about that.” (Ex. 2 to

Opp. at 95-97.) Another manager, Anthony Caiozzo, further in-

dicated at trial that he believed complaints of discriminatory

language could be prompted by benign comments, explaining

that he now refuses to use the word “boy” in any context “be-

cause that’s what they got us walking on pins and needles and

eggshells.” (Ex. 3 to Opp. at 192.)

Such a failure by management to remedy harassing behavior,

combined with a lack of a corporate policy regarding harassment

and knowledge that such conduct is unlawful, is sufficient to sup-

port an award of punitive damages. See, e.g., Cush-Crawford v.

Adchem Corp., 94 F. Supp. 2d 294, 300 (E.D.N.Y. 2000). On the

basis of this evidence and the similar evidence presented

throughout the trial, there was a sufficient basis for the jury to

award punitive damages, and the court will not disturb that ver-

dict or grant a new trial thereon.

With respect to the amount of punitive damages, Electchester ar-

gues that the award is unconstitutional. (Mot. at 20.) Awards of

punitive damages are limited by the due process clause, because

“[t]o the extent an award is grossly excessive, it furthers no legit-

imate purpose and constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of

property.” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S.

408, 417 (2003). Whether a punitive damages award is constitu-

tional is determined by three factors: “(1) the degree of

reprehensibility of the tortious conduct; (2) the ratio of punitive

damages to compensatory damages, and (3) the difference be-

tween this remedy and the civil penalties authorized or imposed

in comparable cases.” Lee v. Edwards, 101 F.3d 805, 809 (2d Cir.

1996) (citing BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575

(1996)).

The degree of reprehensibility is determined by considering if the

harm caused was physical injury; the conduct evinced indiffer-

ence to or reckless disregard of health or safety; the target was

financially vulnerable; the conduct was repeated or isolated; and

the harm was inflicted due to “intentional malice, trickery, or de-

ceit” as opposed to “mere accident.” MacMillan v. Millennium

Broadway Hotel, 873 F. Supp. 2d 546, 564-65 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)

(quoting State Farm Mut. Auto., 538 U.S. at 419). Plainly,

Electchester caused no physical injury and its conduct did not

implicate health or safety; further, no evidence was presented re-

garding Belvin’s financial peril. But the evidence shown at trial

reflected not an isolated incident, but a pattern of racial abuse

that included display of inappropriate and racist toys and sym-

bols, as well as regular use of racial language which went

unremedied. As already discussed, it was also reasonable for the

jury to conclude that Electchester’s failure to act was motivated

by malice and was not a mere accident.

Courts have upheld higher awards in cases that bear some simi-

larity to the present facts. In Greenbaum v. Handelsbanken, 67 F.

Supp. 2d 228, 269-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), the court upheld an

award of $1.25 million in punitive damages because the “jury

could have inferred from some of [a manager’s] comments and

other comments made by high-level GMs that [defendant] was

not only negligent regarding [plaintiff’s] federally protected

rights but was acting with malice,” because the conduct was re-

peated, and because the plaintiff was ultimately retaliated

against when she complained. Similarly, in Goldsmith v. Bagby

Elevator Co., 513 F.3d 1261, 1283 (11th Cir. 2008), an award of

$500,000 was upheld in part due to the pattern of misbehavior.

In Goldsmith, though, the harm included economic harm and the

plaintiff showed economic vulnerability, Goldsmith, 513 F.3d at

1283, while in Greenbaum, the plaintiff was denied promotions

and ultimately transferred to a less desirable position. Green-

baum, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 269-70;.

In any event, the award of punitive damages is excessive because

of the ratio between punitive and compensatory damages. The

$500,000 in punitive damages that the jury awarded were for

Belvin’s Title VII claim for hostile work environment, on which it

also awarded $25,000 in compensatory damages. (Final Jury

Verdict Form at 3.) This results in a ratio between punitive and

compensatory damages of 20:1. “[I]n practice, few awards ex-

ceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory

damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process.” State

Farm Mut. Auto., 538 U.S. at 425. Further, an “award of more

than four times the amount of compensatory damages might be

close to the line of constitutional impropriety.” Thomas v. iStar

Fin., Inc., 652 F.3d 141, 149 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting State Farm

Mut. Auto., 538 U.S. at 425). Considering ratios utilized in other

cases, the court holds that the degree of reprehensibility repre-

sented here—considering the malicious and repeated violation of

Belvin’s federal rights, alongside the lack of physical or economic

injury—a 4:1 ratio is appropriate. See MacMillan, 873 F. Supp.2d

at 566, 569 (allowing an award of “nearly four times the remitted

compensatory damages amount” despite noting this “might be

close to the line of constitutional impropriety” and a finding that

“the defendant’s conduct . . . was by no means as reprehensible

as that in many other employment discrimination cases”); Turley

v. ISG Lackawanna, Inc., 774 F.3d 140, 165-67 (2d Cir. 2014)

(using a 2:1 ratio and noting that “[w]here the compensatory

award is particularly high,” as in this case where the jury

awarded $1.32 million in compensatory damages, a 4:1 ratio

raises more concerns); Iannone v. Frederic R. Harris, Inc., 941 F.

Supp. 403, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (remitting a jury award of puni-

tive damages with a ratio of 10:1). Accordingly, a punitive

damages award of $100,000 is proper in this case, and the court

will grant a new trial limited to the issue of damages unless Bel-

vin agrees to a remittitur to that amount.

3. Mayers’s compensatory damages

Finally, Electchester argues that the jury’s award of $126,000 in

compensatory damages to Mayers for his disability discrimina-

tion claims was excessive. (Mot. at 25-26.) $1,000 of this award

was attributed to Mayers’s claim for denial of bonus, and

$125,000 to his termination, from which he was ultimately rein-

stated; accordingly, Electchester argues that the award must be

attributable to garden variety emotional distress damages, and is

excessive for the same reasons raised with respect to Belvin. (Id.)

Mayers testified that upon receiving his termination letter, he

was suicidal. (Ex. 2 to Opp. at 215.) He was specifically con-

cerned with losing his healthcare while out of work on disability

leave and receiving ongoing treatment for cancer, and thought

this could prevent treatment. (Id. (“It was like one of the scariest

things of my life because my children weren’t ready for me to go.

I have a little cat that depends on me. I was crushed.”).) The jury

could reasonably conclude that a higher award was warranted

considering the emotionally charged context of the discrimina-

tion Mayers faced, and as discussed above, an award of $125,000

falls within the reasonable range of awards for emotional distress

damages. Accordingly, the compensatory damages awarded to

Mayers were not unreasonably excessive.

CONCLUSION

For the aforementioned reasons, Electchester’s motion for judg-

ment as a matter of law is DENIED. Electchester’s motion for a

new trial is GRANTED solely on the issue of Belvin’s award of

punitive damages unless Belvin agrees in writing by the date two

weeks from the date of this order to accept a remittitur reducing

the punitive damage award to $100,000.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: Brooklyn, New York

May 22, 2023

_/s/ Nicholas G. Garaufis _

NICHOLAS G. GARAUFIS

United States District Judge